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 This dissertation contrasts Hong Kong’s and the International Settlement’s 
management of malaria and of leprosy from the 1880s through the 1940s. This dissertation 
has two main objectives. Firstly it examines the historical management of malaria and leprosy 
within specific geo-political contexts. By focusing on British possessions in coastal China, this 
project explores the production of colonial medical knowledge within a transnational context, 
presents new and original analyses of the local history of the disease, and bridges the 
historiography of the British Empire and that of modern China. Secondly this dissertation 
contrasts Hong Kong’s and the International Settlement’s management of each of these two 
diseases. By focusing specifically on these two British possessions in coastal China, this project 
provides insights into the Imperial conceptualisation and management of Chinese bodies and 
Chinese environments, sheds light on broader historiographical debates regarding the role of 
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 In 1894 Dr. James Cantlie, a Scottish physician in Hong Kong, circulated a 
questionnaire on the prevalence, transmission and treatment of leprosy to almost 400 
doctors, medical missionaries, and colonial officials in China, southeast Asia and the Pacific. 
Cantlie hoped to establish, among other things, the relationship between leprosy and other 
diseases including malaria: 
The relation of malaria to leprosy has been a burning question, nor is the belief quite 
dead. The provinces of Kwang-tung [Guangdong], Fokien [Fujian], and Shan-tung 
[Shandong] are the most malarial, at the same time the most leprous… On the other 
hand, we find leprosy in many cases without malaria, and malaria without leprosy.1 
This dissertation does not propose to revolutionise what has long been accepted – what 
Cantlie concluded on the basis of the 75 responses that he received – namely that there was, 
and is, no pathological connection between the two diseases. Leprosy is a chronic infectious 
disease caused by Mycobacterium leprae, whereas malaria is a life-threatening disease caused 
by the mosquito-borne transmission of one of four parasite species.2 Instead this dissertation 
explores the production, evolution and role of colonial medicine in East Asia through the 
prisms of these two diseases. During the colonial period these two diseases were 
conceptualised and managed in very different ways: leprosy was inherently associated with 
colonial bodies, malaria with inhabited environments. In a sense, these two diseases 
represented opposite ends of a conceptual spectrum along which other diseases may be 
situated.  
 The dissertation has two main objectives. Firstly it examines the historical 
management of each of these two diseases within specific geo-political contexts. By focusing 
on British possessions in coastal China, this project explores the production of colonial medical 
knowledge within a transnational context, presents new and original analyses of the local 
histories of these diseases, and bridges the historiography of the British Empire and that of 
modern China. Secondly the dissertation contrasts Hong Kong’s and the International 
Settlement’s management of malaria and of leprosy. By focusing specifically on these two 
British possessions in coastal China, the project provides insights into the Imperial 
conceptualisation and management of Chinese bodies and Chinese environments, sheds light 
on broader historiographical debates regarding the role of colonial medicine, and complicates 
modern debates about the nature of colonialism in China. 
The colonial presence in modern China encompassed colonies, treaty-ports, 
coercively leased territories and spheres of influence. Whilst formations such as British Hong 
Kong, Portuguese Macao and Japanese Taiwan were indisputably ‘colonial’ territories, 
scholars continue to debate the notion of ‘semi-colonial’ possessions. This Leninist term 
                                                          
1 James Cantlie, ed., Report On The Conditions Under Which Leprosy Occurs in China, Indo-China, 
Malaya, The Archipelago, and Oceania. Compiled Chiefly During 1894 (London: MacMillan and Co., 
1897), 21. 
2 The exact transmission of leprosy is still unknown, but the most-widely held belief, at least until 
recently, was that it was transmitted through prolonged physical contact. The four malaria parasites 
are Plasmodium falciparum (the most common and deadly form), P. vivax, P. malariae, P. ovale. These 
parasites are exclusively transmitted through the bites of Anopheles mosquitoes. 
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implied that treaty-ports such as the International Settlement of Shanghai were in a state of 
transition.3 But as historians Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot have argued “the treaty 
system effectively replaced the state as the defining organizational frame”.4 How then are we 
to understand the relationship between medicine and these diverse colonial forms? Historians 
have identified parallels between the medical discourses and practices in these ‘semi-colonial’ 
territories on the one hand, and the British, Japanese and French empires on the other.5 Given 
Rogasaki’s contention that “no one treaty-port history can stand in for all the others”, can we 
even coin new phrases such as ‘semi-colonial medicine’ or ‘treaty-port medicine’?6 Rather 
than providing a conclusive answer, this dissertation provides detailed evidence suggesting 
the validity of such terms.  The dissertation explores how the geography of colonialism in East 
Asia impacted upon the geography of foreign medicine by contrasting Hong Kong’s and the 
International Settlement’s disease prevention strategies. 
Exploring the evolution of medical discourses and practices from the perspective of 
British outposts on the coastal fringes of China sheds light on the locality of colonial medicine. 
Modern historians charting the development of disease discourses, notably leprosy and 
malaria, run the risk of falling afoul of teleological and diffusionist interpretations. Historian 
Michael Worboys for instance cautioned against viewing the identification of the Plasmodium 
parasite in 1880 by French physician Alphonse Laveran and Ronald Ross’s and Giovanni 
Battista Grassi’s research into the mosquito-borne transmission of the disease as inevitable 
discoveries.7 Nor should the diffusion of scientific discoveries, hypotheses and theories be 
understood in terms of the dissemination of a coherent corpus of indisputable knowledge 
from the metropole to a passive colonial audience.8 Scholars have repeatedly called for the 
abandonment of centre-periphery models in favour contact zones and networks.9 My work 
situates Hong Kong and the International Settlement’s management of both diseases within 
the broader context of major developments in aetiology and disease prevention, exploring 
                                                          
3 Bryna Goodman and David S. G. Goodman, eds., Twentieth-Century Colonialism in China: Localities, 
the everyday, and the world (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 1-5; Jürgen Osterhammel,“Semi-
Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysism,” in 
Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities, eds. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen 
Osterhammel (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 296. 
4 Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot, “Introduction,” in New frontiers: Imperialism’s New 
Communities in East Asia, 1842-1953, eds. Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2000), 5. 
5 See for example the studies in Angela Ki Che Leung and Charlotte Furth, eds., Health and Hygiene in 
Chinese East Asia: Policies and Publics in the Long Twentieth Century (Duke: Duke University Press, 
2010). 
6 Ruth Rogasaki, Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China (Berkeley: 
University of California, 2004), 13. 
7 Michael Worboys, “From Miasmas to Germs: Malaria 1850-1879.” Parassitologia 36, nos. 1-2 (1994): 
61. 
8 Paolo Palladino and Michael Worboys, “Science and Imperialism,” Isis 84, no.1 (1993): 99-100. 
9 Warwick Anderson, “Postcolonial Technoscience,” Social Studies of Science 32, nos. 5/6 (2002): 648-
651. See also David Wade Chambers, and Richard Gillespie, “Locality in the History of Science: 
Colonial Science, Technoscience, and Indigenous Knowledge,” Osiris, 2nd ser., 15 (2000): 221-240; J. A. 
Secord, “Knowledge in Transit,” Isis 95, no. 4 (2004): 654-672. 
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the local actors and linkages that underpinned the evolution of medical ideas and practices in 
both territories. 
 
Britain in China 
A brief introduction to the origins of Hong Kong and the International Settlement is 
perhaps pertinent at this stage. The Treaty of Nanjing (1842) formalised the British presence 
in China: Hong Kong Island was ceded “in perpetuity” and five trading ports were established, 
including a British concession of approximately one square mile in Shanghai. This concession 
fused with the American concession to the north to form the International Settlement in 1863; 
the neighbouring French Concession remained a separate entity (map 2).10 The colony of Hong 
Kong was expanded with the acquisition of the southern portion of Kowloon peninsula in 1860 
and with the lease of the New Territories in 1898, the latter extending colonial rule over 365 
square miles of densely-vegetated hinterland and approximately 230 outlying islands. The 
International Settlement was also formally extended, to 2.75 and 8.35 square miles in 1893 
and 1899 respectively.11 The construction of extra-Settlement roads and residences, 
principally to the west of the Settlement, during the second quarter of the 20th century 
unofficially extended the Shanghai Municipal Council’s jurisdiction even further, over a large 
swathe of Chinese territory.12 Following the Japanese occupation of Chinese Shanghai in 1937 
this western extra-Settlement area became known as the ‘Badlands’.13 
Hong Kong and the International Settlement had slightly different medical and 
sanitary infrastructures. The colony’s Sanitary Board was responsible for sanitation during 
much of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Established in 1883, the board initially consisted of 
four members including the Colonial Surgeon, who headed the medical department, and a 
Sanitary Superintendent, who was responsible for overseeing the execution of the Board’s 
decisions.14 The Board gradually increased in size and by the early 20th century also included 
the Director of Public Works, the Captain Superintendent of Police, and at least two Chinese 
                                                          
10 The American concession was established in 1848, the French concession in 1849. Christian Henriot 
et Zheng Zu’an, “Les divisions de la ville à Shanghai (XIXe – XXe siècles),” in Les divisions de la ville, ed. 
Christian Topalov (UNESCO Editions MSH, 2002), 158-161. 
11 Albert Feuerwerker, The Foreign Establishment in China in the Early Twentieth Century (Ann Arbour: 
Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976), 3. 
12 According to Wakeman, the S.M.C. had constructed 45.5 miles of extra-settlement roads, 
encompassing an area of about 265,000 acres or 414 square miles, by the end of 1926. Frederic 
Wakeman Jr., Policing Shanghai, 1927-1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 65-68. See 
also Paul French, The Old Shanghai A-Z (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), 53-54. 
13 See for example Frederic Wakeman Jr., The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime terrorism and urban 
crime, 1937-1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
14 The title Sanitary Superintendent replaced that of Sanitary Inspector in 1887. Y. W. A. Lau, A History 
of the Municipal Councils of Hong Kong 1883-1999: From the Sanitary Board to the Urban Council and 
the Regional Council (Hong Kong: Leisure and Cultural Services Department, 2002), 22-23. For further 
details on early decades of Settlement and the Board’s establishment see Lau, A History of the 
Municipal Councils, 7-20. 
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members; the post of Principal Civil Medical Officer replaced that of Colonial Surgeon.15 The 
colonial government overhauled this sanitary infrastructure in the 1930s: a senior medical 
officer was transferred from Malaya with the remit of overseeing the development of the 
colony’s medical and sanitary services in the guise of its director; and the Urban Council 
replaced the Sanitary Board.16 
The International Settlement’s Health Officer, a post that the Shanghai Municipal 
Council inaugurated in 1871, was responsible for overseeing sanitation.17 Dr. Edward 
Henderson, an extremely well-respected Scottish physician, served as the Settlement’s first 
health officer until the late 19th century.18 The Settlement’s medical community comprised a 
variety of foreign private practitioners, missionaries as well as the medical officers assigned 
to the Imperial Maritime Customs Service.19 The public health infrastructure was reorganised 
in the early 1920s.20 The position of Commissioner of Public Health replaced that of health 
officer, and the Settlement was partitioned into four districts – Central, Northern, Eastern and 
Western – each of which was divided into a different number of sub-districts.21 A Chief Health 
Inspector was placed in charge of the foreign and Chinese sanitary staff in each district. The 
fourth Western sub-district (4W) comprised the Western ‘extra-Settlement’ area, which was 
bounded by the Shanghai-Hangzhou railway to the west, Soochow creek to the north and 
Hungjao Road to the south.  
 
Disease and Empire 
Leprosy took on a new significance within the context of British Imperial expansion. 
Fears that the disease was spreading throughout Britain’s tropical colonies heightened 
metropolitan concerns about a recrudescence of the disease in Britain.22 The Royal College of 
                                                          
15 Lau, A History of the Municipal Councils, 28-31. For detailed summaries of the colony’s Western and 
foreign hospitals, see Arthur Starling et al., eds., Plague, SARS and the Story of Medicine in Hong Kong 
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong Museum of Medical Sciences Society, 2006), 75-143. 
16 For more on the Urban Council’s establishment and pre-war evolution see Lau, A History of the 
Municipal Councils, 71-84. 
17 Alexander Jamieson, “Dr. Alexander Jamieson’s Report on the Health of Shanghai for the half year 
ended 30th September, 1871,” Customs Gazette, Medical Reports 11, no. 6 (Sept. 1871): 33-43, 35; 
Kerrie L. A. MacPherson, A Wilderness of Marshes: The Origins of Public Health in Shanghai, 1843-
1893 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1987), 132. 
18 For a brief summary of the little that is known about Henderson’s life, and the controversial 
appointment of his successor see MacPherson, A Wilderness of Marshes, 84-85, 132-142, 287n4. 
19 Though the origin of this sanitary compartmentalisation of the Settlement is unclear, it was 
certainly in place by the early 20th century. See for instance Stanley, Arthur Stanley, Shanghai 
Municipal Council. Health Department. Annual Report 1901 (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1902), Shanghai 
Municipal Archives (hereafter SMA), U1/16/4650, 31-32, 32. 
20 Dr. Arthur Stanley, who served as health officer from 1898 to 1920, held the first commissionership 
for 1921. His deputy Dr. C. Noel Davis succeeded him the following year. The Health Department was 
renamed the Public Health Department. 
21 Three Central sub-districts, three Northern, six Eastern and Four Western. Each sub-district was 
assigned a reference number, for instance 5E for the fifth Eastern sub-district. 
22 Rod Edmond, Leprosy and Empire: A Medical and Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), chaps.2 and 3; Rod Edmond, “Returning Fears: Tropical Disease and the Metropolis,” in 
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Physicians, for instance, conducted an empire-wide investigation into the disease in the 1860s 
at the government’s request. Despite significant Western medical uncertainty about the 
disease’s aetiology, many governments resorted to “systems of isolation” from the second 
half of the 19th century.23 Rod Edmond’s Leprosy and Empire (2006), for instance, contrasted 
the establishment of “island leper colonies” in Hawaii, the Cape Colony, Australia and New 
Zealand.24 Numerous studies have explored the history of the disease as well as broader issues 
of colonialism through the prisms of specific institutions.25 The confinement of leprosy 
sufferers in leprosaria echoed the Biblical ‘casting out’ of those suspected of suffering from 
the disease. According to Michel Foucault, leprosaria were the precursors of “more 
sophisticated internalised hygienic practices”, exemplified in his eyes by the “plague town”, 
because the early modern “leper was caught up in a practice of rejection, of exile-enclosure”.26 
Many studies have challenged Foucault’s contention that ‘exile-enclosure’ merely separated 
the ‘unclean’ leprosy sufferers from the ‘clean’ community by examining the extent to which 
the inmates of modern leprosaria were internally differentiated, and the resultant impact 
upon the production of “health subjectivities”. 27 Historian Megan Vaughan for instance 
examined how African leprosaria, as colonies within the colonies, engineered new community 
and ethnic identities.28 Hong Kong’s and Shanghai’s management of the disease complicates 
Vaughan’s argument by demonstrating how the emergence of colonial Chinese identities 
impacted upon the colonial management of those within. The Chinese elite within both Hong 
Kong and Shanghai increasingly distinguished between mainland Chinese – i.e. alien – leprosy 
sufferers and local colonial Chinese sufferers. This distinction precipitated an important 
                                                          
Tropical Visions in an Age of Empire, eds. Felix Driver and Luciana Martins (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005), 175-194. 
23 Alison Bashford, Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of Colonialism, Nationalism and Public Health 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 81. 
24 Edmond, Leprosy and Empire, 143-177. 
25 Warwick Anderson, “Leprosy and Citizenship,” positions: east asia cultures critique 6, no. 3 (1998): 
707-730; Josep Bernabeu-Mestre and Teresa Ballester-Artigues, “Disease as a Metaphorical Resource: 
The Fontilles Philanthropic Initiative in the Fight Against Leprosy, 1901-1932,” Social History of 
Medicine 17, no. 3 (2004): 409-421; Harriet Deacon, “Leprosy and racism at Robben Island,” in Studies 
in the History of Cape Town, vol. 7 ed. Elizabeth van Heyningen (Rondebosch: UCT Press, 1994), 45-83; 
Simone Horwitz, “Leprosy in South Africa: A Case Study of Westfort Leper Institution, 1898-1948,” 
African Studies 65, no. 2 (2006):271-295; Rita Smith Kipp, “The Evangelical Uses of Leprosy,” Social 
Science & Medicine 39, no. 2 (1994): 165-178; John Maguire, “The Fantome Island Leprosarium,” in 
Health and Healing in Tropical Australia and Papua New Guinea, eds. Roy MacLeod, and Donald 
Denoon (Townsville: James Cook University, 1991), 142-148; Renisa Mawani. “ ‘The Island of the 
Unclean’: Race, Colonialism and ‘Chinese Leprosy’ in British Columbia, 1891-1924,” Law, Social Justice 
& Global Development (LGD), no. 1 (2003): 1-21. 
26 By contrast Foucault argued that plague victims were “caught up in a meticulous tactical 
partitioning in which individual differentiations were the constricting effect of a power that 
multiplied, articulated and subdivided itself”. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison, trans. Allen Lane (Penguin Books: London, 1977), 198, 199. 
27 Bashford and Nugent, “Leprosy and the management of race,” 107-108. 
28 Megan Vaughan, Curing their Ills: Colonial Power and African Illness (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), 79-
84. 
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change, not so much in terms of ‘how’ leprosy sufferers were managed, but were this 
management took place. 
As Vaughan demonstrated, the treatment of leprosy sufferers was intimately 
associated with the Biblical significance of the disease.29 Historians have explored this 
association by interrogating Erving Goffman’s contention that leprosaria, like prisons and 
other encompassing institutions, were “total institutions”.30 Rita Kipp, for instance, argued 
that evangelistic opportunities varied according to a leprosarium’s status as a total institution: 
the greater the institutional regimentation, the greater the opportunities.31 The dissertation’s 
analysis of leprosaria in East Asia makes explicit the necessity of taking into account 
differences in administrative structures when assessing evangelistic opportunities. More 
importantly my work broadens Goffman’s focus on the internal attributes of ‘total institutions’ 
by demonstrating the impact of external geo-political factors: the engulfment of city beyond 
the walls of Shanghai’s leprosarium during the Sino-Japanese War precipitated a drastic 
increase in the popularity of the superintendent’s evangelical messages. 
Malaria also assumed a particular importance within the context of British imperial 
expansion. As Mark Harrison argued within the context of British India, malaria came to 
symbolise “Oriental backwardness”.32 Unlike leprosy, however, this fatal and prevalent 
disease posed a very real threat to Imperial military and socio-economic hegemony. 
Prevention focused principally on two different approaches: direct environmental 
interventions, such as drainage schemes, and quinine prophylaxis. The success of these 
schemes varied according to local priorities, budgetary constraints, and colonial agendas. 
Recent studies have broadened the traditional historiographical focus on Africa, South Asia 
and Southeast Asia by examining East Asian malaria prevention strategies.33  
 
Malaria, Empire and China 
Much of the scholarship on malaria in East Asia has focused on Hong Kong. This 
reflects, at least in part, Hong Kong’s association with the disease since the earliest decades 
of settlement. Following his return to Britain in the late 19th century, Cantlie delivered a 
lecture on Hong Kong which was later published in the first volume of The British Empire 
                                                          
29 Vaughan, Curing their Ills, 79-84. 
30 Goffman argued that ‘total institution’s were places “of residence and work where a large number 
of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together 
lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life”. Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social 
Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (Chicago: Aldine1962), xiii. 
31 Kipp, “The Evangelical Uses of Leprosy,” 167, 171. 
32 M. Harrison, “ ‘Hot beds of disease’: malaria and civilization in nineteenth-century British India,” 
Parassitologia 40, nos.1-2 (1998): 11. See also K. T. Silva, “Malaria eradication as a legacy of colonial 
discourse: the case of Sri Lanka,” Parassitologia 36, nos.1-2 (1994): 151. 
33 See for instance W. F. Bynum, “ ‘Reasons for contentment’: malaria in India, 1900-1920,” 
Parassitologia 40, nos.1-2 (1998): 19-27; D. J. Bradley, “Watson, Swellengrebel and species sanitation: 
environmental and ecological aspects,” Parassitologia 36, nos.1-2 (1994): 137-147; V. R. 
Muraleedharan and D. Veerarghavan, “Anti-Malaria Policy in the Madras Presidency: An Overview of 
the Early Decades of the Twentieth Century,” Medical History 36, no.3 (1992): 290-305. 
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Series. He noted that the colony’s insalubrious climate had been so notorious during the 
earliest decades of settlement that “Go to Hong-kong” became a byword.34 All histories of the 
colony invariably refer to the prevalence of the disease, but several disease-specific studies 
have recently emerged, most notably Ka-che Yip’s concise edited chapter on malaria and 
public health.35 A number of recent studies have sought to dispel the notion of Hong Kong’s 
intellectual subordination by highlighting the colony’s unique contribution to the 
development of the dominant global discourse on malaria. These studies argued that Patrick 
Manson’s seven-year stint in Hong Kong in the 1880s proved formative for the future ‘father 
of tropical medicine’ than his time in Amoy (Xiamen) during the previous decade. For instance 
Arthur Starling et al.’s Plague, SARS and the Story of Medicine in Hong Kong (2006), published 
by the Hong Kong Museum of Medical Sciences Society, claimed: 
Whilst in Hong Kong, he [Patrick Manson] became interested in malaria and, unaware 
of Laveran’s work, he tried to cultivate the organism by inoculating malaria-infected 
blood onto rotting vegetable matter from the marshes of Happy Valley, without 
success.36 
Yip’s study similarly highlighted this “Hong Kong connection”, claiming that the colony 
prompted Manson to expand upon his work on elephantiasis in Amoy by investigating the 
vectoral transmission of malaria.37 
In fact these studies overstate the extent to which Manson actually researched 
malaria during his time as a medical practitioner in Hong Kong. The colony has been 
undeniably proud of its association with Manson ever since the late 19th century, but even his 
contemporaries recognised that his experience in Amoy proved far more important, at least 
as far as his research into malaria was concerned. More importantly these modern studies 
perpetuated rather than dispelled the colony’s intellectual passivity and reliance on the 
metropole by focusing exclusively on Manson. The dissertation challenges this approach by 
expanding upon my MPhil research into the colony’s vibrant medical community.38 A growing 
                                                          
34 James Cantlie, “Hong-Kong,” in The British Empire Series, ed. William Sheowring, vol. 1, India, 
Ceylon, Straits Settlements, British North Borneo (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1899), 
521. An early draft of this lecture is preserved in the Wellcome Archives. James Cantlie, “Lecture on 
Hong Kong”, ca. 1898, MS 1488, Wellcome Library, London (hereafter Wellcome). 
35 Ka-che Yip, “Colonialism, Disease and Public Health: Malaria in the History of Hong Kong,” in 
Disease, Colonialism, and the State, Malaria in Modern East Asian History, ed. Ka-che Yip (Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, 2009). 
36 Starling et al., eds., The Story of Medicine in Hong Kong, 21. Starling et al. cited Manson’s grand-son 
and official biographer Sir Philip Manson-Bahr. Although the latter stated that “In Hong Kong Manson 
became interested in malaria”, Manson-Bahr also pointed out that his grandfather’s efforts to 
“cultivate the active principle of malaria-blood in infusions of rotting vegetable matter which he had 
obtained from Happy Valley in Hong Kong” marked a ‘return’ to similar experiments in Amoy. Patrick 
Manson-Bahr, Patrick Manson, The Father of Tropical Medicine (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons 
Ltd., 1962), 50-51. 
37 Ka-che Yip, “Colonialism, Disease and Public Health: Malaria in the History of Hong Kong,” in 
Disease, Colonialism, and the State, Malaria in Modern East Asian History, ed. Ka-che Yip (Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 18-19. 
38 D. Ham, “Malarial Hygiene and Colonial Society in Hong Kong, c.1880-c.1910,” (MPhil thesis, 
University of Cambridge, 2009). Coincidentally 2009 also saw the production of another MPhil 
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desire to disseminate and debate local medical research, notably on malaria but also on 
leprosy, underpinned the very establishment of a network of local civilian, military and naval 
medical officers as well as foreign (i.e. non-Chinese) corresponding members from treaty-
ports in China and Japan. These medical officers negotiated, debated and appropriated new 
ideas, tailoring discussions of their local research to suit the latest international trends. As 
historian Douglas Haynes argued, the creation of distinctive career opportunities was central 
to the development of tropical medicine during this period.39 The dissertation highlights how 
local amateurs contributed to the development of local medical discourses, through their own 
independent investigations and through the local validation of ‘foreign’ theories. My work also 
expands significantly upon both Yip’s and my MPhil’s analysis of the colony’s management of 
the disease during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  
 The dissertation also provides the very first analysis of the International Settlement’s 
management of malaria during the early 20th century. To date the only published study on the 
International Settlement’s anti-malaria campaign was a descriptive summary by a local non-
specialist in the late 1930s; Kerrie MacPherson’s seminal study on the origins of public health 
in the Settlement ends just shy of the turn of the century.40 Recent decades have witnessed 
the expansion of scholarly interest in the management of the disease in East Asia, but until 
now, the Settlement has been completely ignored. Yip for instance has focused principally on 
the Chinese Nationalists’ efforts to build a modern healthcare system by controlling 
communicable diseases such as malaria.41 He also brought together specialists on Taiwan, 
Okinawa, and mainland China with the compilation of Disease, Colonialism and the State: 
Malaria in Modern East Asian History.42 This collection of studies explored the management 
of local environments within the context of changing ideas about the transmission and 
prevention of the disease, evolving concepts of health and disease, and local political and 
economic priorities. The dissertation broadens our understanding of the colonial 
                                                          
dissertation on the colony’s early management of the disease. C. A. Cowlie, “Form follows fever 
malaria and the making of Hong Kong, 1841-1848,” (MPhil thesis, University of Hong Kong, 2009). 
39 Douglas Melvin Haynes, “Social Status and Imperial Service: Tropical Medicine and the British 
Medical Profession in the Nineteenth Century,” in Warm Climates and Western Medicine: The 
Emergence of Tropical Medicine, 1500-1900, ed. David Arnold (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996), 219. 
40 H. Crozier Faulder, “Malaria Prevention with Special Reference to Shanghai,” China Journal 30, no. 5 
(1939): 305-312; Kerrie L. A. MacPherson, A Wilderness of Marshes: The Origins of Public Health in 
Shanghai, 1843-1893 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
41 Ka-che Yip, “Antimalarial work in China: a historical perspective,” Parassitologia 40, nos. 1-2 (1998): 
29-38; Ka-che Yip, Health and National Reconstruction in Nationalist China: The Development of 
Modern Health Services, 1928-1937 (Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies, 1995); Ka-che Yip, 
“Disease and the Fighting Men: Nationalist Anti-Epidemic Efforts in Wartime China, 1937-1945,” in 
China in the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945, eds. David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu (New York: Peter 
Lang, 2001), 171-188. 
42 Ka-che Yip, ed., Disease, Colonialism, and the State: Malaria in Modern East Asian History (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009). This edited volume contains chapters on Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, mainland China and Okinawa. For further discussions of Taiwan’s anti-malaria campaigns, see 
Lin Yi-ping and Liu Shiyung, “A Forgotten War: Malaria Eradication in Taiwan,” in Health and Hygiene 
in Chinese East Asia, eds. Angela Ki Che Leung and Charlotte Furth (Duke: Duke University Press, 
2010), 183-203; Ka-che Yip, “Malaria eradication: the Taiwan experience,” Parassitologia 42, nos. 1-2 
(2000): 117-126. 
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management of Chinese environments by comparing the International Settlement’s and Hong 
Kong’s malaria prevention strategies. 
 
Leprosy, Empire and China 
Much of the historiography on China and leprosy has focused on the global rather 
than the local narrative. A number of studies have analysed how Chinese migrants captured 
the Imperial imagination in the 19th century, and were held responsible for introducing the 
disease throughout the Pacific. Indeed leprosy became known as “Chinese disease” in 
Australia and in Hawaii.43 Imperial fears of a leprosy pandemic emanating from China 
simultaneously fed into the social tensions that accompanied the rapid growth of the Chinese 
diaspora and the Western interventions into China. As Alison Bashford has argued, the growth 
of anti-leprosy legislation around the Pacific at the end of the century was inextricably linked 
with the growth of anti-immigration legislation aimed specifically at Chinese immigrants.44 
Moreover this intimate association between the disease and the diaspora prompted a 
distinctive racialised response: exclusively-Chinese leprosy asylums were established at sites 
around the Pacific Rim, and many of the patients were deported to China, occasionally via 
Hong Kong.45 Parry, for instance, stated that the inmates of the Mud Island asylum, in the 
Northern Territory, were occasionally “repatriated to Hong Kong” in the late 19th century 
whenever transport could be found.46 British Columbia similarly relied on an “intermittent 
practice of deportation”.47 My own research has uncovered examples of repatriations via 
Hong Kong from Canada and from Singapore and via the Settlement from the United States.48 
As Bashford explained, the deportation of Chinese leprosy sufferers “beyond national and 
                                                          
43 Edmond, Leprosy and Empire, 146-147, 163-165. On Australia see Bashford and Nugent, “Leprosy 
and the management of race,” 107, 110-111; Suzanne Parry, “ ‘Of Vital Importance to the 
Community’: The Control of Leprosy in the Northern territory.” Health and History 5, no. 1 (2003): 2,5. 
On Hawaii see R. D. K. Herman, “Out of sight, out of power: leprosy, race and colonization in Hawa‘i,” 
Journal of Historical Geography 27, no. 3 (2001): 325; Jaime L. Benchimol and Magali Romero, 
“Adolpho Lutz and controversies over the transmission of leprosy by mosquitoes,” História, Ciências, 
Saúde – Manguinhos 10, no. S1 (2003): 60. 
44 Bashford, Imperial Hygiene, 88-89. 
45 For Australia see Parry, “ ‘Of Vital Importance to the Community,’ ” 5; Edmond, Leprosy and Empire, 
107, 166; Bashford, Imperial Hygiene, 89; “New South Wales,” Brisbane Courier, Oct. 8, 1896, 5. From 
British Columbia see Bashford, Imperial Hygiene, 89; Mawani, “ ‘The Island of the Unclean,’ ” 10-13; 
Janice Dickin McGinnis, “ ‘Unclean, Unclean’: Canadian Reactions to Lepers and Leprosy,” in Health, 
Disease and Medicine: Essays in Canadian History, ed. Charles G. Roland (Hannah Institute for the 
History of Medicine, 1984), 259, 265-67. From San Francisco see Joan B. Trauner, “The Chinese as 
medical scapegoats in San Francisco, 1870-1905.” California History 57, no. 1 (1978): 75. 
46 Parry noted that the indigent and the chronically ill were also repatriated. Parry, “ ‘Of Vital 
Importance to the Community,’ ”5. 
47 Bashford, Imperial Hygiene, 89. 
48 For Hong Kong see E. R. Hallifax, Administrative Reports: Report of the Registrar General for the 
Year 1912, 31 Mar. 1913, Hong Kong Government Records Online (hereafter HKGRO), 11; E. R. 
Hallifax, Administrative Reports: Report of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs for the Year 1915, 15 June 
1917, 4. For Shanghai see J. H. Jordan (C.P.H.) to K. M. Bourne (Com. Police), 3 Jan. 1941, Shanghai 
Municipal Archives (hereafter SMA), U1/16/2618, 83-84. 
- 12 - 
 
Imperial lines” served to return those who “did not ‘belong’ within Imperial or Commonwealth 
territory or systems of obligation”.49 The trans-national management of leprosy thus throws 
light on the nature of Empire. But the deportation of Chinese leprosy sufferers from sites 
across the Pacific was largely conducted on an ad hoc basis, not least because the practice 
was contingent on finding suitable forms of transportation.50 Deportation was thus secondary 
to domestic segregation. Deportation severed Imperial governments’ responsibilities towards 
the confinement (and treatment) of these patients. 
Several recent studies have finally re-oriented the scholarly focus onto China itself. By 
far the most significant contribution is Angela Leung’s seminal Leprosy in China: A History 
(2009) – a 373 page monograph covering the history of the disease in mainland China from 
the 4th century B.C. to the modern. As well as consciously paralleling the “better-known history 
of the disease in the Mediterranean and European worlds”, Leung situated her analysis of 
leprosy in modern China within the “global context of colonialism, racial politics, and ‘imperial 
danger’”.51 For instance she examined the incrimination of the Chinese diaspora, notably in 
Australia, and assessed the impact that this international discourse had upon the Republican 
regime’s attempts to remake the Chinese body politic through public health programs. Leung 
identified three models of segregation – two domestic and one foreign – that the Republicans 
looked to for inspiration at the turn of the century: the “traditional” Chinese model, the 
Western “missionary” model – of which there were many in China – and the “nationalist” 
model, exemplified by world-renowned institutions such as the Molokai colony in Hawaii and 
the Culion colony in the Philippines. Leung argued that the nationalisation of several 
missionary leprosaria in China resulted in the emergence of a conspicuous new form of 
segregation from the 1920s onwards, which she coined the “Nationalist Hybrid” model.52 
These institutions emerged following the Nationalist Government’s realisation that it was 
unable to nationalise missionary leprosaria without the continued support of the missionary 
authorities who ran them. 
Leung’s work represented a major break-through in the field and has rightly been 
praised as essential reading for both modern and pre-modern historians.53 But in situating 
                                                          
49 Bashford, Imperial Hygiene, 89. 
50 Parry, “ ‘Of Vital Importance to the Community,’ ” 5; Edmond, Leprosy and Empire, 107, 166; 
Bashford, Imperial Hygiene, 89, 93; Mawani, “ ‘The Island of the Unclean,’ ” 12-13; Trauner, “The 
Chinese as medical scapegoats,” 75.  
51 Angela Ki Che Leung, Leprosy in China: A History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 1. Li 
and Wang have also made significant contributions. Shang-Jen Li, "Shijiu shiji houqi Yingguo yixue jie 
dui Zhongguo mafeng bing qing di diaocha yanjiu," [British Medical Research on Leprosy in Late 
Nineteenth-Century China], Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, Academic Sinica 74, no. 3 
(2003):445-506; Wen-Ji Wang, “ ‘Laying out a Model Village’: George Gushue-Taylor and Missionary 
Leprosy Work in Colonial Taiwan,” East Asian Science, Technology and Society: an International 
Journal 1, no. 1 (2007): 111-133. 
52 Leung, Leprosy in China, 155-171. 
53 See for instance Howard H. Chiang, review of Leprosy in China: a history, by Angela Ki Che Leung, 
Medical History 54, no.2 (2010): 280-281; Benjamin A. Elman, review of Leprosy in China: A History, by 
Angela Ki Che Leung, T’oung Pao: International Journal of Chinese Studies 96, nos. 4-5 (2010): 550-
553; Yi-Li Wu, review of Leprosy in China: A History, by Angela Ki Che Leung, Harvard Journal of Asiatic 
Studies 71, no. 1 (2011): 220-227. 
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China within the ‘global context of colonialism’, Leung (and her supporters) largely ignored 
the local context of colonialism in China. Although Leung explored the interaction between 
western medical experts and Chinese perceptions of the disease, she focused principally on 
those physicians working in mainland China.54 Hong Kong, the International Settlement and 
indeed the broader context of colonialism in China were thus largely ignored. For instance she 
simply noted that the colonial authorities in Hong Kong “systematically” repatriated leprosy 
sufferers to Guangdong Province during the pre-war period, specifically to the Sheklung 
Asylum from the 1930s onwards. Neither Leung, nor indeed any other scholar, has examined 
the origins, evolution or significance of this policy.55 A handful of other scholars have cursorily 
referred to the establishment of a domestic leprosy asylum at Kennedy Town on Hong Kong 
Island during the late 1930s, but none have examined why, let alone explored the significance 
of this institution within the context of the colony’s policy of ‘systematically repatriating’ 
leprosy sufferers to the mainland.56 The dearth of scholarly analysis on the colony’s pre-war 
management of the disease is striking for two reasons. Firstly, one of the most influential 
articulators of the China-fuelled leprosy pandemic was Cantlie, the Scottish physician based 
in Hong Kong in the late 1880s and early 1890s. Scholars have focused on Cantlie’s 
contributions to the global discourse at the exclusion of localising the production and 
significance of his work.57 Secondly, the dearth of scholarly analysis on the pre-war period 
stands in stark contrast to the wealth of studies on the colony’s post-war eradication of the 
disease. Significantly these studies marginalised the disease’s pre-war significance by 
reinforcing the notion that the domestic segregation of leprosy sufferers in Hong Kong was 
purely a post-war phenomenon.58 Chapter 2 fundamentally revises the existing scholarship by 
examining the origins of Hong Kong’s practice of deporting leprosy sufferers to the mainland, 
                                                          
54 Leung, Leprosy in China, 6-7, 132-176. 
55 She noted that the asylum received philanthropic donations and official support from Hong Kong. 
Leung, Leprosy in China, 143, 168-169, 220, 290n157, 310n20. 
56 Leung makes no reference to this institution. See for instance Starling et al., eds., The Story of 
Medicine in Hong Kong, 25; Kerrie L. MacPherson, “Invisible borders: Hong Kong, China and the 
imperatives of public health,” in Public Health in Asia and the Pacific: Historical and comparative 
perspectives, eds. Milton J. Lewis and Kerrie L. MacPherson (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 20; Yip, 
“Segregation, Isolation, and Quarantine: Protecting Hong Kong from Diseases in the Pre-war Period.” 
Journal of Comparative Asian Development 11, no. 1 (2012): 16. Starling and MacPherson took the 
statements in the colony’s annual medical reports for the latter half of the 1930s largely at face value. 
Yip cited Starling.  
57 Scholars invariably cite Cantlie’s prize-winning Report On The Conditions Under Which Leprosy 
Occurs (1897). More recently scholars such as Edmond and Leung have begun to cite similar 
comments in Cantlie’s earlier pamphlet Leprosy in Hongkong (1890). Leung uniquely noted that 
Cantlie visited a leprosy asylum in Canton shortly after producing this pamphlet, though she was 
principally interested in the impact that the visit had upon Cantlie’s companion Sun Yat-sen. See 
Zachary Gussow and George S. Tracy, “The Use of Archival Materials in the Analysis and Interpretation 
of Field Data: A Case Study in the Institutionalization of the Myth of Leprosy as ‘Leper’,” American 
Anthropologist 73, no. 3 (1971): 701, 706n14; Mawani, “ ‘The Island of the Unclean,’ ”, 8, 17n62; 
Edmond, Leprosy and Empire, 126; Leung, Leprosy in China, 103, 138, 142-143, 145, 150, 155, 217, 
283n85, 284n99. 
58 See for example N. R. Honey, “Leprosy in Hong Kong, Past, Present and Future,” “The Bulletin” 
Journal of Society of Community Medicine Hong Kong 9, no. 1 (1978): 22-28, 22; Lily Chan Lai Lee, “A 
Regional Study of Hay Ling Chau,” (BA. thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1963), ix 
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by analysing the emergence of domestic leprosaria prior to the outbreak of Second World 
War, and by assessing the re-emergence of the deportation policy in the immediate post-war 
period.  
The International Settlement’s management of Chinese leprosy sufferers has received 
even less scholarly attention. A single sentence in Leung’s study noted that the Shanghai 
Municipal Council supported the National Leprosarium of Shanghai, a mainland leprosarium, 
in the 1930s.59 The absence of any scholarly research the International Settlement’s 
management of the disease during the course of the Settlement’s 100-year existence is all the 
more striking given that that the Oxford Wellcome Unit’s Global Project on the History of 
Leprosy identified and summarised some of the relevant files in the Shanghai Municipal 
Archives almost a decade ago.60 Situated on the geographical border between the British 
Empire and China, Hong Kong and the International Settlement have fallen between a 
historiographical fissure without leaving so much as a mark on either Leung’s Leprosy in China 
or Edmond’s Leprosy and Empire. 
 
Racial Ideas and Their Spread 
As Chapter 4 shows, Hong Kong’s experiences shed new light on older debates about 
the interplay between race, space, malaria and colonial governance. Prominent scholars of 
Africa have examined how racialised preventive theories contributed to the residential 
segregation of European populations in some tropical African cities.61 The malaria committee 
of Britain’s Royal Society tasked two doctors, S. R. Christophers and J. W. W. Stephens of the 
Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, to investigate the mosquito-borne transmission of the 
disease in West Africa at the turn of the 20th century. They identified native children as the 
principal source of infection and advocated racial segregation over mosquito control. The 
                                                          
59 She noted that the National Leprosarium of Shanghai received financial support from the Chinese 
municipality and the International Settlement. Leung, Leprosy in China, 171. 
60 The Global Project was an early 21st century initiative of the International Leprosy Association in 
conjunction with WHO and the Nippon Foundation. The project developed a textual and visual 
database of leprosy archives, research institutes, individuals, treatments and leprosaria. See 
http://www.leprosyhistory.org. For instance the project summarised the contents of some of the 
relevant files in the Shanghai Municipal Archives (U1/16/753(1) to U1/16/755; U1/16/758; 
U1/16/759(2) to U1/16/762; U1/16/2618 to U1/16/2622), though the project’s list is incomplete, and 
in some instances inaccurate (specifically U1/16/766 and U1/16/767).  For a brief summary of the 
project see Jo Robertson and A. Colin McDougall, “Leprosy work and research in Oxford, UK: four 
decades in the pursuit of new knowledge about an arcane disease,” International Journal of 
Dermatology 44, no. 8 (2005): 695-698. 
61 Philip D Curtin, “Medical Knowledge and Urban Planning in Tropical Africa,” American Historical 
Review 90, no. 3 (1985): 594-613; John W. Cell, “Anglo-Indian Medical Theory and the Origins of 
Segregation in West Africa,” American Historical Review 91, no. 2 (1986): 307-335); Stephen Frenkel 
and John Western, “Pretext or Prophylaxis? Racial Segregation and Malarial Mosquitos in a British 
Tropical Colony: Sierra Leone,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 78, no. 2 (1988): 
211-228; W. U. Eckart, “Malaria and colonialism in the German colonies New Guinea and the 
Cameroons. Research, control, thoughts of eradication,” Parassitologia 40, nos. 1-2 (1998): 83-90.Cell 
challenged Curtin’s claim that the conjunction between town-planning and the emergence of tropical 
medicine originated in British-Indian sources in the late 19th century. 
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popularity and implementation of this theory varied according to local colonial motives, urban 
contexts and indigenous resistance. For instance the establishment of an exclusively-
European ‘Hill Station’ at Freetown, Sierra Leone, owed as much to contemporary European 
economic rationales and prejudices about indigenous sanitary habits as it did to the 
prevention of malaria.62 A number of historians have alluded to, but failed to explain, the 
relationship between malaria control and the establishment of an exclusively European 
reservation in northern Kowloon in Hong Kong during this period. Welsh for instance simply 
stated that this exclusively European reservation was justified on economic grounds and “on 
specious grounds of health (the Chinese could not be trusted to keep down mosquitoes)”.63 
Others, including the most recent studies, have uncritically accepted the contemporary 
insinuation that the living conditions of lower class Chinese promoted mosquito breeding.64 
These studies have crucially failed to contextualise the anti-malarial justifications for this 
reservation within the broader evolution of Hong Kong’s malarial discourse and the origins of 
the proposal itself. 
The racialised conceptualisation of leprosy in East Asia also complicates modern 
historiographical debates about the leprosy stigma. Broadly speaking three schools of thought 
emerged in the twentieth century, the latter two as polar opposite reactions to the first. The 
earliest school argued that erroneous associations between the disease and Biblical passages, 
most notably the Book of Leviticus, were responsible for perpetuating contemporary 
prejudices towards leprosy sufferers. Many, however, rejected this inherently Western-
centric approach. On the one hand figures such as Dr. Olaf K. Skinsnes argued instead that the 
stigma was an intrinsic reaction to the disease unique combination of pathological factors, 
including the progressive crippling of the body.65 Skinsnes’s recognition of major historical and 
contemporary parallels between ‘Oriental’ and ‘Occidental’ social reactions to the disease was 
not a coincidence. Born in China to medical missionary parents in 1917, he spent a formative 
decade of his career as an eminent leprologist in Hong Kong in the 1950s.66 Zachary Gussow, 
George Tracy and the third school of thought countered by arguing that ‘leprosy phenomena’ 
                                                          
62 Frenkel, “Pretext or Prophylaxis,” 211-227. 
63 Frank Welsh, History of Hong Kong (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997), 378. See also Roger 
Bristow, Land-use Planning in Hong Kong: History, Policies and Procedures (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), 39; G. B. Endacott, History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 
1973), 284; Henry Lethbridge, Hong Kong: Stability and Change (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 
1978), 173-174. 
64 See for example Yip, “Colonialism, Disease and Public Health,” 20; John M. Carroll, “The Peak: 
residential segregation in colonial Hong Kong,” in Twentieth-century Colonialism in China: Localities, 
the everyday, and the world, eds. Bryna Goodman and David S. Goodman (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2012), 85. 
65 Olaf K. Skinsnes, Leprosy Rationale, 2nd ed., 3rd reprint (New York: American Leprosy Missions, 
1971), 12-15. 
66 Robert C. Hastings, “Olaf K. Skinsnes, M.D., Ph.D. – An Appreciation,” International Journal of 
Leprosy 47, no. 1 (1979): 59-60. Skinsnes joined the first General Executive Committee of the Mission 
to Lepers Hong Kong Auxiliary as well as the Board of Managers of the Hay Ling Chay Leprosarium. He 
also attended to the leprosarium’s patients as a pathologist. 
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were specific to particular socio-historical contexts.67 Leprosy was thus “retainted” in the late 
19th century.68 This dissertation complicates modern debates about the interplay between all 
three factors by exploring the emergence of leprosy as a major social and public health issue 
in Hong Kong and the International Settlement.69 
 
Dissertation Outline 
 The structure of the dissertation is tailored to fulfil its two primary objectives. Each 
chapter explores the management of a specific disease within a specific geo-political context. 
The chapters are paired by disease to facilitate comparisons between the two territories. The 
dissertation focuses principally on the period from the 1880s until the 1940s, from the decade 
inaugurated by the discoveries of the causative agents of both diseases to the surrender of 
British colonial rule.70 All four chapters extend beyond December 1941 in order to explore the 
extent of wartime disruptions and continuities. Chapter 2 uniquely extends as far as the early 
1950s because my analysis of Hong Kong’s pre-war management of leprosy radically revises 
the modern historiography’s interpretation of post-war developments. 
Chapter 2 examines the origins of Hong Kong’s dual policy of deporting leprosy 
sufferers to the Chinese mainland and staunchly opposing domestic segregation. Cantlie 
influentially articulated the assumptions that underpinned this colonial management of the 
disease. Conceptually these strategies were two sides of the same coin. On the one hand 
leprosy was inextricably associated with destitute Chinese migrants. Deportation was 
therefore considered both morally justifiable and essential for the preservation of the colony’s 
health. On the other the colony’s prosperity allegedly served as a beacon to destitute and 
diseased mainlanders, as a veritable “El Dorado to the leprous Chinaman from the 
mainland”.71 The inherent superiority of Western medical practices heightened colonial 
anxieties about the colony’s appeal. This chapter complements Cantlie’s well-established 
contribution to the global discourse on the Chinese-fuelled leprosy pandemic by localising his 
research, exploring the interaction between the colony’s management of the disease, his 
experiences of Western- and Chinese-style leprosaria, and his own preventive 
recommendations. This chapter also provides the very first analysis of the evolution of Hong 
Kong’s deportation policy, exploring the official and popular ties that linked the colony to 
Chinese, missionary and Nationalist leprosaria in Guangdong Province. 
                                                          
67 Zachary Gussow and George S. Tracy, “Stigma and the Leprosy Phenomenon: The Social History of a 
Disease in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 44, no. 5 
(1970): 432-444. 
68 Edmond, Leprosy and Empire, 6. 
69 See for example Edmond, Leprosy and Empire, 5-9. 
70 Gerhard Armauer Hansen announced the discovery of the M. leprae in 1873. Laveran described a 
malaria parasite in 1880. Japanese troops occupied the International Settlement on 8th December 
1941, the day after Pear Harbour. Hong Kong surrendered just over a fortnight later on 25th December 
1941. 
71 James Cantlie, Leprosy in Hongkong (Hongkong: Kelly & Walsh, 1890), 1. 
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This chapter fundamentally revises the prevailing presumption that the establishment 
of domestic leprosaria in Hong Kong was a purely post-war phenomenon. All modern studies, 
ranging from scientific papers by respected local dermatologists through Leung’s seminal 
study, attribute the colony’s abandonment of the deportation policy after the Second World 
War to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the resultant closure of the 
Sino-British border. These studies have marginalised the colony’s pre-war management of the 
disease by relying on the records of the Mission to Lepers Hong Kong Auxiliary, a post-war 
organisation that played a pivotal role in establishing a temporary leprosarium at Sandy Bay 
and a permanent leprosarium on Hay Ling Chau (‘The Isle of Happy Healing’) in the early 1950s. 
By reinstating Hong Kong’s four pre-war leprosaria into this narrative, the dissertation 
examines the external and internal factors that challenged the colony’s management of the 
disease and ultimately overturned its reliance on deportation before the outbreak of the 
Second World War. During the early 20th century, for instance, the colony’s geo-political 
expansion and the emergence of international and metropolitan calls for domestic 
segregation appeared to prompt a shift in the colony’s management of the disease. Not only 
did the government support a small leprosy village in the newly-acquired New Territories, but 
it appointed a hospital on Hong Kong Island as a leprosy asylum. These initiatives, however, 
were merely a façade. The government’s actions in the early 1910s actually entrenched rather 
than replaced its reliance on deportation. The growth of humanitarian concern and Chinese 
agency during the interwar period increasingly challenged the colony’s reliance on mainland 
institutions and the government’s contention that all Chinese leprosy sufferers were 
mainlanders. The government finally acknowledged its liability towards the maintenance of 
British Chinese sufferers, but resisted the increasingly persistent internal calls for reform by 
formalising its reliance on a specific mainland leprosarium: the Sheklung Asylum. Popular 
concern about the unregulated movements of domestic communities of leprosy sufferers, 
both real and imagined, and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in the late 1930s 
ultimately forced the government to establish a government-run isolation facility, the 
Kennedy Town Leprosarium on Hong Kong Island, and an isolation cell commonly known as a 
‘leprosarium’ within the Stanley Bay Prison,. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
brief re-emergence of the deportation policy in the immediate post-war period, and the 
implications for modern interpretations of the post-war establishment of domestic leprosaria 
at Sandy Bay and Hay Ling Chau. 
Whereas Hong Kong’s reliance on deportation emerged in the mid-1870s in response 
to police fears about contagion, the International Settlement’s medical community 
considered the disease a rarity well into the early twentieth century. Chapter 3 examines how 
leprosy emerged as a trans-municipal public health issue in the late 1920s. The alarming 
reports of a local foreign-run dispensary inadvertently precipitated the International 
Settlement’s reliance on a mainland leprosarium – a reliance that paralleled Hong Kong’s 
management of diseased Chinese bodies. But the Settlement’s practice of transferring 
Chinese leprosy sufferers to a Church Missionary Society hospital in Hangzhou was far more 
limited than Hong Kong’s deportation policy. Chinese agency nevertheless challenged the 
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Settlement’s opposition to domestic segregation. In particular the Chinese Mission to Lepers 
(C.M.L.), a Shanghai-based Christian Chinese philanthropic organisation with Auxiliaries in 
Hong Kong and major Chinese coastal cities, profoundly impacted on the International 
Settlement’s management of the disease. Whilst the Settlement successfully resisted the 
establishment of isolation facilities within its borders, it was forced to come to terms with the 
establishment of the C.M.L.’s National Leprosarium of Shanghai, a model institution just a few 
miles to the north of the Settlement. The Settlement’s maintenance of ‘bona-fide resident’ 
patients during the second half of the 1930s complicated its conceptualisation of leprosy as 
an alien disease. The remarkable but hitherto largely-forgotten working relationship between 
the Settlement and the C.M.L.’s National Leprosarium was one of intense negotiation: the 
early case-by-case evolution of the admissions, maintenance and discharges procedures 
provides rare insights into the trans-municipal contestations of power.  
The impact of the Sino-Japanese War upon the Settlement’s management of leprosy 
paralleled that of Hong Kong, though the consequences of the Japanese invasion were both 
more immediate and direct in Shanghai. Chapter 3 examines how the military encirclement of 
the city precipitated the evacuation of the National Leprosarium of Shanghai to three 
consecutive temporary premises within the space of a single year. These experiences 
presented the Chinese Mission to Lepers with unprecedented evangelistic opportunities and 
contributed to the greater degree of patient agency displayed in the National Leprosarium 
than in Hong Kong’s Kennedy Town Leprosarium during the same period. Eventually the 
evacuees found shelter at the Brenan Road ‘Emergency’ Leprosarium, which lay within the 
Western extra-Settlement area and was therefore nominally under the S.M.C.’s jurisdiction. 
The leprosarium’s location simultaneously heightened the Settlement’s fears of contagion and 
restricted its ability to confine a growing number of patients within this C.M.L.-run institution. 
The overwhelming refugee crisis exacerbated popular fears of contagion further, prompting 
the Settlement to assume the maintenance of ‘emergency resident’ patients as well as an 
increasing number ‘bona-fide’ resident patients. The Settlement’s management of the disease 
remained intensely racialised, as demonstrated by the exceptionally rare and detailed records 
of the confinement of a Russian leprosy sufferer. Whereas the cessation of colonial rule 
completely interrupted Hong Kong’s management of the disease, successive war-time 
governments preserved the Settlement’s practice of maintaining only those Chinese leprosy 
sufferers classed as ‘bona-fide residents’. 
 The focus of the second pair of core chapters shifts from exploring the management 
of colonial bodies to the management of colonial environments through the prism of malaria 
prevention. Chapter 4 begins by exploring the evolution of malarial aetiology in Hong Kong, 
examining the ways in which the nascent conceptualisation of ‘malarial fevers’ was 
understood in relation to the colony’s insalubrious environment and the insanitary habits of 
its Chinese inhabitants. The colony’s vibrant community contested new ideas regarding the 
disease’s transmission through local research and debate. This chapter significantly expands 
upon the limited historiography by analysing the reception of new ideas regarding the 
mosquito-borne transmission of the disease. The colonial authorities as well as the general 
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public vigorously debated different facets of these theories according to local concerns and 
received experiences. Local amateur entomological research underpinned the process of 
locally (in)validating these new ideas, dictating the evolution of Hong Kong’s localised 
management of malaria. 
This chapter also explores the origins and evolution of the colony’s vectoral 
management of the disease during the first half of the 20th century. My work revises Yip’s 
assessment that a “broad anti-malaria program” was introduced in 1899 by analysing the 
range of experimental measures that were implemented between 1899 and 1901.72 Moreover 
rather than implementing a ‘broad’ program, the colonial administration tailored its 
geographical management of the disease in order to prioritise the colonial state. On the one 
hand, the government restricted its management of malaria on Hong Kong Island to direct 
environmental interventions in the city of Victoria. On the other, the authorities opposed 
managing the malarious environment in the New Territories in favour of the prophylactic 
protection of the colonial police force. The colony vigorously resisted internal calls for its dual 
approach to be extended; only malaria epidemics that threatened the colonial state prompted 
temporary geographical extensions of the colony’s management of the disease. The 
government finally relented in the late 1920s, establishing a dedicated anti-malaria unit, the 
Malaria Bureau. My work revises the traditional historiography’s analysis of this institution by 
situating its establishment within the context of almost a decade’s-worth of internal calls for 
reform. Moreover my research presents an original analysis of the evolution of the Bureau’s 
work during the 1930s and early 1940s, including the impact of its Malayan heritage upon its 
integration of environmental and social indices. The chapter also explores the interplay 
between race, space and colonial governance by presenting a fresh comprehensive analysis 
of the malarial justifications for a European reservation in northern Kowloon. The chapter 
concludes by exploring the impact of the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong upon its 
management of the local environment. 
 Chapter 5 presents the very first modern analysis of the Settlement’s management of 
the disease. The comparative rarity of malarial fevers in Shanghai during the 19th century 
impacted upon the extent of local research, the diffusion of new ideas regarding the 
transmission of the disease and the nature of the International Settlement’s early anti-
mosquito campaigns. Indeed only a desire not to be outdone by the French Concession 
prompted the Settlement to implement an extensive anti-mosquito campaign in 1909. This 
trial laid the foundations for the Settlement’s far more systematic and geographically-
comprehensive approach to malaria prevention compared to Hong Kong. Whereas a 
reluctance to tackle all of the territory under its jurisdiction defined Hong Kong’s management 
of the disease during the early 20th century, the Settlement increasingly turned its attention 
to the territory beyond its immediate control. The Settlement’s attempts to manage the 
malarious environment beyond its borders provides insights into the trans-municipal 
contestations of power, the impact these negotiations had upon the Settlement’s perceptions 
                                                          
72 Yip, “Colonialism, Disease and Public Health,” 19. 
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of Chinese (medical) modernity at a crucial stage in the emergence of the Nationalist 
Government, and the extent to which the Settlement transgressed Chinese sovereignty. 
 The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war impacted to a much greater extent on the 
Settlement’s management of malaria compared to Hong Kong’s precisely because of the 
Settlement’s trans-municipal approach. The encirclement of Shanghai and the capitulation of 
the Chinese forces amplified anti-British sentiment, particular in the Western extra-
Settlement area – an area that was identified as integral to the Settlement’s malaria 
prevention program. This volatile environment intensified the negotiations for the 
deployment of the Settlement’s Malaria Prevention Unit – a product of local innovation rather 
than foreign expertise – beyond the Settlement’s borders. Ironically the war repaired some of 
the damage done to the Public Health Department’s relationship with the Henry Lester 
Institute, a local medical research institute, as a result of the Chinese municipality’s refusal to 
support a joint anti-malaria campaign before the war. By contrast the war strained the 
department’s anti-malarial relationship with other Settlement departments, principally the 
Public Works Department, to such an extent that the Malaria Prevention Unit was forced to 
justify its very existence. Ultimately the interment of the M.P.U.’s and indeed the Settlement’s 
Allied personnel paralleled the fate of many of Hong Kong’s personnel. The M.P.U.’s activities 
continued nonetheless, albeit on a small scale, for several years under Japanese occupation. 
 
Sources 
 The dissertation draws on a wealth of sources including government correspondence, 
departmental records, newspapers, journals and conference proceedings, printed works, and 
the unpublished records of different medical bodies and individuals. The majority of this 
material is in English, though I have also drawn on French- and German-language sources 
where possible. A reliance on sources produced in the languages of the colonial state as 
opposed to Chinese-language records poses interpretational limitations, particularly with 
regard to assessing indigenous agency and patients’ experiences. Both the project’s scope and 
my methodology take these linguistic limitations into consideration. Firstly my work focuses 
primarily on presenting an original analysis of the ‘official’ management of leprosy and malaria 
in Hong Kong and Shanghai. Chinese (and non-Chinese) agency is therefore explored in terms 
of its interaction with and impact upon the state’s prevention strategies. In doing so, this 
project lays the foundations for further research into Chinese medical agency. Secondly an 
assiduous analysis of the extant secondary sources, particularly works by Chinese-speaking 
scholars, guided both my primary and secondary research, enabling me to identify the 
relevant Chinese-language materials that I needed to have translated. In many cases though 
even Chinese-speaking experts such as Leung and Yip relied extensively on contemporary 
English-language sources. I greatly expanded upon this preliminary bibliography by drawing 
on: the wider historiography on disease prevention and colonialism in China; the online 
database of the Global Project on the History of Leprosy; as well as my own knowledge of 
British and Chinese archival records. 
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 The government records from Hong Kong include the annual medical reports 
compiled by the head of the medical department, namely the Colonial Surgeon for 1880 
through 1896 and the Principal Civil Medical Officer for 1897 through 1927. These reports 
were subsequently compiled by the newly-inaugurated Director of Medical and Sanitary 
Services. The annual sanitary reports, compiled by the colony’s Sanitary Board, complimented 
these reports.73 These reports contain morbidity and mortality statistics – for the colony’s 
Western and Chinese hospitals and for different sections of the foreign and Chinese 
communities – as well as qualitative discussions about the prevalence and prevention of 
different diseases. The dissertation also draws on a variety of other annual reports, including 
those of the colony’s police force, the veterinary surgeon and the superintendent of the 
botanical and afforestation department. The government records also include the minutes of 
the Legislative Council (the Hong Kong Hansard), and The Hongkong Government Gazette. All 
of these records are available through an online searchable database hosted by the Hong Kong 
University Library’s Digital Initiative, referred throughout this dissertation as the Hong Kong 
Government Records Online.74 Additionally, I assiduously researched the National Archives in 
London for the colony’s, and indeed the Settlement’s, correspondence with the Colonial 
Office. Furthermore I drew on the often-neglected inter- and intra-departmental records 
preserved in the Hong Kong Public Records Office. The Sanitary Board’s minutes and its 
correspondence with the colonial government, for instance, provide insights into the Board 
members’ opinions and actions which are unavailable through other sources. Unfortunately 
only a fraction of the original material is still extant.75 Finally the departmental records also 
include the Sanitary Board’s publications, including illustrated pamphlets on the prevention 
of specific diseases. 
 The International Settlement’s annual medical reports broadly paralleled those of 
Hong Kong. The fact that only five individuals were responsible for producing Shanghai’s 
extant reports – Dr. E. Henderson (1870-1890), Dr. A. Stanley (1898-1921), Dr. C. Noel Davis 
(1922-1929), Dr. J. H. Jordan (1930-1941) and Dr. Y. Tashiro (1942) – poses both advantages 
and disadvantages. On the one hand the greater degree of continuity provides insights into 
the ways in which each of these men interrogated leprosy and malaria. Yet this continuity also 
promoted formulaic report entries that glossed over the finer details of change. Imbalances 
in the extant inter- and intra-departmental source material also pose a number of problems. 
Whilst the Hong Kong Public Records Office contains a limited volume of colonial material 
primarily from the first half of the twentieth century, the Shanghai Municipal Archives 
preserve an extraordinary wealth of material from the 1920s through to the early 1940s, 
including the records of the Shanghai Municipal Council, the Public Health Department, the 
                                                          
73 The annual reports of the Medical Officer of Health were initially included in the sanitary reports 
(for the years 1897 through 1904) but were subsequently fused with the Principal Civil Medical 
Officer’s reports. The annual medical reports and the annual sanitary reports were published 
separately except for the years 1908 through 1920. 
74 The portal is available through http://www.lib.hku.hk/database/. 
75 For instance only the Board’s letters to and from the government for the period 1900 to 1907 have 
survived. 
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Public Works Department, the Malaria Prevention Unit as well as the minutes of the Health 
Committee. 
 As a complement to these ‘official records’, the dissertation draws on an extensive 
corpus of local English-language newspaper materials. In some instances these newspapers 
provide the only reliable alternative to the ‘official’ records. Hong Kong’s newspapers, for 
instance, provide a more comprehensive record of the Sanitary Board’s meetings than the 
limited volume of original minutes preserved by the Hong Kong Public Records Office. 
Secondly the editorials provide commentaries on the official management of both leprosy and 
malaria, albeit coloured by each paper’s political bias and political inclinations. But even the 
most pro-government papers occasionally criticised the government’s handling of public 
health. Contributions in the form of letters to the editor provide further insights into popular 
attitudes. Chapter 4 for instance examines the controversial reception of new ideas regarding 
the mosquito-borne transmission of malaria by drawing on a flurry of heated personal 
exchanges that appeared in Hong Kong’s press in the early 20th century. The varied modern 
availability of these newspapers, however, has resulted in an imbalance against Shanghai. The 
Hong Kong Central Library’s Multimedia Information System provides an online searchable 
portal of digitised editions of contemporary newspapers.76 I have drawn on three daily 
newspapers and two weekly newspapers: The China Mail (1869-1941), The Hongkong Daily 
Press (1875-1941), The Hongkong Telegraph (1882-1941), The Hongkong Weekly Press (1895-
1909) and The Hongkong Sunday Herald (1929-1941).77 By contrast Shanghai’s Bibliotheca Zi-
Ka-Wei was only just considering putting its impressive collection of English-, French-, 
German-, Russian- and Chinese-language newspapers on microfilm at the time of my visit in 
2011. Moreover this library only made duplicates publicly available.78 Working under visa-
imposed time constraints I nevertheless manually consulted every available fin de siècle 
edition of The North-China Daily Press, a local English-language daily newspaper, as well as 
every edition of The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette, a local weekly 
newspaper, from the late 19th century through June 1941. Additionally the Public Health 
Department’s files in the Shanghai Municipal Archives preserved articles from a variety of 
Shanghai’s English-, Chinese-, Russian- and German-language newspapers. These not only 
help rectify the imbalance of material compared to Hong Kong, but their selection and the 
Department’s annotations provide insights into the medical authorities’ reactions to popular 
developments and public criticisms. 
Materials from a variety of medical networks, organisations and figures complement 
these official and popular sources. For instance the original replies to the Royal College of 
Physicians’ Leprosy Committee, which are held in the College’s archives, as well as the 
                                                          
76 Available through http://hkclweb.hkpl.gov.hk/hkclr2/internet/eng/html/welcome.html. 
77 The dates represent the periods for which I found relevant articles and not do not necessarily 
represent the full extent covered by the Multimedia Information System. The portal is available 
through: 
http://www.hkpl.gov.hk/english/collections/services_er/services_er_mmis/services_er_mmis.html 
78 For instance, the The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette for January 1911 
was not publicly available as the library only had one copy. 
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Committee’s official report, provide some of the earliest insights into the prevalence of 
leprosy in both Hong Kong or Shanghai and raise doubts about the statements made in later 
published reports such as Cantlie’s Leprosy in Hongkong (1890) regarding the disease’s early 
local ‘history’. More importantly these replies contextualise the emergence of the colony’s 
reliance on deportation. Both the original medical reports of the Imperial Maritime Customs 
Service and Gordon’s Epitome similarly provide some of the earliest insights into the 
management of both leprosy and malaria in Shanghai. The dissertation draws on a variety of 
sources by physicians working in Hong Kong and Shanghai, and throughout China more 
generally, including scholarly contributions to international medical journals – such as The 
Lancet, The British Medical Journal and The Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene – and 
conference proceedings. For instance my work provides an original analysis of Cantlie’s 
research on leprosy in Hong Kong, Macao and Canton by drawing on the Wellcome Library’s 
collection of his unpublished papers and case notes. The largely-ignored unpublished minutes 
of the Hong Kong Medical Society serve to localise the research of colonial officers such as 
Cantlie and Manson. The dissertation also examines the missionary context that was so central 
to both Hong Kong’s and Shanghai’s management of leprosy by drawing on the records of 
foreign missionaries. The China Medical Missionary Journal, for instance, served as the 
principal forum for the foreign medical community in China from 1886 until 1949.79 These 
missionaries also elicited support through Hong Kong’s and Shanghai’s newspapers. Foreign 
physicians in China also submitted research and reports to the Leprosy Review and the 
International Journal of Leprosy during the 1930s.80  
My analysis of the importance of Chinese agency, particularly the work of the Chinese 
Mission to Lepers and its Hongkong Auxiliary, draws on all of the above sources as well the 
Mission’s own bilingual mouthpiece, The Leper Quarterly. Produced from 1927 through the 
early 1940s, this journal published the latest research by international specialists, reports from 
foreign and Chinese physicians, the Mission’s conference proceedings, editorials, details of 
public subscriptions, a remarkable selection of photographs of different Chinese leprosaria 
and occasionally articles by cured leprosy sufferers.81 Unsurprisingly the journal’s content was 
tailored to suit a specific objective: eliciting regional support for the Mission’s activities and 
the Chinese leprosaria that it supported. The C.M.L.’s Protestant association impacted upon 
the level of attention accorded to different mainland leprosaria.82 The Leper Quarterly, for 
instance, devoted far less attention to the Catholic asylum at Sheklung than to Protestant 
                                                          
79 The journal was renamed The China Medical Journal in 1907 and The Chinese Medical Journal in 
1932. 
80 First published in 1930 and 1931 respectively, the first paper on China appeared in the former in 
1931 and in 1934 in the latter. James L. Maxwell, “The Menace of Leprosy in Manchuria,” Leprosy 
Review 2, no. 1 (1931): 5-7; Curtis M. Galt and Elder Noi Yawt, “Kiulungkiang Married Lepers’ 
Settlement,” International Journal of Leprosy 2, no. 3 (1934): 315-317. 
81 The journal was first published in 1927. The last English-language articles were published in the 
March 1942 edition, though subsequent editions continued to include a table of contents in English 
until as late as December 1943. I am especially grateful to Angela Leung for directing me Shanghai 
Public Library’s collection. 
82 Leung, Leprosy in China, 161. 
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leprosaria in the region such as Tungkung, Pakhoi and Tai-Kam. Consequently I have also 
drawn on the illustrated pamphlets produced by the missionary superintendents of various 
leprosaria, including Father G. Deswazières’s With the Chinese Lepers at Shek-lung (1925).83 
The C.M.L.’s increasing reliance on the International Settlement for financial support 
restricted the possibilities of publishing critical accounts of the Settlement’s management of 
the disease. The journal’s pieces on the inmates of various mainland leprosaria, particularly 
C.M.L.-run institutions such as the National Leprosarium, tended to downplay instances of 
poor management or patient dissatisfaction. The contestations of power, the extent of 
institutional unrest and the nature of patients’ escapes are revealed by examining this journal 
in conjunction with the Mission’s records, preserved in the International Settlement’s Public 
Health Department files. These include the Mission’s correspondence to and from the Public 
Health Department, regular maintenance statements, the minutes of the Mission’s Executive 
Committee and the department’s own internal correspondence regarding the Mission’s 
activities – all of which was conducted in English until the mid-1940s. Although The Leper 
Quarterly also reported on the Hongkong Auxiliary, the whereabouts of this auxiliary’s records 
are unknown.84 
 
Disease as Text and Image 
The contrast between the modern scholarly management of malaria and leprosy is 
striking. For instance there has never been a malarial equivalent for “leper” in the English 
language: the disease has never subsumed the identity of the sufferer. And yet indigenous 
populations were pathologised as malarial hosts for much of the early 20th century. Moreover 
social factors remain at the heart of modern malarial aetiology. The transmission of the 
disease relies upon the co-existence of human populations, malaria-carrying mosquitoes and 
malaria parasites. The fundamental differences between the ways these two diseases were 
understood during the colonial period thus contextualise the way they were managed. The 
unique stigma attached to leprosy qualifies our understanding of the malarial pathologisation 
of indigenous populations and vice versa. Thus in throwing light the history of colonial 
medicine from different angles, the prisms of malaria and leprosy shed light on one another. 
Viewed together, this prims provide a more nuanced understanding of the management of 
Chinese bodies and Chinese environments in Hong Kong and the International Settlement of 
Shanghai. 
                                                          
83 Time constraints precluded a visit to the Missions Étrangères de Paris. I nevertheless consulted the 
archives online portal (http://archives.mepasie.org/recherche), which provides access to numerous 
records relating to the Sheklung asylum, including the Bulletins des missions étrangères, the Annales 
des missions étrangères, the Rapports des évêques, and the Rapports des établissements. See for 
instance G. Deswazières, “Kouang Tong: La léproserie de Sheklung,” Annales des missions étrangères, 
1926, 7-10, http://archives.mepasie.org/annales-des-missions-etrangeres/kouang-tong-la-la-c-
proserie-de-sheklung. 
84 This pre-war Chinese Mission to Lepers Hongkong Auxiliary should not be confused with the post-
war and unrelated Mission to Lepers Hong Kong Auxiliary. 
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 Throughout the dissertation I refrain from using the derogatory term ‘leper’, except 
when quoting directly from the primary source material or when referring to specific 
institutions. This decision reflects the recommendations made by the “Committee on the 
Change of the Words ‘Leper’ and ‘Leprosy’ ” at the Fifth International Congress of Leprosy 
(Havana, 1948).85 Instead I rely on the term ‘leprosy sufferer’ to designate anyone suffering 
from or suspected of suffering from the disease. I restrict my use of ‘leprosy patient’ – the 
committee’s recommended alternative – to denote an individual’s association with a 
particular leprosarium. As Edmond pointed out, access to medical facilities was especially 
limited during the period.86 I use ‘leprosaria’ as a non-specific collective term for all in-patient 
facilities dedicated exclusively to leprosy sufferers, including clinics, asylums and settlements. 
I do so for the sake of clarity without necessarily implying common institutional structures. 
 In recommending the retention of the term ‘leprosy’, the committee also 
acknowledged the use of appropriate popular alternatives. During the 1960s the patients and 
staff at the National Leprosarium in Carville, Louisiana, took up the chorus for the term to be 
abandoned altogether in favour of “Hansen’s Disease” or “so-called leprosy” – terms which 
they considered destigmatising.87 The institution was even renamed the National Hansen’s 
Disease Center.88 Some modern historians continue to adhere to this practice.89 However as 
Skinsnes explained shortly after his formative decade in Hong Kong, pursuing this name 
change to its logical conclusion results in anomalous terms such as “Hansenology”, 
“Hansenophobia” and “Hansenarium – an institution for the care of Hansen (long since 
departed this world) or peopled with Hansens – hardly practical or significant in China, India, 
Japan, etc.”.90 I would add “Hansen’s diseased” (in place of ‘leper’), “Hansen’s disease 
sufferer/patient” and “Mycobacterium hansenae” to Skinsnes’s list. These terms are 
extremely cumbersome, particularly if pluralised and/or preceded by adjectives: consider for 
instance “British Chinese Hansen’s disease sufferers”. More importantly these terms fall short 
                                                          
85 Dr. N.D. Fraser, who worked at the Swatow Mission Hospital in the late 1920s and 1930s and later 
played a pivotal role in establishing and superintending the Hay Ling Chau Leprosarium in Hong Kong, 
was a member of this committee. Olaf K. Skinsnes, “Notes from the History of Leprosy,” International 
Journal of Leprosy 41, no. 2 (1973): 245. For more on Fraser’s work see his articles in the bibliography 
and Daniel G. Lai and Suchen Wang Lai, “The Kahn Reaction in Leprosy: A Study of 167 Lepers in 
Swatow District,” China Medical Journal 42, no.12 (1928): 880-883, 883. 
86 Edmond, Leprosy and Empire, 17. My use of the term ‘leprosy patient’ does not necessarily imply 
that the individual’s association with a particular leprosarium entailed medical treatment per se. 
87 Zachary Gussow and George S. Tracy, “Status, Ideology, and Adaptation to Stigmatized Illness: A 
Study of Leprosy,” Human Organization 27, no. 4 (1968): 320. For earlier advocates see Howard N. 
Morse “The Changed Attitude Toward Hansen’s Disease,” Journal of the American Medical Association 
199, no. 2 (1967): 253-254. 
88 John Parascandola, “The Gillis W. Long Hansen’s Disease Center at Carville,” Public Health Reports 
109, no. 6 (1994): 728-730. 
89 See for example Yara Nogueira Monteiro, “Prophylaxis and exclusion: compulsory isolation of 
Hansen’s disease patients in São Paulo,” História, Ciências, Saúde –Manguinhos 10, no. S1 (2003): 95-
121. 
90 Olaf K. Skinsnes, “Leprosy in Society III. The Relationship of the Social to the Medical Pathology of 
Leprosy,” Leprosy Review 35, no. 4 (1964): 175-181, 177. Reprinted in Skinsnes, Leprosy Rationale, 15-
17. 
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of achieving their destigmatising objective by complicating matters further, as Skinsnes 
explained: 
Unfortunately, society will want to know what ‘Hansen’s disease’ is. Recognizing it as 
leprosy, society will then need the same rational explanation for its misconceptions 
that it should be challenged immediately with the same energetic efforts that are 
applied to promoting the attempted name change.91 
Multilateral bodies such as the World Health Organisation and philanthropic bodies dedicated 
to raising support for and awareness of leprosy sufferers around the world, such as The 
Leprosy Mission (UK), the Leprosy Mission International and the International Leprosy 
Association, continue to refer to the disease as leprosy.92 There is no denying that the process 
of destigmatisation is a necessary and on-going battle, but a sensitive and informative 
handling of the subject matter is arguably more effective than rebranding the disease.  
 Compared to the extensive debates about textual references to leprosy sufferers, the 
ethical implications of reproducing visual representations of leprosy have largely been 
ignored. This is especially surprising given the extent to which images can fuel popular stigma, 
particularly those images that emphasise the disfiguring nature of the disease. Well-
established and widely-distributed modern journals dedicated to the study of the disease 
continue to publish images of leprosy sufferers. The final 21st century editions of the 
International Journal of Leprosy and other Mycobacterial Diseases, for instance, opened with 
a section dedicated to ‘Images from the History of Leprosy’.93 Yet even images with an 
explicitly educational and destigmatising purpose can inadvertently support stigma and 
discrimination.94 Some of my history postgraduate colleagues therefore abstain from 
reproducing images of leprosy sufferers without the subjects’ explicit permissions. Other 
scholars only reproduce images that do not reveal the sufferers’ identities. For instance in her 
undergraduate dissertation on the Hay Ling Chau Leprosarium in Hong Kong, Lily Chan Lai Lee 
only included photographs of leprosy suffers that concealed their faces.95 
During the course of my research I uncovered a variety of visual depictions of leprosy 
sufferers in contemporary publications, journals, pamphlets, and, to a lesser extent 
newspapers, as well as a limited number of unpublished images. These images consisted 
mostly of photographs – of individuals and communities, of homes and institutions, of doctors 
and patients – but also illustrations and diagnostic schematics. Tracing the identities of those 
depicted in these images in order to secure their consent is beyond the scope of this project 
and in many cases impossible given the period under study. But these images are too valuable 
and under-appreciated not to be reproduced. They provide fascinating, new, personal and 
                                                          
91 Skinsnes, “Leprosy in Society III,” 177. 
92 The Association is currently organising the 18th International Leprosy Conference (Brussels, 2013). 
93 See for example “Images from the History of Leprosy,” International Journal of Leprosy and other 
Mycobacterial Diseases 73, no. 4 (2005): 239. 
94 See for instance Leanne Johnny and Claudia Mitchell, “ ‘Live and Let Live’: An Analysis of HIV/AIDS-
Related Stigma and Discrimination in International Campaign Posters,” Journal of Health 
Communication, no. 11 (2006), 755-767. 
95 Lily Chan Lai Lee, “A Regional Study of Hay Ling Chau,” (BA. thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1963). 
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often unparalleled insights into the lives of Chinese leprosy sufferers during this period – 
insights that neither words (nor maps) can capture. I reproduce them in this dissertation in 
order to strengthen our understanding of the colonial stigma. 
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 Hong Kong’s pre-war management of leprosy has all but been forgotten. In an article 
entitled “Leprosy in Hong Kong, Past, Present and Future”, published in one of the colony’s 
respectable medical journals in 1978, Dr. Honey of the Social Hygiene Service stated simply, 
“Prior to World War II, leprosy was not regarded as a problem in Hong Kong and treatment 
was arranged in Leprosaria near Canton”.1 This narrative has underpinned modern 
interpretations of the colony’s pre-war management of the disease, including Leung’s, for the 
last 60 years.2 Yet the disease’s association with the island dates to the very earliest period of 
settlement. R. Montgomery Martin, the colony’s first treasurer, opened his highly critical 
‘Report on the Island of Hong Kong’ (1844) with a description of the colony’s terrain. After 
comparing the post-monsoon “greenish-hue” of the island’s “hogsback” hills to a “decayed 
Stilton cheese”, he cast his gaze over the Chinese peninsula that lay to the island’s north: 
The desolate aspect to the island … is unrelieved by the adjacent main land, whose 
physical features are precisely similar to those of Hong Kong, its mountain tops and 
sides presenting the appearance of a negro streaked with leprosy.3 
Leprosy swiftly shed its purely metaphorical association with the colony, emerging as an 
alarming social and policing issue in the 1870s. The colonial authorities responded to this 
apparent threat not by casting Chinese leprosy sufferers without the camp but without the 
colony altogether. This chapter traces the evolution of the colony’s management of the 
disease, charting the challenges to its reliance on deportation and its staunch opposition to 
domestic segregation. In doing so this chapter highlights the role of local physicians such as 
Cantlie in the production of local and global colonial medical discourses and the impact of 
colonial Chinese agency 
 
The Emergence of the Deportation Policy 
Leprosy was initially considered a rarity in Hong Kong. The Royal College of Physicians 
in London appointed a Leprosy Committee in 1862 in response to concerns about the 
prevalence of the disease in the British West Indies. The Committee drafted a questionnaire 
that was circulated via the Colonial Office throughout the British Empire, including Hong Kong 
                                                          
1 N. R. Honey, “Leprosy in Hong Kong, Past, Present and Future,” “The Bulletin” Journal of Society of 
Community Medicine Hong Kong 9, no. 1 (1978): 22-28, 22. 
2 See for instance Lily Chan Lai Lee, “A Regional Study of Hay Ling Chau,” (BA. thesis, University of 
Hong Kong, 1963), ix; L. Y. Chong and N. R. Honey, “Leprosy control programme in Hong Kong,” 
Journal of The Hong Kong Medical Association 45, no. 1 (1993): 70-73; K. H. Lau, “Leprosy in Hong 
Kong: From Hay Ling Chau to Cheun Sha Wan,” Hong Kong Journal of Dermatology and Venereology 
10, no. 3 (2002): 107; Angela Ki Che Leung, Leprosy in China: A History (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2009), 220, 310n20. The Mission to Lepers Hong Kong Auxiliary, a post-war organisation which 
was jointly responsible with the government for opening a leprosarium on Hay Ling Chau in 1952, was 
responsible for propagating this narrative. The Mission to Lepers Hong Kong Auxiliary, First Annual 
Report, 1951, (Hong Kong, 1952), 3. 
3 Hong Kong. Copies of ‘Report on Hong Kong;’ ‘Report on Chusan;’ and Minute on the British Position 
and Prospects in China,’ by Mr. R. Montgomery Martin, when Treasurer to The Queen at Hong Kong, 
and a Member of Her Majesty’s Legislative Council in China (Parl. Papers, Session 1 (148), 1857), 3-4. 
Frank Welsh used Martin’s phrase ‘A negro streaked with leprosy’ as a chapter sub-heading. Frank 
Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (London: Harper Collins, 1997), 155, 158. 
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and Shanghai.4 The Acting Governor of Hong Kong forwarded the questionnaire to almost a 
dozen government, military and civilian medical officers.5 The three respondents all asserted 
that the disease was either non-existent or else exceptionally rare in Hong Kong. Instead they 
emphasised the prevalence of Chinese leprosy sufferers in neighbouring Macao and Canton 
(Guangzhou).6 One of the respondents, a German physician named Dr. Schetelig, submitted a 
photograph of a leprosy patient from Canton (fig. 1) and actually travelled to Macao on 
Christmas day in order to report on the dilapidated Hospital de São Lázaro, run by the Santa 
Casa da Misericórdia.7 In contrast to these contemporary assertions, Dr. James Cantlie alleged 
in 1887 – only a year after his arrival in the colony – that a small group of “leper families and 
communities” had in fact resided “on the hill-sides above the town of Victoria” on Hong Kong 
Island from the early 1840s until the 1870s.8 Cantlie’s comments came three decades after 
the College’s report at a time, as we shall see, when the reported prevalence of the disease 
was far more acute. As such his statements may have reflected late 19th century popular 
beliefs. Alternatively awareness of the existence of this hill-side community of leprosy 
sufferers may only have surfaced sometime after Schetelig and his colleagues submitted their 
replies. 
                                                          
4 The Committee’s final report summarised these responses. George Edward Eyre, and William 
Spottiswoode eds., Report on Leprosy by the Royal College of Physicians prepared for, and published 
by her Majesty’s Secertary of State for the Colonies, with an appendix (London: 1867), xiv, 72-78, 221-
23. For more on the Leprosy Committee’s investigation see Rod Edmond, Leprosy and Empire: A 
Medical and Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 51-67. 
5 W. T. Mercer (Actg. Governor) to the Duke of Newcastle, 7 Mar. 1863, Royal College of Physicians 
(RCP), OFFIP/4119/116-116a. Mercer also contacted the authorities in Macao on the Committee’s 
behalf, and also drew its attention to an article in The Chinese Repository by Benjamin Hobson, a 
foreign medical missionary in Canton. João Ferreira Pinto (President, Macao) to Mercer, 12 Dec. 1863, 
RCP, OFFIP/4119/91; “Remarks by Dr. Hobson on the subject of leprosy”, ca. 1851, RCP, 
OFFIP/4119/90. Hobson delivered a similar paper to the colony’s China Branch of the Royal Asiatic 
Society, which provided an early non-specialist forum for discussion (1847-1859). Benjamin Hobson, 
“Leprosy in China and the East. A Brief Account of the Leprosy of China and the East,” Transactions of 
the China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, no.3 (1851-52): 17-27. 
6 The hospital was also known as a hospice. Dickson stated that he “had some years ago opportunity 
of seeing Leprosy” in Canton while working as a private practitioner. “Dr. Dickson’s Answers to 
Queries on Leprosy”, ca. 1863, RCP, OFFIP/4119/117-117a, 1, 7, 15; “Dr. Enscoe’s Answers to Queries 
on Leprosy”, 13 Dec. 1862, RCP, OFFIP/4119/118, 1; “Dr. Schetelig’s Answers to Queries on Leprosy”, 
5 Mar. 1863, RCP, OFFIP/4119/119, 1-5, 17-24. See A. Damas Mora and J. C. Soares, “Leprosy in 
Macao: Some Comments by the Portuguese Doctors in Macao,” Chinese Medical Journal 50 (1936): 
721-725, 722. 
7 “Dr. Schetelig’s Answers to Queries on Leprosy”, 5 Mar. 1863, RCP, OFFIP/4119/119,6-7, 17-24. W. 
Howard of Canton, the author of the original photograph, sent a mounted copy of it along with a 
mounted photograph of a patient with elephantiasis to the College. W. Howard, “Elephantiasis”, ca. 
1861, RCP, OFFIP/4119/101-102; W. Howard, “Leprosy”, ca. 1861, RCP, OFFIP/4119/103 
8 James Cantlie, Leprosy in Hongkong (Hong Kong: Kelly & Walsh, 1890), 3. Thin’s treatise on leprosy 
reprinted Cantlie’s comments. George Thin, Leprosy (London: Percival and Co., 1891), 54-55. 
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Figure 1. Leprosy by W. Howard, Canton, ca. 1861. 
Sent by Dr. Schetelig of Hong Kong to the Royal College of Physicians.9 
This discrepancy notwithstanding, both Cantlie and the early respondents concurred 
on the racial distribution of the disease. Leprosy was reportedly widespread amongst the 
Chinese populations of southern China and Macao, but European cases of the disease were 
exceptionally rare. Schetelig, for example, reported that only two of the 31 patients in the 
Hospital de São Lázaro in Macao were not Chinese: Jacintha, the matron, and “a Goa man of 
Mozambique extraction”.10 Only one European leprosy sufferer from Hong Kong was reported 
                                                          
9 “Photograph of a case accompanying Dr. Schetelig’s replies to interrogatories re leprosy”, ca. 1861, 
RCP, OFFIP/4119/120. 
10 “Dr. Schetelig’s Answers to Queries on Leprosy”, 5 Mar. 1863, RCP, OFFIP/4119/119, 23-34. 
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during this period. The noted British dermatologist Erasmus Wilson examined a fifty year old 
resident who had contracted “Elephantiasis anaesthetica” – which Wilson identified as a form 
of “leprous affections” – in 1858, shortly after the patient’s departure from the year that he 
left Hong Kong after several years’ of residence.11 This unique case attracted the attention of 
at least some European and Chinese physicians in southern China, though Cantlie seems to 
have been unaware of the case.12 
Leprosy emerged as an acute social and policy issue within the colony in the decade 
after the College’s report. The police were increasingly alarmed by the number of detained 
suspects who appeared to be suffering from the disease.13 Captain Superintendent of Police 
W. M. Deane reported that “the number of Mendicants arrested (558), mostly Lepers, is a 
matter of worthy consideration”.14 The absence of any isolation facilities within the Victoria 
Gaol compounded the police’s fears of contagion – fears based on ignorance, suspicion and 
stigma.15 Deane briefly considered converting Round Island, a small uninhabited island off the 
south coast of Hong Kong Island, into a “Lazarette”, but he dismissed the idea because he 
feared the scheme would burden the colonial authorities with an influx of leprosy sufferers 
from the neighbouring mainland.16 Even in this moment of crisis, the authorities opposed the 
idea of domestic segregation on the basis that the colony’s isolation facilities would serve as 
a beacon to sufferers on the mainland. 
Instead this crisis prompted the establishment of a practice that would define the 
colony’s management of the disease through much of the early 20th century. Sir Daniel Brooke 
Robertson, H.M. Consul in Canton, successfully negotiated “the speedy transmission of lepers 
to Canton” with the permission of Governor General of Guangdong Province.17 ‘The 
Deportation and Conditional Pardons Consolidation Ordinance’ (1876) officially sanctioned 
this arrangement: 
                                                          
11 Erasmus Wilson, On Diseases of the Skin. A System of Cutaneous Medicine, 6th ed. (London: John 
Churchill & Sons, 1867), 633-34. The Committee’s report included Wilson’s ‘Observations on the true 
leprosy or elephantiasis, with cases’. Eyre and Spottiswoode, Report on Leprosy, 231-44. 
12 For instance a Chinese physician with the Chinese Maritime Customs Service in Canton cited this 
case several years later. F. Wong, “Memorandum on Leprosy,” Customs Gazette, Medical Reports, no. 
6 (Sept. 1873): 41-47, 44. Cantlie, however, claimed that he had never “heard of any European being 
attacked in China, nor have I yet seen a case amongst the Portuguese”, though he knew of a young 
English girl suffering from the disease who passed through the colony en route from Singapore (italics 
added). Cantlie, Leprosy in Hongkong, 28. 
13 “The Leper Nuisance,’ Police Intelligence, China Mail, Sept. 7, 1877, 2; “A Leper,” Police Intelligence, 
China Mail, Oct. 15, 1880, 3; “Lepers,” Police Intelligence, China Mail, July 10, 1882, 3. 
14 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Feb. 8, 1873, Hong Kong Government Records Online (hereafter 
HKGRO), 39-44, 40. 
15 The Gaol was not equipped with a ‘Leper Cell’ and an ‘Itch Cell’ until the 1880s. E. J. Ackroyd, 
Sessional Papers: Report of the Commission Appointed to Consider the Question of Insufficient 
Accommodation in Victoria Gaol, June 1, 1886, HKGRO, 150. 
16 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Feb. 8, 1873, HKGRO, 39-44, 40. 
17 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Nov. 18, 1876, HKGRO, 496; Minute by P. J. Hennessy (Governor), 
11 July 1881, Hong Kong Public Records Office (hereafter HKPRO), HKRS101/1/4/5. Robertson’s reply 
to the Royal College  of Physicians’ indicated his awareness of Canton’s leprosaria and the reported 
regional prevalence of leprosy since the 1860s. Eyre and Spottiswoode, Report on Leprosy, xiv, 76-77. 
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XVI. All persons affected with leprosy are hereby prohibited from residing or being 
within the jurisdiction of this Colony, and all lepers natives of China found in the 
jurisdiction shall be apprehended, and, subject to the order of the officer for the time 
being in command of the Police, be liable to be forthwith sent to Canton, and there 
handed over to the Chinese authorities, and on being found within this Colony a 
second time, shall be liable to deportation by order of the Governor.18 
Whereas clause XV imposed a range of punishments for mendicancy, ranging from a fine 
through hard labour to deportation, clause XVI sanctioned the immediate deportation of all 
Chinese leprosy sufferers; the prospect of non-Chinese leprosy sufferers was not envisioned. 
Within months Deane reported a “marked decrease in the number of Mendicants of this 
class”.19 Cantlie reported that the small community of leprosy sufferers that had established 
itself on the hillsides above Victoria “were disturbed in their retreats, and were expelled to 
the mainland” as a result of this legislation.20 The authorities also penalised those caught 
bringing leprosy sufferers into the colony by boat.21 The ordinance uniquely criminalised those 
who were guilty of nothing more than succumbing to an incurable disease. Once 
apprehended, the fate of these individuals rested in the hands of the police rather those of 
the medical authorities. 
 The ordinance may have dictated an extreme coercive response, but the colony’s 
management of leprosy was haphazard at best. Firstly senior members of the colonial 
administration initially appeared wholly ignorant of the ordinance’s existence. The 
incarceration of Hong A Kat, a convicted larcener who was suspected of suffering from the 
disease, in the early 1880s prompted the Colonial Secretary to suggest that “it would be well 
to have a definite line of action laid down as regards Lepers”.22 Even the Superintendent of 
the Victoria Gaol was under the impression that the deportation of leprosy sufferers to Canton 
– an arrangement which he himself had helped implement – had lapsed.23 Secondly the 
authorities lacked the resources necessary to enforce the ordinance’s extreme measures. 
Indeed they readily acknowledged the impossibility of preventing deported leprosy sufferers 
from returning to the colony.24 A newspaper report on a case in court in 1876 complained: 
                                                          
18 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Dec. 16, 1876, HKGRO, 552. The ‘Amended Ordinance for better 
Securing the Peace of the Colony (1857)’ did not specifically prohibit leprosy sufferers from residing in 
the colony. Hong Kong Government Gazette, July 18, 1857, HKGRO, 2. 
19 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Feb. 10, 1877, HKGRO, 58. 
20 Cantlie, Leprosy in Hongkong, 3. 
21 The Merchant Shipping Consolidation Ordinance was first read in 1874 but wasn’t promulgated 
until 1879. Hong Kong Government Gazette, Jul 18, 1874, HKGRO, 297-325, 319; Hong Kong 
Government Gazette, Dec. 3, 1879, HKGRO, 774-809, 801. 
22 Minute by F. Stewart (Actg. Col. Sec.), 9 July 1881, HKPRO, HKRS101/1/4/5. The Governor had to 
reassure him that the “question of sending Lepers to Canton has been long since settled”. Minute by 
Hennessy, 11 July 1881, HKPRO, HKRS101/1/4/5. 
23 He informed the Governor, “I am glad to find it in life”. Minute by M. S. (Supt., Victoria Gaol), 12 
July 1881, HKPRO, HKRS101/1/4/5. 
24 “The Leper Nuisance,” Sept. 7, 1877, 2; “A Leper Driven to Steal,” Supreme Court, China Mail, Jan. 
21, 1885, 3; P. B. C. Ayres, Sessional Papers: The Colonial Surgeon’s Report for 1889, June 27, 1890, 
HKGRO, 346. 
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It appears the Government are continually deporting lepers from the colony to their 
native places in passage boats… These lepers had been up to their native place at the 
expense of the Government, and the passenger junks have driven a flourishing trade 
in bringing them back to the colony.25 
This “joke” was still current more than half a century later.26 Junk-masters either flouted the 
prohibition on transporting leprosy sufferers to the colony or else feigned ignorance about 
the penalties for doing so.27 Others were simply unaware that their passengers were suffering 
from the disease. The colony’s porous border heightened local fears about the dangers of an 
unregulated influx of Chinese leprosy sufferers from the mainland. 
The delay in establishing a “Leper Cell” in the Victoria Gaol, as promised by the 
Attorney General, renewed the police’s fears about the threat of contagion.28 Deane 
complained that Hong A Kat had been returned to the police cells because of his condition: 
I desire respectfully, but most strongly to point out that the Police Cells are not proper 
places in which to detain Lepers or mendicants for more than the necessary time to 
send them before a Magistrate.29 
This anxiety was so acute that the Acting Police Magistrate exceeded his powers by personally 
ordering the deportation of a leprosy sufferer who had already been deported once before 
because he considered “a prompt dealing with the case desirable”.30 The Attorney General 
and the Acting Colonial Secretary were forced to remind him that the power to order the 
banishment of a returned ‘deportee’ rested solely with the Governor in Council.31 The 
establishment of a “Leper Cell” within the city’s Gaol may have assuaged some of Deane’s 
concerns, but the necessity of isolating leprosy prisoners in this manner contributed to 
overcrowding within the Gaol’s other cells, much to the annoyance of the Superintendent.32 
The disease thus went from a rarity to a significant social and policing problem within the 
space of a decade. 
 
Dr. Cantlie and the trope of the “El Dorado of the leprous Chinaman from the mainland” 
 Cantlie was responsible for influentially articulating local and Imperial fears about 
Chinese migrants. His dire warnings about the overwhelming threat of diseased Chinese 
migrants and the dangers of inter-racial intercourse stoked Imperial fears of degeneration and 
                                                          
25 “Leper Nuisance,” Hongkong Daily Press, June 16, 1876, 2. 
26 “The Leper World: Leprosy in Hongkong,” Leper Quarterly 13, no. 3 (1939): 125-126, 125. 
27 “Bringing Lepers into the Colony,” Police Intelligence, China Mail, June 15, 1876, 2; “Leper 
Nuisance,” June 16, 1876, 2. 
28 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Nov. 18, 1876, HKGRO, 496. 
29 H. M. Deane (Capt. Supt. Police) to F. Stewart (Actg. Col. Sec.), 9 July 1881, HKPRO, HKRS101/1/4/5. 
30 J. Francis (Actg. Police Magistrate) to Stewart, 13 Aug. 1880, HKRPO, HKRS101/1/4/4, 72-73.  
31 Stewart to J. Francis (Judge), Ng. Choy and (Actg. Police Magistrates), 25 Aug. 180, HKPRO, 
HKRS101/1/4/5. Lum A Ming was allegedly willing to depart the colony, having merely returned to 
collect “some small sum of money and other property taken from him in the Gaol which had been 
detained when he was discharged”. Francis to Stewart, 31 Aug. 1880, HKPRO, HKRS101/1/4/4, 71. 
32 Ackroyd, Sessional Papers: Report of the Commission, June 1, 1886, HKGRO, 150. 
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struck at the heat of Hong Kong’s fears of internal and external corruption.33 Until now, 
however, the scholarly emphasis on his two major publications on the subject – his pamphlet 
Leprosy in Hongkong (1890) and his prize-winning Report On The Conditions Under Which 
Leprosy Occurs in China, Indo-China, Malaya, The Archipelago, and Oceania (1897) – has 
ignored how his formative experiences in Hong Kong impacted upon his conceptualisation of 
the disease. Leung for instance argued that Cantlie’s earlier pamphlet reflected contemporary 
Chinese rumours that leprosy was spread in Hong Kong through “lascivious” sexual relations 
between white men and Chinese women.34 In fact he initially expressed serious doubts the 
about sexual transmission of the disease.35 Yet his position on the matter underwent a 
complete volte-face within the space of just five years. In his later work he not only concluded 
that leprosy was a sexually-transmitted disease, he also overturned his previous opinion 
regarding the threat from “single coitus”.36 Cantlie’s first-hand observations in a Cantonese 
and a Macanese leprosaria had a profound impact upon his beliefs about the transmission of 
the disease and, more importantly, upon his recommendations for the colony’s management 
of leprosy.37 
By his own admission, Cantlie had little prior experience of the disease, save for a few 
cases he had witnessed in Egypt in 1883.38 Stationed in Hong Kong from 1887 to 1896, his 
work exposed him to several Chinese cases of the disease, some of whom he kept under 
observation for several years, and details of which he shared on numerous occasions with the 
newly-formed Hong Kong Medical Society (see fig. 2).39 As we shall with regard to malaria, this 
society served as a vibrant forum for the dissemination of local research and scientific debate. 
                                                          
33 Edmond, Leprosy and Empire, 106-107, 124-126; Rod Edmond, “Returning Fears: Tropical Disease 
and the Metropolis,” in Tropical Visions in an Age of Empire, eds. Felix Driver and Luciana Martins, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 189; See Leung, Leprosy in China, 138, 143, 150, 283n85. 
34 Leung attributed these comments to Cantlie’s earlier pamphlet on Hong Kong but actually cited his 
later report. Leung, Leprosy in China, 150, 283fn85. 
35 Cantlie declared that there was no evidence to indicate that the disease could be “carried by a 
single coitus”. Moreover he raised doubts about the “actual sexual connection” in reported cases of 
European women contracting the disease from their Chinese husbands, primarily in Australia. Cantlie, 
Leprosy in Hongkong, 28, 43-44. 
36 James Cantlie, ed., Report On The Conditions Under Which Leprosy Occurs in China, Indo-China, 
Malaya, The Archipelago, and Oceania. Compiled Chiefly During 1894 (London: MacMillan and Co., 
1897), 16-17.  
37 I dispute Leung’s contention that Wong Foon, the Western-educated Cantonese medical officer of 
the Imperial Maritime Customs whose ‘Memorandum on Leprosy’ (1873) cited the case of a European 
leprosy sufferer from Hong Kong, convinced Cantlie of the sexual transmission of the disease. Leung, 
Leprosy in China, 150. 
38 Cantlie, Leprosy in Hongkong, 7. 
39 Ibid., 7; Hong Kong Medical Society, Minutes of Meetings, 1886-1912, ca. summer/autumn 1887; 
Ibid., ca. autumn/winter 1888; Ibid., 9 Feb. 1888; James Cantlie, “Six cases of leprosy treated with 
Koch’s tuberculin. 1899-94”, MS 1468, Wellcome Library, London (hereafter Wellcome).The society 
was later renamed the Hong Kong and China Branch of the British Medical Association. The original 
bound volume of the Society’s minutes is in poor condition, but a photocopied volume is available at 
the Main Library of the University of Hong Kong. This dissertation refers to the meetings by date, as 
neither the original nor the photocopied volumes contained page numbers. Due to the condition of 
the original volume, some dates are approximate. 
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Many of Cantlie’s colleagues had first-hand experience of treating the disease.40 Indeed 
Patrick Manson claimed to have “obtained in great profusion a bacterium” similar to that 
described by Hansen “by cultivating the juice expressed from leper tubercles” whilst serving 
as an Imperial Maritime Customs Officer in Amoy (Xiamen) in the late 1870s.41 But in 1889, 
prompted in part by growing Imperial concerns about leprosy in India, Cantlie embarked on a 
new project analysing the records of 125 leprosy sufferers from the recently-opened Alice 
Memorial Hospital.42 His investigation revealed only two cases that had originated in colony – 
one from Hong Kong and one from British Kowloon – whilst a third came from the Chinese 
city of Kowloon. The remaining cases were drawn from all over south-eastern China.43 
Consequently Cantlie opened his Leprosy in Hongkong with a dire warning: 
At a time when all the world is bestirring itself in regard to the disease “Leprosy”, and 
more especially as the English Government is about to deal with leprosy in India, it 
behoves us here in China to claim the ear of the Home Government, to protect us 
against the dangers we run. 
The free port of Hongkong offers hospitality to the Chinese of all classes; but by 
no class is the opportunity more likely to be embraced than by lepers, who, driven 
from their relations and friends by virtue of their having the disease, are reduced to a 
state of destitution, and seek refuge in Hongkong in preference to entering one of the 
wretched leper villages of China. Hither lepers come, in the hope of obtaining 
employment, in the hope of getting cured by some of the European doctors, or of at 
least obtaining food by begging in the streets. There is no law against begging in 
Hongkong, therefore the streets of the City with its rich inhabitants are as an El 
Dorado to the leprous Chinaman from the mainland.44 
Leprosy was conceived as an imported social problem within the British colony. Cantlie’s 
warning fuelled contemporary Imperial fears about the threat of infection. The year 1889 was 
marked by the death of Father Damien, the Belgian missionary who contracted leprosy whilst 
treating the sufferers in the Hawaiian asylum of Molokai; the publication of Wrights’s Leprosy 
an Imperial Danger; the establishment of the National Leprosy Fund; and the formation of the 
Leprosy Investigation Commission.45 
                                                          
40 Hong Kong Medical Society, Minutes of Meetings, spring/summer 1887. See also Ibid., 10 June 
1892; Ibid., 16 Dec. 1893. 
41 Patrick Manson, “Notes on Some Skin Diseases,” Imperial Maritime Customs, Medical Reports 2, no. 
21 (Mar. 1881): 27-36, 27n1. See also Max Durand-Fardel, La Chine et les Conditions Sanitaires des 
Ports ouvert au commerce étranger (Paris : Librairie J.B. Baillière & Fils, 1877), 173-177. 
42 Cantlie, Leprosy in Hongkong, 1-2. He claimed that no records were available from the Tung Wah 
Hospital because this Chinese hospital did not regularly keep such information, and because “it may 
be considered important to conceal the prevalence of a disease introduced by the Chinese amongst 
the English community in Hongkong”. The Alice Memorial Hospital, named in memory of Dr. Kai Ho 
Kai, one of the colony’s most prominent Chinese members, was opened in the same year as Cantlie’s 
arrival in Hong Kong. 
43 Ibid., 24. 
44 Ibid., 1. He shared his pamphlet with his colleagues prior to publication. His paper was well received 
in Britain. Hong Kong Medical Society, Minutes of Meetings, 5 Oct. 1889; Ibid., 9 Nov. 1889; “Reviews 
and Notices,” British Medical Journal, Oct. 11, 1890, 849. 
45 Jane Buckingham, Leprosy in Colonial South India: Medicine and Confinement (Chippenham: 
Palgrave, 2002), 152-153; Jo Robertson, “In Search of M. leprae: Medicine, Public Debate, Politics and 
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In spite of his dire introductory warnings, Cantlie rejected a sweeping policy of 
immediate deportation. For a start his analysis of twenty of the most recent cases revealed 
that only a quarter of them had definitely developed the disease before their arrival in the 
colony. International uncertainty regarding the incubation of the disease meant that further 
analysis was pure speculation. On the basis of this sample group Cantlie suggested that the 
proportion of locally-contracted cases ranged anywhere between one in eight and two in 
three. Nevertheless even the most conservative estimate demonstrated that leprosy “can be, 
and is, ‘caught’ in Hongkong” – a fact which had “a most important bearing as to the right we 
have to send our lepers back to the mainland”.46 Cantlie concluded that the government 
therefore had a duty to provide for all its British subjects, irrespective of their nationality: 
If the Government are to act energetically by deportation of all Chinese lepers, be 
they British subjects or not, it would be acting ruthlessly, and to my mind, 
dishonestly.47 
Cantlie recognised that the disease could be contracted locally, and he presaged an increasing 
number of Chinese cases who would be able to claim British citizenship, either by dint of their 
birth or their prolonged residence within the colony.48 Citizenship rather than race thus 
dictated the government’s duty of care. He suggested that the Government could secure 
permission from the Chinese authorities to establish a “leper retreat…for British subjects, be 
they Chinese or Foreigners” on a small neighbouring island – a suggestion that echoed Captain 
Deane’s tentative proposal for Round Island.49 Alternatively he advised the government to 
continue deporting Chinese leprosy sufferers to the mainland on condition that the 
government supported the maintenance of British subjects for a “definite period”.50 Either 
way he acknowledged that the government had a duty of care towards all of the colony’s 
British subjects. 
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Figure 2. A Kiu – Case VI. One of Cantlie’s Leprosy Patients in Hong Kong, ca. 1890.51 
 
Cantlie’s ideas about prevention underwent a profound change as a result of his 
increasingly-ambitious research in the region. According to his biographers, he allegedly 
contacted Sir Joseph Fayrer, a noted British physician, about the possibility of conducting an 
extensive first-hand survey of leprosaria throughout the Far East.52 Though this project never 
materialised, Cantlie and his wife decided to bring in the New Year by visiting leprosaria in 
Canton and Macao; his friend Sun Yat-sen accompanied them as an interpreter in Canton.53 
Cantlie claimed that the visit provided an ideal opportunity to contrast Chinese and European 
segregation methods. Following the visit he concluded: 
The example of the Chinese leper asylum is the antithesis of what is desirable – money 
“squeezing”, fornication, vice & corruption sum up the life in this “philanthropic” 
home. The system – if such [illegible] can be called – instead of being a means of 
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arresting the spread of leprosy is, as we have shown, a hot bed for the incubation, 
growth & spread of leprosy.54 
By contrast he upheld the settlement in Macao as a model of European methods, because it 
“fulfils all the requirements; not only is segregation absolute, but celibacy is the law”.55 
Contemporary international medical discourse advocated sexual segregation as the only 
means of controlling the disease.56 Segregation on Macao was absolute. Not only were the 
patients confined to an island from which there was “no escape for a leper unless aided by 
friends”, but the Portuguese authorities had recently established a separate asylum for female 
patients on a neighbouring island.57 
Yet the Cantlies’ visit to the European-style leprosarium in Macao was profoundly 
disturbing. Cantlie reported that some forty men and boys lived on the desolate and isolated 
island. On arrival the Cantlies found the group at solemn prayer. Whereas Cantlie and his wife 
had marvelled at the air of joy in the Cantonese settlement, they were deeply troubled by 
what they saw: 
On leaving the Macao settlement we felt depressed & uncommunicative, when we 
did find our tongues, it was in short sentences expressing how glad we were to be 
away. We agreed that it was the most depressing sight we had ever seen & believed 
the vision of the place would haunt us. It was a realisation of what many have tried to 
depict in fiction. The hopelessness described in Paradise Lost, the Inferno, or in Letters 
from Hell, was here a reality, a picture of a living inferno.58 
The experience was so unsettling that the group abandoned its intention of visiting the 
adjacent island settlement for female leprosy sufferers.59 Cantlie and his wife were so moved 
by their visit that they returned to Macao in the summer to offer free consultations. They also 
visited the leprosy sufferers on the island of “St. John”, where they distributed provisions and 
operated on the most afflicted sufferer.60 In her biography of her grandparents, Jean Cantlie 
Stewart claimed that the Cantlies established the settlement on the island of St. John within 
a few months of their visit to the leprosaria in Canton and Macao. The China Mail allegedly 
“‘blew’ the story” of their involvement that summer. Moreover she cited an address to the 
Royal Society of Queensland by Cantlie’s friend S. J. B. Skertchly as evidence that this island 
was actually the island of Cheung Chau, i.e. a small island just off Hong Kong (and, ironically, 
                                                          
54 Cantlie, “Two leper settlements in China”, MS 1477, Wellcome. The absence of any segregation of 
the sexes in this asylum doubtless contributed to the erosion of Cantlie’s doubts about the sexual 
transmission of the disease. For instance he observed that, “The Cantonese village annuals any 
possibility of good by allowing free entrance & exit to all and sundry; … the non-leprous and leprous 
dwelling alongside each other; marriage & concubinage are allowed; a leper man living with his 
healthy wife and non-leprous children”. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Edmond, Leprosy and Empire, 99; Alison Bashford, Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of 
Colonialism, Nationalism and Public Health (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 83-88. 
57 Cantlie, “Two leper settlements in China”, MS 1477, Wellcome. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 “Local and General,” China Mail, June 27, 1891, 2. 
- 42 - 
 
just to the south of Hay Ling Chau).61 Significantly Stewart implied that the colony’s first 
domestic leprosarium was established in the early 1890s on an island only 10 miles west of 
Hong Kong Island (map 4). 
 
 
Map 4. The Islands of Dom João (Blue) and Cheung Chau (Red).62 
I disagree with Stewart’s identification of the island and I seriously doubt her claims 
regarding the Cantlies’ involvement in establishing a leprosarium. Firstly The China Mail article 
which allegedly ‘blew the story’ was in fact drawn from The Macaense, a newspaper published 
in Macao. Rather than sensationally revealing the Cantlies’ involvement in establishing an 
island settlement, the article soberly reported that the Cantlies went to the island of “St. John” 
whilst visiting Macao – visiting Cheung Chau would have been far more convenient from Hong 
Kong, and doubtless would have been reported by one of the colony’s newspapers, such as 
The China Mail, rather than a Macanese newspaper (map 4).63 Secondly neither Cantlie nor 
any of his colleagues ever mentioned his involvement in establishing a leprosarium of any 
kind, though it is certainly possibly that he and his wife entertained the hope of doing so.64 
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The island of St. John was thus in fact Dom João Island, home to the leprosarium for male 
patients that the Cantlie’s had visited earlier that year.65 Ultimately James Cantlie’s dreams of 
establishing an asylum envisioned along European lines never materialised, but were instead 
forever haunted by memories of the ‘living inferno’. 
 Cantlie’s collaborative investigation with Skertchly represented his most ambitious 
investigation into leprosy. In February 1894 news reached him that the National Leprosy 
Commission had announced a competition for the best reports on the prevalence or 
diminution of leprosy in different parts of the world.66 With less than nine months to complete 
his assignment, he drafted a circular of nine questions (in English and in French), which he 
despatched to 383 to European “doctors in general practice, missionary doctors, consuls, 
mission bodies, customs and commissioners” throughout East Asia, Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific; he dismissed non-European medical men as ignorant.67 Cantlie collated his own 
observations from his visits to Canton and Macao with the responses that arrived in time and 
he also appended an extract from his Leprosy in Hongkong.68 Cantlie’s Report On The 
Conditions Under Which Leprosy Occurs was remarkable in its scope, and it was one of only 
five papers that received the National Leprosy Fund’s prize of 50 guineas.69 
His Report held coolies from China’s southeastern provinces responsible for spreading 
leprosy throughout much of the Pacific. Moreover he posited Hong Kong at the epicentre of 
this pandemic.70 Whereas Cantlie’s earlier work on Hong Kong had advocated the need for 
domestic segregation, Cantlie now advocated that “deportation, and not segregation, is the 
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proper method of dealing with the Chinese leper in (to him) foreign countries”.71 Strikingly the 
passages he extracted from his earlier pamphlet did not include his discussion on the relative 
merits of domestic segregation, nor did he repeat his recommendation that the government 
of Hong Kong should establish its own island ‘leper retreat’.72 Instead he called on Britain and 
all the other imperial powers to exert greater control over the migration of Chinese coolies, 
and specifically drew Hong Kong’s attention to the fact that, “If not legally compelled to 
interfere, surely a moral duty is incumbent upon the ruling power under whose control is the 
cleansing of this foul region”.73 Cantlie’s earlier objection to the repatriation of foreign cases 
of leprosy also seems to have softened. At a meeting of the colony’s medical society his peers 
advised him to admit the “Roumanian woman suffering from ‘Anæsthetic Leprosy’” to the 
Government Civil Hospital because “in all likelihood the Government would take the 
necessary steps & have her transferred to her own country”.74 Ultimately the government 
remained dedicated to its deportation policy and staunch opposition to domestic segregation 
– a dual policy that Cantlie had once considered ruthless and dishonest, but now 
wholeheartedly endorsed.75 
 
Dual Policy: Au Tau and Deportation 
The acquisition of a Chinese village of leprosy sufferers at the turn of the century 
appeared to mark a shift in the government’s management of the disease. With the extension 
of colonial rule into the New Territories in 1898, Hong Kong unwittingly assimilated a small 
village of twenty-two leprosy sufferers near Au Tau.76 The Governor himself visited this 
“wretched settlement”.77 By sheer coincidence the acquisition of Au Tau coincided with the 
Secretary of State’s endorsement of domestic segregation, as recommended by the First 
International Leprosy Conference (Berlin, 1897).78 As Secretary of State, Joseph Chamberlain 
favoured plans for “regular leper communities where, as far as possible, family life can be 
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enjoyed, and the atmosphere of home may prevail over that of the prison”.79 Governor Blake 
promptly instructed the Public Works Department to erect twelve wooden huts on the hill 
opposite the sufferers’ village; the only other permanent buildings that were erected in the 
New Territories during this period were seven new police stations, including one at Au Tau. 
Ostensibly the scheme relocated Au Tau’s leprosy sufferers away from a plot of swampy land 
– at a time, as we shall see in chapter four, when the authorities were investigating the 
prevalence of malaria-carrying mosquitoes in the New Territories. The move also enabled the 
authorities to encircle the village with a bamboo fence, though this served primarily to 
delineate, rather than rigorously segregate, the community.80 
Blake envisioned the community’s continued reliance on the charity of the local 
Chinese villagers.81 A newspaper correspondent who visited the site shortly afterwards 
lamented that the huts actually appeared deserted: 
You cannot hustle the East, and even the leper of the East refuses to be hustled into 
new tracks by a benevolent government… [T]he fresh whitewash showed that this 
benevolent care for the Au Tau Leper was unappreciated, and the missionary effort 
of the Hongkong Government in this obscure corner of the King’s dominion must be 
pronounced a failure.82 
Despite the community’s initial rejection of the government’s support, the Government 
Medical Officer in the New Territories nevertheless paid weekly visits and the group received 
provisions from the local police station.83 Au Tau thus represented the colony’s first domestic 
government-supported community of leprosy sufferers – a fact that has long since been 
forgotten. Moreover the village’s pre-colonial origins strongly suggest that this asylum 
originally resembled a “traditional” Chinese asylum.84 My research has thus uncovered a 
unique example of a Chinese leprosarium that lay beyond Leung’s tripartite spectrum. 
 The authorities made no attempt, however, to incorporate the Au Tau settlement into 
the existing framework for dealing with leprosy sufferers. Between 1899 and 1912, over forty 
prisoners suffering from leprosy were discharged from the Victoria Gaol and sent to the 
mainland, at least 8 of whom were specifically sent to a “Leper Home” in Canton.85 The 
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Registrar General’s Office and the Tung Wah Hospital also deported thirty-two female leprosy 
sufferers during this period: two were sent to the Church Missionary Society’s Leper Hospital 
in Pakhoi, four to the Rhenish Leper Asylum at Tungkun, one to the female asylum in Macao, 
and the rest to their relatives or homes on the mainland (map 5). Hong Kong’s relationships 
with these mainland institutions complicate Leung’s tripartite conceptualisation of Chinese 
leprosaria by highlighting a distinctive sub-set of “missionary” leprosaria that accommodated 
deported patients. By contrast only five leprosy sufferers were admitted to Au Tau during the 
first decade of the 20th century (table 2.1). Their unique fate did not, however, represent a 
new colonial policy: their admission was simply a matter of convenience, all five of them being 
nearby residents of the Au Tau settlement. 
Table 2.1. Leprosy Deportations and Admissions, 1899-1912.86 
Year 
Deported to China 
from the Victoria 
Goal 
Deported to China by the 
Registrar General & the 
Tung Wah Hospital 
Admitted to the 
Leprosy Village at 
Au Tau 
1899  1  
1900    
1901 6 1  
1902 20   
1903 8   
1904 n/a†   
1905    
1906    
1907 3  3 
1908   2 
1909 3   
1910  18  
1911 4 16  
1912  4  
 
 The authorities thus continued to rely primarily on deportation rather domestic 
segregation. In 1904, for instance, W. V. M. Koch, the medical officer in charge of the Victoria 
Gaol reported: 
It seems a pity that such cases cannot be properly isolated and treated in this Colony, 
but there seems to be great aversion and fear of this disease among the people, who 
I understand regard it as highly contagious.87 
The absence of any reference to the settlement at Au Tau is telling given that Koch had 
previously served as a temporary medical superintendent in a leprosarium in Trinidad.88 The 
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government’s limited support for the Au Tau leprosy village supplemented rather than 
supplanted the government’s deportation policy. 
The official marginalisation of the Au Tau settlement stood in stark contrast to the 
growth of popular interest in the efforts of European doctors and missionaries in neighbouring 
Guangdong Province. For instance The China Mail’s correspondent in Canton encouraged the 
government in Hong Kong to support the efforts of Dr. Razlag, an Austrian-American 
missionary who ran a leprosarium in Canton; at least one of his patients was born in the 
colony.89 The correspondent also announced the dedication of a new “Leper Church” next to 
a Cantonese leprosy village run by Dr. Beattie of the American Presbyterian Mission.90 The 
local press enabled the American Presbyterian Mission to elicit financial and material 
donations from European and Asian individuals, clubs, schools and communities in Hong Kong, 
Canton and Macao. Beattie used The China Mail as a vehicle to appeal for subscriptions to his 
‘Canton Lepers’ Fund’ in the winter of 1903-1904.91 When the subscription list was re-
launched the following winter, the newspaper’s editors called on the colony’s wealthy Chinese 
community to match the generosity of their European counterparts.92 These donations 
assuaged popular fears about an influx of contagion by ensuring the continued upkeep of the 
very institutions that underpinned the colony’s deportation policy. Sensational reports of 
suicidal leprosy sufferers merely served to heighten the sense of ‘despair’ attendant upon the 
disease.93 Towards the end of the decade the press also helped raise awareness of, and 
generate support for, the Rhenish Mission’s asylum at Tungkun and a Roman Catholic asylum 
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at Sheklung (map 5).94 Hong Kong’s popular support for these institutions complicates our 
understanding of Chinese missionary leprosaria further: as well as distinguishing between 
those “missionary” models that accommodated deported leprosy sufferers and those that 
didn’t, we should also distinguish between those that received popular support from abroad 
and those that relied on local donations. Popular interest in the Tungkun asylum evaporated 
within the space of a few years, possibly as a result of the growth of wartime anti-German 
sentiment, but the asylum at Sheklung, as we shall see, came to play a major role in the 
colony’s management of the disease.  
 
 
Map 5. Mainland Leprosaria.95 
 
Shift in Policy? The Lepers Ordinance (1910) 
The greatest indication that the government was preparing to radically alter the way 
it managed leprosy sufferers came at the end of the decade. The Second International Leprosy 
Conference (Bergen, 1909) reaffirmed segregation as the principal method of controlling the 
disease.96 The following year the Legislative Council in Hong Kong drafted “An Ordinance to 
provide for the segregation and treatment of lepers” (hereafter the ‘Lepers Ordinance 
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(1910)’), allegedly in an effort to align the government’s policy with the conference’s 
recommendations.97 Only one of the draft Ordinance’s fourteen clauses was devoted to the 
deportation of non-British subjects.98 Instead the ordinance formally recognised the 
settlement at Au Tau as a “leper asylum”; empowered the Governor-in-Council to establish 
new asylums; and outlined regulations for the management of those institutions.99 Thus the 
ordinance appeared to endorse the domestic isolation of British subjects, irrespective of their 
ethnicity. Within two months of the Legislative Council’s approval of the ordinance, the 
authorities used the ordinance to appoint the Government Infectious Diseases Hospital at 
Kennedy Town as “a Leper Asylum”.100 This hospital’s designation as an ‘asylum’ was rather 
peculiar. Historically this institution served primarily as a hospital for cases of plague. Even as 
an ‘asylum’, the hospital continued to admit non-leprosy sufferers, and in much greater 
numbers, than leprosy patients (table 2.2). This hospital was therefore certainly not a 
leprosaria in the conventional sense, merely a government-run medical facility that treated 
(but did not confine) leprosy sufferers. 
  
                                                          
97 Hong Kong Hansard, Aug. 4, 1910, HKGRO, 67; Hong Kong Government Gazette (Supplement), Aug. 
5, 1910, HKGRO, 308-310; Hong Kong Hansard, Aug. 18, 1910, HKGRO, 73-75. The Attorney-General 
modelled the ordinance on ordinances in Ceylon and Cyprus; as a former member of the Executive 
Council in Cyprus, he had been responsible for regularly inspecting the island’s leprosy asylums. 
98 Hong Kong Government Gazette (Supplement), Aug. 5, 1910, HKGRO, 308-310, 310. 
99 Ibid., 308-310, 308. 
100 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Oct. 14, 1910, HKGRO, 485; Hong Kong Hansard, Sept. 1, 1910, 
HKGRO, 84-85. 
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Table 2.1. Returns at the Government Infectious Diseases Hospital at Kennedy Town, 1898-1914. 
(R)emaining from previous year, (A)dmissions, and (D)eaths.101 
 
Year 
Leprosy Plague Smallpox Cholera Other 
 R A D R A D R A D R A D R A D 
 1898    n/a 379 310 n/a 70 16     46 2 
 1899    n/a 266 85 n/a 37 7       
 1900  4 1  107 83 3 18 3     32 1 
 1901  1   204 156 1 42 12  15 10 1 1  
 1902     94 80 1 17 3  52 33  42 3 
 1903     301 176 1 37 7  2 1  28 2 
 1904     77 63     5 3  5 4 
 1905 n/a 
 1906 n/a 
 1907  1   16 10  8 1     37 1 
 1908  1   3 3  11 2  3 2  41 7 
 1909        2 2       
“Leper 
Asylum” 
1910  1      9 1  7   2  
1911 1 1      13   1   1  
1912        35 1       
 1913        9        
 
These developments nevertheless appeared to formalise the transition that had been 
under way since the turn of the century. Not only were Au Tau’s leprosy sufferers left 
unmolested, they were actively supported. Not only was the colonial administration prepared 
to designate additional leprosy asylums within the colony, it actually did so. The proximity of 
the Government Infectious Diseases Hospital at Kennedy Town to the city of Victoria – the 
political, economic and social hub of the colony – was surely the harbinger of a positive change 
in popular and official attitudes towards the disease. In reality, the contrary was true. In 
forwarding the draft ordinance to the Colonial Office, Francis May, the Officer Administering 
the Government, openly admitted that, “There is not at present any intention of building a 
Leper Asylum as it is possible that the provision of such an establishment may not be 
necessary”.102 He also declared the government’s intention of dispersing the thirteen 
remaining Au Tau leprosy sufferers to the mainland by threatening them with confinement in 
order to precipitate their departure the mainland.103 The ordinance was thus primarily 
intended to empower the government’s deportation policy. 
The Colonial Office did not object to the policy in principle but raised concerns about 
the legislation’s geo-political ramifications. Hong Kong’s recent geo-political expansion 
complicated the status of those living in the newly-acquired New Territories, including the 
                                                          
101 J. Bell, Sessional Papers: Report of the Acting Principal Civil Medical Officer for the Year 1900, Jan. 
23, 1901, HKGRO, 269. 
102 May to the Earl of Crewe, 10 Sept. 1910, CO129/368/306, 550. He made similar comments during 
the Legislative Council’s second reading of the bill. Hong Kong Hansard, Aug. 18, 1910, HKGRO, 75. 
103 May to the Earl of Crewe, 10 Sept. 1910, CO129/368/306, 550-551. Inexplicably May’s letter 
predated the colony’s appointment of the Government Infectious Diseases Hospital at Kennedy Town 
as a ‘leper asylum’ by just over a month. 
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leprosy sufferers at Au Tau. The Colonial Office debated whether the authorities in Hong Kong 
could legally banish lepers discovered in the New Territories, many of whom had spent the 
last decade living under British rule. One colonial official minuted: 
I don’t think that a Chinaman resident in the New Territory at the time of the transfer 
of that territory to H.M.G. is either a “natural-born” or a “naturalized” British subject 
– but he is a British subject to us – though not so regarded by the Chinese Govt….In 
view of our controversy with China on the question of the nationality of New Territory 
Chinaman, it would be a pity to give our case away by banishing a few lepers who – 
according to our contention – are British subjects.104 
By contrast another official, drawing on Cantlie’s Leprosy in Hongkong, feared that a 
leprosarium would lure “alien lepers” to the colony, adding: “healthy Chinese readily associate 
with and conceal them, so that lepers would enter the Colony and New Territory without 
difficulty”.105 Ultimately the Colonial Office informed Hong Kong that they objected to “the 
banishment of a sick person against his will from British territory to China”, preferring instead 
that the ordinance should enable the Governor to deport leprosy sufferers to specific 
settlements in China.106 
The ‘Lepers Amendment Ordinance (1911)’ was a hollow compromise. The colonial 
administration in Hong Kong amended the controversial clause, such that all non-British 
subjects suffering from the disease were prohibited from entering the colony on pain of 
deportation.107 British subjects were to be isolated within the colony, either in an asylum, or 
else in their own homes providing that the Governor was satisfied that they could provide for 
their own “effective isolation and medical treatment” (as per the original ordinance).108 But 
as far as the colonial authorities were concerned the only “resident lepers”, i.e. British Chinese 
leprosy sufferers, were those living at Au Tau.109 In 1911 the government demolished the 
village, including the buildings that it had erected only a decade previously, and forced the 
thirteen remaining leprosy sufferers to flee to the mainland.110 Subsequent references to the 
village’s destruction by fire absolved the government of closing the settlement.111 The colonial 
administration also rescinded the eighteen-month old appointment of the Government 
                                                          
104 Colonial Office minute, 24 Oct. 1910, TNA, CO129/368/306, 547b. 
105 Ibid, 548b. 
106 The Early of Crewe (Sec. of State for the Colonies) to F. H. May (Officer Administering the 
Government), draft, 4 Nov. 1910, TNA, CO129/368/306, 554. 
107 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Feb. 24, 1911, HKGRO, 56. 
108 Hong Kong Government Gazette (Supplement), Aug. 5, 1910, HKGRO, 309. 
109 Atkinson to (Col Sec.), 19 Apr. 1909, CO129/356/107, 112. 
110 Hong Kong Government, Administrative Reports: Medical and Sanitary Reports, Feb. 18, 1911, 
HKGRO, 51. 
111 Hong Kong Government, Administrative Reports: Medical & Sanitary Report for the Year 1929, 
1930, HKGRO, 20. The fact that Wellington, a medical officer who only arrived in Hong Kong in the 
late 1920s in order to assume the newly-inaugurated position of Director of the Medical and Sanitary 
Services, reported that the huts at Au Tau were “discontinued” suggests that the government’s role in 
dismantling the village was never truly forgotten. A. R. Wellington, Administrative Reports: Medical & 
Sanitary Report for the Year 1931, 1932, HKGRO, 88. 
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Infectious Diseases Hospital at Kennedy Town as a ‘leper asylum’.112 Thus within the space of 
two years the government abolished all of the colony’s existing leprosy settlements, banished 
all known ‘resident’ cases, and criminalised any hope of return. Having expelled all known 
‘sources’ of infection, the authorities presumed that any newly-discovered cases would ipso 
facto be non-residents, and would therefore be liable to deportation.  
 
Foreign and International Philanthropy 
Popular interest in leprosy was renewed by foreign missionaries during the interwar 
period. Wartime inflation left many leprosaria struggling to cope with their expenses.113 Dr. 
Bradley of the Church Missionary Society’s Leper Hospital in Pakhoi therefore attempted to 
elicit donations from Hong Kong by delivering a lecture on the subject to the Helena May 
Institute.114 Bradley tried to dispel the commonly-held “peculiar ideas” about leprosy by 
highlighting the fact that hygienic practices were sufficient to prevent the transmission of the 
disease. He also contrasted British efforts in India with the Chinese government’s total lack of 
concern for its own leprosy sufferers.115 St. Stephen’s Girls’ College, Bishop Lander and his 
wife, and Miss Innes of the Matilda Hospital all responded to Bradley’s call for support by 
donating clothes, medical supplies and money.116 The following year two Cathedral Hall 
concerts were organised in aid of the Pakhoi Hospital, the former presided over by the 
colony’s Bishop, the latter under the patronage of the Governor’s wife.117 Governor Stubbs 
even forwarded a letter from the Sister in charge of the Hospital describing the institution’s 
successful use of Chaulmoogra oil to the Colonial Office.118 Bradley’s lecture did little, 
however, to dispel rumours about an “invasion” of Cantonese leprosy sufferers seeking refuge 
in Hong Kong and Macao.119 
The Principal Civil Medical Officer’s detailed entry on leprosy in his annual report for 1922 
bore testament to the increasing official importance accorded to the disease for the very first 
time. The disease featured in the introduction of this annual report. Dr. Johnson (P.C.M.O.) 
argued that the best hypothesis explaining the disease’s geographical distribution and 
transmission was the consumption of “imperfectly cured or salted fish” – an outdated theory 
advocated by the late Sir Hutchinson.120 The colony’s medical and lay communities were well 
                                                          
112 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Mar. 29, 1912, HKGRO, 182. 
113 “The Leper Hospital at Pakhoi: High Exchange Hampers Medical Missions,” China Mail, Jan. 18, 
1918, 4. 
114 Lady May, the Governor’s wife, founded the institute in 1916 to support women living and working 
away from home. 
115 “Work Among Lepers in China: Dr. Bradley’s Work,” China Mail, Mar. 12, 1919, 4 
116 “Pakhoi Leper Hospital,” Hongkong Daily Press, Mar. 25, 1920, 4. 
117 “Pakhoi Lepers: Successful Cathedral Hall Concert,” China Mail, Dec. 8, 1921, 4. 
118 R. E. Stubbs (Governor) to W. Churchill (Sec. of State for the Colonies), 12 June 1922, TNA, 
CO129/475/225, 376. 
119 The China Mail accused the Morning Post of scare-mongering. “The Morning Post’s Leper Scare,” 
China Mail, Nov. 14, 1921, 4. 
120 Hong Kong Government, Administrative Reports: Medical Report for the Year 1922, 1923, HKGRO, 
11-13, 11. 
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aware of Hutchinson’s research in India and his ‘fish theory’.121 Indeed in 1904 a member of 
the Legislative Council had called for the appointment of an enquiry into Hutchinson’s 
hypothesis, but the Acting Colonial Secretary had informed him that the disease was not 
prevalent in the colony.122 By the 1920s, however, Johnson claimed there was sufficient 
evidence to support the hypothesis, having “seen a fair amount of leprosy in Africa and some 
in China” himself, though others noted that he did not advance any fresh supporting 
evidence.123 
The widely-proclaimed establishment of an imperial effort to eradicate leprosy drew popular 
attention to the lack of parallel efforts within the colony. In the summer of 1923 Lord 
Chelmsford presided over the formation of the British Empire Leprosy Relief Association 
(B.E.L.R.A.).124 The association confidently asserted that a new chaulmoogra oil-based remedy 
would swiftly eradicate the ‘scourge’ of leprosy. B.E.L.R.A.’s announcement of a campaign to 
raise £250,000 to provide better treatment and “to segregate the begging and pauper classes 
who spread infection” made the front page of several of Hong Kong’s newspapers.125 The 
colony’s Medical Officer of Health assured the press that there was “nothing to be scared 
about in Hongkong” as the disease was extremely rare.126 But the discovery of a murdered 
Chinese leprosy sufferer later that year triggered popular concerns about the lack of proper 
treatment facilities in the colony. Dr. Addison, who succeeded Johnson as P.C.M.O., denied 
claims that leprosy sufferers mingled freely with other patients in the colony’s hospitals, 
though he conceded that neither the medical nor police authorities could segregate local 
leprosy sufferers against their will.127 Describing the murder as “undoubtedly the crime of 
some person or persons whose dominant idea was that of self-protection against infection”, 
The Hongkong Telegraph called on the government to emulate practices in Manila by 
providing domestic treatment facilities.128 Significantly these discussions (and the murder) 
came at a critical time for the health authorities: 
So much has been said of late regarding the need of a new Government Department 
charged solely with the care of public health, that we would only add that if such a 
Department be created, as it should be, the question of the isolation and treatment 
of leper patients should be one of the first to be considered, in the task of eliminating 
our past sins of omission.129 
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Although the prosecution of a Chinese woman brought the case of the murdered leprosy 
sufferer to a close, concern about the absence of domestic isolation facilities became more 
pressing.130 
The timing of the murder was doubly unfortunate. Just three months later the colony hosted 
two back-to-back medical conferences during which leprosy prevention and treatment were 
high on the agenda. Some of the most eminent leprologists participated in a joint meeting of 
the colony’s medical society and the China Medical Missionary Association (C.M.M.A.), 
including Henry Fowler of Shanghai and Ernest Muir of the School of Tropical Medicine in 
Calcutta.131 In his ‘A Survey of Leprosy in China’, Fowler repeated the well-established claim 
that leprosy was most widespread in neighbouring Guangdong Province.132 The China Medical 
Journal dedicated its July edition to these leprosy presentations; as we shall see in the next 
chapter, the journal’s editor secured an editorial from Dr. Davis, the International 
Settlement’s Commissioner of Public of Public Health.133 The C.M.M.A.’s seventeenth biennial 
conference, which followed immediately after the joint meeting, included an evening session 
specifically dedicated to “Leper Administration”, chaired by a medical missionary from 
Canton.134 Strikingly neither conference referred to the management of the disease within the 
colony itself, nor did any of the colony’s medical officers play a prominent role in the leprosy 
proceedings. 
The conference provided Rev. John Lake, the founder of the Tai-Kam Leper Colony, 
with an ideal opportunity to raise the profile of his work. Located on a small island to the west 
of Macao, and roughly 80 miles from Hong Kong, the colony was established in 1921 with the 
generous assistance of Wu Ting-fang, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs.135 Prior to the 
conference the colony’s Anglophone press had only referred to Lake’s leprosarium on a 
handful of occasions. Lake’s offer of a guided tour to Muir, his fellow conference delegate and 
a figure whom the local press had taken a keen interest in, kindled the press’s interest.136 The 
China Mail, for instance, published a photograph of a leprosy sufferer along with Lake’s 
interview.137 “A Typical Leper” epitomised the plight of Lake’s colony (fig. 3). This was the first 
photograph of a leprosy sufferer ever to have been published in the colony’s Anglophone 
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press.138 For many of the colony’s residents, this was probably the very first leprosy sufferer 
that they had ever paused to look at. The image’s prominence on the front-page ensured that 
the pitiable condition of China’s leprosy sufferers was inescapable. Whilst Tai-Kam was never 
officially incorporated into Hong Kong’s deportation policy, the colony nevertheless 
maintained important informal links with Tai-Kam’s leprosy sufferers through the early 1930s. 
 
 
Figure 3. A Typical Leper.139 
 
Caring for Hong Kong’s Chinese British Lepers 
 The growing disparity between international efforts to eradicate leprosy and the lack 
of treatment facilities within the colony ensured that the situation was ripe for change. The 
seeds of change were initially sown by the Americans, but harvested by the Chinese. In April 
1926 William Danner, the General Secretary of the American Mission to Lepers, visited the 
colony as part of his tour of southern China.140 At a luncheon hosted by “a body of young 
Chinese professional and business gentlemen interested in cultural and social matters”, 
Danner urged the establishment of a local auxiliary of the recently-established Chinese 
Mission to Lepers (C.M.L.).141 Headquartered in the Chinese city of Shanghai, the C.M.L. hoped 
to improve the plight of China’s leprosy sufferers by actively supporting leprosaria, leprosy 
clinics and dispensaries throughout the country. The China Mail endorsed Danner’s 
recommendation: 
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Should a local auxiliary be formed it should prove but another instance of the 
possibility of Chinese and foreigners combining in a common effort that has nothing 
to do with race, colour or creed; but sets itself to relieve the sufferings of those unable 
to help themselves.142 
Within months of the Mission’s establishment Rev. T. C. Wu, the Mission’s first General 
Secretary, embarked on a four-month tour of south-eastern coastal China with the specific 
aim of establishing auxiliaries in Swatow (Shantou), Canton, Hong Kong, Amoy and Foochow 
(Fuzhou).143 He took advantage of his trip to visit the leprosy asylums at Sheklung, Tungkung 
and Tai-Kam – the latter through the assistance of his former classmate General Chiang Kai-
shek – before travelling to Hong Kong.144 Wu elicited donations from several schools and 
Chinese congregations in the colony.145 More importantly, he announced the establishment 
of the Hongkong Auxiliary of the Chinese Mission to Lepers. 
 The Hongkong Auxiliary of the Chinese Mission to Lepers played a pivotal role in 
challenging the government’s management of the disease. The organising committee 
consisted almost exclusively of members of the Chinese and Eurasian elite (fig. 4).146 For 
instance Li Chor-chi of the Ho Hung Bank served as the Auxiliary’s chairman from its 
establishment until his death in March 1940.147 The Auxiliary’s primary objective was to 
support mainland leprosaria by remitting local donations to the Shanghai headquarters of the 
Chinese Mission to Lepers.148 Li Chor-chi initially reported that, “It is hard to get anything here 
from individuals, so we are relying on such clubs and societies which give regularly to 
charity”.149 The Auxiliary hosted popular fund-raising events, including cinema performances 
and charity concerts, and also raised donations through the colony’s schools; the Auxiliary’s 
Secretary, Prof. Andrew Ling, was headmaster of St. Stephen’s College for Boys.150 From 1929 
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these events focused on supporting Lake’s Tai-Kam leprosy asylum. For instance the colony’s 
support enabled the appointment of a trained medical doctor.151 Li Chor-chi and Lake 
organised a guided tour of the asylum for a group of Hong Kong’s and Canton’s European and 
Chinese elite including: Dr. S. W. Ts’o (O.B.E.), a Chinese member of the Legislative Council 
and a patron of the Auxiliary, as well as his wife and daughter; Dr. Clifts, Visiting Medical 
Officer to the Chinese hospitals in Hong Kong; and Dr. W. W. Cadbury, Superintendent of the 
Canton Hospital.152 In thanking Rev. Lake on the guests’ behalf, Ts’o “stressed that in view of 
the large number of lepers in South China people interested public welfare should take deep 
interest in the treatment of lepers and their isolation in properly designated places”.153 
 
Figure 4. Board of Directors, Hongkong Auxiliary, ca. 1927.154 
  The establishment of the Chinese Mission to Lepers and the Hongkong Auxiliary 
profoundly challenged the colonial government’s reluctance to establish domestic facilities 
for the isolation of leprosy sufferers. Previously, local support for international philanthropic 
organisations such as the American Mission to Lepers and B.E.L.R.A. was limited to the 
European and Chinese elites in Hong Kong. By contrast the Chinese Mission to Lepers 
appealed to the Chinese inhabitants of both the mainland and the neighbouring territories. 
The Auxiliary did not contest deportation and segregation as a means of treating leprosy 
sufferers. Instead they contested the indiscriminate deportation of all Chinese leprosy 
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sufferers, irrespective of whether they were British subjects or not. The Auxiliary’s proactive 
stance threw a critical light on the colonial government’s passive attitude. In the Mission’s 
bilingual mouthpiece, The Leper Quarterly, Jonas A. Lee, a former leprosy sufferer in the 
Pakhoi asylum, lamented: 
The Government [in Hong Kong] is at present adopting on the one hand, an 
unconcerned, “let-things-go” sort of attitude, while, on the other, is trying to keep the 
Colony respectable without incurring whatever expense by passing the great 
economic, sanitary, social and vexing leper problem on, by declaring the Colony a 
forbidden land to lepers.155 
Lee saw the establishment of the Hong Kong Auxiliary as “truly magnificent and 
congratulatory” and he suggested that the establishment of a domestic leprosarium, possibly 
in the New Territories, would “serve as a salutory [sic] incentive to more serious endeavours 
on the part of the Chinese in the Republic”.156 The South China Morning Post’s editorial 
sympathised with Lee’s concerns, but argued that “all charitable efforts in the Colony are 
menaced with abuse” by immigrants from the mainland.157 The trope of the leprous 
mendicant from the mainland and the colonial El Dorado thus continued to underpin the 
colony’s objection to domestic treatment facilities almost forty years after the publication of 
Cantlie’s pamphlet on Hong Kong. 
Internal calls for reform inadvertently entrenched the government’s deportation 
policy by formalising the colony’s relationship with a mainland leprosarium. In July 1930 M. K. 
Lo, a prominent Eurasian lawyer and member of the Sanitary Board, questioned the Board 
about the colony’s management of leprosy.158 The Board’s president stated that whilst a few 
“British subjects” had been treated in the colony’s hospitals, “Chinese subjects are removed 
by the Police to Canton where they are handed over to the local police”.159 Significantly Lo’s 
questions came just over a month after the local press had reported on a court case against a 
deported “leper mendicant” that exemplified the impossibility of enforcing the deportation 
policy.160 But the newly-appointed Director of the Medical & Sanitary Services countered Lo’s 
recommendation that the colony should establish a domestic leprosarium.161 Having visited 
the leprosy asylums at Tai-Kam and Sheklung the year before, Wellington suggested that the 
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government should enter into negotiations with the latter for the transfer of “Hongkong 
lepers”.162 Wellington’s suggestion represented an important shift towards a more coherent 
official deportation policy – one that relied on a single mainland leprosarium. 
As previously noted the colony’s Anglophone press provided a medium for eliciting 
popular colonial support for the Sheklung asylum during the early 20th century. The press had 
demonstrated a keen interest in the Sheklung asylum’s early development and in its founder, 
the Belgian Father Conrardy. A close friend of Father Damien – the Belgian missionary who 
famously succumbed to the disease whilst working in the Molokai leprosarium in Hawaii – 
Conrardy had originally hoped to develop the asylum along the same lines as Molokai.163 
Conrardy’s successor, Father Deswazières highlighted the parallels between the two 
institutions, going so far as to claim, “There is no other Leper Asylum in the world to which it 
may be compared, except that of Molokai, whose daughter it is”.164 But Sheklung’s foreign 
missionaries were forced to make concessions to the Republican authorities in the absence of 
support from the French government. Consequently the Republican government sent the first 
“assignment of lepers”, some 700 men and women, in the autumn of 1913.165 The institution 
rapidly developed into the largest leprosarium in China, housing more than a 1,000 patients 
in the early 1920s. But its reliance on the local Cantonese authorities left the institution 
vulnerable to political instability, and the foreign missionaries regularly appealed for 
donations from abroad.166 Moreover as a Catholic leprosarium, the Sheklung asylum received 
only a limited degree of attention and support from the Protestant Chinese Mission to 
Lepers.167 Wellington’s proposal to support the Sheklung asylum therefore came at a crucial 
moment for the institution. 
 The government’s support for the Sheklung asylum marked an important shift in the 
colony’s deportation policy. Prior to the 1930s the government had largely ignored the 
question of ‘British Chinese’ leprosy sufferers. Now they were incorporated into the 
government’s deportation policy and uniquely maintained in a mainland leprosarium through 
an unprecedented annual grant. The Legislative Council approved a grant of $5,000, though 
the asylum did not receive the sum until the following year “owing to retrenchment” in Hong 
Kong.168 Previously the authorities had only ever paid for the maintenance of a single Chinese 
leprosy sufferer in a mainland institution, principally because he had been a “Hong Kong 
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Government employee”.169 Wellington subsequently affirmed that an “actual liability” rested 
on the government for the maintenance of “British Chinese lepers”.170 Moreover he reported 
that 70 British Chinese leprosy sufferers, roughly equivalent to a tenth of the asylum’s 
population, had been deported to Sheklung in the early 1930s.171 The colonial authorities in 
Hong Kong approved annual grants of $2,500, and later $4,000 during the mid-1930s.172 
Popular fund-raising events, such as a bridge, mah-jong & whist afternoon in a local church 
hall supplemented the government’s financial support for Sheklung.173 According to Leung the 
colony’s support soon accounted for almost 80% of the asylum’s revenue.174 This annual grant-
in-aid therefore formally tied the colony to a mainland institution, though the grant itself bore 
little correlation to the number of deported leprosy sufferers. 
The colonial authorities detained leprosy sufferers “until a certain number had been 
collected” and then conveyed them to Sheklung “in a special [railway] coach or a portion of a 
special coach” which was disinfected before being put back into regular service.175 A 
“responsible person”, presumably a member of the police or medical department, 
accompanied Hong Kong’s leprosy sufferers on their journey; the Railway Ordinance of 1909 
prohibited leprosy sufferers from travelling by themselves.176 The Public Health Department 
in the International Settlement of Shanghai similarly ‘escorted’ leprosy patients by train to the 
Church Missionary Society’s Hospital in Hangzhou during the first half of the 1930s. As we shall 
see in the next chapter, the International Settlement’s support for a mainland leprosarium 
was calculated to the day for every single Settlement patient.  
The government’s support for the Sheklung Asylum failed, however, to placate the 
Sanitary Board. Lo once again motioned for the government to review its objection to the 
establishment of a domestic leprosarium.177 For the first time criticism was levelled at the 
trope of the leprous mendicant from the mainland as an excuse: 
I am aware of the stock argument against the provision of any asylum for lepers in the 
Colony. It is suggested that all the lepers from Kwangtung would flock to it. But is this 
really a valid argument for not providing reasonable facilities in the Colony for the 
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segregation, treatment and cure of lepers, especially as regards those who have been 
resident in the Colony for a substantial period?178 
In contrast to the negative reception that Lo’s motion had received four years earlier, all but 
one unofficial board member supported his proposal. Dr. Li Shu-Fan, for example, argued that 
the indiscriminate segregation of leprosy sufferers induced the concealment of cases. He 
added that unless they were “treated humanely and scientifically as is being done elsewhere 
such as in India and the Phillipines [sic] we are not doing our duty”.179 A combination of 
humanitarian concern and anxiety underpinned the Board’s support for Lo’s motion. The 
temporary detention of leprosy sufferers in the Tung Wah Infectious Diseases Hospital at 
Kennedy Town, pending their transfer to Sheklung by rail, alarmed the Board’s members. One 
member, for instance, reported that as a Justice of the Hospitals he had drawn the Tung Wah 
Directors’ attention “to the improper housing of lepers with other patients”, but lamented 
that leprosy sufferers had been sent to the Tung Wah Infectious Diseases Hospital ever 
since.180 Admissions to the Chinese Hospitals certainly appeared to be on the increase (table 
2.3). Lo’s motion also received the support of the Legislative Council, most notably from Dr. 
Ts’o, who had recently joined the group of prominent European and Chinese residents from 
Hong Kong and Canton on Lake’s guided tour of the Tai-Kam asylum.181 The government finally 
relented, appointing a four-man committee consisting of Wellington (D.M.S.S.), the Secretary 
for Chinese Affairs, Lo and Li Chor-chi, chairman of the Hongkong Auxiliary, to investigate the 
matter.182 
Table 2.2. Return of Leprosy Admissions and Deaths, 1928-35.183 
 Government Hospitals Chinese Hospitals 
 Admissions Total Treated Deaths Admissions Total Treated Deaths 
1928 10 10 0 7 7 0 
1929 15 15 3 5 5 1 
1930 12 13 0 1 1 0 
1931 15 17 0 3 3 0 
1932 21 21 6 14 14 1 
1933 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1934 9 12 0 25 27 1 
1935 3 5 0 21 21 2 
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Shift in Policy? Lepers Ordinance (1935) 
 The four-man committee’s report appeared to prompt a fundamental shift in the 
colony’s management of the disease. With the assistance of Dr. James Maxwell, and Professor 
Dr. B. Nocht, formerly the President of the 1930 International Commission on Leprosy, the 
committee estimated that there were between 800 and 1,000 leprosy sufferers within the 
colony, though they were “conscious that any estimate must be almost purely conjectural”.184 
Tellingly popular revulsion informed the committee’s recommendations just as much as 
contemporary medical thought: 
It might seem attractive simply to recommend the complete repeal of Ordinance 
No.24 of 1910 [the ‘Lepers Ordinance (1910)’] and to allow leprosy to take its chance 
like tuberculosis, the infectivity of which is much greater. But the revolting nature of 
the disease in its advanced stages and the horror with which it is commonly regarded 
seem to us to call for some special legislation alike for the protection of the public 
from distressing spectacles and still more for the amelioration of the leper’s own 
unhappy lot.185 
The committee therefore recommended that a missionary or philanthropic organisation 
should establish a small leprosy asylum in the New Territories. This recommendation ran 
contrary to the entrenched belief that the provision of domestic facilities would turn the 
colony into an El Dorado for destitute leprosy sufferers from the mainland. The committee 
was confident, however, that a residency clause of three years, “regardless of the question of 
British nationality”, would ensure that only “genuine residents” were admitted.186 Non-
residents were to be summarily deported. Moreover the committee conditioned its support 
for voluntary rather than compulsory segregation by suggesting that the Director of Medical 
and Sanitary Services (i.e. Wellington) should be granted the discretion to legally enforce the 
segregation of advanced, destitute cases: “in this we are equally influenced, as above, by the 
rights of the public to be spared the distressing sight of lepers in the streets”.187 
 The committee’s report informed the drafting of new legislation which not only 
repealed the ‘Lepers Ordinance (1910)’, but appeared to mark a new era by sanctioning 
domestic leprosaria. Officially the ‘Lepers Ordinance (1935)’ moved “away from the idea that 
a leper settlement or asylum is to be regarded as a prison and regards it instead as a centre 
for treatment and as a retreat for severe cases or those who are deserted by their relatives”.188 
The Colonial Office not only approved the ordinance, but considered using it as a model for 
Malaya.189 Four months after the ordinance was approved delegates from all over China, 
including twelve from Shanghai, gathered for the Chinese Mission to Lepers’ Second National 
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Leprosy Conference (Canton, 1935).190 The Mission explained that the primary reason for 
hosting the conference in Canton was “to call the attention of the authorities of South China 
to the grave situation of leprosy in their territory”.191 Although this critical international 
spotlight focused primarily on mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao were also under 
scrutiny by sheer dint of their proximity.192 Whereas the subject of Hong Kong was markedly 
absent from the joint medical conferences that the colony had hosted in 1925, as well as from 
the C.M.L.’s First National Leprosy Conference (Shanghai, 1932), this time the colony took to 
the stage. Wellington informed his fellow conference delegates that the colony’s leprosy 
legislation had been “radically changed” with the introduction of a new ordinance that 
provided for “the same sympathetic treatment of lepers as in the case of tuberculosis”.193 He 
also announced that the colony planned to establish a leprosarium that would “adequately 
provide for all lepers within the Colony”.194 The president of Chinese Mission to Lepers 
referred to the Ordinance as an “encouraging” sign.195  
In reality the ‘Lepers Ordinance (1935)’ drew heavily on the old ordinance, whilst 
efforts to establish a domestic leprosarium soon faltered. For instance, the Governor-in-
Council retained the power to appoint leprosy asylums or hospitals; to enact regulations 
concerning their management; and to banish alien leprosy sufferers.196 Obsolete clauses, such 
as the reference to the Au Tau settlement, were dropped.197 The ‘radical’ changes were limited 
to the inclusion of a clause detailing the appointment of visiting justices of the peace and the 
removal of the prohibition against the establishment of private asylums. The latter change 
was motivated by the government’s desire to relegate the responsibility of establishing and 
managing a domestic leprosarium to a missionary or philanthropic organisation.198 The 
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government initiated discussions with the Canadian Sisters of the Immaculate Conception, 
who now ran the Sheklung asylum, but the scheme was deemed prohibitively expensive: 
But as it would have involved Government in an initial expenditure of $50,000 on 
buildings alone for only twenty inmates, it did not seem that the scheme was one 
which should be embarked upon in the midst of a depression. It has therefore been 
decided not to proceed with the home until times have improved.199 
Instead the Legislative Council approved an increase in the annual grant to Sheklung – a 
decision that predated the conference in Canton by a month.200 Wellington made no mention 
of this fact in his address, though he must have been aware of it. Instead he simply stated that 
the location and the degree of co-operation between the government and missionary 
organisations had yet to be settled.201 At a stroke the Council had rendered much of the 
‘radically’ new ordinance void. 
 
“Open House” at Hong Kong’s Leprosarium 
 Official and popular concerns about unregulated communities of leprosy sufferers 
within the colony undermined the government’s refusal to implement the new ordinance. 
From the mid-1930s the medical authorities relied increasingly on the Tung Wah Infectious 
Diseases Hospital at Kennedy as a temporary detention centre for the colony’s leprosy 
sufferers, pending transfers to Sheklung.202 Established in 1902 for the “herbal treatment of 
smallpox cases”, the hospital had recently fallen into a state of disrepair.203 By the time the 
colonial authorities secured the Tung Wah Hospital Committee’s permission for the hospital 
to serve as a “refuge for lepers”, Wellington reported that the buildings were without heating 
and running water and the only staff consisted of a Chinese coolie caretaker and an amah.204 
Indeed Wellington reported: 
There being no trained staff resident and the control being such as it is there must be 
grave doubts regarding the efficiency of the disinfection processes and the means 
taken to prevent dissemination of disease by patients, contacts and formites [sic]…. 
…There can be no doubt that conditions at this so called hospital are most 
unsatisfactory both from the point of view of the public and the patients. For some 
time past it has been badly upkept and it is now in a very delapidated [sic] state and 
unworthy to be called a hospital. As an institution for the segregation and treatment 
of the infectious sick it has outlived its usefulness and is now obsolete.205 
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Nevertheless the colonial authorities admitted 44 leprosy sufferers to this temporary 
detention facility in 1935, at least a quarter of whom were still there the following year (see 
table 2.4). Lo’s ignorance of this arrangement is striking given that the government’s 
negotiations with the Tung Wah Hospital Committee took place just a few months after Lo 
and the other members of the four-man committee published their report.206 The fact that 
Wellington hoped for a revival of the scheme for a domestic leprosarium run by the Sisters of 
the Immaculate Conception suggests that the Tung Wah Infectious Diseases Hospital was 
viewed as a temporary expedient. Moreover the authorities were probably anxious to avoid 
sparking popular fears about contagion by publicising the hospital’s new role, especially given 
the institution’s dilapidated condition and its proximity to the city of Victoria. 
 Despite the existence of temporary accommodation for leprosy sufferers in the Tung 
Wah Hospital at Kennedy Town, rumours of unregulated communities of leprosy sufferers 
abounded, prompting one residents’ association to take action. The press reported rumours 
of a “colony” of leprosy sufferers living in Sham Shui Po in northwestern Kowloon. The 
Hongkong Daily Press reported the rumours as false but the Hong Kong Sunday Herald’s 
informant sensationally reported that there was a “definite ‘colony’ of lepers” that mingled 
freely with the local population under the cover of darkness.207 Wellington’s deputy anxiously 
sought to reassure the general public (and the press) that the rumours were false; that leprosy 
did not pose a public threat; and that leprosy sufferers were either admitted to the ‘Leper 
Hospital’ at Kennedy Town (and thence to the Sheklung Asylum) or else treated as out-
patients.208 But the General Committee of the Kowloon Residents’ Association (K.R.A.), of 
which Li Chor-chi was a member, was so alarmed by the rumours that it formally called upon 
the medical and sanitary authorities to take immediate action.209 Dr. Chau of the Urban 
Council questioned the Council’s chairman about the government’s response to the rumoured 
‘colony’ at Shamshuipo, and about its management of leprosy more generally.210 According to 
the health authorities, the ‘colony’ was little more than a community of squatters, only some 
of whom were suffering from leprosy. Much to the Committee’s disbelief the government 
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Not content with the government’s response, the K.R.A. resolved to take matters into 
its own hands by appointing a sub-committee to investigate the matter. This sub-committee 
circulated a letter and questionnaire to medical practitioners and leprosy workers in Hong 
Kong, China and the Philippines.212 According to the Association, the Shamshuipo ‘colony’ 
epitomised the failings of the government’s laissez-faire attitude and the paramount 
importance of establishing a domestic leprosy asylum: 
We are not afraid of leprosy: what we are more concerned about is the fate of our 
lepers. We think that in this Government is palpably evading its responsibility. We 
have suggested the use of the now abandoned Laichikok Gaol as a Leprosarium. 
Whether Government adopts this suggestion or can offer a better one remains to be 
seen. But what we particularly wish to emphasize is that Kowloon residents cannot 
indefinitely view with equanimity the sight of poor, helpless lepers having their homes 
torn down, while the lepers themselves are dispersed among the community, without 
medical attention, food or adequate shelter.213 
Popular stigma undoubtedly lurked beneath the association’s apparently genuine 
humanitarian rhetoric. The government briefly considered erecting a settlement on Lamma 
Island but Li Shu Fan, a member of the Legislative Council, voiced a concern about the 
scheme’s proximity to “one of our most beautiful bathing beaches”.214 His objection was 
somewhat surprising given his attendance at the First National Leprosy Conference (Shanghai, 
1932) and his earlier insistence that leprosy sufferers should be treated ‘humanely’.215 The 
K.R.A., however, was adamant that the government should establish “a properly equipped 
Leper Asylum for the accommodation of Hong Kong-born lepers…at the earliest possible 
date”.216 The Association’s report also urged the Government to open free leprosy clinics and 
“to encourage private practitioners, hospitals and health centres to treat leprosy by 
recognized methods”.217 Whilst the issue of establishing a domestic asylum remained a 
subject of debate and speculation, the medical authorities admitted an increasing number of 
leprosy sufferers to the Tung Wah Infectious Diseases Hospital at Kennedy Town (see table 
2.4 and fig. 6). 
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Figure 5. The Hongkong Sunday Herald’s Sensational Article about the Kennedy Town Asylum.218 
 
 The lack of confinement measures heightened popular fears about the unregulated 
movement of large numbers of leprosy sufferers within the colony. The number of escapes 
from the Tung Wah Infectious Diseases Hospital rose from 21 patients in 1936 to 35 in 1937, 
the latter equivalent to roughly a fifth of the total number of cases treated that year (see table 
2.4). The local press, for instance, reported that two “certified lepers…broke out of the Leper 
Home in Kennedy Town” and were “at large”; one of them was “found and returned to the 
Home”.219 The Hong Kong Sunday Herald stoked these fears with a sensational piece entitled 
“‘Open House’ At Hong Kong’ Leprosarium” (fig. 5). The article claimed that a government 
committee had been appointed following reports that a female patient had escaped in order 
“to attack a woman whom she accused of notifying the authorities of her complaint”.220 The 
Sunday Herald’s coverage of local events was notoriously sensational but the escapes 
nevertheless highlighted the government’s inability to confine the patients. Even though the 
hospital was popularly known as a leprosarium, the medical authorities could not legally 
prevent the hospital’s inmates from leaving – as per clause 6 of the ‘Lepers Ordinance (1935)’ 
– because the hospital was not officially designated a leprosy asylum until July 1938.221 The 
authorities were unable to enforce the segregation of the colony’s patients precisely because 
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The Kennedy Town Leprosarium 
 Official recognition for the Kennedy Town Leprosarium was a matter of necessity 
rather than choice. As late as June 1938, members of the Legislative Council continued to 
oppose the establishment of a domestic, government-run isolation facility. During a 
Legislative Council debate about a maintenance grant of $9,000 for the Tung Wah Infectious 
Diseases Hospital at Kennedy Town, Li Shu Fan stated that the monthly cost of maintaining an 
inmate at Sheklung was only $5, as opposed to $9 for an inmate in the Kennedy Hospital. “As 
this is a difference of almost 50 per cent. in upkeep,” he pointed out, “I think an understanding 
between this Government and the Mission should be reached with a view to entering into 
some satisfactory arrangement”.222 The colonial authorities actually increased the provisional 
annual grant to the Sheklung Asylum to $36,400 in order to expand the asylum’s 
accommodation.223 The project aimed to reduce the necessity of relying on the temporary 
detention facilities at Kennedy Town by increasing Sheklung’s capacity to accommodate 
deported leprosy sufferers. But the negotiations fell through as a result of the Japanese 
invasion of southern China. The hostilities had a profound impact upon mainland leprosaria: 
the Japanese Navy temporarily occupied the Tai-Kam Leper Colony; some of the 72 leprosy 
sufferers transferred from Hong Kong to Sheklung in July of that year “drifted back” back to 
the colony; Warren L. Winter, Superintendent of the Tsingyuen Leprosarium in Guangdong 
Province, was forced to seek refuge in Hong Kong; and, as we shall see in the next chapter, 
the Chinese Mission to Lepers was forced to evacuate the National Leprosarium of Shanghai 
three times in the space of a single year.224 Faced with a critical influx of refugees, including 
leprosy sufferers, the government in Hong Kong had little choice but to purchase the 
“dilapidated and dangerous” premises of the Infectious Diseases Hospital at Kennedy Town 
from the Tung Wah Committee at a cost of $50,000, formally proclaiming it as the colony’s 
official ‘leper settlement’.225 The timing of the proclamation was fortuitous. Less than a 
                                                          
222 Hong Kong Hansard, June 16, 1938, HKGRO, 49. 
223 Hong Kong Government, Annual Medical Report for the Year 1938, 1939, HKGRO, 12, 17; Hong 
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fortnight had passed since the sensational “Peak Murder Case” had triggered fears about the 
racial threat of unconfined leprosy sufferers. The accused, a mentally-unsound 30-year old 
cookboy, claimed that he had been so enraged by his masters’ taunts that he was a leprosy 
sufferer that he murdered his mistress Mrs. S. R. Challinor.226 
 The government immediately set about imposing discipline even before the handover 
of the institution was complete. Within months the leprosarium was encircled by a wire fence, 
beyond which was a “continuous police patrol”.227 The official proclamation also enabled the 
medical officer in charge to exercise a greater degree of control over the “unruly and turbulent 
body” of inmates.228 The Director of the Medical and Sanitary Services conceded that “the 
change in administration was not altogether [as] popular as might be expected”.229 The 
patients objected to their enforced confinement, but “in this manner the annoyance 
previously caused in the town by wandering lepers has been overcome and the risk of 
spreading the disease is lessened”.230 Whereas a total of 29 patients successfully requested to 
be discharged prior to 1938, none were permitted to do so once the government took over 
the management of the institution. The authorities reported a decline in the number of 
escapes from 91 in 1938 to 67 in 1939, though this was still nearly double the number of 
escapes in 1937 (see fig. 6 and table 2.4).231 This probably reflected the leprosarium’s 
transformation from a de facto institution in which segregation was voluntary to a de jure 
leper settlement in which it was enforced. The colonial administration was nevertheless 
gladdened by the savings its new management was able to effect.232 
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227 Hong Kong Government, Annual Medical Report for the Year 1938, 1939, HKGRO, 12. 
228 Ibid., 48. 
229 Hong Kong Government, Administrative Reports: Annual Medical Report for the Year 1939, 1940, 
HKGRO, 54. 
230 Hong Kong Government, Annual Medical Report for the Year 1938, 1939, HKGRO, 48; Hong Kong 
Government, Annual Medical Report for the Year 1939, 1940, HKGRO, 21. 
231 Interestingly the annual report for 1938 contained a discrepancy regarding these 91 patients: the 
section on leprosy stated that they were discharged at the patients’ requests whilst the section on the 
“Leper Settlement” reported them as escapes. This probably reflected the leprosarium’s 
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settlement in which it was enforced. Hong Kong Government, Annual Medical Report for the Year 
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Figure 6. The Kennedy Town Leprosarium, 1935-39. 

















at end of 
yr. 






1935 - 44 8 16 (8) - 9 11 44 44 44 
1936 15 129 82 9 (7) 21 12 8 140 144 140 
1937 10 167 49 20 (14) 35 11 62 175 177 183 
1938* 133 200 72 30 (-) 91 17 133 262 333 268 
1939 133 295 165 3 (-) 67 21 172 428 428 353 
 
The government also made provisions for the isolation of prisoners suffering from 
leprosy. Wellington explained: 
This will do away with the highly unsatisfactory system prevailing at the moment whereby 
a leper is convicted for theft or attempted murder, sent to prison, released from prison 
immediately and transferred to the leper settlement from which he escapes without 
difficulty to repeat once more the felony or misdemeanour for which he was originally 
sent to prison, and so on any number of times!234 
                                                          
233 Data from the annual medical reports. Discrepancies in the annual reported statistics complicate 
the task of calculating the annual ‘population’ of the leprosarium. Specifically the total number of 
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remaining from the previous year. The ‘Adjusted’ annual population is calculated on the basis of an 
adjusted figure for the number of patients remaining at the end of the year. 
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The late circulation of the government’s tender delayed the construction of an isolation block 
at the Stanley Bay prison until the end of the year.235 In the meantime, prisoners suffering 
from leprosy continued to be released from the colony’s prisons (fig. 7). Once constructed, 
the block was popularly known as a “Leprosarium”: the Allied personnel who were interned 
in Stanley Bay during the Second World War preserved this nickname, though the building 
itself was converted into a sanatorium for prisoners of war suffering from pulmonary 
tuberculosis.236 This isolation block was not a leprosarium in the same sense as that at 
Kennedy Town. Instead it was reminiscent of the colony’s very first leprosy isolation facility in 
the late 19th century: the Victoria Gaol’s “Leper Cell”. But whereas the cell served as a site of 
temporary detention, the Stanley Bay Leprosarium was intended as a permanent isolation 
facility. 
Figure 7. Prisoners discharged from the colony’s prisons with leprosy, 1931-39.237 
 
 Whilst the government concentrated on confining a growing number of leprosy 
sufferers within the Kennedy Town Leprosarium, a young American missionary attempted to 
establish a small leprosy clinic within the colony. Miss Ethel R. Groce, a graduate of the 
Presbyterian Hospital of Chicago, arrived in Hong Kong in 1938 as a member of the South 
China Boat Mission.238 She began by assisting Warren Winter, the founder and superintendent 
of Tsingyuen Leprosarium who had been forced to seek refuge in the colony following the 
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outbreak of the hostilities in southern China. Winter reported that he had attempted to secure 
“permission to start a leper home here in Hongkong, but have not been able to make much 
headway”.239 Groce took over during Winter’s furlough to the United States and she travelled 
to the Tsingyuen Leprosarium on a number of occasions and also visited the Kennedy Town 
Leprosarium (fig. 8).240 It is unclear whether her hopes of establishing a leprosy clinic in Hong 
Kong ever materialised, though she noted that there were two public out-patient clinics in the 
colony during a C.M.L.-hosted radio broadcast in Shanghai in August 1941.241 Until now no 
historian has recognised her independent efforts to support the colony’s leprosy sufferers at 
a crucial juncture in the colony’s domestic management of the disease. 
 
Figure 8. A Modern Nightingale. Miss Ethel R. Groce ministering to a female leper in Hong Kong.242 
Resigned to the existence of a domestic leprosarium, the colony made an effort to 
improve conditions for the inmates in the final years before the Japanese invasion of Hong 
Kong. The government finally provided the inmates with beds and a properly balanced diet, 
and continued to give the patients “weekly intramuscular injections of the iodised esters of 
chaulmoogra oil”.243 The Botanical and Forestry Department donated some seedlings to 
enable the patients to engage in some therapeutic gardening, and the inmates’ “necessarily 
                                                          
239 “The Leper World: Tsing Yuen Leprosarium Safe, though Half City Destroyed,” Leper Quarterly 13, 
no. 1 (1939): 26. 
240 “News Brevities,” Leper Quarterly 13, no. 2 (1939): 88; Groce, “Brothering the Leper,” 104-105; 
“The Leper World: Tsingyuen Leper Colony has a record enrollment [sic],” Leper Quarterly 15, no. 3 
(1941): 122. Winter returned to Hong Kong in July 1941. “News Brevities,” Leper Quarterly 15, no. 3 
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241 Wu had asked Groce to speak at the Christian Broadcasting Station about leprosy – “one of the 
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Shanghai in the summer of 1941. Groce spoke highly of Shanghai’s leprologists including Reiss, 
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243 The government had been responsible for the provision of medical treatment when the 
leprosarium was managed by the Tung Wah Hospitals Committee. Hong Kong Government, Annual 
Medical Report for the Year 1939, 1940, HKGRO, 21, 54-55. 
- 73 - 
 
restricted and monotonous lives [were] brightened” by Dr. Ho Kom Tong’s (O.B.E.) gifts, which 
included “a radio set, pingpong, cards, mah-jong, dominoes, daily newspapers, monthly 
magazines, and so on”.244 The medical authorities also reported a marked improvement in 
discipline and cleanliness as a result of the promotion of three patients (two men and one 
woman) as “heads”.245 Selwyn-Clarke, who succeeded Wellington as Director of the Medical 
and Sanitary Services, reported: 
True, sixty-seven lepers escaped from the premises in spite of a small police guard, 
but there was a cessation of the former custom of regarding the place as a convenient 
institution in which to avoid paying rent and from which to sally forth to streets, 
markets, tea-houses, restaurants, cinemas, etc., at will and to “sell” their disease to 
others.246 
Western physicians in China, including figures such as Patrick Manson, had long been aware 
of the Chinese belief that leprosy could allegedly be cured or ‘sold off’ through sexual 
intercourse.247 The medical authorities also pointed to the return of 20 of the 40 inmates who 
had been transferred to an island asylum near Swatow (Shantou) as evidence that “the 
conditions were generally appreciated by the inmates”.248 In fact they made the 20-day 
journey on foot, “some with perforating ulcers of the feet”, to seek readmission because they 
were bombed out of the Swatow Settlement (figs. 9 and 10).249 
                                                          
244 Hong Kong Government, Annual Medical Report for the Year 1939, 1940, HKGRO, 21, 54. 
245 Two men and one woman, each of whom was paid a monthly stipend of $5. Hong Kong 
Government, Annual Medical Report for the Year 1939, 1940, HKGRO, 21.  
246 Hong Kong Government, Annual Medical Report for the Year 1939, 1940, HKGRO, 54. 
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248 Hong Kong Government, Annual Medical Report for the Year 1939, 1940, HKGRO, 54. 
249 Ibid.; T. C. Wu, “Leprosy Situation in War-Torn China,” Leper Quarterly 13, no. 4 (1939): 151.The 
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Figure 9. The Swatow Municipal Leprosarium after air-raid on May 5, 1939.250 
Figure 10. Some Victims among the patients of the ill-fated Leprosarium.251 
 
 
Nevertheless Selwyn-Clarke was genuinely concerned about the provision of 
adequate accommodation “for Hong Kong citizens who fall victim to the disease”252 A scheme 
to replace the building – estimated at $16,000 and later revised to $18,000 – was initially 
favoured. By 1940 though, Selwyn-Clarke favoured the Director of Public Work’s more cost-
effective renovation scheme.253 Securing official support for this plan was not, however, a 
foregone conclusion. Li Shu Fan, who had previously raised ‘aesthetic objections’ to the 
establishment of a leprosarium on Lamma Island, voiced concerns about the proximity of 
                                                          
250 Leper Quarterly 13, no. 4 (1939) 
251 Leper Quarterly 13, no. 4 (1939) 
252 Hong Kong Government, Annual Medical Report for the Year 1939, 1940, HKGRO, 21, 54-55, 54. 
253 Report of the Technical Committee for the Reorganization and Improvement of Existing Official 
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“such an institution knowing it houses contagious diseases” to “a vegetable market, slaughter 
house and so on” within the confines of Victoria City.254 The domestic segregation of Hong 
Kong’s leprosy sufferers thus remained a contentious issue as late as the early 1940s. 
 
Figure 11. Lt. Gen. Norton’s visit to the Kennedy Town Leprosarium made front-page news.255 
The Acting Governor’s visit to the Kennedy Town Leprosarium in December 1940 
marked a defining moment in the history of the colony’s management of the disease. Lt. Gen. 
Edward Norton was welcomed by a “guard-of-honour” of patients. His tour included a visit to 
the men’s “Northcote Ward”, named after the Governor, and the women’s “Norton Ward”. 
The leprosarium’s 223 patients included the group of former deportees who had been 
“bombed out” of the leprosy settlement in Swatow.256 The colonial authorities had successful 
resisted the establishment of a permanent domestic isolation facility for almost a century. The 
authorities had forced the 13 remaining leprosy sufferers in the Au Tau ‘asylum’ to flee to the 
mainland in 1911. Yet almost thirty years later the Acting Governor found himself touring a 
                                                          
254 Hong Kong Hansard, July 25, 1940, HKGRO, 109. 
255 “Governor Pays Visit to Leper Settlement,” Hongkong Daily Press, Dec. 10, 1940, 1. 
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government-run leprosarium for both British and non-British subjects with a ward named 
after himself (fig. 11). Ironically the Kennedy Town leprosarium stood adjacent to the 
Government Infectious Diseases Hospital, which had briefly served as a ‘leprosy asylum’ in the 
early 1910s. Whereas the government rescinded its appointment of the latter institution after 
just 18 months, the outbreak of war in the Pacific ultimately spelt the end of the Kennedy 
Town Leprosarium. Within a year of Norton’s visit, the colonial government was forced to 
surrender to the invading Japanese forces. Following his release from the Stanley internment 
camp, Selwyn-Clarke reported that the Japanese authorities had “soon allowed the Leper 
Settlement at Kennedy Town to disintegrate”.257 When he returned to the leprosarium in 
August 1945, he discovered that “all roofs, floors, doors, windows, and sanitary structures had 
been removed for firewood”.258 
 
The Immediate Post-War Period: Stanley Prison, Sandy Bay and Hay Ling Chau 
The colonial authorities reinstated the practice of deporting all Chinese leprosy 
sufferers, irrespective of their citizenship, to the Sheklung Asylum in the months immediately 
after the war. For instance a Chinese leprosy sufferer who was allegedly born in Happy Valley 
in Hong Kong was deported in February 1946.259 Leprosy sufferers were “collected” at the 
Tung Wah Hospital pending deportation.260 An exception was made, however, for prisoners 
suffering from the disease. Selwyn-Clarke, who resumed his position as Director of the 
Medical and Sanitary Services, was adamant that the Stanley Bay Leprosarium should be 
reopened as a result of the discovery of “our first [post-war] leper prisoner”: 
It would be quite out of the question to evade responsibility for our own criminals by 
off-loading them to the Sisters of the Immaculate Conception at Sheklung Leper 
Asylum [sic]. I recommend rehabilitation of the Prison leprosarium & that the leper 
be segregated meanwhile in the Prison hospital, unless he is a burnt-out non-infective 
case & suitable for an ordinary prison cell.261 
By contrast Selwyn-Clarke’s efforts to enlist the support of the colony’s railway authorities in 
returning leprosy sufferers to the Chinese mainland during the late 1940s proved 
unsuccessful. Despite the Crown Solicitor’s reassurances that the railway authorities “could 
legitimately make rules for segregating these persons [i.e. Chinese leprosy sufferers] and 
locking them in until they arrive at some appointed destination, e.g. Canton” – providing of 
course that the rules were “reasonably humane” – the General Manager of the Kowloon- 
                                                          
257 Selwyn-Clarke, Report on Medical and Health Conditions, 7. 
258 Ibid. 
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Canton Railway insisted that the medical department should convey leprosy sufferers to 
Canton by boat instead.262 Ultimately the closure of the mainland’s borders following the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China rendered the debate moot. 
 The government responded by erecting a temporary leprosarium on the western edge 
of Hong Kong Island that ultimately paved the way for the establishment of the Hay Ling Chau 
Leprosarium. The government granted $60,000 to the Tung Wah Hospitals Committee to 
establish a “leprosarium” enclosed by barbed wire at Sandy Bay on the west coast of Hong 
Kong Island.263 In the meantime an increasing number of leprosy sufferers were isolated in the 
Tung Wah Hospital in a ward designed for just 18 patients; the hospital housed 161 patients 
by the time the accommodation huts were finished at Sandy Bay in December 1950.264 The 
reported prevalence of the disease continued to rise dramatically: the number of patients in 
the temporary leprosarium increased by over 75% within the first year.265 Unsurprisingly the 
trope of the “El Dorado to the leprous Chinaman from the mainland” reared its head once 
again. One colonial official reported: 
The word seems to have gone round that we are providing new accommodation for 
lepers and they have been flocking in. Very few of these lepers have any claim on 
Hong Kong, but if they are thrown out of the leprosarium they will only beg on the 
streets. The Communist authorities will not re-admit them into China and it will, 
therefore, be very difficult to get rid of them.266 
Left with no other choice, the authorities began to develop the Sandy Bay Leprosarium into a 
modern leprosy asylum. Dr. Olaf K. Skinsnes, a newly-arrived member of the University of 
Hong Kong’s Department of Pathology, introduced “intensive and methodical medical 
work”.267 Therapeutic work such as carpentry, gardening, stone cutting and domestic work 
was also encouraged and religious services were held regularly – an unprecedented 
development in terms of the colony’s management of the disease. Over half of the patients 
that entered Sandy Bay in 1950 were already Christians. Ironically the colony’s pre-war 
deportation policy was partly responsible for this evangelisation: the leprosarium 
accommodated some 23 Protestant patients who had previously been confined to the Rhenish 
Mission’s asylum in Tungkun and 70 Catholic patients from Sheklung.268 But a further 40 
patients were baptised just over a year later on Christmas Day.269 The temporary leprosarium 
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also finally prompted the fulfilment of one of the new clauses of the ‘radical’ ‘Lepers 
Ordinance (1935)’: regular inspections by Justices of the Peace.270 Unlike Hong Kong’s previous 
asylums, the Sandy Bay Leprosarium was jointly administered by a missionary organisation, 
the recently-formed Mission to Lepers Hong Kong Auxiliary – a body completely unrelated to 
the pre-war Chinese Mission to Lepers Hong Kong Auxiliary – and the Board of Directors of 
the Tung Wah Hospitals.271 A group of 16 prominent local foreign and Chinese women, many 
of whom were either Auxiliary members or members’ wives, established the Marianne Reichl 
Aid to Lepers Group to raise financial support for the Auxiliary’s activities and to “promote a 
better understanding of the leprosy problem”.272 
 The Sandy Bay Leprosarium was only ever destined to be a temporary facility. Even 
before the leprosarium opened its doors Dr. Fraser, part-time secretary for China to the 
Mission to Lepers (London), initiated discussions with the colonial government to establish a 
permanent leprosarium.273 A number of sites in the New Territories and outlying islands were 
debated, but all of them were dismissed in the face of local residents’ complaints.274 Many 
were “shocked” to hear that the government intended to establish a leprosarium in their 
district.275 Local residents feared the patients’ alleged lasciviousness and worried that other 
communities would ostracise their village by sheer dint of their proximity to the 
leprosarium.276 The District Commissioner for the New Territories informed the colonial 
authorities that “We have to overcome a rooted prejudice against leprosy, and a deep dread 
that your male leper will find his chance to rape some woman not infected”.277 Writing over a 
decade later Governor Grantham reported that Fraser had been at “his wits’ end” searching 
for a suitable site.278 Eventually, however, the authorities settled on Nai Gu Chau (‘Nun 
Island’), a sparsely settled island to the west of Hong Kong Island, which the Mission accepted 
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after some misgivings.279 The Sandy Bay leprosarium was maintained as an “admission centre” 
whilst a “pioneer party” of 22 patients were transferred to the island, which was renamed Hay 
Ling Chau, ‘The Isle of Happy Healing’. A local Chinese construction company as well as 
volunteers from the Royal Engineers and other regiments helped erect a small staff hut and a 
larger accommodation block known as the “workshop” enabling a further 38 patients to be 
transferred from Sandy Bay.280 These buildings laid the foundations for the Hay Ling Chau 
Leprosarium and ushered in a new era in domestic segregation in Hong Kong. 
 The brief resumption of the colony’s practice of deporting all leprosy sufferers except 
prisoners during the immediate post-war period begs a number of important questions 
regarding the broader evolution of domestic segregation within colonial Hong Kong. How are 
we to understand the combined impacts of the out-break of the Sino-Japanese War, the 
Japanese occupation of Hong Kong, and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
upon the colony’s management of the disease given the staunch opposition to domestic 
segregation that emerged in the 1870s, was formalised by ordinance in the 1910s, and 
vigorously resisted through the early 1930s. Did the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war impose 
a phenomenon that might never have emerged? After all the Kennedy Town Leprosarium was 
considered little more than an undesirable and temporary solution pending the return of 
peace on the mainland – a solution, moreover, that was all but abandoned immediately after 
the British reoccupation of Hong Kong in 1945. Or did the Second World War interrupt and 
temporarily reverse an inevitable progression towards domestic segregation? Had the British 
managed to retain control of Hong Kong whilst war continued to wage on the mainland, the 
Kennedy Town Leprosarium and the Stanley Bay Isolation Unit might have continued to 
accommodate leprosy sufferers well into the 1940s. A preliminary survey of the source 
material suggests that the arrival of eminent leprologists such as Dr. N. D. Fraser and Dr. O. K. 
Skinsnes played a pivotal role in promoting a new humanitarian approach to the segregation 
of leprosy sufferers.281 This dissertation’s original analysis of the pre-war period demonstrates 




                                                          
279 “Executive Council Meeting”, 5 June 1951, HKPRO, HKRS503/2/12; Hong Kong Auxiliary, First 
Annual Report, 5. For the government’s report on the island and the issue of compensation for the 
island’s inhabitants see HKPRO, HKRS503/2/11. 
280 Barty to Fraser, 17 Aug. 1951, HKPRO, HKRS156/1/2835; Hong Kong Auxiliary, First Annual Report, 
5-6. 
281 In a joint article on the construction of Hay Ling Chau, the two men detailed seven basic purposes 
of leprosaria, including: the provision of medical treatment facilities; providing “for the general 
welfare, educational growth and spiritual care of resident patients”; promoting “the rehabilitation of 
patients cured of leprosy by every available means”; and “lead[ing] the way in attacking society’s 
misconceptions regarding leprosy and its maltreatment of persons suffering from leprosy”. Olaf K. 
Skinsnes and Neil D. Fraser, “The Design of a Leprosarium (Hay Ling Chau, Hong Kong),” International 
Journal of Leprosy 37, no.2 (1969): 183-193, 186. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the very first analysis of Hong Kong’s management of 
leprosy, charting the evolution of the colony’s reliance on deportation and its staunch 
opposition to domestic segregation from the mid-19th through the mid-20th centuries. This 
chapter has fundamentally revised the limited historiography and revealed that pre-war Hong 
Kong was in fact home to four institutions that were officially or popularly recognised as 
leprosaria: a leprosy village and a leprosy hospital in the early 20th century, and a leprosarium 
and a leprosy prison cell during the late 1930s. Comparing these institutions on the basis of 
their contemporary designations would lead to erroneous conclusions. For instance both the 
leprosy village at Au Tau and the Government Infectious Diseases Hospital in Kennedy Town 
were briefly designated as ‘leper asylums’. Yet the former was a colonial hybrid of a traditional 
Chinese leprosy village whilst the latter was simply a hospital that treated a small number of 
leprosy sufferers. Nevertheless these two pairs of institutions appeared to mark shift in the 
government’s attitude towards confinement and segregation. Geo-politics, contemporary 
international medical discourse and the village’s remote location informed the government’s 
initial laissez-faire attitude in the early 20th century. Although the authorities encircled the 
leprosy village at Au Tau with bamboo fences, the Governor acknowledged the regular 
interactions between the village and the neighbouring communities. Moreover the leprosy 
villagers at Au Tau were not internally segregated by sex. Despite the paucity of source 
material, it is clear that men, women and even children resided alongside one another; one 
woman even gave birth to a baby girl “with macules on her body” who was promptly sent to 
the Tung Wah Hospital “by order of the local Magistrate”.282 This laissez-faire attitude in no 
way reflected, however, the government’s support for domestic segregation as a permanent 
means of managing the disease. The Au Tau community was expelled to the mainland and the 
appointment of the Government Hospital at Kennedy Town was rescinded almost before the 
ink on the ‘Lepers Ordinance (1910)’ had dried. 
This attitude hardened during the ensuing decades, and confinement was de rigueur 
in the late 1930s. War-time disruptions prompted the colonial authorities to detain an 
increasing number of sufferers for an increasing length of time within the Tung Wah Infectious 
Diseases Hospital at Kennedy Town. Sensational reports about the unregulated movements 
of this community of sufferers and of other ‘colonies’ heightened popular fears about the 
threat of infection. The government was finally forced to assume control of this de facto 
leprosarium and recognise it as a de jure leprosy settlement precisely in order to quell this 
popular anxiety. Both the government-run Kennedy Town Leprosarium and the Stanley Bay 
Prison Leprosarium rigidly enforced confinement – the latter, as an isolation unit within a 
prison, doubly so. Moreover Lt. Gen. Norton’s inspection of the male and female wards in the 
                                                          
282 Reports that rice was issued to ten of the thirteen patients in the latter part of the decade suggests 
that three were too young (or perhaps too incapacitated) to receive these provisions. See for instance 
Hong Kong Government, Sessional Papers: Report on the Health and Sanitary Condition of the Colony 
of Hongkong, for the Year 1905, 1906, HKGRO, 350. The baby’s fate is unclear. The fact that the 
mother was not a recent admission suggests that sexual relations within or possibly even without the 
community were tolerated, at least as far at the colonial officials were concerned. 
- 81 - 
 
former institution in December 1940 clearly indicated that the patients were segregated by 
sex. In some ways, the Kennedy Town Leprosarium thus paralleled the segregation of leprosy 
sufferers that Cantlie had witnessed in Macao half a century earlier, though the intensity of 
the Kennedy Town patients’ suffering was perhaps not quite akin to the Macanese ‘living 
inferno’. The intervening decades witnessed repeated and ultimately successful attacks 
against Cantlie’s trope of the “El Dorado to the leprous mainland”, from without and 
increasingly from within. The challenge to the government’s management of the disease from 
the local Chinese elite centred not on the segregation of Chinese leprosy sufferers, but the 
indiscriminate deportation of British Chinese subjects. The objection focused not on how 
these diseased bodies were managed, but where they were institutionalised. Chapter two 
explores how this trope underpinned the International Settlement of Shanghai’s parallel 
management of the disease during this period. 
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Chapter 3: Leprosy in the International 
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The International Settlement’s conceptualisation of leprosy as a mainland Chinese 
disease mirrored that of Hong Kong. But whereas the disease was a concern within decades 
of the colony’s establishment, the International Settlement’s public health authorities 
regarded leprosy as a rarity up until as late as the 1920s. The International Settlement’s 
management of the disease was thus confined largely to the second quarter of the 20th 
century. The Settlement’s strategy during this period nevertheless paralleled that of Hong 
Kong in many ways. A report by a local missionary dispensary on the prevalence of the disease 
immediately beyond its northern border precipitated the deportation of Chinese leprosy 
sufferers to a mainland leprosarium, albeit on a much smaller scale and during a much shorter 
time-frame. The Settlement’s authorities similarly opposed the establishment of domestic 
leprosaria on the grounds that such facilities would serve as a beacon to hordes of Chinese 
leprosy sufferers. Moreover just as Chinese agency challenged Hong Kong’s reliance on 
deportation, so too did the Chinese Mission to Lepers confront the Settlement’s management 
of the disease though in a much more direct manner. For one thing the Mission was, at its 
core, a Shanghai organisation – it was founded and headquartered in the city by a group of 
local Chinese Christians. The Mission therefore took a much more proactive role in 
establishing local treatment facilities within city. Whilst the Settlement successfully resisted 
the Mission’s efforts within its own borders, the sheer proximity of the Mission’s activities 
beyond its borders inevitably complicated the Settlement’s reliance on deportation.  
 
‘The Very Rarest of Rarities’ 
 In contrast to Hong Kong, the reported incidence of leprosy was remarkably rare in 
the International Settlement of Shanghai during the 19th century. Early commentators, 
however, suggested that the disease was prevalent in the countryside beyond the city, and 
within the province of Jiangsu more generally. James Henderson, a medical missionary who 
worked in Shanghai from 1860 until shortly before his death in 1865, informed the Royal 
College of Physicians that he had encountered 75 cases.1 The following decade the 
distinguished French physician C. L. M. Durand-Fardel, who was regarded by the French 
government as an expert on treaty-port sanitation, reported, “Il n’y a pas de lépreux à 
Shanghaï, ou du moins on n’en rencontre que rarement”.2 He expressed similar statements in 
an extensive article on the prevalence of the disease in China.3 Two decades later R. A. 
                                                          
1 George Edward Eyre, and William Spottiswoode eds., Report on Leprosy by the Royal College of 
Physicians prepared for, and published by her Majesty’s Secertary of State for the Colonies, with an 
appendix (London: 1867), 77-78; James Henderson, Memorials of James Henderson, M.D., medical 
missionary to China (London: James Nisbet and Co., 1867). 
2 Max. Durand-Fardel, La Chine et les Conditions Sanitaires des Ports ouvert au commerce étranger 
(Paris: Librairie J.B. Baillière & Fils, 1877), 173. Durand-Fardel spent the winter of 1875-76 in Shanghai, 
tasked by the French Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce with “une mission qui me faisait un 
devoir particulier de porter mon attention sur les sujets de nature à intéresser la medicine et 
l’hygiène.” Durand-Fardel, La Chine et les Conditions Sanitaires, 6. 
3 Max Durand-Fardel, “La Lèpre en Chine; note pour server à l’histoire de la lèpre,” pt.1, Gazette 
médicale de Paris 26 (1877): 318-319, 318. As Durand-Fardel had “peu d’occasions d’étudier 
personellement la lepre” during his stay, he drew on the annual medical reports of the Sociétés des 
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Jamieson, a physician who had worked in Shanghai since 1868, responded to Cantlie’s circular 
on the distribution of leprosy by stating: 
I should be very glad to answer your questions respecting leprosy if there were any 
specimens of the disease to be found here. It is the very rarest of rarities in Shanghai, 
so rare that I should be afraid to say how few cases I have seen in the twenty-six years 
during which I have been without interruption connected with large hospitals for 
natives.4 
Cantlie actually despatched his colleague S. J. B. Skertchly to visit the Settlement’s foreign and 
native hospitals in the “vain hope of finding a solitary leper”.5 Skertchly alleged that “the 
Yangste Valley, from the neighbourhood of Shanghai is clean for four hundred miles”.6 Cantlie 
warned, however, that Shanghai’s “wealth of medical men” might yet trigger an influx of 
Chinese leprosy sufferers from the interior.7 He cited the example of one of his own patients, 
who had travelled from Yunnan Province to Hong Kong, “a distance of 900 miles as the crow 
flies”, because word had reached him of Cantlie’s skills as a foreign doctor.8 In time the 
Settlement’s medical authorities would adopt the trope of the leprous migrant from the 
mainland to justify their opposition to establishing domestic treatment facilities. 
The Settlement’s Health Department gradually accorded the disease a limited degree 
of attention during the early 20th century. Leprosy was first mentioned in the department’s 
Annual Report for 1902 as a result of the introduction in Shanghai of a new metropolitan-
inspired method for the notification of infectious diseases.9 The department also began 
                                                          
missions évangéliques as well as the medical reports of the Chinese Maritime Customs, including the 
memorandum on leprosy by Dr. Wong of Canton – the article that drew attention to Wilson’s report 
regarding the European leprosy sufferer from Hong Kong. For the full article see Max Durand-Fardel, 
“La Lèpre en Chine; note pour server à l’histoire de la lèpre,” pts. 1-5, Gazette médicale de Paris 26 
(1877): 318-319; 28 (1877): 341-343; 30 (1877): 367-368; 33 (1877): 402-404; 34 (1877): 414-415. 
4 James Cantlie, ed., Report On The Conditions Under Which Leprosy Occurs in China, Indo-China, 
Malaya, The Archipelago, and Oceania. Compiled Chiefly During 1894 (London: MacMillan and Co., 
1897), 44. Jamieson first arrived in Shanghai in 1862 after a brief stint in a consular post in Japan. He 
established the Shanghai Recorder and then became editor of the North-China Herald. After 
qualifying as a doctor in Great Britain (1866-1868) he returned to Shanghai and assumed the 
editorship of Chinese Maritime Customs Medical Reports (1871-1894). Only one of his half-yearly 
medical reports referred to leprosy in Shanghai. Alexander Jamieson, “Dr. Alexander Jamieson’s 
Report on the Health of Shanghai for the half year ended 30th September, 1871,” Customs Gazette, 
Medical Reports 11, no. 6 (Sept. 1871): 33-43, 42-43; Kerrie L. A. MacPherson, A Wilderness of 
Marshes: The Origins of Public Health in Shanghai, 1843-1893 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 
1987), 60-61. For more on the Chinese Maritime Customs see Robert Bickers, “ ‘Good work for China 
in every possible direction’: The Foreign Inspectorate of the Chinese Maritime Customs, 1854-1950,” 
in Twentieth-century Colonialism in China: Localities, the everyday, and the world, eds. Bryna 
Goodman and David S. G. Goodman (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 25-36. 
5 Cantlie, ed., Report, 44. 
6 He did not, however, mention his trip to Shanghai. Sydney B. Skertchly, “The Ethnography of Leprosy 
in the Far East,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of Queensland, no. 13 (1898): 6. 
7 Cantlie, ed., Report, 44. 
8 Cantlie, ed., Report, 44. 
9 Arthur Stanley, Shanghai Municipal Council. Health Department. Annual Report 1902 (Shanghai: 
Kelly & Walsh, 1903), Shanghai Municipal Archives (hereafter SMA), U1/16/4650, 23. 
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detailing the number of leprosy sufferers admitted to the Chinese Isolation Hospital: a grand 
total of 8 leprosy sufferers, including one foreign case, were admitted in the first decade of 
the 20th century (see table A2.2).10 Arthur Stanley, the Settlement’s health officer first 
dedicated a separate, albeit brief, qualitative mention to the disease in his report for 1908: 
Leprosy is a disease which so seldom concerns foreigners in Shanghai that its study is 
somewhat neglected. Cases are met with occasionally though it seldom figures in the 
death statement of either foreigners or natives. There appears to be no urgent call for 
preventive measures.11 
As in Hong Kong, leprosy was defined as a rare alien disease, though the Settlement placed 
less emphasis on its Chinese origins. Consequently Stanley’s department ignored it in favour 
of other more pressing sanitary concerns. This neglect persisted throughout the following 
decade: Stanley reprinted this brief entry in every annual report through 1921.12  
 Instead the management of the International Settlement’s leprosy sufferers during 
this period was relegated to its hospitals and out-patient facilities. Dr. E. S. Tyau, a Chinese 
physician recently returned from the University of Pennsylvania’s School of Public Health and 
Tropical Medicine, was placed in charge of the laboratory and out-patient dispensary at St. 
Luke’s Hospital in 1914.13 Tyau helped established a Skin Clinic as part of his efforts to co-
ordinate the Settlement’s out-patient dispensaries: 
The first attempt at the scientific treatment of lepers was made in the spring of 1915, 
when Leprosy was about to enter the domain of curable and preventable diseases…. 
…In the course of about six months my attention was drawn to quite a few lepers in 
this Skin Clinic. As some of them were in the advanced stage, the hideous sight and 
obnoxious odor [sic] were very distressing to the other patients and it was felt 
necessary to have a separate clinic for the lepers. Thus the first clinic for the treatment 
and study of Leprosy in Shanghai was founded in a humble way.14 
The importance of this early contribution should not be exaggerated. Tyau delivered this 
statement as part of a paper on the origins of the Chinese Mission to Lepers (C.M.L.) – entitled 
‘The History of Leprosy in Shanghai’ – at the C.M.L.’s First National Leprosy Conference 
(Shanghai, 1932). As one of the Mission’s founders and first vice-presidents, Tyau was eager 
to highlight the Mission’s local Western-educated heritage at a time when the Mission was 
publicising its efforts to tackle what was by then a growing public health issue in Shanghai. 
As far as the Settlement’s medical authorities were concerned, however, leprosy 
continued to be regarded through to the early 1920s. Indeed Stanley’s successor, C. Noel 
                                                          
10 Arthur Stanley, Shanghai Municipal Council. Health Department. Annual Report 1903 (Shanghai: 
Kelly & Walsh, 1904), SMA, U1/16/4650, 21. Despite the rarity of admissions, the disease retained a 
permanent entry in this hospital’s annual morbidity and mortality table under successive heads of the 
Settlement’s health department. 
11 Arthur Stanley, Shanghai Municipal Council. Health Department. Annual Report 1908 (Shanghai: 
Kelly & Walsh, 1909), SMA, U1/16/4651, 19. 
12 Arthur Stanley, Shanghai Municipal Council. Health Department. Annual Report 1921 (Shanghai: 
Kelly & Walsh, 1922), SMA, U1/16/4653, 20. 
13 E. S. Tyau, “The History of Leprosy in Shanghai,” Leper Quarterly 6, no. 4 (1932): 45-51, 46. 
14 Ibid., 46-47. 
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Davis, dropped all qualitative references to the disease from his annual reports. This absence 
is striking given the contemporary growth of international concern for the prevalence of the 
disease in China. For instance the conference on leprosy that was organised as part of the 
inauguration of the Peiping Union Medical College (P.U.M.C.) in 1921 estimated China’s 
population of leprosy sufferers at ½ million.15 Davis’s contribution to The China Medical 
Journal’s “special ‘Leprosy’ number” in 1925 is especially revealing. The journal’s editor invited 
him to submit a “leading article…on leprosy from the point of view of the Commissioner of 
Public Health of such a large city as Shanghai” for a forthcoming issue that would contain the 
papers on leprosy prevention and treatment from the joint medical conferences in Hong 
Kong.16 Davis’s discussion on modern leprosy prevention emphasised the importance of public 
health propaganda; the necessity for confidential notifications of cases; the importance of 
segregating leprosy sufferers in dedicated institutions that “should give opportunities for full 
and attractive individual and corporate life”; and the desirability of specially-trained medical 
officers equipped with modern research facilities.17 Strikingly Davis’s editorial made no 
reference to the International Settlement whatsoever. Instead he concluded: 
Such a scheme would take years to carry out, and still more years to achieve the 
desired result, but it could and should be efficiently undertaken by the Ministry of 
Health of a powerful and stable Government, inspired by the highest humanitarian 
and scientific ideals.18 
By referring to the ‘Ministry of Health’ as opposed to his own Public Health Department, Davis 
clearly considered leprosy to be an exclusively Chinese public health, and therefore a priority 
for the new Nationalist government. 
 
The Early Practice of Deportation 
Reports from a foreign missionary highlighting the prevalence of leprosy in Shanghai 
in the late 1920s inadvertently precipitated the International Settlement’s emulation of Hong 
Kong’s reliance on mainland leprosaria. Elizabeth Shapleigh, a medical missionary who 
established and ran the Hongkew General Dispensary, informed both the Chinese Mission to 
Lepers and the Health Bureau of the Greater Chinese Municipality that leprosy was “very 
                                                          
15 Peiping Union Medical College, Addresses & Papers: Dedication Ceremonies and Medical 
Conferences, Peking Union Medical College, September 15 -22, 1921 (Peking, 1922), 274-275. 
16 E. M. Merrins to C. N. Davis, 22 Apr. 1925, SMA, U1/16/2619, 22. See China Medical Journal 39, no. 
7 (1925): 575-636. 
17 C. Noel Davis, “Leprosy,” China Medical Journal, 39, no. 7 (1925): 632-634. Davis’s summary of the 
disease’s dissemination from Ancient Egypt echoed that of Sir Leonard Rogers. Davis also noted that 
Chinese emigrants were held responsible for introducing the disease around the Pacific Rim, a clear 
reference to Cantlie’s work some three decades earlier. See for example Leonard Rogers, “The 
Spread, Probable Mode of Infection, and Prophylaxis of Leprosy,” China Medical Journal 36, no. 6 
(1922): 474-486. 
18 Davis, “Leprosy,” China Medical Journal, 39, no. 7 (1925): 634. 
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prevalent” in Hongkew (Hongkou), the Japanese district that straddled the Settlement’s 
northern border.19 She estimated that there were between 100 and 200 leprosy sufferers, 
including those in hiding.20 Shapleigh’s alarming report localised the nascent official and 
popular Chinese concern for the disease. The Chinese municipal health authorities tasked two 
Chinese medical experts to accompany Rev. T. C. Wu (Wu Zhijian), the Mission’s first general 
secretary, to conduct house-to-house enquiries in the Hongkew District.21 On the basis of their 
discovery of 8 “fully developed” cases The Leper Quarterly, the C.M.L.’s bilingual mouthpiece, 
stoked local Chinese and foreign fears about the unregulated prevalence of the disease within 
the city: 
Those of us who have been living in good health and in comfort have never dreamed 
that Shanghai has so many lepers. The appalling condition of leprosy in our midst 
ought to be a challenge, both to the Chinese and Settlement authorities and to every 
right-thinking man and woman for immediate action.22 
Prior to Shapleigh’s report, the Chinese Mission to Lepers had only interrogated leprosy as a 
national issue. Indeed it had adopted the motto ‘Ridding China of Leprosy’. Indeed shortly 
after the Mission’s establishment Wu stated that he and his fellow founding members, who 
were prominent “Christian leaders in Shanghai, mostly Southerners”, had been “anxious” to 
support the leprosy sufferers in their native towns, but had not found “any chance to act in 
Shanghai” because the disease was considered “almost non-existent”.23 Thus Shapleigh’s 
‘discovery’ of leprosy sufferers in Hongkew prompted the Chinese Mission to Lepers to 
promote leprosy as a major local trans-municipal public health issue. The Mission promptly 
set up a “Leper Clinic” at the Dispensary, where Tyau and a Chinese nurse helped treat a small 
number patients (figs. 12 and 13).24 The S.M.C.’s Public Health Department was sufficiently 
aroused by the local press coverage that the Deputy Commissioner of Public Health visited the 
clinic in December 1929.25 
                                                          
19 Shapleigh established the Swarthmore Dispensary, on Tien Teh Road, in November 1925 but then 
relocated to Hongkew three years later. She ran the Hongkew dispensary until her death in 1930. 
Elizabeth Shapleigh, “Leprosy Prevalent in Shanghai,” Leper Quarterly 2, no. 4 (1928): 30; F. Y. Pan, 
“Shanghai: Hongkew General Dispensary,” Chinese Medical Journal 44, no. 8 (1930): 793. 
20 Shapleigh, “Leprosy Prevalent in Shanghai,” 30; “Investigation Reveals Much Leprosy in Shanghai,” 
Leper Quarterly 3, no. 1 (1929): 31. 
21 “Investigation Reveals Much Leprosy in Shanghai,” 31. Shapleigh turned down Wu’s suggestion that 
she might conduct the survey herself in return for a fee of $10 and free bandages for three months. 
Shapleigh complained about the lack of funding from the C.M.L. to the Settlement’s Deputy 
Commissioner of Public Health. W. Wolnizer (P.H.D.), “Visit of the D.C.P.H. to the Hong-Kew Leper 
Clinic on 12th December 1929,” 12 Dec. 1929, SMA, U1/16/2620, 43. 
22 Rev. Wu probably wrote the article himself. “Investigation Reveals Much Leprosy in Shanghai,” 31. 
23 T. C. Wu, “Editorial,” Leper Quarterly 1 (1927): 1. As Leung has noted, many of the Mission’s board 
members were fervent Protestant Christians, including its president William Yinson Lee, general 
secretary Wu and vice presidents Drs. Fong F. See and E. S. Tyau. Angela Ki Che Leung, Leprosy in 
China: A History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 161. 
24 “The Leper World: The Shanghai Leper Clinic,” Leper Quarterly 3, nos. 2&3 (1929): 42. The Mission 
attributed the low attendance rate to local ignorance about the effectiveness of modern treatment. 
25 (Actg. D.C.I. for Com. Police) to (C.P.H.), 25 Feb. 1929, SMA, U1/16/2620, 3-4; “Numbers of Lepers 
in Shanghai: Investigation by Mission and Chinese Authorities,” North-China Herald, Mar. 2, 1929, 
358; “Local Work Among Lepers: Over 200 in Shanghai,” North-China Herald, July 27, 1929, 132; W. 
- 90 - 
 
 
Figure 12. E. S. Tyau (far left) and the Leper Clinic at the Hongkew General Dispensary, ca. 1929. 26 
Figure 13. Staff and Patients at the C.M.L.’s Hongkew Clinic for Skin Diseases, ca. 1933.27 
 
 Despite its proximity to the International Settlement the Hongkew General 
Dispensary, which was taken over by the C.M.L. and renamed the Hongkew Clinic for Skin 
Diseases following Shapleigh’s death, nevertheless appeared to offer a convenient solution to 
the problem of accommodating the Settlement’s leprosy sufferers. This is borne out by the 
case of Dong Siau Lau, a remanded prisoner admitted to the Chinese Isolation Hospital with a 
“moderately advanced stage of leprosy”, who was ordered to be “removed” to the Hongkew 
                                                          
Wolnizer (P.H.D.), “Visit of the D.C.P.H. to the Hong-Kew Leper Clinic on 12th December 1929”, 12 Dec. 
1929, SMA, U1/16/2620, 43. See also C. Noel Davis, Shanghai Municipal Council. Public Health 
Department. Annual Report 1929 (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1930), SMA, U1/16/4655, 23; “Numbers 
of Lepers in Shanghai,” North-China Daily News, Feb. 23, 1929, SMA, U1/16/2620, 2. 
26 The Leper Quarterly 3, nos. 2&3 (1929). 
27 The Leper Quarterly 7, no. 3 (1933). 
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Dispensary.28 This order represented the first attempt to transfer a leprosy sufferer to a 
treatment facility beyond the Settlement’s borders. But Dong was promptly returned to the 
Chinese Isolation Hospital owing to the absence of any beds at the Hongkew clinic: neither 
the police nor the medical authorities were aware that the clinic was only an out-patient 
facility.29 Dong’s status as a remanded prisoner presented the authorities with a unique 
problem as Duck, the Acting Commissioner of Public Health, reported: 
The few lepers I have seen in Shanghai who had no means were advised to stay at 
their homes, and this would have been done already in the case in question if the 
charge were dismissed. If the case is remanded indefinitely it appears to me that the 
Police Department will bear the cost of a special guard for the remainder of his life, 
as he will not recover to any appreciable extent, and is likely to live many years.30 
As in Hong Kong, the incarceration of prisoners suffering from the disease heightened official 
fears of contagion. Resigned to the incurability of Dong’s fate, the medical authorities 
considered alternative treatment facilities beyond the Settlement’s borders.31 But the patient 
“refused” to be sent anywhere apart from his home in Chapei (Zhabei), the district adjacent 
to Hongkew.32 Whilst the medical authorities were anxious to resolve the situation as quickly 
as possible, even suggesting that the police might acquiesce to Dong’s release, the police 
authorities secured a court order enforcing the prisoner’s transfer to a missionary leprosarium 
in Hangzhou for medical treatment.33 
The Church Missionary Society had been treating Chinese leprosy sufferers in its 
hospital at Hangzhou since the 1880s. Duncan Main, the hospital’s founder and medical 
superintendent, subsequently established a dedicated leprosy hospital, the Kwang Chi Leper 
Hospital, at the turn of the century.34 By the late 1920s, the hospital accommodated more 
than sixty patients in gender-segregated homes, some of whom, including a young lady from 
Hong Kong, were sent by the Chinese Mission to Lepers.35 The hospital was nationalised soon 
afterwards, much to the dismay of the Chinese Mission to Lepers and the European medical 
                                                          
28 E. F. Duck (Assist. C.P.H.) to M.O. Springfield (Assist. Com. Police), 10 June 1930, SMA, U1/16/2621, 
2; Springfield to Duck, 17 June 1930, U1/16/2621, 3. 
29 Duck to Sprinfield, 20 June 1930, SMA, U1/16/2621, 6. Wolnizer’s report on the clinic had stated 
that it was primarily an out-patient facility. 
30 Duck to Springfield, 4 July 1930, SMA, U1/16/2621, 9. 
31 When Dong’s disease was first brought to Duck’s attention, he stated, “There is no prospect 
whatever of permanent cure.” Duck to Springfield, 10 June 1930, SMA, U1/16/2621, 2. 
32 Minute by E. Stillwell (Matron, C.H.I), 18 July 1930, SMA, U1/16/2621, 10. 
33 Duck to Springfield, 22 July 1930, SMA, U1/16/2621, 12; (Com. Police) to Duck, 12 Aug. 1930, SMA, 
U1/16/2621, 13. 
34 According to Wang the leprosy hospital was established in 1897 but Sturton stated that the 
temporary leprosy hospital was not established until 1903. Wang Lin-Zei, “A Brief History of the 
Hangchow Leper Hospital,” Leper Quarterly 2 (1927): 20-22, 20; Phyllis Haddow and Sydney D. 
Sturton, “Hangchow,” Chinese Medical Journal 44, no. 8 (1930): 789-792, 789-790; S. D. Sturton, “The 
Problem of Leprosy in Hangchow,” Chinese Medical Journal 47, no. 3 (1933): 263-269, 263. 
35 Duncan Main, “The Hangchow Leper Hospital,” Leper Quarterly 1 (1927): 31-32; Wang “A Brief 
History of the Hangchow Leper Hospital,” 20-22. 
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staff.36 The missionaries regained control of the hospital the following summer, but the 
institution was more strictly administered – according to Leung this institution exemplified 
the “Nationalist-hybrid” model.37 Sturton, the Hospital’s Superintendent, therefore requested 
further particulars about the remanded prisoner: 
I should be glad to know on what charge Dong Siau Lau was convicted, & if you 
consider him a dangerous character, such as an armed robber or kidnapper. We could 
not undertake to restrain such a patient in Hospital, & think it probable that he would 
break out by night. If he has been convicted for some minor or technical offence we 
shall be glad to go further into the matter with you.38 
In assuring Sturton that Dong had only been convicted of minor offences, Duck acknowledged 
that Sturton “would not take any precautions to restrain the patient in hospital, and would 
not be in any way responsible should he decide to leave eventually”.39 Duck’s admission sat 
uneasily with the police’s insistence that Dong be transferred to Hangzhou rather than 
released to return home. Duck probably viewed Dong’s transfer as an unsatisfactory but 
necessary expedient given: the lack of suitable alternatives in and around the International 
Settlement; the urgency of freeing up Dong’s bed in the Chinese Isolation Hospital for other 
patients; and the fears of contagion that his presence provoked.40  
Dong’s admission to the Kwang Chi Leper Hospital in Hangzhou established a 
precedent. The following month the Public Health Department contacted Sturton to have a 
beggar suffering from an advanced stage of the disease transferred as soon as possible.41 
Significantly the beggar’s consent for the transfer was sought.42 Three further cases were 
transferred, including “a beggar in advanced stage of the disease” and a Chinese policeman 
“in an early stage”.43 Their transfers mirrored Dong’s removal, and indeed Hong Kong’s 
practice of transferring patients to Sheklung during the 1930s. As a result of Sturton’s 
stipulation that a plain-clothes member of the Shanghai Municipal Police accompany Dong on 
the journey to Hangzhou, all subsequent Settlement cases travelled by train under escort from 
a member of the Public Health Department and with the consent of the Shanghai railway 
authorities.44 Indeed the latter insisted that both the leprosy cases and their respective 
medical ‘escorts’ travel by first class, allegedly in consideration of “disinfection and other 
                                                          
36 “Chinese Mission to Lepers: Hangchow Hospital and Medical Training College Taken Over by 
Government,” North-China Herald, May 7, 1927, 246; Haddow and Sturton, “Hangchow,” 790; 
Sturton, “The Problem of Leprosy in Hangchow,” 263-269. 
37 Leung, Leprosy in China, 164-165. 
38 S. D. Sturton to Duck, 20 Aug. 1930, SMA, U1/16/2621, 15. 
39 Duck to Sturton, 26 Aug. 1930, SMA, U1/16/2621, 16. 
40 Duck to Springfield, 22 July 1930, SMA, U1/16/2621, 12. 
41 H. Smith (P.H.D.) to Sturton, 12 Jan. 1931, SMA, U1-16-2621, 24. 
42 (C.H.I., P.H.D.) to M. Weaves, 6 Nov. 1930, SMA, U1/16/752, 68. 
43 D. Allan (P.H.D.) to Sturton, 7 Jan. 1932, SMA, U1/16/2621, 30; E. L. Sergeant (Kwang Chi Leper 
Hospital) to Allan, 18 June 1933, SMA, U1/16/2621; C.M. Zao (P.H.D.) to D. Heathcote (P.H.D.), 20 
June 1933, SMA, U1/16/2621, 43. 
44 U1-16-2621 Sturton to Duck, 20 Sept. 1930, SMA, U1/16/2621, 18. 
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routine preventive measures”.45 Travelling in the less crowded first class compartments may 
have rendered the transfer less conspicuous, reducing the possibility of eliciting anxious 
objections from the general public.46 The policy of transferring Shanghai’s lepers to the C.M.S. 
hospital Hangzhou necessitated only a limited expenditure: a $5 admission fee, a single first 
class ticket for the patient and the travel expenses incurred by the sanitary inspector or cadet 
health inspector tasked with escorting the patient.47 As Bashford explained, deportation 
removed sufferers beyond “Imperial or Commonwealth territory or systems of obligation”.48 
The Settlement’s reliance on Hangzhou thus mirrored Hong Kong’s early reliance on mainland 
leprosaria such as those at Sheklung, Tungkun and Pakhoi. This reliance provides further 
evidence of a distinctive sub-set within Leung’s “missionary” model: those that 
accommodated deported patients. 
The International Settlement’s reliance on deportation, however, was extremely 
limited compared to Hong Kong’s management of the disease. Only five patients were 
transferred to Hangzhou during this period. Deportation was restricted to destitute leprosy 
sufferers, and in all cases the transfer was consensual.49 As we shall see, the authorities also 
removed patients to other mainland sites during this period.50 Strikingly the Inspector 
responsible for reporting on these latter individuals was tasked with compiling a “Suggested 
Tour of Inspection” of eight of “the most outstanding cases” as part of the department’s 
preparations for the reception of delegates attending a medical conference in Nanjing.51 
Ultimately the Settlement’s reliance on deportation to the hospital at Hangzhou was an 
intermittent practice rather than a concerted policy. 
 This practice was permanently interrupted in the mid-1930s as a result of changed 
circumstances between the hospital and the Hangzhou municipal authorities. The court 
authorities once again mistook the Hongkew Clinic for Skin Diseases for an in-patient facility: 
Zung Pong Sai, a prisoner diagnosed with leprosy on his admission to Ward Road Gaol, was 
                                                          
45 W. K. Dunscombe (P.H.D.) to Sergeant, 20 June 1933, SMA, U1/16/2621, 42; U1-16-2621 T. F. 
Huang (Med, Officer, Rwy. Authorities) to Allan, 16 June 1933, SMA, U1/16/2621, 37. 
46 Cadet Zao stated that after transferring “the patient” to the Shanghai North Station by ambulance, 
he “was placed in a quite corner in the 1st class train.” C. M. Zao (P.H.D.) to D. Heathcote (P.H.D.), 20 
June 1933, SMA, U1/16/2621, 43. 
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Wolnizer to Heathcote, 19 Jan. 1931, SMA, U1/16/2621, 28; Zao to Heathcote, 17 May 1933, SMA, 
U1/16/2621, 33. 
48 Alison Bashford, Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of Colonialism, Nationalism and Public Health 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 89. 
49 Jordan noted that “it is not easy to arrange for the removal thither [i.e. to Hangzhou] of Shanghai 
lepers except with their consent”. “Extract from the Meeting of the Health Committee”, 4 May 1933, 
SMA, U1/16/753(1), 9. 
50 Others were ‘removed’ to Yangzhou, Nanjing, Canton, Kongpo and Suzhou. The department 
compiled details about the leprosy sufferers residing in all four districts, including those who were 
removed. H. J. Mentor (P.H.D.) to Heathcote, 4 Oct. 1934, SMA, U1/16/2690, 73-77. 
51 Mentor to Heathcote, 5 Oct. 1934, SMA, U1/16/2690, 78. 
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ordered to be confined within the clinic.52 Following his inevitable rejection, the Settlement 
contacted Sturton in the hope of having the prisoner admitted to the Leper Hospital at 
Hangzhou. Sturton regretfully informed the Acting Commissioner of Police that the hospital 
now had “a ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’ with the Hangchow Municipality to receive only local 
cases, which we usually interpret as meaning Chekiang [Zhejiang Province]”.53 Miss Maud 
Henderson of the St. Faiths Settlement, which lay on Jessfield Road in the western extra-
Settlement area, similarly failed to have Wang Kying-ziang, a young Chinese boy suffering from 
leprosy, admitted to the hospital in Hangzhou.54 Ironically Wang was admitted to the hospital 
in Hangzhou in July 1937 ahead of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. For the time being, 
however, he was kept in isolation in the Chinese Red Cross Hospital.55 Ultimately the 
International Settlement’s reliance on this mainland leprosarium relied on the tacit support 
of the Nationalist authorities. By sheer coincidence an alternative solution materialised just 
as the Nationalists’ revoked their support – an alternative that was much closer to home. 
 
The Emergence of a Public Health Issue: 2,000 Lepers in Shanghai 
 The Chinese Mission to Lepers was largely responsible for promoting leprosy as a 
public health issue of local as well as national importance during the 1930s. At one of the 
Mission’s meetings Dr. Herbert W. Wade, who was visiting from the Culion Leprosy Asylum in 
the Philippines, alleged that Shanghai’s population of leprosy sufferers stood at over 2,000 
cases.56 Having recently visited the Hongkew Clinic for Skin Diseases, he probably arrived at 
this figure by extrapolating Shapleigh’s estimate that there were between 100 and 200 leprosy 
sufferers in Hongkew alone. The Mission appropriated Wade’s speculative estimate, 
championing it as the official figure for the city for the rest of the decade.57 Reiss, a noted 
dermatologist and leprologist in Shanghai who supported the Mission’s endeavours, informed 
a local meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society: 
We are living in a modern settlement and lepers are running about without being 
recognized as such, not to speak of the sad fact that there is no suitable care taken 
for their treatment. The number of lepers in Shanghai who are attending various 
hospitals are about 100 to 250, but judging from the fact that lepers are appearing in 
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Heathcote, 11 May 1935, SMA, U1/16/2620, 55. 
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various clinics and disappearing, gives me the supposition that we must have in 
Shanghai several hundreds of lepers.58 
Both Wade’s and Reiss’s statements were primarily intended to generate support for the 
C.M.L.’s activities. But the notion that a large population of unregulated and unreported 
leprosy sufferers was roaming the city came as an alarming revelation to many, much to the 
dismay of the Settlement’s Public Health Department. 
Unsurprisingly the Settlement’s Health Committee was anxious to know whether the 
Public Health Department could deal with the allegedly high prevalence of this “obnoxious 
disease”.59 Jordan, the Commissioner of Public Health, reassured the Committee that his own 
relatively recent investigations had revealed that Shapleigh’s records were inaccurate “due to 
lack of staff and overwork”, and that the four patients that had been traced to the Settlement 
were in fact “nomads of no fixed abode”.60 Moreover he objected to the Mission’s adoption 
of Wade’s estimate because it failed to distinguish the prevalence of the disease within each 
of Shanghai’s different municipalities: 
I have no doubt that the statistics may quite well be true, providing Shanghai is taken 
to include the limits of Greater Shanghai, which of course as you are aware, spreads 
over a very great area, and in certain Northern districts [i.e. Chapei and Hongkew] 
comprises inhabitants of what is known as Beggar or Squatter villages.61 
Every time the Mission publicly referred to Wade’s estimate the Settlement’s Public Health 
Department appeared guilty: of negligence at the very least, at worst of failing to abate a 
major threat to the Settlement’s health. The Mission’s repeated promotion of this “plain 
untruth” increasingly frustrated Jordan.62 As Commissioner of Public Health, he undertook the 
task of providing the Health Committee (and the general public) with fresh reliable 
information. 
Jordan initially turned to the Chinese Mission to Lepers in the hope of acquiring 
accurate information regarding the prevalence of leprosy within the city. He was soon 
disappointed. William Yinsom Lee, the Mission’s President and brother to a member of the 
Hongkong Auxiliary’s organising committee, ventured a figure of 1,000 sufferers as the most 
conservative estimate for the three municipal areas, and he confidently asserted that at least 
a quarter of them were to be found within the Settlement alone.63 Lee’s figures, however, met 
                                                          
58 Reiss made his comments at a meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society in Shanghai. Frederick Reiss, 
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with the Public Health Department’s scorn; the department’s secretary informed Jordan, “I do 
not think there is any use wasting our time conducting further correspondence with Mr. 
Lee”.64 This disregard for Lee’s estimates reflected the frustration evinced by the medical 
authorities at the absence of reliable statistics. Moreover it demonstrated that the Public 
Health Department viewed leprosy as an alien, mainland Chinese disease. The department 
was therefore disinclined to accept the high extrapolative ratios that the Chinese Mission to 
Lepers favoured to account for concealed cases. 
Instead the Public Health Department initiated its own investigation in order to 
assuage the S.M.C.’s fears. By corresponding directly with Shanghai’s hospitals, Jordan 
ascertained that only a handful of cases were from the Settlement. The Hongkew Clinic, for 
instance, eventually reported that thirty-four of the 100 cases that its staff had treated in the 
past year were from the Settlement.65 But Jordan subsequently informed the Shanghai 
Municipal Council that seven of these thirty-four ‘Settlement cases’ resided outside the 
Settlement’s jurisdiction. Moreover only six of the remaining twenty-seven cases could be 
traced to addresses provided by the Clinic. Jordan concluded: 
Making due allowance for concealed and untreated cases, and bearing in mind the 
fact that most lepers are by virtue of circumstances, more or less compelled to lead a 
nomadic existence, I am of opinion [sic] that the result of this enquiry serves to show 
that the incidence of Leprosy in the Settlement has been overrated.66 
Crucially Jordan withheld from estimating how many unreported lepers were living in the 
Settlement. He was among a minority to do so. Reiss, the noted dermatologist, speculated 
that there were 400 to 500 cases within the Settlement.67 
Whilst Jordan was content to let the matter rest there, the Chinese Mission to Lepers 
was eager to draw international attention to its efforts by hosting the First National Leprosy 
Conference in Shanghai. This conference provided an ideal opportunity to showcase the 
Mission’s local work including its management of the Hongkew Clinic. For instance the clinic’s 
superintendents presented a detailed account of twenty-nine of the clinic’s cases, twelve of 
whom “seemingly acquired the disease in Shanghai and its immediate neighbourhood”.68 
Tyau, now Vice-President of the C.M.L., delivered his paper on ‘The History of Leprosy in 
Shanghai’, in which he summarised: his involvement in setting up and running the St Luke’s 
Leper Clinic in the 1910s; the “epoch-making” establishment of the Chinese Mission to Lepers 
in 1926; and the Mission’s management of the Hongkew Clinic for Skin Diseases.69 He 
concluded: 
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The history of Leprosy in Shanghai is undeniably one of progress in every way. Surely 
the residents of Shanghai, particularly the medical men, should all join in the march, 
nay, the crusade against the further ravages of the disease.70 
The C.M.L. conference highlighted the importance of leprosy as a public health issue that 
transcended all three municipalities. The Hongkew Clinic’s superintendents emphasised this 
fact in their annual report on the clinic, which was published in the following issue of The Leper 
Quarterly. The report included a map that suggested that many of the clinic’s patients resided 
within the International Settlement and the French Concession.71 The map not only placed a 
number of leprosy sufferers within the Settlement’s midst, but suggested that many more 
travelled through the Settlement (or at the very least up the Huangpu River past the Bund) in 
order to secure treatment at the clinic. 
 
A Major Turning Point 
 Jordan’s report ‘Leprosy and the Medical Conference at Nanking’ (1933) marked a 
significant turning point in the Settlement’s management of the disease. Jordan, the 
Settlement’s Commissioner of Public Health, found himself caught between a rock and a hard 
place. On the one hand he had misgivings about the Mission’s “projected and possibly 
visionary developments”.72 Away from the international spotlight the C.M.L.’s physicians were 
franker about the Clinic’s limitations, notably the lack of temporary hospital 
accommodation.73 The Mission therefore began to envisage the possibility of building a small 
leprosy hospital in Shanghai and a larger leprosarium on the city’s outskirts.74 On the other 
hand Jordan was anxious to avoid international criticism at the Ninth Congress of the Far 
Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine, which was scheduled to take place in Nanjing in 
October 1933. Consequently he informed the Shanghai Municipal Council: 
It is highly probable that the whole subject of Leprosy will be ventilated at the 
Meetings in Nanking and that owing to a general confusion between the Leprosy 
statistics (mainly hypothetical) of the interior, and those in Shanghai, an attempt may 
be made to indicate a supine spirit in the health administration of various cities.75 
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Jordan rejected the Mission’s estimate and he resented its recent exaggerations regarding the 
high prevalence of the disease in the municipal Gaol.76 Not only had Reiss and other C.M.L. 
representatives failed to identify any new cases, but the Assistant Superintendent of Hospitals 
had recently confirmed that none of the prisoners were suffering from the disease.77 
Moreover Jordan pointed out that the present superintendent of the Gaol had served on the 
Visiting Committee of the Leprosy Commission in the Federated Malay States for three years, 
and was therefore “quite conversant with the appearances of Leprosy”.78 
Jordan’s report was distinctive for several reasons. Firstly, whereas the department’s 
census in 1931 had stopped short of estimating the total number of sufferers within the 
Settlement, Jordan now posited that there were no more than 100 cases including the 40 
cases already known to the authorities.79 This represented the first official acknowledgement 
of a not inconsiderable number of local leprosy sufferers. Secondly, Jordan identified leprosy 
as “an imported disease”, confined largely to the “nomadic and poorer populations, probably 
to be found mostly in the floating populations contained in beggar boats and Squatter 
villages”.80 The fear of migrating leprosy sufferers was heightened by the belief that this 
migration was likely to go largely undetected, and the imported cases “would [therefore] only 
have to remain concealed for a time in order to become residents”.81 Jordan’s assumptions 
about leprosy paralleled Hong Kong’s fears of this Chinese disease. 
 Jordan’s report also represented a radical departure from earlier discussions on the 
subject by actively seeking to revise the Settlement’s management of leprosy. He 
acknowledged that the practice of relocating consenting homeless leprosy cases to the Kwang 
Chi Leper Hospital in Hangzhou was “quite embarrassing as there is no suitable machinery for 
dealing with them”.82 Moreover he even conceded that other cases “perhaps 3 or 4 in number, 
could be located, but frankly at the moment we are not too desirous to search for them, as 
we do not know what to do with them when found”.83 The Mission’s plan to establish a leprosy 
clinic within the Settlement only threatened to make things worse: “if the fame of a Leper 
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Clinic in Shanghai becomes noised abroad it will serve as a magnet for cases and the Hospital 
will soon be filled, with the result that ambulatory cases in greater or lesser number will be 
found in this town”.84 As in Hong Kong, the trope of the leprous migrant from the mainland 
underpinned the Settlement’s opposition to the establishment of domestic Western-style 
isolation facilities. Any increase in the number of resident lepers would not only threaten the 
health of the Settlement’s population, but would also necessitate the transfer of “funds and 
resources from diseases already a problem in Shanghai to a more or less imported disease”.85 
Jordan therefore advised the S.M.C. that “some main lines of thought should be decided 
upon”.86 The impending medical conference in Nanjing added a sense of urgency to these 
deliberations.  
 The Chinese Mission to Lepers was either unaware, or optimistically chose to ignore, 
the Council’s staunch opposition to the establishment of treatment facilities within the 
Settlement. Following a meeting of the Health Committee, the S.M.C.’s Press Information 
Office released a very brief outline of Jordan’s report along with the minutes of the Health 
Committee’s meeting. The press release specifically noted that the report had highlighted the 
“desirability of avoiding any action which would encourage the migration of lepers from other 
parts of the country to Shanghai”.87 An ambiguously worded article in the Chinese press, 
however, encouraged the Mission to believe that Jordan actually supported the proposed 
relocation of the C.M.L. Hongkew Clinic to premises within the Settlement.88 Allan, the 
Assistant Superintendent of Hospitals, avoided committing himself either way in front of the 
clinic’s staff but in private he was adamant that leprosy was, and should remain an issue for 
the Chinese municipal authorities: 
My visit to the clinic convinces me that in the surrounding districts of Shanghai there 
is a certain amount of Leprosy to be found, though how it compares with other parts 
of China, I cannot say, and a leper hospital, or a leper colony, preferably, would not 
be amiss in the district, providing it is far enough away from the Settlement, but I think 
that problem is mainly for the Chinese Authorities to settle. All we want is some 
working arrangement whereby we can get rid of the odd lepers which find their way 
into the Chinese Isolation Hospital.89 
The Shanghai Municipal Council promptly corrected the Mission’s “fanciful interpretation of 
bare facts” by reaffirming the Settlement’s staunch opposition to any such plans.90 But the 
Settlement’s victory was a hollow one. In asserting its authority over the management of 
leprosy within the confines of the Settlement, the Council was forced to recognise the 
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jurisdictional limits of its opposition: the Settlement was powerless to oppose the 
construction of a C.M.L. leprosarium just a few miles north of the Settlement. 
 
The National Leprosarium and ‘Resident’ Leprosy Sufferers 
The National Leprosarium was a Chinese leprosarium unlike any other. Built with the 
support of the Chinese and French municipalities at Tazang (Dachang), the Chinese Mission to 
Lepers sincerely believed that this leprosarium was “destined to render a nationwide service 
as a model and training centre” for the rest of the country.91 Daniel G. Lai, the leprosarium’s 
honorary superintendent, hoped that the institution would emulate the National Leprosarium 
at Carville, Louisiana, by serving as a “‘Paradise’ to the Victims of Leprosy”.92 But the outbreak 
of the Sino-Japanese war shattered the Mission’s hopes. According to Leung the war 
“reduced” the National Leprosarium’s significance as a “Nationalist-hybrid model”.93 But this 
institution bore none of the hallmarks of this hybrid model. Instead this institution, like Hong 
Kong’s village of sufferers at Au Tau, lay beyond Leung’s spectrum. The International 
Settlement’s fascinating relationship with the National Leprosarium defined and indeed 
increasingly underpinned this institution’s very existence. 
Unable to obstruct the Mission’s plans to develop this institution on the northern 
outskirts of Shanghai, the Settlement’s medical authorities resigned themselves to developing 
a working relationship with this institution. After all, the leprosarium provided an expedient 
solution to the Settlement’s leprosy problem now that the Hangzhou hospital refused to 
accept the Settlement’s patients as a result of its ‘Gentlemen’s agreement’ with the local 
Chinese authorities.94 But whereas the French Municipal Council donated $10,000 towards 
the construction of the Leprosarium, the Shanghai Municipal Council stipulated that it was 
only prepared to pay $1,200 per annum towards the maintenance of ten Settlement 
patients.95 Dunscombe, who was serving as Acting Commissioner of Public Health in Jordan’s 
absence, justified this maximum expenditure on account of the rarity of the disease within 
the Settlement. Moreover he pointed to the Mission’s decision to name the institution ‘the 
National Leprosarium’ as evidence that it was “primarily a subject of national, rather than 
                                                          
91 “Dedication of the National Leprosarium of Shanghai,” 243.  
92 Daniel G. Lai, “What the National Leprosarium of China May Serve,” Leper Quarterly 8, nos. 1&2 
(1934): 3-7, 4. Lai was intimately familiar with this American institution, having spent time there in the 
latter half of 1932. During his stay Lai examined the clinical records of the Chinese patients that had 
been admitted to Carville and met with a number of the patients living there at the time. Daniel G. 
Lai, “Chinese Leprosy Cases in the U.S. National Leprosarium: A Clinical and Laboratory Study of 36 
Patients with 7 Autopsy Reports,” Chinese Medical Journal 47, no. 8 (1933): 772-784. 
93 Leung, Leprosy in China, 163-171, 171. Leung used “Nationalist model” and “Nationalist-hybrid 
model” interchangeably; “nationalist” models referred to foreign institutions such as Molokai or 
Culion. Her brief discussion of the National Leprosarium concluded her analysis of ‘Nationalist-hybrid 
models’ such as Swatow, Hangzhou and Sheklung.  
94 Dunscombe to Nash, 26 Jan. 1934, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 22. 
95 The equivalent of a rate of $10 per capita per mensem. “Fund For Leper Hospital: Only $14,000 
Needed to Enable Work to be Started,” North-China Herald, Feb. 28, 193428, 331; J. M. McKee (S.M.C. 
Deputy Sec.) to Wu, 22 Feb. 1934, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 25. 
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local, importance”.96 The Settlement’s racialised conceptualisation of leprosy underpinned its 
reluctance to support this mainland leprosarium. Leprosy was considered a Chinese problem, 
not an Imperial one. 
Almost immediately claims emerged that undermined the Council’s refusal to provide 
a grant-in-aid towards the construction of the National Leprosarium. The Chinese Mission to 
Lepers claimed that the number of sufferers residing within the Settlement was far greater 
than the Public Health Department alleged. Jordan informed his department that “Dr. Lai 
made a statement in his speech that there were 36 case of Leprosy in the Settlement now, 
and that the Council’s health report was in error”.97 Jordan was so alarmed by Lai’s claims that 
he immediately issued the following staff memorandum: 
(a) Enquiries are to be made by the Hospital Division as to how their cases were 
admitted and kept in Hospital (i.e. was there any police assistance). 
(b) Enquiries to be made by the Inspectorial Staff and a Spot Map to be prepared of 
all the known cases. In the latter connexion enquiries should be made concerning 
the probable number of cases which have moved into the Settlement since the 
Sino-Japanese trouble. 
(c) Finally it is desirable to ascertain the number of cases notified by Dr. Lai.98 
Whereas Jordan’s earlier censuses were largely the product of his own enquiries, he now 
called for a full departmental investigation into the disease. This memorandum led to the 
identification of twenty-seven cases, and may have prompted the ‘removal’, referred to 
above, of eleven of these individuals, principally to Chapei.99 Of the fifteen cases still residing 
in the Settlement, four were natives of Shanghai; a further seven, including a Russian woman, 
contracted the disease whilst living in the city.100 The Settlement therefore concluded that its 
limited support for the National Leprosarium was fully justified. By contrast the Chinese 
Mission to Lepers continued to insist that a far greater number of the clinic’s patients were 
residents of the Settlement (table 3.1). 
                                                          
96 Dunscombe to Nash, 26 Jan. 1934, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 21. Jordan actually donated $30 towards 
the construction of the institution. See SMA, U1/16/4840, 18. 
97 Emphasis in the original. Jordan, “Staff Memo No.16: Leprosy”, 29 Mar. 1934, SMA, U1/16/2622, 
171. Jordan also stated that Lai presented a map indicating the location of at least 11 different cases 
within the Settlement at a C.M.L. meeting. Bizarrely, Jordan then went on to detail the locations of 
12-13 leprosy cases, though as he himself admitted, “It was only possible to glance at the map and 
hence locations are a bit vague”. Lai published his paper in The Leper Quarterly, though the article did 
not explicitly refer to the number of cases in the Settlement, or indeed the city, nor did it include the 
map. Lai may have used the map published by Drs. Chen and Chen in the clinic’s annual report. Lai, 
“What the National Leprosarium of China May Serve,” 2-7. 
98 Emphasis in the original. Jordan, “Staff Memo No.16: Leprosy”, 29 Mar. 1934, SMA, U1/16/2622, 
171. 
99 H. J. Mentor (P.H.D.) to Heathcote, 4 Oct. 1934, SMA, U1/16/2690, 73-77. Jordan’s annual report 
noted that a total of 22 Chinese leprosy sufferers – 7 residents and 15 non-residents – were notified 
during the year, though his lists do not correspond exactly with Mentor’s. J. H. Jordan, Shanghai 
Municipal Council. Public Health Department. Annual Report 1934 (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1935), 
SMA, U1/16/4655, 20-22, 20. 
100 Mentor did not specify which Municipality they were natives of. H. J. Mentor (P.H.D.) to Heathcote, 
4 Oct. 1934, SMA, U1/16/2690, 73-76. 
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Table 3.4. Distribution in Shanghai: Out-patients at the Hongkew Clinic for Skin Diseases, 1934-35.101 
Origin Cases % of Total Cases 
Chapei 83 40.4 
International Settlement 68 33.1 
French Concession 18 8.8 
Nantao 29 14.1 
Pudong 7 3.4 
TOTAL 205  
 
The admission of leprosy sufferers from the Settlement to the National Leprosarium 
was a contentious issue from the moment the institution officially opened its doors in 
December 1935. When Kao Sz-ling, a young homeless beggar picked up by the police, was 
suspected of suffering from leprosy, the police attempted to transfer him to the National 
Leprosarium. Kao was the very first leprosy sufferer that the Public Health Department 
attempted to admit to this institution; Wang Kying Ziang, the young boy from the St. Faiths 
Settlement whose admission to the hospital in Hangzhou had been refused, had already been 
admitted to the National Leprosarium by the Chinese municipal authorities.102 Rev. Wu, the 
C.M.L.’s general secretary, refused to admit Kao without a letter of request from the Public 
Health Department.103 The Department, however, refused to take responsibility for the 
patient because Kao Sz-ling was not considered a “bona-fide resident”, having only recently 
arrived in Shanghai.104 Duck therefore informed Wu: 
Despite the fact that specific arrangements have not yet been concluded between the 
Mission and the Council for the care and maintenance of what may be described as 
“non-residents” of the Settlement, it is clear to me that the admission of Kao to the 
Leprosarium is a matter of urgency.105 
The Public Health Department expected the Leprosarium to admit cases from the Settlement, 
even if the Settlement refused to acknowledge them as ‘residents’ and therefore assume 
financial responsibility for their maintenance. Duck considered that it would be “manifestly 
unfair” for the Council to assume responsibility for these cases.106 Given the philanthropic and 
humanitarian principles upon which the C.M.L. was founded, the size of the institution and 
the fact that the Leprosarium’s inauguration coincided with the closure of the Hongkew Clinic, 
                                                          
101 W. Y. Chen, “Annual Report of the Hongkew Clinic for Skin Diseases, for the Year 1934-1935,” Leper 
Quarterly, 9, no. 2 (1935): 235. 
102 C.H.I. Bogomoloff reported that Wang was admitted to the National Leprosarium on November 1st. 
M. J. Henderson to Jordan, 10 May 1935, SMA, U1/16/2620, 52-53; A. E. C. Charlot (P.H.D.) to C. N. 
Bogomoloff (P.H.D.), 8 May 1936, SMA, U1/16/759(1), 6. 
103 A. W. Tucker (St. Luke’s Hospt.) to Jordan, 17 Dec. 1935, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 38. 
104 From Tainan, Shandong Province. H. Smith (P.H.D.) to E.F. Duck (D.C.P.H.), 17 Dec. 1935, SMA, 
U1/16/753(1), 39. 
105 E. F. Duck (D.C.P.H.) to Wu (C.M.L.), 20 Dec. 1935, SMA, U1/4/232, 207. 
106 Duck to G. G. Phillips (Sec., S.M.C.), 21 Dec. 1935, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 37. 
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the Mission had no other choice but to admit Kao Sz-ling without the promise of financial 
support from the Settlement.107 
 
Figure 14. Dedication of the National Leprosarium of Shanghai, Dec. 12, 1935.108 
 Tensions between the Mission and the Public Health Department continued to mount 
in the months immediately after the opening of the National Leprosarium. The department 
was concerned that the Settlement would be “debited with sundry ‘unwanted’ cases” unless 
it devised “some cut & dried formulae”; by now the Mission claimed that 6 of the 
Leprosarium’s first 25 patients were Settlement cases.109 The medical authorities faced similar 
concerns regarding the maintenance of patients in the Mercy Hospital and the Ching Chong 
Tuberculosis Hospital.110 But according to Jordan the disproportionate number of beggars 
suffering from leprosy as opposed to mental illnesses or tuberculosis complicated the process 
of verifying patients’ residential qualifications. He believed that leprosy sufferers inevitably 
claimed that they were from the Settlement, and thus caused “erroneous calculations”.111 The 
Council therefore conditioned its approval of the Mission’s request for an increase in the per 
capita maintenance rate to $20 per month by emphasising that “cases should only be 
admitted as Settlement cases after the Public Health Department has been afforded the 
opportunity of checking their residential qualifications”.112 Despite the Council’s attempt to 
clarify the admissions procedure significant confusion persisted. Within months of accepting 
Kao Sz-ling the Leprosarium rejected Li Chong Chiao, a ricksha coolie sent to them by the 
                                                          
107 Wu to Duck, 23 Dec. 1935, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 42; T. C. Wu, “A Record Year of the Mission: The 
Annual Report of the General Secretary for 1935,” Leper Quarterly 10, no. 1 (1936): 21. 
108 Leper Quarterly 10, no.1 (1936). 
109 Turnbull (Sec., P.H.D.) to Jordan, 20 Mar. 1936, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 49; Wu to G.G. Phillips, 17 
Mar. 1936, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 50. 
110 Jordan to Phillips, 21 Mar. 1936, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 53; Jordan, “Staff Instruction No.20: Grant-
Aided Hospital and Leprosarium – Residential Qualifications”, 6 Apr. 1936, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 65. 
111 Jordan to Phillips, 21 Mar. 1936, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 53. 
112 Emphasis in the original. Phillips to Wu, 28 Mar. 1936, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 54. 
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Ricksha Pullers’ Mutual Aid Association, “on the ground that no poor leper could stay there 
without charges”.113 The Council refused to accept responsibility for this case because their 
enquiries revealed that Li had never resided in the Settlement. Jordan was adamant that 
“cases not verified as Settlement cases by the Health Department shall not be described as 
Settlement cases, even when sent in by doctors practising and residing in the Settlement”.114 
Keenly aware that the controversy had arisen over the Council’s failure to define the criteria 
for distinguishing between non-residents and bona-fide residents, Jordan stipulated that only 
leprosy sufferers who had resided in the Settlement for a minimum of six months were 
entitled to the Council’s support.115 By contrast Hong Kong’s four-man leprosy committee 
favoured a residency clause of three years. 
 The controversial residency statuses of the National Leprosarium’s patients prompted 
the Public Health Department to initiate an investigation into the qualifications of those 
leprosy patients that had already been admitted, or were in the process of being admitted, to 
the National Leprosarium.116 “Prima facie, all of the cases have little or no claim on Settlement 
status (residence),” the departmental secretary explained, “but I anticipate that the very 
keenest enquiries will be needed in order that we furnish wholly reliable evidence in rebuttal 
of the [Mission’s] claim”.117 Jordan advised his staff to use “tact and discretion in all cases” 
and emphasised the importance of tracing the addresses and durations of residence of the 
seven leprosy sufferers. 118 As a result of these investigations the Council agreed to cover the 
maintenance of three of the seven patients: Wang Kying-ziang (Case No.1), Chow Dziang-ling 
(Case No.4) and Kao Sz Ling (Case No. 2), the young homeless beggar that the department had 
initially refused to recognise as a resident.119 Jordan convinced the Municipal Council that it 
had a “moral obligation” towards this patient because his department “in an emergency was 
more or less compelled to request admission of the case”.120 Wang was also initially classified 
as a non-resident because the Chinese municipal authorities had arranged his admission, but 
Chief Health Inspector Bogomoloff over-turned this decision on the basis of a letter from the 
                                                          
113 T. L. Chang (Gen. Sec., Ricksha Puller’s Mutual Aid Assoc.) to Jordan, 28 Mar. 1936, SMA, 
U1/16/753(1), 62. 
114 Jordan to Phillips, 2 Apr. 1936, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 56-58, 56. 
115 Jordan to Phillips, 2 Apr. 1936, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 57. 
116 Jordan, “Staff Instruction No.20”, 6 Apr. 1936, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 65. 
117 (Sec., P.H.D.) to Duck, SMA, U1/16/759(1), 6 May 1936, 4. 
118 Jordan, “Staff Instruction No.20”, 6 Apr. 1936, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 65. 
119 Wu Foh Li (Case No.3), Fong Yoh Teh (Case No.5), and Kyi Zee-tsung (Case No.6) were deemed non-
residents. The Council was therefore only prepared to pay $337.36 instead of $481.98 as requested 
by the Mission as maintenance for the Settlement’s patients for the first half of the year. Wu to 
Jordan, 5 May 1936, SMA, U1/16/759(1), 2-3, 9; Phillips to Wu, 3 June 1936, SMA, U1/16/759(1), 19-
20. Resident and refugee Settlement cases were subsequently assigned patient numbers, referred to 
throughout this dissertation with a ‘#’. Thus Kao Sz Ling remained Resident #2, but Chow Dziang-ling 
became Resident #6. Wang was the exception: he was never assigned a number as a result of a 
clerical error. Instead the monthly returns exceptionally referred to him by his name through to 1945. 
For the lists of patient numbers see “Lepers in the Leprosarium, Brenan Road”, ca. 1938, SMA, 
U1/16/759, 96-97; “Individual Cases”, ca. 1937-38, SMA, U1/16/755, 1-2; “Individual Cases (51-100)”, 
ca. 1938-40, SMA, U1/16/756, 1-3; “Individual Cases (101-150)”, ca. 1940-43, SMA, U1/16/757, 1-3; 
“National Leprosarium of Shanghai, Individual Cases (151-200)”, ca. 1943-45, SMA, U1/16/758, 1. 
120 Jordan to Phillips, 21 May 1936, SMA, U1/16/759(1), 17. 
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St. Faiths Settlement which clearly indicated the boy had contracted leprosy in Shanghai.121 
These three patients represented the first of at least ten ‘bona-fide’ residents admitted to and 
maintained in the National Leprosarium between November 1935 and the outbreak of the 
Sino-Japanese War. Chow Dziang-ling left in February 1937, but both Wang Kying-ziang and 
Kao Sz Ling were evacuated to a mainland leprosarium in the summer of 1937.122 Wang as well 
as another early resident patient were eventually re-admitted to one of the National 
Leprosarium’s war-time incarnations in 1938: the Brenan Road Emergency Leprosarium.123 
 
The National Leprosarium: Formalising a Working Relationship, 1936-37 
The evolution of the International Settlement’s working relationship with the National 
Leprosarium provides fascinating insights into trans-municipal medical co-operation prior to 
and during the Sino-Japanese war. No sooner had the Council begun to formalise the 
admissions procedure than it was confronted with a new issue: burial charges. A “working 
routine in respect of burials and burial charges” had not been foreseen, let alone established, 
largely because of contemporary perceptions about the low morbidity of leprosy.124 Jordan 
hoped that the Shanghai Public Benevolent Cemetery Organisation (S.P.B.C.O.) would take 
charge of the burial for Ku Lan-sen (Resident #5), and would also agree to “deal with such 
cases gratis”.125 Failing that he recommended that the Council bear the charges for bona-fide 
residents – he anticipated a low “outlay since mortality is low and in most cases the relatives 
prefer to arrange for burial”.126 Although the S.P.B.C.O. agreed to deal with the burial of 
resident patients free of charge, Jordan subsequently recommended that a special exemption 
be made in respect to the burial fees for Ku Lan-sen.127 Ultimately Ku Lan-sen was the only 
resident patient who died in the National Leprosarium prior to the outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese War. 
 Official concern about the concealment of leprosy cases prompted the medical 
authorities to call for compulsory and enforced hospitalisation. Jordan noted that a minority 
of cases were taking “immediate steps to ‘depart for the country’ or in some manner escape 
from our jurisdiction in order to avoid hospitalisation”.128 Incidentally the number of leprosy 
                                                          
121 Minute by C. N. Bogomoloff (P.H.D.), 8 May 1936, SMA, U1/16/759(1), 6; M. J. Henderson to 
Jordan, 10 May 1935, SMA, U1/16/759(1), 7-8.  
122 To a leprosarium in Shantung. C.B. Chambers Chen (C.M.L.) to Jordan, 17 Apr. 1937, SMA, 
U1/16/759(1), 48;  Sze (C.M.L.) to Jordan, 30 Sept. 1937, SMA, U1/16/759(1), 57. 
123 The other patient was Nyi Kyiang Ziang (Resident #8). It is unclear whether Nyi was related to 
Wang. K. Wang (C.M.L.) to Jordan, 3 Feb. 1939, SMA, U1/16/755, 101. Ironically the Brenan Road 
Emergency Leprosarium was located only a stone’s throw away from Wang’s original home, the St. 
Faiths Settlement on Jessfield Road. Both Wang and Nyi remained in the Brenan Road Emergency 
Leprosarium through 1945. 
124 Jordan to Phillips, 12 Oct. 1936, SMA, U1/16/752, 7. 
125 Jordan to Phillips, 8 Oct. 1936, SMA, U1/16/752, 2. Ku Lan-sen (Resident #5) died less than a 
fortnight after admission. Wu to Jordan, 3 Oct. 1936, SMA, U1/16/754, 12. 
126 Jordan to Phillips, 8 Oct. 1936, SMA, U1/16/752, 2. 
127 S. K. Ying (Hon. Sec., S.P.B.C.O.) to Jordan, 12 Oct. 1936, SMA, U1/16/752, 4; Jordan to Phillips, 12 
Oct. 1936, SMA, U1/16/752, 7. 
128 Jordan to R.T. Bryan (Municipal Advocate), 4 Aug. 1936, SMA, U1/16/754, 2. 
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sufferers who had previously consented to hospitalisation whether in the Settlement’s 
hospitals, the Hangzhou Leprosy Hospital, or more recently in the National Leprosarium is 
striking given the absence of legal compulsion. Jordan nevertheless thought it time to legally-
endorse hospitalisation. Moreover he was eager to expedite the process, arguing that the 
present procedure for investigating cases under the existing bye-law “necessarily entails a 
delay which in turn gives the patient sufficient warning to enable him to change his address 
and thus remain a menace to all those who come in contact”.129 Jordan hoped to prevent 
these cases from escaping by empowering the police to immediately detain all leprosy 
sufferers upon discovery, pending their removal to the Leprosarium. Jordan acknowledged 
that this procedure “presumably interferes with the liberty of the subject” but deemed it 
necessary to protect the health of the Settlement. The Settlement’s judicial authorities 
informed Jordan that the police could transfer all leprosy sufferers to the Leprosarium before 
securing a court approval as this was the procedure for dealing with the Settlement’s 
lunatics.130 The Deputy Commissioner of Police, however, refused to endorse this practice, 
arguing that the procedure was only suitable “in extreme cases, on request, where urgency is 
necessary for the protection of life and property”.131 Jordan was clearly frustrated by the 
Deputy Commissioner’s response: “As to the question of urgency, I suggest that a leper as a 
cook in a restaurant is perhaps as great a potential danger to the Public as the homeless 
imbecile found wandering on the streets”.132 In the event, the matter was dropped.  
A satisfactory working relationship gradually emerged between the Settlement and 
the National Leprosarium. Many of the leprosy sufferers sent from the Settlement were 
transported to the leprosarium in the Chinese Public Sanatorium’s ambulances.133 
Alternatively Shanghai’s leprosy sufferers could travel to the National Leprosarium by public 
transport: the C.M.L.’s admission permit advised patients to catch a bus from the Settlement’s 
northern border.134 This mode of transport was probably restricted to voluntary admissions 
as opposed to admissions requested by the Settlement’s Public Health Department or by the 
Shanghai Municipal Police. Inevitably disagreements continued to arise regarding the 
admission of both resident and non-resident leprosy sufferers sent by the Public Health 
Department. For instance the Public Health Department refused to accept responsibility for 
Ah Loh Tse even though his admission was “thrust upon” the National Leprosarium by his 
 
                                                          
129 Jordan to Bryan, 4 Aug. 1936 SMA, U1/16/754, 2. 
130 Bryan to Jordan, 8 Aug. 1936, SMA, U1/16/754, 3-4. 
131 (Deputy Com. Police) to Jordan, 14 Aug. 1936, SMA, U1/16/754, 7. 
132 Jordan to Bryan, 18 Aug. 1936, SMA, U1/16/754, 9. 
133 The S.M.C. used the Sanatorium’s petition for a renewal of its ambulance license fee exemption as 
leverage to secure the Sanatorium’s consent to transport leprosy sufferers. J. R. Jones (Sec., S.M.C.) to 
S. T. Chen (Chinese Public Sanatorium), 17 Jan. 1936, SMA, U1/16/763, 81. 
134 Chinese Mission to Lepers, “Translation: The National Leprosarium of Shanghai – Admission 
Permit”, ca. 1936, SMA, U1/16/754, 37-38. 
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Shanghai Municipal Police escort.135 On the other hand the Mission refused to admit Chow 
Chang Di (Resident #3) – a female patient whom Inspector Mentor had included on the 
‘Suggested Tour of Inspection’ for the Nanjing conference delegates back in 1934 – until the 
Public Health Department provided a guarantor for the patient.136 The Settlement relented, 
maintaining Chow in the National Leprosarium from September 1936 until her voluntary 
departure in February 1937.137  
The increasing number of patients identified as residents brought into question the 
level of support provided by the other two municipalities. The National Leprosarium charged 
the Settlement $236.50 for the first quarter of 1937 for the maintenance of five resident 
patients.138 As far as the Settlement was concerned, this (limited) financial support was more 
than commensurate with its responsibilities, though it conceded that the per capita 
maintenance rate of $20 per month was “somewhat low and less than the actual cost of their 
upkeep”.139 Jordan challenged the lack of proportional support from the French 
municipality.140 Jordan’s major criticism, though, was levelled at the Chinese Municipality: 
I fail to see that the Council is doing less than any other local body when it subscribes 
approximately $1,200 for 10 patients per year if one takes the figures claimed by the 
Institute as correct, and not our figures, as against $2,000 for 50 patients per year, 
coming from other areas. In this proportion the City [i.e. Chinese] Government, or 
other responsible authorities, should subscribe approximately $6,000 per year.141 
The crux of Jordan’s argument lay in his belief that “in most countries the care of lepers 
devolves to the State” because of the inevitable gravitation of leprosy sufferers towards urban 
centres.142 According to Jordan the Settlement was forced to devote valuable resources and 
personnel to the maintenance of aliens suffering from a mainland disease. Consequently the 
                                                          
135 Ah Loh Tse had been convicted of petty theft sentenced to 15 days in prison, but was refused 
admission to the Ward Road Gaol as a result of being diagnosed as a leprosy sufferer. Wu to Jordan, 1 
July 1936, SMA, U1/16/759(1), 25; Jordan to Wu, 9 July 1936, SMA, U1/16/759(1), 29. 
136 Jordan to Wu, 28 Sept. 1936, SMA, U1/16/754, 13. 
137 The National Leprosarium’s statement for the 1st quarter of 1937 reported that she “left” rather 
than escaped. C. B. Chambers Chen (Gen. Sec., C.M.L.) to Jordan, 17 Apr. 1937, SMA, U1/16/759(1), 
48. 
138 In addition to Wang Kying-ziang and Kao Sz Ling, the Settlement was responsible for Nyi Kying-
ziang (Resident # 8) and Woo Kyi Chung (Resident # 10), who were admitted in December 1936 and 
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to Jordan, 17 Apr. 1937, SMA, U1/16/759(1), 48. 
139 Jordan to (Sec., S.M.C.), 28 Apr. 1937, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 89. 
140 Jordan to (Sec., S.M.C.), Apr. 1937, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 89. A recent enquiry from Jordan’s 
counter-part in the French Concession regarding the Settlement’s relationship with the National 
Leprosarium probably prompted his reference to the Concession. Dr. Rabaute, (Directeur de l’Hygiène 
publique, French Concession) to Jordan, 11 and 13 Jan. 1937, SMA, U1/16/752, 59, 62. According to 
the Mission, 6 of the 74 patients admitted to the Leprosarium in 1936 were residents of the French 
Concession as compared to 10 from the International Settlement. Daniel G. Lai, “The First Annual 
Report of the National Leprosarium of Shanghai for the Year 1936,” Leper Quarterly 11, no. 2 (1937): 
87. 
141 Jordan to (Sec., S.M.C.), 28 Apr. 1937, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 90. 
142 Jordan to (Sec., S.M.C.), 28 Apr. 1937, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 89. 
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Council refused to reconsider the C.M.L’.s request for a grant-in-aid of $2,000 per year.143 
Private donations from members of the Public Health Department tempered this lack of 
official support. The Superintendent of Hospitals, for instance, subscribed to the request for a 
contribution towards the National Leprosarium’s poultry farm and he promised to secure 
further support for this occupational therapy from his colleagues.144 The timing of this 
donation was extremely inauspicious. Less than two months later the Chinese Mission to 
Lepers was forced to call an emergency meeting to discuss the evacuation of the National 
Leprosarium. 
 
The Evacuation of the National Leprosarium 
 Fearing the Japanese invasion, the Chinese Mission to Lepers looked to the 
International Settlement for assistance. Initially the Public Health Department was unwilling 
to aid the National Leprosarium. Dr. Miau, who attended the emergency meeting at the end 
of July 1937 in Jordan’s stead, was instructed to inform the Mission that the Settlement would 
not be able to provide hospital accommodation in the event of an evacuation.145 According to 
the official minutes of the meeting, the committee resolved that no immediate action was 
necessary though provisions were to be stockpiled and permission to leave was granted to 
those patients with families.146 All seven ‘bona-fide’ resident cases left the Leprosarium during 
this period, four of them to neighbouring leprosaria.147 The emergency meeting concluded: 
That when war, if any, has reached such a stage as to endanger their lives, both staff 
and the able-bodied lepers may quit the place with the understanding that the latter 
will fight their own way for a livelihood. Those disabled lepers remain the Leprosarium 
[sic].148 
Miau informed his superiors that many of the ambulatory cases in the leprosarium would 
doubtless seek refuge within the Settlement.149 By early August the evacuation looked 
increasingly imminent, and Dr. Charles L. Wong, the National Leprosarium’s resident 
superintendent, enquired whether the P.H.D. objected to the housing of some of the inmates 
within the Settlement in an out-patient clinic that the Mission had recently opened behind 
the Chinese Medical Association’s building on Tszepang Road. Duck, the Acting Commissioner 
                                                          
143 Chambers Chen to (Sec., S.M.C.), 24 Apr. 1937, SMA, U1/4/232, 151. 
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of Public Health, consented to this request as “an emergency measure”.150 The evacuation of 
the National Leprosarium threatened to undermine the Settlement’s management of the 
disease and heightened fears about ambulatory cases within the city. A temporary solution, 
however objectionable, was therefore of the utmost urgency.  
 The evacuation of the National Leprosarium severely strained the Mission’s 
relationship with the Settlement. According to the Mission’s official account, written early the 
following year, the evacuation seemingly took place according to plan. On the night of 
September 16th Dr. Wong, the resident superintendent, and the other staff safely evacuated 
the patients by truck to the coolies’ quarters of the Chungsan Hospital, located to the south 
of the International Settlement and the French Concession in the native city of Shanghai (see 
map 6).151 The following day a meeting of the Board of the National Leprosarium “placed on 
record its approval of the honorary general secretary’s action in ordering the timely 
evacuation of the leprosarium, and also its appreciation of the courageous part played by Dr. 
Wong and the leprosarium staff in going out to Tazang to fetch some of the moveable 
property”.152 No mention was made of Wong’s prior arrangement with the Settlement’s 
medical authorities for transferring the patients to the out-patient clinic at Tszepang Road. 
But the Public Health Department’s records reveal a much more controversial 
departure. Dr. Robert C. Robertson, who was placed in charge of managing the refugee crisis 
that threatened to overwhelm the Settlement, was alarmed by the discovery of several cases 
of leprosy in the refugee camps in early September.153 In a confidential report dated almost a 
week before the leprosarium’s ‘official’ evacuation, Robertson reported that the Mission had 
stonewalled his attempts to have these patients hospitalised because they “could and would 
not do anything” and he lamented that the Mission had “not in any way realised their moral 
obligations”.154 Furthermore Robertson was outraged that the leprosarium’s staff had 
evacuated the premises, abandoning a number of inmates in the process. He went so far as 
to state that the C.M.L.’s refusal to return to the leprosarium was “tantamount to 
desertion”.155 The Mission’s honorary general secretary subsequently admitted that between 
20 to 30 patients had elected to remain in the leprosarium at Tazang; they had been left with 
two members of staff and “sufficient” stocks of food.156 After securing the necessary vehicles 
and military permits, the Mission finally evacuated the remaining patients on September 16th. 
                                                          
150 “Lepers at Da Zang Leprosarium”, ca. Sept. 1937, SMA, U1/16/761, 12-13. 
151 Keiz Wang, “A Report of the National Leprosarium of Shanghai since its evacuation from Tazang in 
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Remarkably three patients returned to the leprosarium to watch over the property.157 This 
badly-handled operation left a poor impression of the Chinese Mission to Lepers in the eyes 
of the Settlement. 
Fortunately the damage to the Mission’s relationship with the Settlement was limited 
by the establishment of temporary accommodation at the Chungsan Hospital.158 The Acting 
C.P.H. hoped to encourage the C.M.L.’s endeavours by offering to continue the practice of 
maintaining all resident cases, “provided of course the accommodation and medical 
supervision are reasonably satisfactory”.159 Sze Szeming, the honorary general secretary and 
future co-founder of the World Health Organization, stated that the new ‘Leprosarium’ would 
be staffed with three members, whilst other additional staff would visit the premises daily.160 
But the site’s proximity to the advancing Japanese lines left it increasingly isolated. The 
patients were largely responsible for their own daily welfare, “carrying on work such as 
religious service, injection, schooling, etc.”.161 As of early November, the only outside medical 
help they could count on came from the daily visits of Dr. Lee Huizenga, an American 
missionary with extensive experience treating leprosy sufferers at Jukao. He reported: 
Early this morning I went to the Shanghai Leprosarium [at the Chungsan Hospital] over 
the Japanese lines. This institution has now been placed under my care as no Chinese 
can enter the area and I have found favour in the sight of the Japanese….The distance 
from the French lines is about three blocks, but it is desolation. Unburied bodies lay 
about when the Chinese took over the lines. I found the thirty-four lepers we still have 
there in a state of fear, but when I assured them that I could visit them daily they 
calmed down.162 
His movements, unlike those of the C.M.L. staff, were not restricted by the Japanese 
authorities because he was a foreigner.163 A few leprosy sufferers were admitted from the 
Settlement’s refugee camps during this period but the Mission was forced to reject cases to 
prevent overcrowding.164 The Mission suggested that new cases could be sent to Hangzhou or 
to neighbouring C.M.L. Auxiliaries providing the Council assumed their subsequent 
                                                          
157 Minutes of the National Leprosarium Board Meeting, 17 Sept. 1937, SMA, U1/16/2622, 34-35. 
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National Leprosarium,” 32-34, 33. Huizenga’s visits were later reduced to every other day. 
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maintenance.165 By now, however, it was no longer possible to transfer patients out of 
Shanghai to mainland leprosaria by rail.166 
 
 
Figure 15. The remaining lepers in crowded quarters with shells flying over their heads in morning 
worship. Chungsan Hospital, Shanghai, ca. Oct.-Dec. 1937.167 
 The outbreak of war left the Leprosarium in dire financial straits. In early October Sze 
petitioned the medical authorities to consider subsidising an additional category of local 
leprosy sufferers: 
We have gone out of our way to make special arrangements to receive lepers whom 
you may wish to send for hospitalisation, although our quarters are very limited. I 
have discussed the matter with Dr. Robertson, who agrees with me that it will be 
reasonable to regard such lepers as emergency residents of the settlement and that 
as such we are morally entitled to expect the maintenance charge from you for such 
patients so long as the state of emergency lasts.168 
Robertson’s support for Sze’s claims likely extended only so far as defining the refugees as 
emergency residents (hereafter referred to as ‘refugee patients’). After all he had recently 
accused the Mission of failing in its ‘moral obligations’. Nevertheless Sze’s request found 
support amongst the medical authorities, principally because the temporary quarters at 
Chungsan offered the only solution to the Settlement’s leprosy problem during a moment of 
crisis.169 The rapidity with which the Council authorised the maintenance of “lepers discovered 
in the Settlement, whether normal residents or those in Refugee camps” clearly demonstrated 
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the urgency of the situation.170 This arrangement was “subject to revision in the event of 
support from external sources being obtained for the maintenance of the refugee camps”.171 
Ultimately the Council’s support was only revised in February 1942. By then the Council had 
admitted and maintained over 50 of these refugee patients. 
 
The Evacuation to the Salvation Army Camp 
 The Japanese invasion of Shanghai finally forced the Settlement authorities to accept 
a situation they had struggled to avoid for decades: the segregation of leprosy sufferers within 
the Settlement. In early December 1937 the Japanese military authorities pressed for the 
leprosarium’s removal. With nowhere left to turn except the foreign concessions, the Mission 
successfully secured permission to relocate the thirty-three leprosy patients to the Salvation 
Army Group’s Camp on Ferry Road in the Western district (see map 6).172 The relocation from 
Japanese-occupied territory through the French Concession to the Salvation Army Camp 
proved a highly stressful operation. The Japanese military authorities halted the vans 
conveying the patients and all their supplies at the border with the French Concession and 
ordered them to make the crossing on foot.173 The transfer was made all the more frantic by 
the fact that the Japanese authorities only granted the C.M.L. a two-hour window. Some of 
the more able-bodied patients managed to scrounge two rickshaws to carry the supplies and 
the bed-ridden patients. The convoy was swelled by the addition of two octogenarian beggars, 
neither of whom suffered from the disease but who had recently been benefiting from the 
patients’ generosity.174 Fortunately all of the patients made it into the Concession before the 
expiry of the Japanese deadline; they proceeded to the International Settlement to their new 
home on Ferry Road without further incident. Sze reported that the transfer would have been 
“impossible” without the Public Health Department’s support, and he was pleased to 
announce that the camp was prepared to receive the Settlement’s cases, including the three 
refugees who had previously been turned away from the temporary leprosarium at 
Chungsan.175 
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There were high hopes that Shanghai’s leprosy patients would finally be able to settle 
down in their new accommodation in the Salvation Army camp after so many months of 
uncertainty, upheaval and hardships. The camp was significantly larger and more open than 
the cramped servants’ quarters at Chungsan.176 The Public Health Department approved of 
the site because it was “near the Settlement border and [therefore] away from residents and 
likelihood for complaint”.177 Concerns were expressed, however, about the proximity of the 
leprosy patients to the rest of the camp’s inmates. Consequently the leprosy patients were 
relocated within the camp – a move that provided an opportunity to re-build the leprosy 
patients’ hut in such a manner as to “facilitate cleansing or disinfecting [sic]”.178 The leprosy 
sufferers were also provided with “separate accommodation for washing, cooking and 
lavatories” and “also a separate small dispensary or dressing room”, presumably to minimise 
the fear if not the fact of transmission.179 Although the medical authorities viewed the site as 
a ‘Temporary Leprosarium’, the Mission nevertheless initiated a program of education, 
evangelisation and medical treatment.180 The addition of wooden floor boards and paper 
pasted onto the walls provided a bare modicum of insulation against the freezing cold of a 
Shanghai winter. Some of the patients nevertheless managed a little “farming”, raising poultry 
and pigeons.181 Others, however, refused to accept their confinement. Three of the nine 
resident and refugee cases admitted between December and April failed to return after being 
granted short-leave; a fourth patient left against the advice of the C.M.L. staff.182 
The case of Tsa Tsang Z (Refugee #21), a 29 year old mother from Jiangsu province 
exemplified how harrowing admission and confinement could be. Her admission to the 
temporary leprosarium in the Salvation Army Camp separated her from her healthy husband 
and their four year-old daughter. Moreover the child that she gave birth to the day before her 
admission died just a few days later.183 Confined to the leprosarium for at least the next four 
years, the fact that the Public Health Department maintained her as a “refugee patient” until 
February 1942 would have been small consolation.184 In July of that year Chow Van Sze 
(Resident #142), another 29 year old mother, protested so vigorously at being separated from 
two of her three children – her youngest daughter Chow Siao Ngoh (Resident #143) was 
admitted alongside her because the girl was (wrongly) suspected of suffering from leprosy – 
that Jordan, the Settlement’s Commissioner of Public Health, requested that all four of them 
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be admitted.185 Whilst the Settlement’s records indicate that Chow Van Sze was maintained 
in the National Leprosarium until the summer of 1945, the fate of her three children is 
unclear.186 
 The leprosarium at Ferry Road ultimately proved temporary, though not in the way 
that the Council had anticipated. The Chinese Mission to Lepers was forced to relocate the 
patients once again – the third time in less than a year since the original evacuation from 
Tazang. In May 1938 a Japanese company that owned the land on which the Salvation Army 
camp was located gave the authorities one month’s notice, ostensibly because it wanted to 
develop the site.187 The closure of the camp – a disaster according to Jordan – entailed the 
relocation of 3,400 refugees, a tuberculosis hospital containing 200 refugee patients, the 150 
refugees in the Home for the Aged and Infirm as well as the Mission’s 62 leprosy sufferers, 
including 6 resident patients and 18 refugee patients.188 Dr. Alfred Sao-ke Sze, the former 
Chinese ambassador to London and Washington and father to Sze, the C.M.L.’s honorary 
general secretary, offered the Chinese Mission to Lepers the use of a plot of vacant land at 
the intersection of Brenan and Edinburgh Roads in the Western extra-Settlement area 
(map6).189 
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Map 6. The National Leprosarium and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-38.190 
The green arrow denotes the location of the original institution at Tazang. The three orange stars 
denote the three consecutive evacuations, first to the Chungsan Hospital, then to the Salvation Army 
Camp in the International Settlement (in blue), and finally to the Brenan Road Emergency Leprosarium 
in the 4 Western extra-Settlement district (in red). 
 
The Brenan Road Emergency Leprosarium 
The establishment of the Brenan Road Emergency Leprosarium profoundly impacted 
upon the Mission’s relationship with the Public Health Department. The Settlement initially 
fully supported the relocation. The Acting Commissioner of Public Works informed the Council 
that the premises were bounded by “Chinese residences of the poorer class” and “a 
contractor’s yard and several small industrial undertakings” whereas the nearest “good 
foreign residences” were located “at some distance” (map 7).191 Jordan also endorsed the 
move: 
No danger is anticipated to the general public from the establishment of this Camp 
which, in fact, is doing excellent work in keeping the influx of lepers from outside areas 
from mixing with and infecting the community. I cannot guarantee that in the present 
inflamed condition of the public mind that no complaints will be received from 
residents of Brenan Road, nor that it will not be the subject of comment from the 
newspapers. Since these comments will be fallacious, I would recommend that this 
Mission be enabled to carry out its good work.192 
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He even prevailed upon the Shanghai Waterworks Company to supply the Leprosarium with 
fresh water from a nearby hydrant.193 The Council approved the relocation on condition that 
“the leprosarium must be of a temporary character and that as soon as the military situation 
permits it must be removed beyond the environs of Shanghai”.194 The Mission readily agreed: 
ever since the outbreak of the hostilities it had been keeping an eye on the abandoned 
buildings at Tazang in the hope that it would eventually re-occupy the facilities.195 
 
                                                          
193 Jordan persuaded the Shanghai Waterworks Company (S.W.C.) that this scheme would be mutually 
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Map 7. The Brenan Road Emergency Leprosarium196 
From the outset the Settlement took far greater efforts to confine the patients within 
the Brenan Road Leprosarium than it had done at any of the Leprosarium’s previous 
incarnations. Jordan posted two Chinese police constables at the entrance of the Ferry Road 
Camp in order to prevent any of the patients from escaping during the relocation to Brenan 
Road. At Jordan’s request, a police guard was permanently posted at the entrance of the new 
Emergency Leprosarium.197 Inmates were required to apply for permission to leave the 
premises, though Jordan rejected a number of the applications (even those that had received 
the Mission’s support) because he feared “this would make a most undesirable precedent 
resulting in the receipt of a number of similar applications”.198 Inevitably many of the patients 
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resented these harsher confinement measures. An “ugly incident” broke out as a result of the 
authorities’ refusal to grant leave to one patient just over a fortnight after the relocation.199 
Three months later a group of inmates acted violently towards Wong, the resident 
superintendent, accusing him of “negligence, malpractice and manslaughter”.200 Two of the 
ringleaders, one of whom was a resident patient, were promptly discharged in order to “quell 
the trouble which was nothing short of a riot”.201 Unsurprisingly Wong’s official annual report 
completely glossed over this event.202 
The Leprosarium’s inability to enforce confinement failed to live up to Jordan’s 
expectations. Less than three months after the Emergency Leprosarium’s establishment, an 
audacious series of escapes made a mockery of the police guard posted to the entrance of the 
Emergency Leprosarium. Initially the staff were only aware of the disappearance of Tseu Foh 
Dong (Resident #55) and Bang Tien Hwo, but the subsequent police investigation revealed 
that these two patients had taken advantage of the confusion caused by the escape of Wei 
Zung Yui.203 The police’s report identified a fundamental and embarrassing flaw in the existing 
security measures: 
These [three] persons effected their escape by means of an open window into the 
compound where one of the them walked briskly past the Chinese Police Constable 
who owing to the complete absence of means of identification between the Staff and 
lepers assumed he was permitting one of the Staff to leave the premises. Whilst the 
Chinese Police Constable and the member of the Staff were searching the 
neighbourhood, the other two lepers walked out of the gate.204 
Wong, the leprosarium’s superintendent, promised to bar the windows and to issue the staff 
“with some means of identification for the information of the Police on duty”.205 A further 
three patients, including a refugee patient, escaped in swift succession the following summer 
by taking advantage of a shortage of police personnel.206 The Commissioner of Police 
grudgingly agreed to post a permanent police guard at the entrance of the Leprosarium.207 
When this practice was discontinued early the following year the Mission petitioned the 
medical authorities for “the vigilance [to] be resumed in order to prevent patients from 
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escaping from the hospital and disturbing the public welfare”.208 This time, however, Jordan 
argued that the Leprosarium needed to rely on its own resources.209 
 An attempt to forcibly confine two local resident leprosy sufferers proved similarly 
embarrassing. A local Chinese physician drew the P.H.D.’s attention to the ‘threat’ of 
contagion emanating from a shoe shop on his street. Dr. Siao alleged that Loh Liang, the thirty-
five year old proprietor of ‘The Continental Shoe Shop’, and his employee Li Ping, were a threat 
to city – “especially those who come into contact with them, as many send their shoes to them 
for repair and handling” – because Siao suspected the two men of suffering from leprosy.210 
A departmental investigation confirmed Siao’s suspicions, and the two men were referred to 
Huizenga, the American medical missionary in charge of the out-patient clinic on Tszepang 
Road, for further confirmation and treatment. Chief Inspector Self, who conducted the 
investigation, reported: 
No legal status exists to force isolation but the danger of allowing them to continue 
in their present business is obvious. It is suggested that if the two lepers were 
removed from the business and attended the leper clinic regularly a check could be 
kept upon their movements. Should they refuse to do this then it is submitted that 
legal opinion be obtained as to the possibility of closure of the premises.211 
Unlike so many other cases of leprosy in Shanghai, Loh Liang and Li Ping were neither vagrant 
beggars nor helpless refugees, and Self clearly anticipated significant resistance. As Huizenga 
noted, “we can only use the argument of persuation [sic] rather than that of force in getting 
respectable patients to the leprosarium”.212 A court order approving Loh’s and Li’s admission 
to the Emergency Leprosarium was nevertheless secured. Self and a member of Shanghai 
Municipal Police escorted the two men “under protest” in an ambulance to the Emergency 
Leprosarium the following day at 9.30a.m.213 Both men escaped just before lunch. Significantly 
the poorly-worded court order had failed to empower the Emergency Leprosarium’s staff to 
detain these patients.214 By the time the Legal Department had confirmed that the Court 
Order still empowered the police to detain and re-admit the two patients, the authorities 
reported that “one is said to be ‘somewhere north of the Creek’ and the other to have gone 
to Canton or Hongkong”.215 
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Evangelisation and Occupational Therapy in the Brenan Road Emergency Leprosarium 
 The Mission’s proposal to establish a permanent presence at Brenan Road reignited 
the Settlement’s fears about the leprous migrant from the mainland. One of the Mission’s 
Board members proposed purchasing the site upon which the Emergency Leprosarium stood. 
Wu sought advice from Jordan, in the latter’s capacity as a director of the Mission, as to the 
land’s potential post-war value and as to the Public Health Department’s attitudes towards a 
post-war treatment facility within the Settlement.216 The medical authorities were adamantly 
opposed to the establishment of a permanent leprosaria or leprosy clinic within the 
Settlement. Jordan informed Wu: 
It is my opinion that a large city possesses sufficient attraction for lepers without 
further encouraging them to come by providing receiving stations. 
…It is my opinion that [leprosy] Clinics should be attached to larger teaching hospitals 
and should refer their cases to Leprosaria outside the towns, otherwise the 
temptation is for people to send as many lepers as possible to the towns.217 
The trope of the leprous migrant from the mainland continued to underpin Jordan’s, and the 
Settlement’s, opposition to permanent domestic segregation facilities. Moreover Jordan 
concluded that as the Brenan Road site was too big for just a leprosy clinic “the tendency 
would be to establish a Leprosaria there, which would, in my view, be a mistake”.218 In spite 
of the Public Health Department’s objections, the Emergency Leprosarium not only remained 
a permanent fixture, but outlasted the existence of the International Settlement itself. 
The war-time evacuations of the National Leprosarium and the apparent permanency 
of the Emergency Leprosarium heightened the patients’ receptiveness to evangelisation. The 
“social and religious life” had been an important feature in the original institution at Tazang 
prior to the outbreak of the war. Services were regularly held by visiting missionaries in the 
National Leprosarium’s chapel, and Christmas was celebrated with donations from the 
“Christian friends in Shanghai”.219 But it was only after the relocation to the Brenan Road 
Emergency Leprosarium that the Chinese Mission to Lepers reported that this religious work 
was “blessed” with the baptism of four leprosy patients by Huizenga - Rev. Huang, “a leper 
preacher” in the leprosarium, doubtless played an equally important evangelical role (fig. 
16).220 As Wong, the physician-in-charge explained: 
Since these lepers are not all bed-ridden, patients are confined in the leprosarium not 
only for weeks or months, but for years. Therefore, their worries for the future are 
many. Spiritual instruction gives not only comfort and confidence, but adds to the 
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peacefulness of the leprosarium, and hence is urgently necessary for the patients.221 
The Mission’s hope that these new converts, along with the small group of patients who were 
already “Christians of several years’ duration”, would form a “nucleus” that would 
“undoubtedly lead to the organization of a church group” was soon realised.222 Further 
baptisms followed and by 1939 the Mission proudly announced the formation of the 
Leprosarium’s own “Chinese Christian Church”.223 This group successfully established a small 
“church library of books pertaining to a better understanding of the Bible, of the Church and 
its duties” and organised a “Christian Endeavour Society”.224 Huizenga reported that the group 
had converted “far over three-fourths” of the Brenan Road Emergency Leprosarium’s 100-
some patients by late 1940.225 Shanghai’s experiences thus provide fresh evidence in support 
of Kipp’s analysis of the correlation between evangelistic opportunities as total institutions.226 
The hostilities beyond the camp and the resultant war-time shortages reinforced the patients’ 
perceptions of the Emergency Leprosarium as a ‘total institution’, heightening their 
receptiveness to fervent missionaries such as Huizenga who promised peace, hope and 
(spiritual) salvation. And unlike the state-run leprosarium at Kennedy Town in Hong Kong, the 
Emergency Leprosarium was run by a Christian Chinese Mission that facilitated the work of 
foreign and Chinese missionaries. 
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Figure 16. The Brenan Road Emergency Leprosarium. ca. 1938-40. 
Dr. Lee S. Huizenga, wearing trademark bow-tie, hat and glasses is standing at the back (far-left).227 
Figure 17. A Bread-eating Contest at the Shanghai Emergency Leprosarium, ca. 1941.228 
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Figure 18 & 19. Ong Ih-dao, a leper artist in the National Leprosarium of Shanghai and Ong Caught on camera 
while at work in his open air studio on enlarging a photo of the Rev. T. C. Wu.229 
Unsurprisingly the war severely constrained the opportunities for occupational 
therapy. The patients had previously engaged in carpentry, farming, “house and street 
cleaning” and raising a few cattle at Tzang.230 By contrast they were only able to raise a small 
number of poultry in the Salvation Army Camp.231 The patients nevertheless instituted a 
variety of creative pastimes once they settled into the Brenan Road Emergency Leprosarium. 
For instance a group of patients produced the Melancholic Wind Ten Day News, a ten-day 
newspaper with “news items and editorials reflecting upon the ethical and religious aspects 
of leprosarium control [sic]” which was circulated throughout the leprosarium and to a few 
“friends” beyond leprosarium’s walls.232 This newspaper probably morphed into (or else was 
replaced by) the Morning Light Quarterly, a bilingual quarterly which, according to Leung, was 
created by three Brenan Road patients in the spring of 1940.233 One of Brenan Road’s Christian 
patients, Ong Ih-dao, dispelled “gloomy ideas” about his incarceration by painting pictures 
including a portrait of the Mission’s general secretary (figs. 18 and 19).234 Incredibly his 
paintings were put on display in the Brenan Road Emergency Leprosarium’s auditorium and 
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offered for sale to the general public! By contrast the colonial state in Hong Kong never 
consented to facilitating such opportunities within the Kennedy Town Leprosarium. 
 
Anna E. Korchakova 
 The case of a Russian female leprosy sufferer provides an exceptionally rare insight 
into the racialised isolation and treatment of Shanghai’s foreign leprosy sufferers. Her 
discovery in November 1938, less than five months after the opening of the Brenan Road 
Emergency Leprosarium, attracted an unprecedented level of official attention. Foreign 
leprosy sufferers had been identified on at least three previous occasions, but Anna E. 
Korchakova was the first foreign case since the Settlement had formalised its policy of 
transferring leprosy sufferers to a C.M.L.-run leprosarium.235 Her condition was therefore 
promptly reported to the Public Health Department.236 Her status as a foreign leprosy sufferer 
presented the authorities with a unique problem. On the one hand, the hospital was not 
considered suitable for the segregation of leprosy sufferers. On the other, the Chinese Mission 
to Lepers asserted that the Brenan Road Emergency Leprosarium was not suitable for foreign 
patients.237 The solution presented itself in the form of the Russian Orthodox Confraternity 
Hospital, which reluctantly agreed to admit her only after the Council promised to bear her 
maintenance.238 Whereas the Council maintained Chinese patients in the Emergency 
Leprosarium at a rate of $20 per month, they agreed to support Korchakova’s accommodation 
at a daily rate of $4 – the maintenance rate for foreign indigent cases of lunacy (table 3.2).239 
From the outset her admission to the Russian Orthodox Confraternity Hospital was 
meant to be temporary. Dr. Kasakoff, the hospital’s superintendent, complained that her 
isolation had necessitated the removal of all the patients from a room in the tuberculosis ward 
because “her presence depresses and frightens the other patients”.240 The other patients’ 
awareness of her condition suggests her diagnosis was broadcast, that her condition was 
manifestly visible, or indeed both. Ultimately both Jordan and Kasakoff expected that Reiss 
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would be able to assist them in their search for some suitable accommodation for her as soon 
as he returned to Shanghai.241 
Not only were the authorities unable to secure alternative accommodation, but 
official interest in her plight soon waned. Reiss regrettably informed Jordan what the latter 
already knew: that there was no suitable accommodation for foreign leprosy cases in or near 
the Settlement. Instead Reiss recommended that she be discharged and referred to the Out-
Patient Department of the Chinese Red Cross where she could receive the necessary 
treatment.242 Johnston, the Superintendent of Hospitals, certainly favoured this solution, 
particularly as Kasakoff claimed that her ulcers had healed, though he was unable to certify 
that she was no longer infectious.243 Instead she remained in the Russian Orthodox 
Confraternity Hospital at the Council’s expense. The unique degree of official attention 
devoted to her isolation evaporated, to be replaced by the mundane formalities of the 
department’s bureaucracy. Official knowledge of her hospitalised existence was confined 
solely to the monthly statements of account submitted by the Hospital.244 These were all 
processed without comment, despite increases in the daily maintenance rate.245 The 
procedure became so formalised that Jordan asked, “Could we not arrange to forward the 
accounts without covering letters, as long as the patient is treated in the hospital?”.246 
Consequently Korchakova’s monthly statement was forwarded together with the statements 
for the mental patients in the same hospital from March 1940 onwards.247 
 The deterioration of Korchakova’s condition in late 1940 finally forced the medical 
authorities to confront her case once again. In November Kasakoff informed Jordan that the 
patient was showing “signs of mental derangement and great excitability” and stated that the 
hospital could no longer accommodate her.248 As a preliminary step Jordan called upon 
Huizenga – “the only authority on leprosy in this town” – to determine the infectiousness of 
her condition.249 Huizenga diagnosed her as a “Chronic Mixed Case of leprosy with mutilations 
and ulcers” and “throat complications”, and he reported that she was still infectious.250 
However he stated that her isolation in a “special room” ensured that she was not a danger 
to the other patients, providing the nursing staff took the necessary precautions.251 Confined 
to her private hospital room for more than two years, and neglected by her husband and 
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daughter, it is perhaps unsurprising that Huizenga reported that she had recently become 
violent.252 Huizenga’s report did not reveal anything fatal about her case. Yet she passed away 
the very next day.253 By a cruel twist of fate this was not the end of her story as far as the 
Council was concerned. News of her death only reached Jordan after he had forwarded the 
statement of account for the month of November on to the S.M.C. Treasurer.254 The 
Settlement’s bureaucracy only finally caught up with her death in January 1941 with the 
submission of a statement of account for her maintenance for the first 18 days of 
December.255 














21st - 30th Nov. 10 4 40 20 6.67 
Dec. 31 4 124 20 20 
1939 
Jan. 31 4 124 20 20 
Feb. 28 4 112 20 20 
Mar. 31 4 124 20 20 
Apr. 30 4 120 20 20 
May 31 4 124 20 20 
June 30 4 120 20 20 
July 31 4 124 20 20 
Aug. 31 6 186 20 20 
Sept. 30 6 180 20 20 
Oct. 31 6 186 20 20 
Nov. 30 6 180 20 20 
Dec. 31 6 186 20 20 
1940 
Jan. 31 6 186 30 30 
Feb. 29 6 174 30 30 
Mar. 31 6 186 30 30 
Apr. 30 6 180 30 30 
May 31 6 186 30 30 
June 30 9 270 30 30 
July 31 9 279 30 30 
Aug. 31 9 279 30 30 
Sept. 30 9 270 30 30 
Oct. 31 9 279 30 30 
Nov. 30 9 270 30 30 
1st - 18th Dec. 18 9 162 30 17.42 
TOTAL 759  $4,651  $614.09 
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254 Jordan to (Treasurer, S.M.C.), 19 Dec. 1940, SMA, U1/16/834, 45. Jordan informed Huizenga of her 
death a week later. Jordan to Huizenga, 23 Dec. 1940, SMA, U1/16/834, 46. 
255 U1-16-834 Jordan to (Treasurer, S.M.C.), 14 Jan. 1941, SMA, U1/16/834, 51. 
- 127 - 
 
The discovery of this case back in November 1938 had forced the medical authorities 
into an unanticipated, controversial and problematic situation: the necessity of 
accommodating a non-Chinese leprosy sufferer. Unable to admit her to either the Isolation 
Hospital or the Emergency Leprosarium, the medical authorities seized upon her nationality 
as leverage to gain admission to the Russian Orthodox Confraternity Hospital. However this 
temporary expedient soon became a less than satisfactory arrangement seemingly without 
end. It was sustained by a unique and unprecedented subsidy from the Council that totalled 
$4,651 – a sum that could have maintained at least seven resident or refugee Chinese leprosy 
sufferers in the Emergency Leprosarium for the same period. Her deteriorating condition in 
late 1940 once again raised the taboo of foreign accommodation. But as Huizenga noted with 
finality, “her death settled the problem that arose regarding the case”.256 
 
At Loggerheads: Jordan and Wu 
The deteriorating relationship between Rev. T. C. Wu of the C.M.L. and Jordan 
profoundly impacted upon the Settlement’s management of Chinese leprosy sufferers. 
According to the Settlement’s medical authorities the case of Loh Liang and Li Ping illustrated 
a number of alarming deficiencies in the C.M.L’s management of the disease. The Emergency 
Leprosarium’s inability to detain its inmates not only posed a “danger to the Settlement” but 
highlighted the Mission’s failure to heed Jordan’s advice about the necessity of hiring a 
guard.257 Secondly Loh’s and Li’s referral to the Tszepang Clinic for diagnosis prior to admission 
raised concerns about the clinic’s effectiveness.258 Jordan had readily accepted Huizenga’s 
request for assistance by tasking the Public Health Department to “check up on” the 
Settlement cases that had failed to return to the clinic; the patients residing in the French 
Concession lay beyond the Department’s jurisdiction.259 Only one Settlement case, however, 
was actually traced to the address provided by the clinic. Chief Health Self complained: 
In other cases it was ascertained that the number of houses given on roads did not 
exist, the cases were not on the record at the Clinic, or that the Clinic admitted that 
the patients had left Shanghai… 
These enquiries have taken considerable time and the results show that the Clinic 
Authorities took no trouble to verify the patients’ addresses while they were 
attending.260 
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The fact that the Clinic had 216 cases on its books made Self’s report all the more worrying.261 
In the meantime Jordan grew increasingly frustrated at the number of leprosy sufferers 
presenting themselves at his office in order to secure permission to be admitted to the 
Leprosarium. Huizenga blamed Wu, the Chinese Mission to Lepers’ general secretary.262 
Jordan remained on friendly terms with Huizenga but these revelations severely strained his 
already deteriorating relationship with Wu to such an extent that Jordan elected to address 
all future correspondence regarding the admission of patients to the Leprosarium to Huizenga 
instead.263 
Jordan’s friendship with Huizenga doubtless contributed to a brief rapprochement 
between the Public Health Department and the Chinese Mission to Lepers. Jordan was 
especially grateful for Huizenga’s assistance in the “exceptional circumstances” of 
Korchakova’s case.264 As for his fee, Huizenga stated that he was more than happy to waiver 
it as a show of his appreciation of the Council’s and the Public Health Department’s financial 
support for the Chinese Mission to Lepers.265 Meanwhile wartime inflation exerted a severe 
strain on the Mission’s finances, and the Leprosarium closed its books in 1940 with a deficit 
of over £26,000.266 Although the Settlement was by now contributing 45% of the 
Leprosarium’s budget (as opposed to only 7% from the French Concession), Jordan 
nevertheless supported the Mission’s request for an increase in the maintenance rate from 
$30 to $45 per patient.267 
 The rapprochement proved short-lived. In May 1941 the Japanese and Chinese public 
health authorities gave the leprosarium one month to relocate, allegedly because the 
institution posed “a menace to the public health to the community”.268 At an emergency 
meeting of the board of directors, Jordan firmly opposed Wu’s suggestion that the Mission 
evacuate the patients back to the original leprosarium at Tazang, as the buildings were located 
in an area “marked off by the Japanese for military purposes”.269 Jordan was principally 
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concerned that the relocation to Tazang would result in a large influx of patients “appearing 
on the [Settlement’s] streets as beggars”.270 Jordan’s frustration with Wu’s handling of the 
situation became so acute that he threatened to resign his position as a director of the 
National Leprosarium: 
The Secretary of this Mission [Rev. Wu] appears to be working on his own, without 
reference to the Board and frequently, apparently not in what I at least consider the 
interests of the Mission. Moreover, his views on the subject of the Shanghai 
Leprosarium are not, in my view, sound, and he occasionally interferes with the 
Superintendent [i.e. Huizenga]. I gather that he has taken a most irregular step [of 
corresponding with the Chinese authorities without first discussing the matter with 
the C.M.L.’s board of directors], contrary to the wishes of the Board, and I think it is 
desirable that I should be free to resign, if this proves to be the case.271 
Wu was forced to write an extremely apologetic letter to Jordan, assuring him that he would 
exercise greater care in handling the Mission’s affairs in the future.272 Wu’s admission a 
fortnight later that Van Ching Tiau (Resident #136), a leprosy sufferer who had recently been 
admitted from the Settlement’s Gaol, had escaped from the Emergency Leprosarium did little 
to help Wu’s cause in Jordan’s eyes.273 Ultimately the Japanese occupation of the Settlement 
later that year rendered the evacuation moot, and the leprosarium was permitted to remain 
at Brenan Road. 
 Wu’s handling of this evacuation scare profoundly impacted upon Jordan’s attitude 
towards the Mission’s management of the leprosarium for the remainder of his tenure as 
Commissioner of Public Health. Jordan had always endorsed Wu’s repeated appeals for 
increases in the maintenance rate, but he opposed Wu’s request for an increase to $75 per 
patient per month. By now the Council was supporting 41 resident patients and 37 refugee 
patients – more than three-quarters of the Leprosarium’s total population – at a cost of just 
over $3,500 per month.274 This figure was almost three times higher than the annual sum that 
the Council had been prepared to pay prior to the opening of the National Leprosarium some 
6 years earlier. The Settlement objected to the Mission’s reliance on the Council; its failure to 
secure financial support from the Chinese municipality; and its “lax” attitude in generating 
public support.275 Although the Settlement eventually agreed to an increase in the 
maintenance rate, it conditioned its support by unanimously voting in favour of ceasing the 
                                                          
270 Ibid., 62. 
271 Jordan to Liang, 30 Aug. 1941, SMA, U1/16/2622, 24. Jordan expressed similarly disparaging 
remarks about Wu’s actions in private letters to Huizenga and Tyau, the Mission’s chairman. U1-16-
761 Jordan to Huizenga, 26 July 1941, SMA, U1/16/761, 65; Jordan to E. S. Tyau, 19 Sept. 1941, SMA, 
U1/16/2622, 28. 
272 Wu to Jordan, 25 Sept. 1941, SMA, U1/16/2622, 29-30. 
273 Wu to Jordan, 8 Oct. 1941, SMA, U1/16/757, 166. 
274 The Public Health Department initially put the official figure at 74 Settlement patients (residents & 
refugees) but subsequently revised this as a result of a clerical error. G. F. Jones (P.H.D.) to Jordan, 29 
Jan. 1942, SMA, U1/4/232, 51; Wu to Jordan, 28 Jan. 1942, SMA, U1/16/755, 127; Jordan to J. W. 
Morcher (Treasurer, S.M.C.), 5 Mar. 1942, SMA, U1/16/759(2), 390-392. 
275 Jordan to (Sec. & Com. Gen., S.M.C.), 30 Jan. 1942, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 165; Morcher to (Sec. & 
Com. Gen., S.M.C.), 11 Mar. 1942, SMA, U/16/753(1), 173. 
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Council’s support for refugee cases.276 Henceforth only ‘bona-fide’ residents were to be 
maintained. The Council had been supporting four of these refugee patients ever since the 
start of the hostilities, including the very first ‘refugee patient’, Chen Siao Wong (Refugee #16), 
who was admitted to the temporary leprosarium at Chungsan in October 1937 at the age of 
13.277 The Settlement was outraged by Wu’s subsequent request for a lump sum of $100 per 
refugee patient to facilitate their return to their native homes:278 
…I have to inform you that the Council is unwilling to assist your Mission in such an 
apparently anti-social act. 
The Council cannot view with favour your proposal to send these sick refugees 
home without even attempting an appeal to the extra-Settlement Authorities on 
whom the responsibility for the care of these patients devolves. I have accordingly to 
reiterate the suggestion … that your Mission should either obtain funds for the 
maintenance of these refugee patients from the Chinese Authorities or endeavour to 
raise money by a campaign for public contributions.279 
The Settlement authorities were principally concerned with preventing a large influx of 
recently-dispersed refugee patients, rather than with the fate of the patients themselves. 
Moreover they considered that the onus of ensuring the continued confinement of these 
patients rested firmly with the Chinese puppet authorities, rather than with the Shanghai 
Municipal Council. 
 The Mission’s attempt to heed the Council’s advice by initiating a major public fund-
raising campaign merely alarmed the Council further, fuelling exaggerated claims about the 
dangerously high prevalence of the disease within Shanghai. In its attempt to emphasise the 
“disastrous consequences” wrought by the outbreak of the Second World War in the Pacific, 
the C.M.L.’s fund-raising campaign asserted that “a number of large leprosaria have already 
been closed and hundreds of lepers forced to leave”.280 According to the Ostasiatischer Lloyd-
Shanghaier Nachrichten, a local German daily newspaper, the C.M.L. subsequently declared 
that “at present more than 3,000 lepers are moving freely about Shanghai”, many of them as 
beggars, and that the “leprosy problem…has become a danger for the public”.281 By 
inadvertently implying that the large bankrupted leprosaria were located in Shanghai, the 
Mission fuelled fears that large numbers of patients had been turfed out onto the city’s 
streets. The Settlement’s Assistant Superintendent of Hospitals was so alarmed by rumours 
that “the lepers had broken out” of the Emergency Leprosarium that he immediately tasked 
                                                          
276 J. C. Greig, (Assist. Sec., S.M.C.), 17 Mar. 1942, SMA, U1/4/232, 42. 
277 Tsa Tsang Z (Refugee #21), Sze San Pa Tse (Refugee #30) and Wong Ah Da (Refugee #39) were 
admitted to the Salvation Army Camp in January, February and April 1938 respectively. 
278 Wu to Greig, 11 Apr. 1942, SMA, U1/16/753(2), 307. Wu mistakenly informed Greig there were 38 
rather than 37 refugee patients. Wu acknowledged the latter as the official figure in a letter to Jordan 
dated the same day. Wu to Jordan, 11 Apr. 1942, SMA, U1/16/759, 402. 
279 K. Teraoka (Sec., S.M.C.) to Wu, 30 Apr. 1942, SMA, U1/16/753(2), 311. For Wu’s request for the 
$100 per patient see Wu to Greig, 11 Apr. 1942, SMA, U1/16/753(2), 307. 
280 “A Terrible Blow,” Leper Quarterly 16, no. 1 (1942): 1. 
281 “Translation of Article which appeared in ‘Ostasiatischer Lloyd’ ”, 12 May 1942, SMA, U1/16/2622, 
208. 
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a Health Inspector to conduct a full head-count.282 The contents of the Mission’s fund-raising 
article continued to be misconstrued, making the general public “extremely nervous”.283 For 
instance a member of the S.M.C. Co-ordinating Committee reported that a member of the 
Public Health Department had allegedly confirmed that between 3,000 and 4,000 leprosy 
patients “had been thrown out on the streets” of Shanghai.284 The notion that a significant 
number of leprosy cases allegedly existed in Shanghai was an alarming revelation in itself but 
rumours that the closure of Shanghai’s bankrupted leprosaria was responsible for a sudden 
deluge of several thousand leprosy sufferers triggered fears of a major public health crisis. 
Jordan strenuously denied the Mission’s statements, questioned the effectiveness of its fund-
raising “propaganda” and concluded that “the whole thing is a worked up scare”.285 The 
Council exerted much stricter control over the wording of the Mission’s fund-raising campaign 
the following month as a result of this incident.286 
 
Post-1941 
Remarkably the invading Japanese forces preserved the Settlement’s management of 
leprosy through the early 1940s. Indeed the authorities approved an increase in the 
maintenance rate for resident leprosy sufferers in the latter half of 1942. In doing so, they 
unwittingly established a precedent that had profound ramifications for the extent of the 
Settlement’s support for the Brenan Road Emergency Leprosarium. Duck, the Deputy 
Commissioner of Public Health, considered the Mission’s request for an increase in the 
maintenance rate from $75 to CRB$250 to be “excessive”, particularly as Wu had claimed that 
the per capita rate was roughly CRB$100 only two months before.287 After reviewing the 
institution’s monthly statements and receipts, the S.M.C. Treasurer agreed to an increase to 
$135 per capita per mensem, in line with the increase in the cost of living index for Chinese 
workers.288 Neither Morcher nor the Commissioner of Public Health nor even the Council 
recognised the implications of this decision. Wu was only too happy to enlighten them: 
We take for granted, therefore, that should the cost of living index under the same 
category further rise from the subsequent months, we shall be permitted to revise 
our monthly statements without sending in further application”.289 
The arguments between the Chinese Mission to Lepers and the Council in Shanghai over the 
adjustment of the maintenance rate continued well into the following year. On the one hand, 
                                                          
282 R. Bereford (P.H.D.) to P. S. Page (P.H.D.), 14 May 1942, SMA, U1/16/752, 187. Bereford assured 
Dr. Lücke that all 64 male and 27 female patients were present and correct. Ironically a prisoner who 
was admitted to the Leprosarium earlier that month by the Shanghai Municipal Police escaped less 
than a week after Bereford’s visit. Bereford to Lücke, 14 May 1942, SMA, U1/16/752, 188; Wu to 
Jordan, 6 June 1942, SMA, U1/16/757, 187. 
283 Minutes of the Co-ordinating Committee, 14 May 1942, SMA, U1/16/2622, 211. 
284 Ibid., 211. 
285 Jordan to T. Beesley, (Sec., Co-ordinating Committee), 20 May 1942, SMA, U1/16/2622, 212. 
286 U1-4-232 Wu to T. K. Ho (S.M.C.), 11 June 1942, SMA, U1/4/232, 34. 
287 E. F. Duck (D.C.P.H.) to A. B. Lang (Sec., S.M.C.), 8 Aug. 1942, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 185. 
288 J. W. Morcher (Treasurer, S.M.C.) to (Sec., S.M.C.), 3 Sept. 1942, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 193. 
289 Wu to (C.P.H.), 15 Sept. 1942, SMA, U1/16/753(1), 199. 
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Wu repeatedly pushed the Leprosarium’s luck by attempting to bill the Settlement on the 
basis of an inflated maintenance rate. On the other, the Council attempted to stand firm by 
its decision to revise the rate quarterly. These squabbles continued, and continued in English, 
well into 1943.290 From the autumn of that year however, the government relented any 
opposition, and the maintenance rate rose dramatically as a result of massive inflation. In 
October 1943 the rate stood at CRB$435.27. A year later it stood at $5,300 per patient – the 
total subsidy for that month alone exceeded $300,000!291 
The Japanese authorities and the Settlement’s foreign personnel were eager to 
maintain an air of normality. Bickers, for instance, noted that the framework of the Shanghai 
Municipal Council and the Shanghai Municipal Police remained largely intact after the 
Japanese invasion and that much of the bureaucratic paperwork continued to be produced in 
English until early 1943.292 By focusing on the history of leprosy, this chapter has broadened 
the existing historiography by demonstrating the significant medical continuities. There are 
several remarkable features about this financial relationship. Strikingly the Chinese Mission to 
Lepers’ statements continued to be rendered in the same format and in English until May 
1945.293 More importantly the distinction between ‘resident’ and ‘non-resident’ patients was 
preserved. ‘Resident’ patients continued to be identified, admitted to, and maintained in, the 
National Leprosarium until early 1945.294 Whereas the Japanese authorities allowed Hong 
Kong’s Kennedy Town Leprosarium – established in the same year as the National Leprosarium 
of Shanghai – to disintegrate shortly after the colony’s surrender, the International 
Settlement’s practice of maintaining ‘resident’ patients in the National Leprosarium was 
preserved until the end of the Second World War. 
 
Conclusion 
 The International Settlement shared Hong Kong’s racialised conceptualisation of 
leprosy as an imported Chinese disease. Both territories shared a staunch aversion to 
domestic segregation facilities, fearing that the inherent superiority of Western medical 
practices would trigger an unwelcome influx of diseased mainlanders. The International 
                                                          
290 See for instance I. Nagai (D.C.P.H.) to (Treasurer, S.M.C.), 27 July 1943, SMA, U1/16/760, 25. 
291 Wu to Y. Tashiro (C.P.H., First District, Shanghai Special Municipality), 16 Nov. 1943 and 16 Nov. 
1944, SMA, U1/16/760, 44, 96. 
292 Robert Bickers, “Settlers and Diplomats: The End of British Hegemony in the International 
Settlement, 1937-1945” in In the Shadows of the Rising Sun: Shanghai under Japanese Occupation, 
eds. Christian Henriot and Wen-Hsin Yeh, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 247-250. 
293 Wu to (C.P.H., Shanghai Special Municipality), 29 May 1945, SMA, U1/16/760, 121, 123. The 
statements continued to be produced in the same format until August 1945. Moreover Dr. L. C. Tseu, 
who was in charge of the leprosy clinic inside the Brenan Road Leprosarium, submitted monthly 
report’s in English up until April 1945. See SMA, U1/16/762, 60-76. 
294 The leprosy sufferers were referred to as former residents of the International Settlement, then as 
patients of the former First District Administration and finally as “leprous patients of the former 1st 
District and 8th District”. Although the term “resident” was dropped in Wu’s cover letter of January 
1945, the term continued to appear (in English) his statements of account until May 1945. (C.M.L.) to 
(P.H.D.), 24 Aug. 1943, SMA, U1/16/760, 28; Wu to (C.P.H.), 11 Jan., 14. Mar., 16 Apr. and 29 May 
1945, SMA, U1/16/760, 101, 107-8, 113, 116, 121, 123.  
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Settlement thus considered itself as much of an ‘El Dorado to the leprous Chinaman from the 
mainland’ as Hong Kong. Both authorities managed the disease by deporting Chinese leprosy 
sufferers to the mainland, removing these unwanted bodies beyond their respective spheres 
of obligation. The management of leprosy sufferers therefore took on a whole new 
significance in the British colonial possessions in East Asia: these individuals were not simply 
cast without the camp, but without the colonial sphere altogether. But parallel internal 
pressures, principally the emergence of Chinese agency, profoundly impacted upon the 
International Settlement’s and Hong Kong’s managements of leprosy. It was not so much that 
the practice of ‘casting without’ was displaced. Instead both territories were forced to 
distinguish between those who were being cast out: between immigrants from the mainland 
on the one hand, and colonial citizens or Settlement residents on the other. This distinction 
extended the both territories’ spheres of obligation. Or more accurately, this distinction 
incorporated foreign mainland leprosaria into the settlement’s and the colony’s spheres of 
obligation. The history of leprosy thus sheds light on the trans-national management of 
diseases in East Asia. Moreover in the case of Shanghai the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war 
altered the final destination of those cast without the camp, bringing the without within. Thus 
the National Leprosarium was forced to seek shelter within the extra-Settlement. This 
relocation profoundly impacted upon: its reliance on the Settlement’s financial support; the 
Settlement’s racialised management of the disease; the relationship between the Mission and 
the Public Health Department; the Settlement’s emphasis attitudes towards confinement; and 
the extent of patient agency. 
 
Epilogue 
During the course of my research in Shanghai I came across a remarkable set of 
documents that provided an extraordinary glimpse into the life of a ‘cured’ leprosy sufferer. 
The discharge of ‘cured’ patients from either the National Leprosarium or the Kennedy Town 
Leprosarium was exceptionally rare. Neither the colonial nor the Settlement authorities 
envisioned the ‘reintegration’ of such individuals into society. Indeed programs to ‘resettle’ 
and employ ‘cured’ leprosy sufferers only emerged in Hong Kong in the early post-war period, 
principally as a result of the Mission to Lepers Hong Kong Auxiliary’s involvement in the 
administration of the colony’s post-war domestic leprosaria.295 But I stumbled across the case 
of patient Huang Sze Shih (Resident #112). Jordan, the Settlement’s Commissioner of Public 
Health, had requested Huang’s admission to the Brenan Road Emergency Leprosarium in the 
autumn of 1940 because a “tubercle” had been identified on the left side of his face.296 At the 
time, Huang was an unemployed 18 year old originally from Amoy, who had been living in 
Shanghai for two years. As a result of a clerical error, the Mission failed to charge Huang’s 
maintenance to the S.M.C., as well as the maintenance of 2 other resident and one refugee 
                                                          
295 See Hong Kong Public Records Office (hereafter HKPRO), HKRS163/1/1829; HKPRO, 
HKRS163/1/1758; HKPRO, HKRS41/1/9600. 
296 Jordan to Huizenga, 14 Oct. 1940, SMA, U1/16/757, 52-55, 55. 
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patient, until after the Japanese invasion of the Settlement.297 Jordan suggested that this error 
absolved the Settlement’s responsibility for maintaining Huang and the three other patients 
– the timing of this error came at a low-point in Jordan’s relationship with the Chinese Mission 
to Lepers – but the S.M.C. Treasurer disagreed.298 Just over a year letter, Huang sent the 
following typed letter to the Settlement’s Commissioner of Public Health, which bears 
reprinting in full: 
I, patient Huang Sze Shih, have received a few years’ treatment in the Shanghai 
Leprosarium. Both Dr. Chow Wen Ching of the Leprosarium and Dr. Pan Chee Shing of 
the Chinese Red Cross No.1 Hospital, who examined me recently, certify that I do not 
carry leprous bacteria; and the Chinese Mission to Lepers is also kind enough to give 
me a letter of certification to the effect that I can be discharged and do some light 
duty. I have now obtained a job in the Overseas Chemical Industrial Co., but owing to 
the fact that the letter of certification states that treatment should be continued in 
order to avoid a relapse, the company assumes that my disease has not yet been 
cured completely. For the sake of public health, the company hesitates to accept my 
service. 
I beg to request that you will kindly enquire into the matter, asking the 
Leprosarium to furnish information regarding my examination or examine me by your 
doctor. In case you are of opinion that I don’t not carry leprous bacteria and there is 
no danger of infecting other people, I shall be much obliged if you will kindly certify 
to this effect so that the public will not be suspicious and I will be enabled to earn a 
living.299 
Though this letter was probably not the direct result of a Chinese leprosy patient’s 
penmanship, its very existence is astonishing. Firstly, it provides a rare insight into the 
difficulties that discharged patients faced. Medical treatments may have provided a physical 
cure, but they did little to abate the popular stigmatisation of the disease. Even more 
incredible is the fact that the Commissioner of Public Health supported Huang’s application.300 
This letter was written in May 1943, i.e. well after the Japanese occupation. This is a unique 
and extraordinary example of a senior Japanese physician attempting to assist a discharged 
Chinese leprosy patient to secure wartime employment. Despite the Commissioner’s support, 
Huang failed to secure employment with the Overseas Chemical Industrial Company. Indeed 
he failed to secure any form of employment at all. Instead he remained confined in the Brenan 
Road Emergency Leprosarium through the spring of 1945.301 For Huang at least, the puppet 
government’s management of Chinese bodies differed little from that of the International 
Settlement. 
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 The preceding two chapters explored Hong Kong’s and the International Settlement’s 
coercive, racialised medical practices by focusing specifically on leprosy. A shared 
conceptualisation of diseased Chinese bodies underpinned both territories’ parallels reliance 
on deportation and staunch opposition to domestic segregation. Chapters 4 and 5 shift this 
focus to explore the parallels between Hong Kong’s and the Settlement’s conceptualisation 
and management of diseased environments. The colony’s historical association with malaria 
was even more inherent than that with leprosy. In his highly critical report which likened the 
hills of northern Kowloon to a ‘negro streaked with leprosy’, R. Montgomery Martin, the 
colony’s first treasurer, reported that the location of the early settlement on the northern side 
of Hong Kong island favoured the “retention of a mortific poison at the surface, to be 
occasionally called into deadly activity”.1 Martin was so alarmed by the threat of the febrile 
diseases that plagued the early colonists that he questioned whether “the objects sought or 
to be obtained by the possession of Hong Kong, are worth the dreadful sacrifice of life which 
the maintenance of the present establishment entails”.2 This chapter traces the evolution of 
the colony’s efforts to understand and abate the threat from malarial fevers by taming this 
hostile Chinese environment. 
 
From Miasmas to Germ Theories 
Foreign commentators in the Far East attributed the prevalence of fevers in China, 
including in Hong Kong and Shanghai, to the combined effects of humidity, temperature and 
three predisposing environmental causes: organic decomposition, the exposure of virgin soil 
and the disintegration of granite.3 Some alleged that local residents avoided up-turned soil 
near newly constructed homes.4 The role of disintegrating granite was particularly emphasised 
in Hong Kong. For instance J. Thomson, who travelled through the colony in the 1870s, 
observed: 
When first the city was being built, vast surfaces of decomposed granite were laid 
bare as the workmen cut into the face of the hill; from the exposed spots noxious 
miasmas exhaled, and to them are attributed those maladies which prevailed so 
fatally at that time, and which proved themselves the worst enemies our troops had 
to contend against in China”.5 
                                                          
1 Hong Kong. Copies of ‘Report on Hong Kong;’ ‘Report on Chusan;’ and Minute on the British Position 
and Prospects in China,’ by Mr. R. Montgomery Martin, when Treasurer to The Queen at Hong Kong, 
and a Member of Her Majesty’s Legislative Council in China (Parl. Papers, Session 1 (148), 1857), 4. 
2 Ibid., 5-6, 6. 
3 D. Ham, “Malarial Hygiene and Colonial Society in Hong Kong, c.1880 – c.1910,” (MPhil diss., 
University of Cambridge, 2009), 20-22. 
4 Charles Alexander Gordon, China from a Medical Point of View in 1860 and 1861, to which is added a 
chapter on Nagasaki as a Sanatarium (London: John Churchill, 1863), 35. 
5 J. Thomson, The Straits of Malacca, Indo-China an China; or Ten Years’ Travel, Adventures and 
Residence Abroad (London: Sampson Low, Maston, Low, & Searle, 1875), 202. See also N. B. Dennys, 
ed., The Treaty Ports of China and Japan. A Complete Guide to the Open Ports of those Countries, 
together with Peking, Yedo, Hongkong and Macao. Forming a Guide Book & Vade Mecum for 
Travellers, Merchants, and Residents in General. With 29 Maps and Plans (London: Trübner and Co., 
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Even popular local guide-books warned travellers about the “deleterious gas evolved from the 
decomposed granite”.6 This discourse regrouped diseases by geographical origin rather than 
common physical symptoms. Hence the term ‘Hong Kong fever’ was used to describe a variety 
of (pathologically different) febrile illnesses. 
Hong Kong’s physicians gradually began to identify specific types of ‘malarial’ fevers 
during the final quarter of the 19th century. According to Yip, this shift occurred from 1890 
onwards.7 In fact the colonial medical authorities distinguished between three different 
malarial fevers as early as the 1880s. Dr. John Mitford Atkinson, the Superintendent of the 
Government Civil Hospital (1887 - 1896), compiled a separate admissions and mortality table 
specifically for malarial fevers.8 The emergence of specific disease categories did not, 
however, displace the miasmatic theories. The Colonial Surgeon, for instance, attributed the 
prevalence of fevers at one of the colony’s police stations to building works and swamps in 
the neighbourhood.9 The Government Astronomer similarly attributed the intermittent and 
remittent fevers from which he and his colleagues had been suffering to the “malaria” 
emanating from the deserted rice-paddies to north of the Observatory.10 
 From the mid-1880s Hong Kong’s vibrant medical community actively interrogated 
the diseases that threatened the colony’s health. The desire to understand and tame the local 
environment was compounded by a profound sense of intellectual dislocation. In 1886 the 
colony’s civilian and military physicians established the Hong Kong Medical Society – later 
renamed the Hong Kong and China Branch of the British Medical Association – in order to 
provide a forum for regular discussion and to stimulate pioneering research into “Eastern 
diseases”, about which there was an “amazing ignorance in the profession, both at home and 
abroad”.11 In his augural address as the society’s first president, Patrick Manson explained that 
malaria was chief amongst those ‘Eastern diseases’: 
Yet, undoubtedly, there are fevers in China which have not yet been described distinct 
from the recognized types – as distinct as typhus is from typhoid. I have sometimes 
wondered how much quinine is wasted in the world in a year on account of inability 
to diagnose malarial from the continued fevers… Certainly great ignorance prevails at 
                                                          
1867), 32; Henry Knollys, English Life in China (London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1885), 29-30. Some 
however dissented from this view. John Wilson, Medical Notes on China (London: John Churchill, 
1846), 148-149. 
6 A Guide to Hongkong, with a short account of Canton and Macao, and embracing many chapters on 
interest relating to the Far East (Hong Kong: W. Brewer, 1883), 5. 
7 Ka-che Yip, “Colonialism, Disease and Public Health: Malaria in the History of Hong Kong,” in Disease, 
Colonialism, and the State, Malaria in Modern East Asian History, ed. Ka-che Yip (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 2009), 11-12. 
8 Atkinson arrived in Hong Kong in late 1887. He divided his table into three categories of malarial 
fevers (intermittent fever/ague, remittent fever and malarial cachexia) and beriberi. 
9 P. B. C. Ayres, Sessional Papers: Colonial Surgeon’s Report for 1884, Mar. 30, 1885, Hong Kong 
Government Records Online (hereafter HKGRO), 173. 
10 W. Doberck, Sessional Papers: Report of the Director of the Observatory, for 1885, Feb. 4, 1886, 
HKGRO, 143. 
11 Patrick Manson, “The President’s Address,” in Transactions of the Hongkong Medical Society. 
Papers and Cases Read during the First Two Years of the Society’s existence, eds. G. P. Jordan, P. 
Manson and J. C. Thompson, vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Kelly and Walsh, 1889), 1. 
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home. What about our own ignorance? Well, perhaps it is only a little less profound 
than that of our home brethren, and that only inasmuch as we have got the length of 
knowing that we are ignorant.12 
Contrary to modern scholarly assumptions, Manson showed a limited interest in researching 
the disease, at least compared to his contemporaries. According to the society’s minutes the 
only paper that he produced on the subject of the disease was delivered in absentia shortly 
after his departure in the late 1880s.13 Instead he presided over a number of papers prepared 
by his colleagues.14 The society’s very first speaker, W. W. Pike of the Army Medical Service, 
delivered a stimulating presentation on ‘The Malarial Fevers of Hong Kong’ in which he 
reiterated the miasmatic causation of the disease.15 By contrast Staff-Surgeon T. J. Preston 
attempted to incorporate a number of emerging medical ideas: he rejected the notion that 
the colony’s granite foundations were “in themselves productive of ill-health” but speculated 
that there were harmful bacteria or “mycelium” trapped within “the hollows of the granitic 
boulders of the Colony, awaiting the day when disintegration shall permit them to exercise 
their disastrous effect upon the local population”.16 The Society’s numerous discussions on 
malaria bore testament to extent to the community’s desire to improve its limited 
understanding of the disease through local research. 
The Fever Commission of 1888 epitomised the colony’s reactive and miasmatic 
management of the disease during this period. A group of 43 local residents first drew the 
government’s attention to the prevalence of febrile diseases in the western suburbs of 
                                                          
12 Italics in the original. Ibid., 3. 
13 Hong Kong Medical Society, Minutes of Meetings, 1886-1912, 5 Apr. 1889. Of all places that 
Manson’s colleagues could have trumpeted the ‘Hong Kong connection’, doubtless the most pertinent 
would have been the Second Biennial Congress of the Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine, 
held in Hong Kong in 1912. Instead Atkinson, Manson’s close friend and colleague, informed the 
delegates that Manson’s experiments into the mosquito-borne transmission of Filariasis whilst 
stationed in Amoy, i.e. before his arrival in Hong Kong, had a formative impact on Manson’s post-
Hong Kong research into the mosquito-borne transmission of malaria. J. Mitford Atkinson, 
“Presidential Address: The Progress of Tropical Medicine during the past Twenty-five Years,” in 
Transactions of the Second Biennial Congress held at Hongkong 1912, ed. Francis Clark, (Hong Kong: 
Noronha & Co., 1913), 5-17, 6-7. 
14 In addition to Pike’s and Preston’s papers, four other presentations discussed the subject of malaria 
prior to Manson’s departure. A further eight discussions were held between late 1889 and 1896. Hong 
Kong Medical Society, Minutes of Meetings, 2 Oct. 1886; Ibid., 6 Nov. 1886; Ibid., 4 Dec. 1886; Ibid., 
ca. Mar. 1887; Ibid., 4 Nov. 1887; Ibid., ca. Dec. 1887; Ibid., 5 Apr. 1889; Ibid., 7 Dec. 1889; Ibid., 12 
Dec. 1891; Ibid., 9 Jan. 1892; Ibid., 27 Feb. 1892/02; Ibid., 11 Nov. 1892; Ibid., 10 Jan. 1896; Ibid., 14 
Feb. 1896. 
15 Drs. Manson, Hartigan, Thomson, Preston (R.N.), Scanlan (R.A.M.C.), McCarthy (R.N.) and of course 
Pike himself discussed the paper afterwards. W. Watson Pike, “The Malarial Fevers of Hongkong,” in 
Transactions of the Hongkong Medical Society. Papers and Cases Read during the First Two Years of 
the Society’s existence, eds. G. P. Jordan, P. Manson and J. C. Thompson, vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Kelly and 
Walsh, 1889), 26-38; Hong Kong Medical Society, Minutes of Meetings, 2 Oct. 1886. 
16 T. J. Preston, “The Telluric Causation of Disease,” in Ibid., 39-56, 53-54; Hong Kong Medical Society, 
Minutes of Meetings, 6 Nov. 1886. 
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Victoria.17 The civilian and military members of the colony’s medical society were initially 
unable to reach a consensus as to the nature of the outbreak.18 The Governor therefore 
appointed several of the colony’s medical officers, including Manson, Cantlie, Atkinson and 
Ayres, the Colonial Surgeon, to investigate the matter.19 As well as inspecting the area, the 
commissioners cross-examined a number of the petitioners. A Mr. Coughtrie, for instance, 
informed the Commission that “earth-cutting” was the main cause of the epidemic.20 Many of 
the witnesses believed that the noxious smells emanating from the neighbouring Chinese 
settlement were at least partly, if not wholly, responsible. The Commissioners’ report, which 
concluded that the outbreak was “chiefly malarial”, reflected these cultural assumptions.21 It 
attributed the outbreak to the absence of sub-soil drainage, earth cuttings, the absence of 
cultivation and the damp location of the houses. The commission also identified a number of 
unhygienic factors that had exacerbated the outbreak. As well as recommending anti-
miasmatic measures, including the regulation of earth cuttings and the planting of eucalyptus 
trees (thought to prevent the diffusion of miasmas), the commissioners also pointed to the 
necessity of improving the sewerage in the area.22 Thus the Commission situated the 
management of malarial fevers within a broader sanitary framework. 
 The timing of the report contributed to its poor reception. The Surveyor General 
criticised the report for failing to “throw a very clear light” on the causation of the disease, 
particularly “now that it is, I understand, admitted that the cause of malarious fevers of a 
malignant type is a germ”.23 Awareness, let alone acceptance, of Laveran’s discovery of the 
causative agent of malaria in 1880 developed gradually in the colony. Atkinson informed his 
fellow delegates to the Eleventh International Medical Congress (Rome, 1894) that he 
doubted that Laveran’s “hæmatozoa” was the “intimate cause” of the disease. Instead he 
pointed to the well-established threat of upturned soil in Hong Kong. Strikingly he predated 
his own awareness of Laveran’s discovery. In his conference paper Atkinson alleged that he 
had “described certain flagellated corpuscles” as early as 1889, and “described and showed 
what I took to be Laveran’s hæmatozoa” at a meeting of the colony’s medical society in 1890.24 
Both of these statements were inaccurate. Firstly he made no such references in his annual 
                                                          
17 Hong Kong Government, Sessional Papers: Report of the Commissioners appointed by His Excellency 
Sir G. William Des Voeux, to Enquire into the cause of the Fever Prevailing in the Western District 
together with minutes of evidence taken before the commission, 1888, HKGRO, 1-3. 
18 Hong Kong Medical Society, Minutes of Meetings, ca. Dec. 1887. 
19 The local press regularly reported on the Commission’s activities. See Ham, “Malarial Hygiene,” 24-
25. 
20 Hong Kong Government, Report of the Commissioners, 1888, HKGRO, 21. 
21 Ibid., vii. 
22 The report noted that eucalyptus trees were being planted in many “malarial districts”, including 
Italy. Ibid., vii-xv. 
23 “The Surveyor General on the Fever Commission’s Report,” China Mail, Feb. 1, 1890, 4. The Colonial 
Surgeon, who had sat on the Commission, also expressed his dissatisfaction with the report. “Sanitary 
Board: Fever at Kowloon,” China Mail, Nov. 21, 1889, 3. 
24 J. Mitford Atkinson, “The Malarial Fevers of Hong-Kong,” Lancet, Apr. 28, 1894, 1054-1060. 
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report for 1889, nor in that for 1890.25 Secondly he did not deliver his paper on ‘The Remittent 
Fevers of Hongkong’ to his colleagues until January 1892, by which stage he was able to draw 
on the description of the parasite that Laveran had presented at the Seventh International 
Congress of Hygiene and Demography (London, 1891): 
Under the microscopes you will see specimens of what I consider to be the 
“hœmatozoa” Laveran describes, they were prepared in exactly the same way, as 
described by him, but we must not forget that these hœmatozoa may simply be 
concomitant of the disease, and not its cause.26 
The fact that Atkinson’s earlier reports on the treatment of malaria made no reference to this 
diagnostic technique strongly suggests that he was largely ignorant or else dismissive of 
Laveran’s research until after the London Congress in the summer of 1891. By predating his 
awareness of Laveran’s discovery, he was able to present his work on malarial admissions in 
Hong Kong to the audience of international specialists in Rome in 1894 as an example of 
cutting-edge research. Atkinson remained decidedly sceptical about Laveran’s work even after 
the congress in Rome.27 He devoted the rest of the decade to establishing a correlation 
between monthly rainfall and mean temperature on the one hand, and the monthly incidence 
of the disease on the other – an approach that clearly reflected his staunch support for the 
miasmatic conceptualisation.28 
 
The Search for the Anopheles Mosquito 
Hong Kong’s cumulative amateur entomological investigations profoundly impacted 
upon the colony’s management of the disease in the early 20th century. The colonial 
administration only began to seriously entertain the possibility that malaria was a mosquito-
borne disease as a result of a circular from Sir Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, announcing the establishment of the London School of Tropical Medicine.29 
Chamberlain called on these territories to support the Malaria Investigation Commission’s 
                                                          
25 P. B. C. Ayres, Sessional Papers: The Colonial Surgeon’s Report for 1889, June 27, 1890, HKGRO, 330-
331, 333-335; P. B. C. Ayres, Sessional Papers: The Colonial Surgeon’s Report for 1890, June 15, 1891, 
HKGRO, 352, 354-357. 
26 He appended this paper to his annual report for 1891. See P. B. C. Ayres, Sessional Papers: The 
Colonial Surgeon’s Report for 1891, June 21, 1892, HKGRO, 425-432, 427-428; Hong Kong Medical 
Society, Minutes of Meetings, 9 Jan. 1892. Laveran delivered his paper on ‘The Etiology of Malaria’ at 
the Congress in August 1891. “Seventh International Congress of Hygiene and Demography,” Public 
Health 3 (1890-1891): 449-451, 451. 
27 He did, however, begin to examine blood samples taken from his malarial patients. See for instance 
J. M. Atkinson, Sessional Papers: The Acting Colonial Surgeon’s Report for 1895, Apr. 30, 1896, HKGRO, 
301. 
28 Atkinson first published a graph of the monthly incidence of intermittent and remittent fever cases 
in the same year that he began producing a separate admissions table for these fevers. From 1892 
through 1900 he plotted rainfall and temperature data on this graph. See Ayres, Colonial Surgeon’s 
Report for 1891, June 21, 1892, HKGRO, 408; J. M. Atkinson, Sessional Reports: Report of the Principal 
Civil Medical Officer for 1899, Mar. 17, 1900, HKGRO, 517. 
29 J. Chamberlain to the Governors of Non-Responsible Government Colonies, 19 Aug., 1898, The 
National Archives, London (hereafter TNA), CO885/7/9, 43-44; Ham, “Malarial Hygiene,” 28. 
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research into the possible connection between malaria and mosquitoes by having “collections 
made of the winged insects in the Colony which bite men or animals”.30 Historians have 
traditionally presumed that the task of assembling these collections in Hong Kong was a 
straightforward process. Yip for instance simply stated that the colony’s first official 
investigation in 1899 was followed a year later by a more comprehensive report.31 In fact the 
government’s official investigation failed to identify any of the species that were held 
responsible for transmitting the disease, prompting two civilian officials to conduct their own 
independent investigations. This local validation of these new theories relied upon 
independent enthusiasts – a process that created competitive career opportunities. 
The task of conducting the government’s official investigation fell to Charles Ford, the 
Superintendent of the Botanical and Afforestation Department. Ford was selected for the task 
because of his horticultural experiences rather than on the basis of any specialist knowledge 
about mosquitoes.32 The fact that the local press encouraged volunteers to get in touch with 
Ford highlighted the amateur nature of this ‘official’ investigation, which was delayed until the 
arrival of essential instruments from London.33 Ford eventually transmitted several hundred 
specimens to the British Museum for positive identification.34 Significantly these specimens 
were all Culex mosquitoes, which, as Ford reported, “so far, has not been found to be 
responsible for conveying malaria parasites”: 
Of the genus Anopheles, which Surgeon-Major Ross is convinced from his own careful 
investigations is responsible for inoculating mankind with malarial germs, not a single 
specimen seems to have been discovered in Hongkong. 
 …We have here no information that any species of Anopheles has been found except 
in India and Africa where they have been seen in abundance and proved to be one 
cause of malarial fever.35 
The failure to identify any Anopheles mosquitoes suggested an alternative means of 
transmission. Ford’s contention reflected broader assumptions about the plurality of disease 
                                                          
30 Chamberlain to the Governors of Non-Responsible Government Colonies, 6 Dec. 1898, TNA, 
CO885/7/9, 88-89, 89. This circular along with instructions from the British Museum on “How to 
Collect Mosquitoes” was published in the Government Gazette. Hong Kong Government Gazette, Jan. 
28, 1899, HKGRO, 88-90. 
31 Yip, “Colonialism, Disease and Public Health,” 12, 19.  
32 His interest in entomology was principally concerned with the caterpillars that plagued his work. 
See for instance C. Ford, Sessional Reports: Report of the Superintendent of the Botanical and 
Afforestation Department for 1894, May 27, 1895, HKGRO, 417-31, 422-26. 
33 “The Study of Malaria and Mosquitoes,” Hongkong Weekly Press, Feb. 4, 1899, 98. Many of the 
specimens that were sent to him provided unusable. For instance 20 of the 25 specimens supplied by 
a Mr. Dealy were “mildewed or incomplete”. C. Ford (Supt., Botanical and Afforestation Dept.) to J. H. 
Stewart Lockhart (Col. Sec.), 29 Nov. 1899, TNA, CO129/294/351, 491-492, 491b. The materials cost 
$73.33. Hong Kong Hansard, Dec. 21, 1899, HKGRO, 46. 
34 Ford to Stewart Lockhart, 29 Nov. 1899, TNA, CO129/294/351, 491-494, 493. See also Fred V. 
Theobald, Report on the Collections of Mosquitoes (Culicidæ) received at The British Museum (Natural 
History) From Various Parts Of The World in connection with the Investigation Into The Causes Of 
Malaria (London: British Museum, 1900), 5, 9-10; Fred V. Theobald, A Monograph of the Culicidae of 
the World, vol. 2 (London: British Museum, 1901), 154, 161, 359, 361. 
35 Emphasis in the original. Ford to Stewart Lockhart, 29 Nov. 1899, TNA, CO129/294/351, 492b-493. 
 - 143 - 
 
environments: Indian and African experiences did not necessarily hold true in China. Malarial 
fevers continued to be understood as local variations of a worldwide phenomenon. They were 
still conceptualised as ‘Hong Kong fevers’ in all but name. 
 
Map 8. The Cattle Depôts and Slaughter Houses at Kennedy Town.36 
Ford’s report impacted upon the nature of the colony’s localised management of the 
disease. Just as he was drawing his investigations to a close Atkinson, who was now the 
Principal Civil Medical Officer, tasked Dr. Francis W. Clark (M.O.H.), to investigate the 
notoriously unhealthy inspector’s quarters at the Cattle Depôts at Kennedy Town (map 8).37 
But when Clark suggested that mosquitoes were responsible for “the feverish reputation of 
the house”, Atkinson informed him: 
Unfortunately for your theory these malarial carrying mosquitoes are not to be found 
in this Island although a thorough search has been made for them. So I am afraid we 
must find some other cause for the fever.38 
                                                          
36 “Map of Victoria”, ca. 1899, TNA, MFQ/1/53/1. 
37 J. M. Atkinson to F. W. Clark, 4 Oct. 1899, HKPRO, HKRS202/1/1/37; J. M. Atkinson, Sessional 
Papers: Report on the Health and Sanitary Condition of the Colony of Hongkong for 1899, Mar. 10, 
1900, HKGRO, 388; G.A Woodcock (Actg. Sec., San. Bd.) to J.H. Stewart Lockhart, 7 Dec. 1900, HKPRO, 
HKRS202/1/1/36, 399-400. 
38 Emphasis in the original. Clark to Atkinson, 5 Oct. 1899, HKPRO, HKRS202/1/1/37; Atkinson to Clark, 
5 Oct. 1899, HKPRO, HKRS202/1/1/37. Clark would later gloss over Atkinson’s rejection. Writing in 
1906, at a time when the malaria-borne transmission of the disease was almost universally accepted, 
he alleged that “since the year 1899…the attention of the Medical and Sanitary Department has been 
specifically targeted toward the prevention of the formation of breeding pools for mosquitoes”. 
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Ford’s investigation clearly underpinned Atkinson’s response. Rather than investigating the 
possibility of implementing anti-mosquito measures, Atkinson recommended raising the 
building by a storey so as to reduce the danger of contracting malaria by sleeping close to the 
ground – a preventive measure informed by a miasmatic conceptualisation of the disease.39 
Viewed on a broader timescale, this incident merely represented a minor delay in terms of the 
colony’s implementation of vector-centred measures. But Atkinson’s actions directly 
impacted upon the lives of Inspector Watson and his family. Moreover the continuing 
prevalence of the disease at Kennedy Town profoundly impacted upon the subsequent 
validation of the new malaria-mosquito theory, dictating the site of the Sanitary Board’s 
earliest anti-mosquito experiments. This incident highlights the importance of contextualising 
the evolutionary stages of the local validation of new theories. 
A major step in this validation process came from an unexpected quarter early the 
following year. At a meeting of the colony’s medical society, C. V. Ladds delivered a paper on 
the subject of Hong Kong’s mosquitoes.40 As the colony’s veterinary surgeon, he had a vested 
interest in reducing the threat of malaria at the Cattle Depôts at Kennedy Town; he himself 
had been repeatedly “incapacitated from duty” by “attacks of tropical disease”.41 Dissatisfied 
with Ford’s report and Atkinson’s recommendations, and allegedly “having always taken a 
great interest in the Malaria question”, Ladds saw an opportunity to “take up the subject 
privately”.42 He successfully identified Anopheles mosquitoes breeding near the Inspector’s 
quarters, doubtless in the very same pools of stagnant water that Clark had pointed to only 
three months previously.43 By the time of the medical society’s meeting Ladds confidently 
asserted that Anopheles mosquitoes did exist in all of the colony’s malarial districts.44 He 
lectured on the breeding habitats of both the Anopheles and Culex mosquitoes, and discussed 
his experiments with different insecticides: 
In conclusion, I think I may safely say that by working upon these lines, and given the 
services of half-a-dozen intelligent coolies, some one to look after them, and the 
necessary supplies of the above mentioned chemicals, in a very short time it would be 
possible to cause the Anopheles to become so scarce in Hongkong that should they prove 
                                                          
Francis William Clark, The Prevention of Malaria in Hongkong (An Address) (Hong Kong: Naronha & 
Co., 1906), 4-5. 
39 Atkinson to Clark, 9 Oct. 1899, HKPRO, HKRS202/1/1/37. The government, however, dismissed 
Atkinson’s suggestion. Stewart Lockhart to C.W. Duggan (Sec., San. Bd.), 23 Oct. 1899, HKPRO, 
HKRS202/1/1/37. 
40 Hong Kong Medical Society, Minutes of Meetings, 28 Mar. 1900. 
41 F. Clark, Sessional Papers: Reports of the Medical Officer of Health, the Sanitary Surveyor, and the 
Colonial Veterinary Surgeon for the Year 1898, Jan. 10, 1899, HKGRO, 277. 
42 Ladds conducted his investigation in December 1899. “The Malarial Mosquito in Hongkong,” 
Hongkong Telegraph, Apr. 4, 1900, 2. 
43 Ladds also identified Anopheles mosquitoes breeding at several sites on Hong Kong Island and 
Kowloon Peninsula. Ibid., 2.  
44 Interestingly he made no reference to his work in the annual report he drafted in the weeks before 
the meeting. Atkinson, Report on the Health and Sanitary Condition, Mar. 10, 1900, HKGRO, 384-388. 
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to be the only source of infection by malaria, cases of malarial fever would soon be as 
rare as cholera.45 
Whilst his specimens led to the ‘discovery’ of Anopheles plumiger, a species now recognised 
as ‘harmless’, it is highly possible that Ladds may not actually have discovered any malaria-
carrying species.46 His research nevertheless constituted a major milestone precisely because 
of the nascent state of medical entomology: all Anopheles mosquitoes were presumed to 
transmit malaria, just as all Culex mosquitoes, including Ford’s specimens, were presumed not 
to. Ladds’s amateur research thus laid a major foundation in the local validation of the 
mosquito-borne transmission of malaria. Remarkably his contribution to the advancement of 
local and indeed global medical knowledge was due in no small measure to chance and pure 
coincidence. Had malaria not posed a problem to Ladds and the other foreign staff at the 
Cattle Depôts at Kennedy Town or had Atkinson accepted Clark’s suggestion regarding the 
prevalence of mosquitoes in the area, the colonial veterinary surgeon might never have ‘taken 
up the subject privately’. 
The enterprising research of another colonial physician soon eclipsed Ladds’s position 
as the colony’s newfound ‘expert’ on malaria-carrying mosquitoes. With over a decade’s 
worth of experience supervising several of Hong Kong’s hospitals, Dr. John Christopher 
Thomson was well-versed in the disease’s clinical manifestations.47 He was also an active 
member of the colony’s medical society, delivering a paper on “Typho-malarial Fever” in the 
early 1890s.48 He took advantage of home leave at the turn of the century to attend a course 
on ‘Pathological Bacteriology’ at the University of Edinburgh (his alma mater) and a two-
month “course of instruction in Diseases of Tropical Climates” at the new London School of 
Tropical Medicine.49 Thus whilst Ladds’s spent the winter of 1899-1900 searching for 
                                                          
45 Italics in original. “Malarial Mosquito,” Hongkong Telegraph, Apr. 4, 1900, 2. Ladds’ paper was 
published in the local press and The British Medical Journal. The Jeyes’ Sanitary Compounds Company 
of London took advantage of Ladds’ praise for their product to forward a copy of his paper to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Colonial Office resolved to send the paper to Manson 
“(privately)” and to the Secretary to the Royal Society for the Malaria Commission “in a non-
advertising form”. “Mosquitos and Malaria,” British Medical Journal, May 12, 1900, 1186-1187; J. 
Dawson (Jeyes’ Sanitary Compounds Co.) to J. Chamberlain (Sec. of State for the Colonies), 15 Aug. 
1900, 370-371, TNA, CO129/303, 370-371; Colonial Office minute, 16 Aug. 1900, TNA, CO129/303, 
369. 
46 The species was named by the German entomologist Prof. W. Doenitz. “Nachrichten aus dem 
Berliner Entomologischen Verein,” Insekten-Börse 18, no. 5 (1901): 36-38, 37. 
47 He served as the Superintendent of the Alice Memorial & Nethersole Hospitals, Inspecting Medical 
Officer of the Tung Wah Hospitals (and Medical Officer at the Victoria Gaol. J. C. Thomson (Asst. 
Surgeon) to J. Chamberlain, 11 May 1901, TNA, CO129/305/196, 163. 
48 Thomson attended his first meetings shortly after arriving in Hong Kong in January 1889. Within 
four months Drs. Manson and Cantlie nominated him to serve as the Society’s secretary and 
treasurer. Along with Drs. Jordan and Manson he also co-edited the Transactions of the Hongkong 
Medical Society, published in 1889. In December 1891 he delivered his paper on ‘Typho-malarial 
Fever’. Hong Kong Medical Society, Minutes of Meetings, 5 Jan. 1889; Ibid., 5 Apr. 1889; Ibid., 12 Dec. 
1891; G. P. Jordan, P. Manson and J. C. Thomson, eds., Transactions of the Hongkong Medical Society. 
Papers and Cases Read during the First Two Years of the Society’s existence, vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Kelly 
and Walsh, 1889). 
49 Thomson to Chamberlain, 11 May 1901, TNA, CO129/305/196, 163b, 165. 
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Anopheles mosquitoes at Kennedy Town, Thomson was schooled in the latest theories on 
tropical medicine at the epicentre of imperial research. What’s more, he could call on Manson 
and Cantlie, his former colleagues and now the world’s leading experts in the field, as 
references.50 Armed with the latest theories Thomson set to work collecting specimens of 
adult mosquitoes shortly after his return to Hong Kong in May 1900. An ardent advocate of 
the mosquito-borne transmission of the disease, he was still a colonial ‘Hong-Konger’ at heart: 
The general mosquito-malaria theory has been proved to the hilt, and has recently 
been brilliantly demonstrated to the public by Manson’s double experiment; but the 
connection of malaria with disturbance of soil, an important point in Hongkong, is by 
no means clear yet. Grassi disposes of the subject by stating that it depends on the 
creation during digging operations of puddles of water in which Anopheles breed. This 
certainly does not hold for Hongkong.51 
He confined his work largely to the city of Victoria, but acquired specimens from the New 
Territories and the outlying islands through the help of the police force and Dr. Ho Nai Hop, 
the Chinese Medical Officer in the New Territory who was responsible for providing medical 
treatment to the small community of leprosy sufferers at Au Tau.52 Significantly Thomson’s 
report was the first to differentiate distinct Anopheles (and Culex) species, including the 
malaria-carrying Anopheles sinensis.53 
 
Anti-Malaria Measures in Transition 
Modern historical studies identify Thomson’s initial investigations into Hong Kong’s 
mosquitoes as the genesis of a concerted anti-mosquito campaign. Yip, for instance, cited 
Thomson’s first report, published in November 1900, as evidence that the authorities initiated 
“a broad anti-malaria campaign” in that year.54 Thomson certainly considered himself a 
pioneer working on the very frontiers of Imperial research, and his report did indeed call for 
the “extirpation” of malaria, through the levelling or covering in all of the water-courses in the 
western part of the city of Victoria.55 A decade later Thomson claimed that: 
My work on the subject of Malaria in this Colony, voluntarily undertaken and not 
remunerated in any way, in the years immediately following the discovery of its true 
causation … resulted in preventive action by the Government of this Colony before 
                                                          
50 Ibid., 163b. 
51 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Nov. 24, 1900, HKGRO, 1701. 
52 Ibid., 1700.The report was also printed in the local press, and extracts were published in The Lancet, 
The British Medical Journal and The Journal of Tropical Medicine. Thomson also published extracts in 
J. C. Thomson, Malaria Prevention in Hongkong: Reports and Minutes, 1900-1903 (Hong Kong: Victoria 
Gaol, 1903), 1-2. 
53 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Nov. 24, 1900, HKGRO, 1700. 
54 Yip mistakenly dated the publication of Thomson’s report in the Government Gazette to Nov. 17 
instead of Nov. 24, 1900. Yip, “Colonialism, Disease and Public Health,” 19, 129n55; Hong Kong 
Government Gazette, Nov. 24, 1900, HKGRO, 1700-1703. 
55 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Nov. 24, 1900, HKGRO, 1701. 
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most of the other Colonies of the Empire had awakened to the necessity for such 
action.56 
The impact of his pioneering research, however, was not as immediate as either Thomson or 
Yip would have us believe. For one thing the Sanitary Board was largely unaware of Thomson’s 
independent investigations during the summer of 1900 until shortly before the publication of 
his first report.57 Moreover even Ladds’s well-publicised discovery had little immediate impact 
upon the way the Board managed the disease at Kennedy Town.58 
Rather than implementing a ‘broad anti-malaria campaign’, both the military and 
civilian authorities in Hong Kong implemented experimental anti-mosquito measures in highly 
localised contexts. The military focused its efforts on their Sanatorium at Magazine Gap, a 
winding road leading up to the Peak on Hong Kong Island, which had recently been abandoned 
“in consequent of the ravages made by Malarial Fever”.59 Reducing the prevalence of the 
disease was an urgent necessary. Dr. T. M. Young, a recently-arrived civilian medical officer 
attached to the China Expeditionary Force, set about investigating the matter. Young was 
already well-versed in the latest theories, having learnt “something which came in useful in 
the East” from Sir Ronald Ross when the two of them had met in Sierra Leone.60 As Ladds had 
already settled the matter of the Anopheles’ existence in Hong Kong – Young arrived five 
months after Ladds’s lecture – Young devoted “his attention more especially to the question 
of the breeding-grounds of the Anopheles mosquito in the Colony”.61 Young concluded his 
“independent observations” at Magazine Gap by recommending the clearance of brushwood 
up to a distance of 300 yards, the drainage of several small bogs and the filling in of breeding 
pools.62 The Governor subsequently informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the 
military authorities tested the value of these measures: 
I gave carte blanche so far as the surrounding Crown Land was concerned and 200 
men of an Indian Regiment were sent to carry out the work under Dr. Young’s 
supervision. It has been very thoroughly done, and a detachment of Indian Troops is 
about to be sent to re-occupy the Sanatorium. When the Malarial season arrives I shall 
watch the result with great interest.63 
                                                          
56 Thomson to Atkinson (P.C.M.O.), 30 Aug. 1909, TNA, CO129/357/265, 513. 
57 See for instance Dr. Clark’s comments. “Hongkong Sanitary Board: The Malarial Infection of 
Europeans,” Hongkong Weekly Press, Oct. 27, 1900, 325-326, 326. 
58 See for instance the correspondence between the Sanitary Board’s officials. HKPRO, 
HKRS202/1/1/36. See also “Quarters of Sanitary Inspector: Units for Habitation,” China Mail, Aug. 31, 
1900, 3. 
59 H. A. Blake (Governor) to Chamberlain, 5 Feb. 1901, TNA, CO129/304/40, 165. 
60 T. M. Young to R. Ross, 4 Mar. 1901, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (hereafter 
LSHTM), Ross/79/01.  
61 Thomson reported that Young arrived in Hong Kong in August 1900. Hong Kong Government 
Gazette, Nov. 24, 1900, HKGRO, 1700. 
62 Blake to Chamberlain, 5 Feb. 1901, TNA, CO129/304/40, 166. See also W. J. Tutcher, Sessional 
Papers: Report of the Acting Superintendent of the Botanical and Afforestation Department for 1900, 
Feb. 28, 1901, HKGRO, 306; T. M. Young, “The Prevention of Malaria in Hong Kong,” British Medical 
Journal, Sept. 14, 1901, 683-686. 
63 Blake to Chamberlain, 5 Feb. 1901, TNA, CO129/304/40, 165-166, 166. 
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These localised measures represented the colony’s first anti-mosquito experiments. 
The civilian authorities only began to implement anti-mosquito measures in the 
winter of 1900 in response to the military’s successful experiments and at the instigation of 
the Governor himself. Blake instructed Young to investigate the most pressing malaria concern 
for the civilian authorities: the inspector’s quarters at the Cattle Depôts in Kennedy Town.64 
Blake informed the Sanitary Board that Young had 
found that the neighbourhood of the Inspector’s Quarters and the New Police Station 
is infected with the Anopheles Mosquito, which would, as suggested by the M.O.H. 
[i.e. Clark] in October ’99, account for the recurrence of Malarial symptoms.65 
Blake instructed the sanitary authorities to replicate the military’s experimental measures at 
the sanatorium, namely brushwood clearance. When Young reported that the work was being 
neglected, the Governor insisted that his subordinates “must understand that I consider this 
one of the most important questions affecting the Colony at present”.66 The nature of these 
measures reflected the Board’s reliance on Young’s advice and its ignorance of Thomson’s 
independent but parallel investigations. Rather than focusing on training the hillside streams, 
known as nullahs, in the vicinity of the inspector’s quarters, as per Thomson’s first report, the 
Board pursued the cheaper expedient of filling in and liming the offending breeding pools.67 
Unfortunately Young was unable to observe the results of his efforts at Magazine Gap and 
Kennedy Town first-hand because he returned to England early in January 1901.68 
 
The Police in the New Territories 
 The combination of local research into the malaria-mosquito theory and the 
circulation of controversial new ideas from the metropolis prompted the Sanitary Board to 
extend its management of malaria from the highly localised context of Kennedy Town on the 
north-western tip of Hong Kong Island to the New Territories, specifically out of concern for 
the police force. Malaria was renowned as an occupational hazard. In the early 1890s for 
instance Atkinson had confirmed his suspicions that the “Malarial poison” was “most rife” at 
night by documenting the hours of duty of the policemen admitted with intermittent and 
remittent fevers.69 But the deployment of policemen at sites throughout the newly-acquired 
New Territories resulted in an alarming increase in the incidence of this occupational hazard 
                                                          
64 Blake to Stewart Lockhart, 6 Oct. 1900, HKPRO, HKRS202/1/1/26. 
65 Blake to Stewart Lockhart, 28 Oct. 1900-10-28, HKPRO, HKRS202/1/1/36; “Hongkong Sanitary 
Board: The Inspector’s Quarters at Kennedytown,” Hongkong Weekly Press, Nov. 10, 1900, 370. 
66 Blake to Stewart Lockhart, 5 Jan. 1901, HKPRO, HKRS202/1/1/26. The D.P.W. promptly resumed the 
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“Hongkong Sanitary Board: The Causes of Malaria in the New Territory,” Hongkong Daily Press, Nov. 
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68 Young left Hong Kong on Sunday Jan. 6. “The Mosquito-Malaria Theory,” Local and General, China 
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69 Ayres, Colonial Surgeons’ Report for 1891, June 21, 1892, HKGRO, 404, 407, 409, 423. 
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– one that threatened the colony’s nascent and fragile grip in its vast rural backyard (fig. 20).70 
Housed in temporary structures and working in rural conditions, the police were exposed to 
malaria-carrying mosquitoes as well as a variety of other endemic diseases.71 Protecting this 
widely-dispersed colonial presence was therefore considered a matter of utmost importance. 
 
Figure 20. ‘An Occupational Hazard’: Malaria and the Police Force, 1897-1920.72 
 Attempts to apply the latest Imperial preventive recommendations to the police in 
the New Territories appeared, however, to fly in the face of conventional local wisdom. In the 
autumn of 1900 Clark informed his Sanitary Board colleagues of the Malaria Investigation 
Committee’s latest reports from West Africa, which identified native populations as the 
principal source of malaria infection.73 He subsequently applied these theories directly to local 
circumstances in Hong Kong by identifying “Asiatics” as the principal hosts of the colony’s 
malarial parasites and by emphasising the necessity of adhering to the Committee’s 
recommendation in favour of racial segregation.74 Francis H. May, Captain Superintendent of 
Police, challenged the universality of the Committee’s reports: 
The deductions set out in the M.O.H.’s interesting report have not been made from 
experience gained in China but in other countries. I am prepared to prove that they 
                                                          
70 Atkinson, Report of the Principal Civil Medical Officer for 1899, Mar. 17, 1900, HKGRO, 525. 
71 For the development of Hong Kong’s police force in the New Territories see Colin N. Criswell and 
Mike Watson, The Royal Hong Kong Police Force (1841-1945) (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1982), 94-97. 
72 Data from table A2.4. 
73 “Hongkong Sanitary Board: The Malarial Infections,” Hongkong Weekly Press, Oct. 27, 1900, 325-
326. 
74 “Hongkong Sanitary Board: The Malarial Mosquito,” Hongkong Weekly Press, Nov. 10, 1900, 370-
371. Clark would later confuse the timing of this incident with his suggestion in October of the year 
before that mosquitoes were responsible for the prevalence of malaria at the inspector’s quarters at 
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do not hold good in this part of the world, and I therefore advise that they be not yet 
accepted and acted upon. Over a year’s experience in the New Territories has proved 
that the Police Stations which are situated in the Chinese villages are much more free 
from malaria than the stations which on medical advice were placed outside and at a 
distance from native villages.75 
Moreover he raised doubts about the vectoral role of Anopheles mosquitoes by stating, 
“Theories deduced from investigations in other countries should not be accepted till justified 
by observation and experience here”.76 Clark insisted that the malaria-mosquito theory “had 
been proved far more conclusively than any of them ever anticipated, and he thought that a 
theory which had held good in almost every part of the world would be found to hold good in 
China”.77 Was Hong Kong’s environment, and therefore its diseases, unique or did it conform 
to universal aetiological theories? The government pre-empted the Board’s decision to 
investigate why malaria was more prevalent at certain police stations in the New Territories 
than at others by assigning a similar task to Thomson and Young.78 
 The two men concentrated their investigation on the police station at Tai Po, which 
served as the first police headquarters in the New Territories (map 9). As well as searching for 
signs of breeding pools, they examined blood samples taken from ten children from the 
nearest village. “At first we had some difficulty in obtaining the necessary specimens,” they 
reported, but they attracted volunteers by advertising their willingness to pay for blood 
samples.79 Despite the fact that only half of the 10 volunteers tested positive for malaria, their 
joint report reflected the Malaria Investigation Committee’s pathologisation of indigenous 
populations: 
In the abundance of mosquitoes of the Anopheles genus … with their breeding 
grounds almost close up to the Government buildings, and in the near proximity of an 
extensively infected native population, by which many of the mosquitoes are being 
continuously rendered infective to healthy persons who may be bitten by them, we 
have the factors that account sufficiently and conclusively for the fevers that have 
prevailed among the Government officers at Tái Pó.80 
The use of the passive tense shifted the blame from the mosquitoes to the neighbouring 
Chinese population. Thomson and Young principally advocated the reclamation and drainage 
of all the land within a 250 yard radius of the station, and advised the government to relocate 
the staff from their matsheds to permanent accommodation “well removed from any 
considerable population”, namely on an island 900 yards to the east of the station.81 
                                                          
75 “The Malarial Mosquito,” Hongkong Weekly Press, Nov. 10, 1900, 371. 
76 Ibid., 371. 
77 Ibid., 371. 
78 Ibid., 371; “Hongkong Sanitary Board: The Causes of Malaria in the New Territory,” Hongkong 
Weekly Press, Nov. 24, 1900, 408-409. 
79 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Dec. 8, 1900, HKGRO, 1752-1754, 1753. Young and Thomson 
published an extract of their report in The Journal of Tropical Medicine. J. C. Thomson and T. M. 
Young, “Mosquitoes and Malarial Parasites in Hong Kong,”J. of Tropical Medicine, Feb. 1, 1901, 38-40. 
80 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Dec. 8, 1900, HKGRO, 1753. 
81 Ibid., 1752-1753, 1753. Thomson and Young also acknowledged the benefits of mosquito curtains 
and brushwood clearance. 
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Their report also prompted the authorities to initiate plans to purchase and drain the land 
around other police stations in the New Territories, though many of these schemes were 
abandoned as both impractical and prohibitively expensive.82 
 Unable to implement preventive measures based on the latest racialised medical 
discourse, the sanitary authorities resolved instead to improve the effectiveness of oral 
prophylactic regimes. The authorities had already drafted a set of instructions regarding the 
regular administration of quinine in 1899.83 But the following year the authorities conducted 
an experiment with three different regimes at eight police stations in the New Territories; a 
ninth station was used as a control (table 4.1 and map 9).84 Atkinson (P.C.M.O.) attributed the 
overall diminution in the percentage of malarial fever cases from 90% in 1900 to just over 50% 
in 1901 principally to these prophylactic experiments.85 Both he and the government’s 
Medical Officer in the New Territories concurred that only quinine was an effective 
prophylactic, arsenic being “practically ineffectual as a preventive measure”.86 The statistical 
effectiveness of the former remedy, however, was far from overwhelming. 
 

















Ping Shan 3 23 13.0 9 14 64.3 
San Tin 2 19 10.5 3 12 25.0 
Sha Tin 14 14 100.0 2 8 25.0 
Tai O 12 11 109.1 1 10 10.0 
Tai Po 30 16 187.5 7 10 70.0 
† 
Sha Tau Kok 33 19 173.7 4 13 30.8 
Sheung Shui 7 25 28.0 7 11 63.6 
‡ Au Tau 35 20 175.0 17 14 121.4 
± Sai Kung 2 6 33.3 2 7 28.6 
 Total 138 153 90.2 52 99 52.5 
 
                                                          
82 See HKPRO, HKRS58/1/15/31; HKPRO, HKRS58/1/15/29. 
83 Atkinson, Report of the Principal Civil Medical Officer for 1899, Mar. 17, 1900, HKGRO, 525. 
84 Thomson’s discussion about different prophylactic regimes during a meeting of the colony’s medical 
society probably instigated this experiment. Hong Kong Medical Society, Minutes of Meetings, 6 Mar. 
1901. 
85 J. M. Atkinson, Sessional Papers: Report of the Principal Civil Medical Officer, for the Year 1901, Apr. 
15, 1902, HKGRO, 722, 755-756. This overall decline actually belied increases in the percentage of 
admissions at some of the stations where quinine was trialled (table 4.1) 
86 J. H. Stewart Lockhart, Sessional Papers: Report on the New Territory, for the Year 1901, Mar. 22, 
1902, HKGRO, 568-70, 568. 
87 Atkinson, Report of the Principal Civil Medical Officer, for the Year 1901, Apr. 15, 1902, HKGRO, 722. 
* “Koch’s method was used, one gramme of quinine being given daily for two days followed by an 
interval of five days without any quinine and so on”. 
† 3-5 grains of quinine administered daily 
‡ “Arsenious acid” administered twice daily 
± No prophylactics given (control station).  
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Map 9. Experimental Malarial Prophylaxis at the Police Stations in the New Territories.88 
The colonial agenda dictated a different approach to malaria prevention in the New 
Territories in the early 20th century. Whereas the colonial authorities focused on 
environmental interventions on Hong Kong Island, principally in the vicinity of the city of 
Victoria, they avoided such interventions in the New Territories, focusing instead on the 
prophylactic protection the police force. As a result of this experiment, the authorities 
administered 3 grains of quinine daily to all the policemen stationed in the New Territories, 
“whether European, Indian or Chinese” every summer through to the outbreak of the Second 
World War.89 Admittedly the authorities also implemented a number of small-scale preventive 
measures, but all of these measures prioritised the police force rather than the local Chinese 
communities. Thomson, for instance, compiled “a series of simple instructions” for the officers 
in charge of the police stations which explained how to conduct basic anti-mosquito measures 
at the request of Captain Superintendent of Police May.90 These measures appeared to affect 
a marked decline in the prevalence of the disease, reducing the number of officers annually 
                                                          
88 Source of map: http://nla.gov.au/nla.map-brsc31. 
89 J. M. Atkinson, Sessional Papers: Report of the Principal Civil Medical Officer, for the Year 1902, Apr. 
9, 1903, HKGRO, 277. 
90 Hong Kong Government Gazette, Nov. 9, 1901, HKGRO, 1963, 1969. Wire gauze windows were also 
added to the station buildings in an effort to reduce infection rates. H. A. Blake, Sessional Papers: 
Report on the New Territory for the Year 1900, Aug. 12, 1901, HKGRO, 1. On Atkinson’s 
recommendation eucalyptus trees were planted to help drain the swampy land around the station, 
though Charles Ford, the Superintendent of the Botanical and Afforestation Department, doubted the 
effectiveness of this measure. Stewart Lockhart, Report on the New Territory, for the Year 1901, Mar. 
22, 1902, HKGRO, 570; C. Ford, Sessional Papers: Report on the Botanical and Afforestation 
Department for the Year 1901, Apr. 18, 1902, HKGRO, 688. 
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incapacitated by malaria (fig. 20).91 As we shall see in the next chapter, Hong Kong’s enclavist 
management of the disease stood in marked contrast to the International Settlement’s all-
encompassing approach during the second quarter of the 20th century. In part this reflected 
the Settlement’s much smaller size and alluvial topography, as compared to the densely-
vegetated, rugged terrain in the New Territories. But the colonial agenda also had a profound 
impact upon the colony’s management of the disease. This chapter will demonstrate that the 
authorities did not implement any other anti-malaria measures in this region until 1930, 
except for a localised intervention to protect another hallmark of the colonial state: the 
Kowloon-Canton Railway. 
 
‘The Vexed Question of the Malarial Mosquito’: Official and Public Debates 
 The co-ordination of the colony’s early anti-mosquito experiments, both at Kennedy 
Town and in the New Territories, sparked a heated personal argument between two 
prominent officials, which in turn triggered a popular debate about the validity of the malaria-
mosquito theory itself. Dr. William Hartigan, a member of the Sanitary Board and physician to 
the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, objected to the government’s reliance on 
Thomson, who, as member of the medical department, was not directly accountable to 
Hartigan and the rest of the Sanitary Board. Secondly Hartigan objected to the government’s 
de-centralised strategy, whereby the Public Works Department (P.W.D.) dealt with the pools 
identified by Thomson. During a Board meeting about the “vexed question of the malarial 
mosquito”, Hartigan insisted that an officer of the sanitary department should be assigned the 
dual task of identifying and eliminating small mosquito breeding sites; larger sites could be 
left to the P.W.D.92 Instead the Board favoured May’s counter-proposal, which effectively 
entrenched the government’s de-centralised approach.93 Hartigan vented his frustrations in 
an open letter to the local press, lamenting that May and the Board’s president had “squashed 
all attempts at doing something practical, partly because they did not believe in the mosquito 
theory…but principally because it would be an unnecessary and expensive experiment and 
therefore not justifiable”.94 He also questioned the Board’s reliance on Thomson – whom he 
conceded was “a most excellent and efficient officer” – rather than “Mr. Ladds, an officer of 
the Board and the original discoverer of the anopheles [sic] in Hongkong and first worker in 
 
                                                          
91 Bell blamed the slight increase in malarial admissions in 1903 to inaccurate diagnoses. J. M. 
Atkinson, Sessional Papers: Report of the Principal Civil Medical Officer, for the Year 1903, Mar. 30, 
1904, HKGRO, 413. 
92 “Extermination of Mosquito Anopheles: What is about to be done in Hongkong,” China Mail, Dec. 7, 
1900, 3. 
93 Ibid., 3. 
94 Original emphasis. William Hartigan, letter to the editor, Hongkong Daily Press, Dec. 10, 1900, 3. 
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anopheles ports”.95 May countered with a letter of his own, in which he corrected Hartigan’s 
allegations.96 
 By airing their differences in public, Hartigan and May unwittingly triggered a 
passionate public debate that revealed just how entrenched miasmatic theories were in Hong 
Kong. ‘Visitor’ initiated this popular debate by arguing that miasmas were the true causes of 
malaria. He lamented: 
All the long record of malaria from Hongkong to Panama, is now entirely forgotten 
and overlooked by our mosquito doctors. They have mounted their hobby, and like 
the beggar on horseback are riding to the devil.97 
‘Visitor’ cited Young’s anti-malarial efforts at the sanatorium at Magazine Gap as evidence of 
this ‘hobby’, claiming that the clearance of brushwood actually promoted malaria by exposing 
fresh soil.98 This letter provoked a flurry of exchanges, some in support and others in 
vehement opposition to Visitor’s comments.99 But even those who spoke ardently in favour 
of the malaria mosquito theory conceded that there was insufficient evidence to conclusively 
prove that mosquitoes were the sole means of transmission.100 News of the debate quickly 
spread beyond the colony. For instance, word filtered back that the Times of India believed 
that the debate epitomised Hong Kong’s “curiously conservative” eccentricities.101 Many in 
Hong Kong vigorously clung to the older miasmatic theories well into the 20th century. By far 
the most ‘eccentric’ opponent of the new theory was a resident named J. Grant Smith, who 
repeatedly sought the Colonial Office’s nomination for a Nobel Prize in the early 1910s. Smith 
claimed to have ‘discovered’ how the release of “osmium oxide” from disintegrated rocks 
caused malaria. He petitioned the Secretary of State for the Colonies, then the Principal 
Secretary of State and finally the Under Secretary of State for endorsement for his nomination. 
The Colonial Office eventually dismissed him as a “crank”.102 
 The focus of the heated exchanges in the press swiftly shifted from debating the 
malaria-mosquito theory to a highly critical discussion of the colony’s anti-malaria operations. 
 
                                                          
95 Ibid., 3. 
96 F. H. May, letter to the editor, Hongkong Daily Press, Dec. 11, 1900, 3. Hartigan countered with 
another letter. William Hartigan, letter to the editor, Hongkong Daily Press, Dec. 12, 1900, 3. 
97 Ironically ‘Visitor’ had travelled to Hong Kong to recover from a bout of malaria. Visitor [pseud.], 
letter to the editor, Hongkong Weekly Press, Dec. 29, 522. 
98 Visitor [pseud.], letter to the editor, Hongkong Weekly Press, Dec. 29, 522. 
99 Ham, “Malarial Hygiene,” 38-39. 
100 For a more detailed account of these exchanges see Ham, “Malarial Hygiene,” 38-39. 
101 H. A. Blake, Sessional Papers: Drainage Systems – Plague Mortality, Oct. 25, 1901, HKGRO, 7.  
102 J. Grant Smith to the Earl of Crewe (Sec. of State for the Colonies), 22 Dec. 1909, TNA, 
CO129/359/403, 147; Smith to L. Harcourt (Principal Sec. of State), 22 Apr. 1913, TNA, CO129/408, 
316;Smith to A. Emmott (Under Sec. of State), 2 May 1913, TNA, CO129/408, 324; Smith to A. Emmott 
(Under Sec. of State), 3 Nov. 1913, TNA, CO129/408, 370-71; Colonial Office minute, 6 Nov. 1913, 
TNA, CO129/408, 369. 
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In a letter attacking ‘Visitor’ and his allies, ‘Resident’ defended Thomson’s and Young’s 
“splendidly thorough work”.103 This prompted ‘Anti-Logroller’ to enter the fray: 
And what is this “splendidly thorough work” these two gentlemen are doing? Dr. 
Young, I believe, is employed in cutting down brushwood, (work that it does not 
require a “scientific” man to do) … Considering that the highest authorities say a 
mosquito will fly two or three miles to feed, there is not much use in that.…And now 
for Dr. Thomson. Is the “splendidly thorough work” he is doing showing that 
anopheles exist in the colony? Defend us from our friends. That was proved before 
either he or Dr. Young studied the question in Hongkong. Discovering parasites in the 
blood of children living in a malarial district? Queen Anne is dead, sir. Dr. Thomson 
would be doing just as useful original work if he carried out experiments to prove the 
circulation of the blood. It is not his fault that he has to waste his time over this 
rubbish. He has to do as he is told.104 
Hartigan became so exasperated by the situation and the Sanitary Board’s refusal to heed his 
advice that he publicly resigned his position on the Board.105 ‘Dolly’ commemorated the 
occasion with a satirical poem about a Native American “wigwam” and its failure to heed the 
anti-malarial advice of “Hearty Gun [Harti-gan], medicine man of the tribe” (see Appendix).106 
As we shall see in the next chapter, the International Settlement’s ready acceptance of the 
malaria mosquito stood in marked contrast to Hong Kong’s intense official and public debates. 
 
Specialisation 
 The colony’s senior officials initially looked to London for a means out of this impasse. 
Dr. Bell (Actg. P.C.M.O.) identified the need for specialist knowledge as the key to an effective 
anti-malaria campaign, and he speculated that “some energetic entomologist may turn up in 
the Colony”.107 In reality the issue was not one of speculation, but rather negotiation. Early 
the following month Governor Blake urged the Colonial Office to appoint a trained 
bacteriologist to “make satisfactory investigations into the origin and cure” of “Plague, 
                                                          
103 Resident [pseud.], letter to the editor, Hongkong Weekly Press, Dec. 31, 1900, 3. 
104 Anti-Logroller [pseud.], letter to the editor, Hongkong Weekly Press, Jan. 3, 1901, 3. These 
exchanges provoked several satirical contributions. ‘Irrirated’ for instance declared, “I used to point 
out a mosquito to children as a rare and curious insect, now I point out my children to the mosquitoes 
and implore them not to take a full meal, because there are much better children next door”. Irritated 
[pseud.], letter to the editor, Hongkong Daily Press, Jan. 3, 1901, 3. See also The Shade of Hamlet 
[pseud.], letter to the editor, Hongkong Daily Press, Jan. 5, 1901, 2 
105 W. Hartigan to the Ratepayers, 1 Mar. 1901, TNA, CO129/304/170, 705. See also “Another 
Anopheles Discussion,” China Mail, Jan. 19, 1901, 2. 
106 Dolly [pseud.], “Hearty Gun’s Warning,” China Mail, Mar. 22, 1901, 2. This poem was published 
above the article about the Sanitary Board’s discussion of Thomson’s report. “Anopheles Larvae at 
Kennedy-Town: Official Denials Disposed of,” China Mail, Mar. 22, 1901, 2. 
107 J. Bell, Sessional Papers: Report of the Acting Principal Civil Medical Officer for the Year 1900, Jan. 
23, 1901, HKGRO, 249. He voiced similar comments to his colleagues on the Sanitary Board. “Another 
Anopheles Discussion,” China Mail, Jan. 19, 1901, 2. 
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Malaria, Leprosy, BeriBeri [sic] and Rinderpest”.108 Blake reported that although Thomson was 
“accumulating valuable observations on mosquitos [sic]”, he had his ordinary medical 
obligations to attend to and “he has not gone through the necessary training in 
bacteriology”.109 Manson “made a point of seeing” Atkinson (P.C.M.O.), who happened to be 
on leave in the Britain at the time, to discuss the governor’s dispatch.110 Although Blake’s 
request led to the inauguration of the colony’s Bacteriological Institute, malaria did not 
constitute a major focus of the Institute’s early work: neither the first nor the second 
government bacteriologists discussed the disease in their respective annual reports.111 Indeed 
it was not until the early 1910s, when Government Bacteriologist Harold Macfarlane was 
tasked with investigating the distribution of the species responsible for transmitting Yellow 
Fever, and with collecting anopheline and culicine specimens, that the Institute began to 
research mosquito-borne diseases.112 Significantly Macfarlane’s research led to the ‘discovery’ 
of four new species.113 
 Atkinson was not the only medical officer from Hong Kong meeting with the world’s 
most pre-eminent malariologists to discuss the colony’s urgent need for specialists. On his 
return to England Young arranged a meeting with Ross, whom he had known in Sierra Leone, 
in order to show him a collection of mosquitoes – “all the varieties of the Island & mainland” 
– but more importantly “to talk over what has been done there & to ask your help in ‘carrying’ 
                                                          
108 Blake actually devoted the majority of his despatch to the subject of malaria: the first two 
paragraphs detailed Young’s work at the military Sanatorium whilst the third summarised the anti-
malarial efforts at Kennedy Town. The fourth and fifth paragraphs discussed the need for research 
into plague and leprosy respectively. Blake to Chamberlain, 5 Feb. 1901, TNA, CO129/304/40, 165-
168, 165, 168. 
109 Ibid., 165-168, 165, 168. Blake seems to have been unaware that Thomson attended courses on 
‘Pathological Bacteriology’ and ‘Tropical Diseases’ whilst on leave in the U.K. in the winter of 1899-
1900. 
110 P. Manson to W. H. Onslow (Under Sec. of State for the Colonies), 12 Apr. 1901, TNA, CO129/309, 
503. Atkinson took advantage of his leave to attend a two-month course at the London School of 
Tropical Medicine “in order that I may be quite conversant with the latest discoveries in Malaria & 
Tropical Medicine generally”. J. M. Atkinson to C. P. Lucas, 11 Mar. 1901, TNA, CO129/309, 234-235. 
111 For more on the Institute’s establishment and early work see Faith C. S. Ho, The Silent Protector: A 
Short Centennial History of Hong Kong’s Bacteriological Institute (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Museum of 
Medical Sciences, 2006); Arthur Starling et al., eds., Plague, SARS and the Story of Medicine in Hong 
Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Museum of Medical Sciences Society, 2006), 147-224. 
112 Harold Macfarlane, “Special Investigations”, 20 Aug. 1913, TNA, CO129/403/321, 317-326; Harold 
Macfarlane, “Report on Work (other than routine work) done in the Bacteriological Institute during 
the six months – July 1st to December 31st 1913”, 28 Jan. 1914, TNA, CO129/409/39, 254-55; Harold 
Macfarlane, “Report on work other than routine work done in the Bacteriological Institute, Hongkong, 
for the 1st half year, 1914”, 5 Aug. 1914, TNA, CO129/413/315, 235-37. See also “The Stegomyia 
Survey in Hong Kong,” Bulletin of Entomological Research 6, no. 1 (1915): 67-68. 
113 Aedes macfarlanei, Culex syn. virgatipes, Uranotaenia macfarlanei, Culex infantulus. F. W. Edwards, 
“New Species of Culicidae in the British Museum, with Notes on the Genitalia of Some African Culex,” 
Bulletin of Entomological Research 5, no. 1 (1914): 63-81; F. W. Edwards, “New Culicidae from Borneo 
and Hong Kong,” Bulletin of Entomological Research 5, no. 2 (1914): 125-128, 126-127; F. W. Edwards, 
“A Synopsis of Adult Oriental Culicine (Including Megarhinine And Sabethine) Mosquitoes,” Indian 
Journal of Medical Research 10 (1922): 249-293, 287. 
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it thro!”.114 The two men got on extremely well: Ross invited Young to join him on a research 
trip to Africa whilst Young tried to convince Ross of Hong Kong’s suitability for the latter’s 
experiments. Young was sorely tempted by Ross’s offer, but in the end had to decline the 
invitation. Strikingly both Young’s telegram and his letter declining Ross’s offer reiterated 
Hong Kong’s suitability for the latter’s anti-malaria experiments. In his letter, for example, 
Young emphasised the colony’s main benefits: 
(1) It is localized: in every sense of the world. You would find the pools and the lie of 
the land admirable suited to your work. 
(2) It is important to the Military & they are willing & have offered to send me out for 
their work alone. The second port in the Empire with [illegible] trade interests. 
(3) It is world wide experiment [sic] you are making and work [illegible] the Americans 
are begun in Statton Island [sic] this spring. I saw the Secy. of Agriculture in 
Washington, etc. & they are spending money & sending two men to live there & 
do the very work you propose. They have asked me to go over & I have contracted 
to keep mosquitoes away from Houses in given areas around New York. I mention 
this because you ought to be first in your work & you might not know what is 
being done the other side of the water! 
(4) The civil governor is very much in sympathy & asked me to stay in Hong Kong and 
he is getting out a man special trained [sic] for your very proposal from London. 
They would back you up I think in everything. 
(5) A little has been done already to prepare the way. Indeed in my estimation the 
place is ripe for your work.115 
Young concluded that “as far as my judgement goes knowing both places I say unquestioned 
that you will have a much more brilliant success in Hong Kong”.116 If only Young had managed 
to persuade Ross to conduct his experiments in Hong Kong, the colony’s role in the 
development of modern malarial aetiology would have been world-renowned. 
Ultimately enterprising local medical officers, rather than Imperial specialists 
despatched from London, were responsible for pioneering new research into the 
transmission, treatment and prevention of malaria in Hong Kong. Bell (Actg. P.C.M.O.) for 
instance compiled a ‘Clinical Report on Malaria’ with the assistance of Lt. Stewart (I.M.S.), 
Acting Assistant Superintendent at the Government Civil Hospital – the two of them were “not 
aware of any extensive attempt in this direction having yet been made in a tropical hospital 
                                                          
114 Young to Ross, 4 Mar. 1901, LSHTM, Ross/79/01. Young left Hong Kong on January 6th. “Local and 
General: The Mosquito-Malaria Theory,” China Mail, Jan. 4, 1901, 2. 
115 Emphasis in the original. Young to Ross, 5 May 1901, LSHTM, Ross/79/03, 2-4. Young telegrammed 
and wrote to Ross from the ‘Hotel-Hydropathic’ in Peebles, where he was nursing a brother suffering 
from malaria contracted in India. His telegram read “With very many thanks [.] definitely decided 
cannot go to West Africa [.] urge you Hongkong [.] I never knew a place more suitable for you 
experiment [sic] [.]”. Young to Ross, telegram, 4 May, 1901, LSHTM, Ross/79/02. 
116 Young to Ross, 5 May 1901, LSHTM, Ross/79/03, 4. He made similar comments in his paper on ‘The 
Prevention of Malaria in Hong Kong’ at the 69th Annual Meeting of the British Medical Association 
(Cheltenham, 1901) later that summer. T. M. Young, “The Prevention of Malaria in Hong Kong,” British 
Medical Journal, Sept. 14, 1901, 683-686, 685-686 
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where, needless to say, there is a large amount go material available”.117 More importantly 
Thomson emerged as the colony’s sole expert following Young’s departure. Thomson 
continued his investigations into the prevalence of mosquitoes, analysing the monthly 
collections that were submitted to him from police stations throughout the colony.118 
Intriguingly Thomson briefly considered leaving the colony just as he was establishing his 
expertise. He wrote to Chamberlain requesting promotion to another colony, claiming a lack 
of seniority in Hong Kong.119 Rather than pursuing the matter further though, he continued 
with his work at the Tung Wah Hospital and his investigations into malaria, actively publicising 
his work through lectures and pamphlets.120 His analysis of over 30,000 mosquito specimens 
was significant for a number of reasons. Firstly he identified three different Anopheles species 
and twelve different Culex species within the colony, and his specimens led to the discovery 
five new species previously unknown to Western entomologists.121 He also alleged that his 
research conclusively proved the validity of the new malaria-mosquito theory.122 His work was 
critically acclaimed back in London. Manson, for instance, informed Ross of “good news of 
activity from Hong Kong”, whilst the Secretary of State for the Colonies expressed his 
appreciation for Thomson’s work in an official despatch to the Acting Governor.123 Years later 
Thomson remembered the latter mention as one of the highlights of his career.124 Thomson’s 
contribution to the colony’s malarial discourse provides insights into the production of 
colonial medical knowledge, and the competitive professional framework that underpinned 
it. 
 
                                                          
117 The report was published in the Government Gazette, publicised in the local press as well as The 
Lancet, and circulated to Manson and Ross as well as both Schools of Tropical Medicine. Blake to 
Chamberlain, 23 July 1901, TNA, CO129/305/267, 755; Minute by C. P. Lucas, 3 Sept. 1901, TNA, 
CO129/305/267, 754. 
118 He published his results quarterly in the Government Gazette. The press regularly announced the 
publication of his quarterly reports and his reports also caught the attention of The British Medical 
Journal. Thomson shared his results with his medical society colleagues, delivering a paper on the 
subject as well as joining in the discussion of a paper on the “prophylaxis of Malaria”. Hong Kong 
Medical Society, Minutes of Meetings, 30 Jan. 1901; Ibid. 6 Mar. 1901. 
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Early Anti-Malarial Campaign 
The colonial administration’s dual approach to the management of malaria in the 
early 20th century reflected its prioritisation of the colonial state. On the one hand, as we have 
already seen, the authorities focused its anti-malaria efforts in the New Territories on the 
prophylactic protection of the colonial police force. On the other, the authorities prioritised 
the main urban settlement on Hong Kong Island: the city of Victoria. From 1901 the thrust of 
this campaign consisted of training the city’s nullahs or mountain streams. As the Director of 
Public Works explained, nullah-training– i.e. concreting these streams to prevent the water 
from stagnating and forming ideal mosquito-breeding pools (figs.21 and 22) – was not an 
innovative measure, but rather was “originally carried out…to protect property from the 
serious damage caused by heavy rainstorms, which frequently produced landslips and washed 
down large boulders in the case of the untrained channels”.125 The authorities initially 
concentrated on the nullahs in the western and central districts; only one nullah in Happy 
Valley and one in Kowloon were trained during this period.126 A lack of funding limited the 
scale of these operations.127 Indeed the Governor was forced to secure an advance of $20,000 
from two prominent individuals, including Fung Wa Chun, a Chinese member of the Sanitary 
Board, in order to train the nullahs in the vicinity of Ripon Terrace.128 Consequently the 
P.W.D.’s expenditure on nullah-training increased dramatically – from just over $2,000 for 
1902 to over $26,500 in 1903 – with the Colonial Office’s approval.129 The authorities also 
implemented a number of supplementary measures including the oiling of mosquito pools, 
brushwood clearance and minor filling-in operations.130 
The Sanitary Board’s management of the disease continued to rely on localised 
interventions prompted by public complaints, just as it had done in the case of the Fever 
Commission in the previous century. For instance, Robert Ho Tung, one of the colony’s most 
prominent Eurasians, called the Board’s attention to his tenants’ complaints about the 
prevalence of malignant malaria at Morrison Hill Gap.131 Having investigated the matter at his 
request, Hartigan concluded that the incidence of the disease was due to the proximity of 
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mosquito-breeding grounds.132 The Colonial Secretary informed the Governor that the 
“mosquito gang” was attending to the matter.133 As this is the only document in which the 
term ‘mosquito gang’ appeared, it probably referred to a group of coolie labourers under the 
supervision of a foreign (i.e. non-Chinese) overseer from the Public Works Department. Unlike 
the International Settlement’s Public Health Department, the colonial authorities’ 
management of the disease did not rely on the systematic deployment of dedicated mosquito 
squads. 
  
Figure 21 & 22. An Untrained (left) and a Trained Nullah (right). 
Sent by Dr. F. W. Clark (M.O.H.) to R. Ross.134 
The authorities were so impressed with the early nullah-training program that they 
promptly publicised its effectiveness. Atkinson’s annual report, for instance, attributed the 
marked decline in malarial admissions in the colony’s hospitals to the increase in the colony’s 
expenditure on nullah-training: “I know of no sanitary works hitherto undertaken which have 
given such a satisfactory return not only in the diminution of sickness but also in the saving of 
life”.135 Governor Blake similarly highlighted the effectiveness of this scheme in his farewell 
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HKPRO, HKRS202/1/6/67. 
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address.136 His successor, Sir Matthew Nathan, was eager to share Hong Kong’s experiences 
with the Colonial Office and his former colleagues in Sierra Leone.137 Two years after assuming 
the Governorship of Hong Kong, Nathan informed the Earl of Elgin: 
Of the work carried out by the Public Works Department [in Hong Kong] in improving 
the sanitary condition of this town undoubtedly that which has had most definite and 
direct effect has been the systematic training of the nullahs which formerly provided 
breeding grounds for the anopheles mosquito….I trust your Lordship will not consider 
that I am travelling outside my proper sphere by suggesting that the measures which 
you have proved efficacious here might advantageously be followed as closely as 
possible in Freetown in Sierra Leone where similar conditions exist of streams flowing 
into and through the town over rough beds formed of granite rocks and boulders.138 
Nathan was well-versed in Sierra Leone’s efforts to tackle malaria: he served as the colony’s 
Governor at precisely the time when Ross was working in Sierra Leone to demonstrate the 
vectoral transmission of malaria.139 Nathan and the Governor of Sierra Leone subsequently 
exchanged information and photographs via the Colonial Office.140 Clark similarly shared 
photographs and details of the colony’s nullah-training program with Ross as well as with the 
delegates of the Second Biennial Congress of the Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine 
(Hong Kong, 1912) (figs. 21 and 22).141 
 
Malaria, Race and Colonial Space 
A number of historians have alluded to, but failed to explain, how the management 
of malaria contributed to the establishment of an exclusively European residential reservation 
in northern Kowloon during this period.142 Most historians have typically interrogated the 
establishment of this reservation within the broader context of residential segregation in Hong 
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Kong, exemplified most notoriously by the ‘European Reservation Ordinance (1888)’ and the 
‘Hill District Reservation Ordinance (1904)’. The former prohibited the construction of Chinese 
dwellings in a district in the city of Victoria, the latter excluded Chinese from living on the 
Peak. Indeed historians often use the Kowloon reservation as a brief introductory backdrop 
against which the Peak reservation takes centre-stage. This marginalisation has prompted an 
uncritical interpretation of the reservation’s establishment. Scholars have traditionally 
accepted the economic and ‘malarial’ justifications advanced by the Acting Governor in the 
colony’s official application for metropolitan endorsement. Reliance on this single despatch 
has led to simplistic explanations about the role of malaria prevention. Welsh, for instance, 
simply stated that the Kowloon reservation was established “on specious grounds of health 
(the Chinese could not be trusted to keep down mosquitoes)”.143 In the most recent study on 
the subject Carroll suggested that the living conditions of the Chinese lower classes “were said 
to be more favourable for the transmission of malaria by mosquitoes”.144 I want to challenge 
these simplistic explanations by demonstrating that the malarial discourse pathologised 
Chinese bodies rather than simply Chinese cultural and residential practices. Furthermore I 
want to demonstrate how this malarial discourse was central to the approval of this proposal 
at the colonial level but was insufficient on its own as a justification at the Imperial level. A 
close analysis of the original proposal sheds light on how the colony’s sanitary officials 
appropriated this discourse to convince the colonial government to sanction a controversial, 
twice-rejected proposal, and how this discourse was relegated to a subsidiary role in the 
colonial government’s efforts to secure metropolitan sanction.  
The acquisition of New Territories in 1898 sparked intense land speculation in 
southern Kowloon. Developers quickly recognised that this geo-political expansion not only 
cemented the colony’s future but introduced an extensive rural buffer zone that greatly 
reduced the risks of investing in the Peninsula opposite Hong Kong Island. Anxious to exclude 
Chinese competition for this prime real estate, the government considered a proposal from a 
group of European residents to extend the provisions of the ‘European Reservation Ordinance 
(1888)’ – which prohibited the construction of Chinese dwellings in part of the city of Victoria 
– to a portion of southern Kowloon (map 10).145 News that a group of (European) developers 
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intended to demolish a European house in the area and erect 28 Chinese tenements in its 
stead heightened fears about Chinese encroachment.146 Clark, the colony’s Medical Officer of 
Health, was so alarmed by this proposal that he persuaded the Sanitary Board (by a slim 
majority) to petition the government to reserve “that portion of British Kowloon to the South 
of Austin Road”, an area of some 200 acres, on the grounds that 
it was wise of the Government to reserve some district where Europeans might live 
together and where they would not be exposed to such diseases as smallpox and 
plague by the contiguity of Chinese tenement houses.147 
No reference was made to malaria at this stage. The colonial authorities dismissed the 
possibility of establishing a reservation anywhere in Kowloon as financially unsound and as an 
impediment to the peninsula’s commercial development.148 Undeterred, Clark convinced the 
Board to petition the government again, but this time he advised against delineating the site 
of the reservation: the reservation was essential, but its actual location, at least as far as Clark 
was concerned, was largely “immaterial”.149 The Executive Council’s dismissal of this second 
proposal left Hartigan lamenting that “Government pigeon-holes are proverbially 
capacious”.150 
The Sanitary Board’s appropriation of the latest racialised malarial discourse provided 
the key to unlocking the stalemate. As previously noted, Clark was responsible for 
controversially applying the metropolitan theories regarding the malarial threat of indigenous 
populations in Africa to the colony’s ‘Asiatic’ population.151 Fresh circulars from London 
reiterated the malarial threat that native populations posed to nearby European residences.152 
These circulars did not advocate racial segregation per se, but recommended that all new 
buildings should be constructed away from native quarters and any potential breeding 
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grounds.153 Bell (Actg. P.C.M.O.) explained that this was “of course impossible in Hongkong 
itself except as far as the Peak is concerned, this place being practically a European 
Reservation” and “out of the question” as far as Kowloon was concerned.154 Clark, however, 
was adamant that a European reservation in Kowloon was an absolute necessity: 
In a recent report to the Royal Society, Drs. Stephens and Christophers, who are 
working at this subject in Lagos, say that “to stamp out native malaria is at present 
chimerical, and every effort should rather be turned to the protection of Europeans,” 
and I certainly think that the same principle holds good in this Colony. The Colony has 
recently acquired a very extensive addition to its territory and every effort should be 
made to secure and maintain an extensive European reservation in this territory, 
before the land becomes too valuable for the Government to be able to resume from 
the native holders…There is no objection to a small number of personal servants 
residing within the reservation area, but in no case should any native families be 
allowed, as it is the native children, and especially those under the age of ten years, 
who are the principal source of infection.155 
Additionally, he recommended surrounding the reservation with a “zone of neutral ground”, 
a cordon-sanitaire that would allegedly inhibit the movement of mosquitoes between the 
European residences within the reservation and the ‘infected’ Chinese populations without.156 
As part of a three-man sub-committee appointed by the Board to consider sanitary 
improvements, Clark recommended establishing a 2,047 acre reservation in the foothills of 
northern Kowloon (map 10).157 This location was originally mooted by Osborne, the Sanitary 
Board member who had staunchly opposed Clark’s original proposal as economically unsound, 
and then taken up by Chater of the Executive Council just two-months after the Council had 
‘pigeon-holed’ the Board’s second application for a reservation.158 Whereas their proposal had 
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run into difficulties, Clark’s proposal was finally approved.159 The latest Imperial racialised 
discourse on malaria prevention thus provided the sole justification that persuaded the 
colony’s Executive Council to approve a proposal for a reservation – one that was ten times 
larger than the Board’s original proposal. 
 
 
Map 10. The Kowloon Reservation: the Approximate Location of the Original Proposal (Blue) and the 
Approved Location of the Anti-Malarial Reservation (Purple), 1900-2160 
Securing the British Government’s approval for the proposal, however, required more 
than just anti-malarial justifications. The colonial authorities required metropolitan approval 
for the scheme because they hoped to set aside the 1,928 acres of crown land immediately; 
the reservation could not be enacted by ordinance unless the government resumed the 119 
acres of private property.161 The Acting Governor’s despatch explained that an exclusively-
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European reservation was not only necessary as a means of “safeguarding” the European 
population from malaria “by keeping at a distance the native population in accordance with 
the new accepted theory of the transmission of the Malarial germ by Mosquitoes”, but was 
also necessary in order to “exclude from such reservation the rich Chinese who, if they invaded 
the area, would by competition in rents gradually oust the poorer white population”.162 Whilst 
the malarial justification was sufficient to persuade the colonial government to establish a 
reservation, it was insufficient by itself as a justification to the metropolitan authorities for 
the exclusion of the Chinese upper classes. The Secretary of State for the Colonies approved 
of the scheme but ardently opposed the exclusion of these upper classes, much to the 
resentment of the Hong Kong’s European population: 
The essence of the present proposal is to provide an area where Europeans are to 
have safety and low rents while well to do (and in many cases better-educated) 
Chinese are excluded…. 
Such a distinction appears to me to be not in accordance with our method of 
administration and moreover calculated to defeat the proper object of the reservation 
viz the protection of the more intelligent section of the community from malaria; and 
I think that, in approving the scheme generally, it should be laid down that educated 
Chinese, who may usually be supposed to have sanitary habits, should always be 
granted permission to reside in the selected area.163 
European assumptions about the relationship between class and hygiene exonerated the 
Chinese of better standing from the latest medical discourse on malaria – the discourse that 
had crucially convinced the colonial authorities to sanction the proposal for a reservation in 
the first place. These assumptions restricted the ‘usefulness’ of this Imperially-sanctioned 
racialised medical rhetoric. This discourse was markedly absent from the petition that resulted 
in the reservation of the Peak for European residences only two years later precisely because 
the ‘Hill District Reservation Ordinance (1904)’ specifically targeted the Chinese upper 
classes.164 Ultimately the Kowloon reservation was never formally inaugurated by ordinance. 
Instead the authorities added a clause to the leases “forbidding transfers or outleases to any 
but persons approved by the Govr.” in order to prevent “respectable Chinese or European” 
landlords from dividing their properties into tenements and letting these to “non respectable 
Chinese”.165 As we shall see from the next chapter the appropriation of the latest malarial 
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discourse to cement existing traditions of racial segregation nevertheless marked Hong Kong 
apart from the International Settlement’s management of the disease. 
 
Public Health Education 
 The medical authorities in Hong Kong recognised the importance of domestic 
prophylaxis. From the outset Thomson had encouraged private householders to complement 
official anti-mosquito measures by destroying Culex mosquitoes breeding in artificial 
collections of water; an addendum to his first report on the prevalence of mosquitoes noted 
that Anopheles mosquitoes could also breed in such collections.166 Thomson and Clark, for 
instance, published their lectures on malaria prevention.167 The colonial authorities 
recognised the importance of public health propaganda at a much earlier stage than their 
treaty-port counterparts. A “set of Sanitary Instructions for the use of mercantile houses in 
the Tropics” conveyed by the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine prompted the Sanitary 
Board to compile its own short pamphlet on disease prevention in Hong Kong.168 The Board 
printed 400 copies of Precautions against Plague, Malaria and Cholera (1904) in English and 
1,000 copies in Chinese, but it was forced to abandon its original intention of selling the 
pamphlet in the face of a significant lack of popular interest.169 Fortunately the distribution of 
Advice concerning Mosquitoes and Malaria (1910), a short illustrated pamphlet produced by 
Clark on the Sanitary Board’s behalf, proved far more successful: within the first year 2,000 
copies were distributed to “Europeans and English-speaking Chinese” and 10,000 out of a 
proposed 50,000 Chinese copies were distributed to the “native population”.170 Clark and 
Atkinson highlighted the free distribution of this pamphlet in their joint annual medical reports 
for a number of years.171 Clark also presented this pamphlet as part of his paper on ‘Public 
Health Literature’ at the Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine’s Second Biennial 
Congress (Hong Kong, 1912).172 
 News of a successful West African scheme for teaching tropical sanitation in schools 
prompted the colony to target this nascent public health propaganda at a new audience: the 
colony’s children. The Colonial Office circulated a report from Governor William MacGregor 
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of Lagos summarising his colony’s public health education programs.173 He emphatically urged 
“that Hygiene should be taught by every teacher in every school, without reference to colour, 
race, or religion”.174 Prior to the circulation of this report E. A. Irving, Hong Kong’s Inspector of 
Schools, had only considered two unofficial proposals to promote tropical hygiene. Firstly he 
had suggested that a Chinese doctor could deliver a course of ambulance lectures to the upper 
classes of Anglo-Chinese schools, to be supplemented the following year by “another course 
of 12 lectures on tropical diseases, especially plague & malaria”.175 Secondly he had 
recommended that a certain Mrs. James, who had “attended courses on hygiene”’ and was 
apparently “qualified to lecture”, could instruct an amalgamation of the upper classes of 
several schools.176 As a result of MacGregor’s report, however, the Officer Administering the 
Government tasked Atkinson (P.C.M.O.), Pearse (M.O.H.), Irving and Dr. Bateson-Wright, the 
headmaster of Queen’s College, to draw up a “definite scheme of work”.177 The scheme 
initially struggled to gain momentum but Sir Matthew Nathan revived the project within 
months of assuming the governorship of the colony, and the project’s fruition owed much to 
his personal involvement.178 
Malaria prevention featured prominently in this new curriculum. For instance the first 
girls’ advanced course examination paper tested their knowledge of “the importance of 
training Nullahs and natural watercourses near inhabited houses in a tropical country”.179 
Irving nevertheless lamented that an important opportunity had been missed: 
I cannot help regretting the absence of a question on the sources of malaria. Thanks 
to the action of the Government, that disease is disappearing from Hongkong: but its 
prophylaxis will not cease to be of vital importance to Chinese boys, as long as they 
continue to return for their holidays to fever-ridden homes.180 
Accordingly the elementary examination for the following year included a question on the 
transmission and prevention of the disease.181 Receptive young Chinese minds provided an 
opportunity of eliciting popular support for the colony’s management of the disease in 
precisely those areas in which the colonial administration did not want to intervene directly. 
Inevitably problems arose. Three years later Irving, now Director of Education, complained 
that the subject of hygiene “had been forced untimely into the curriculum of schools because 
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it was considered politically desirable”, with the result that it did not “harmonise” with the 
other courses.182 The joint annual reports of the Principal Civil Medical Officer and the Medical 
Officer of Health nevertheless continued to emphasise how integral this program was to the 
colony’s anti-malaria campaign.183 Teaching tropical sanitation and malarial hygiene in the 
colony’s Anglo-Chinese schools was thus central to the promotion of public co-operation in 
the prevention of disease.  
 
The Kowloon-Canton Railway and the Military at Shau Kei Wan 
 Two unexpected outbreaks briefly challenged the colony’s geographically-restricted 
management of the disease. On the one hand, the government was forced to intervene in the 
New Territories as a result of an epidemic amongst the coolie workforce constructing the 
Kowloon-Canton Railway. The authorities responded by adopting the same preventive 
measures that were used to protect the other colonial ‘presence’ in the region, namely the 
police. The outbreak did not, however, prompt the government to extend malaria prevention 
to the Chinese communities in the region. On the other hand, the Sanitary Board responded 
to an unprecedented request for assistance from the military authorities as a result of the 
alarming prevalence of malaria on the eastern end of Hong Kong Island. Once again this 
epidemic did not precipitate a permanent extension of the government’s management of the 
disease on the island. Instead the government’s anti-malaria operations retreated to the city 
of Victoria once the epidemic abated. 
The colonial authorities were forced to implement a variety of anti-malaria measures 
along the Kowloon-Canton railway as a result of a major outbreak of the disease. The initial 
outbreak amongst the coolie workforce caught the medical authorities totally off-guard. 
Intense scrutiny from within the colony and from London to keep expenditure to a minimum, 
compounded by a lack of forethought, ensured that little attention was devoted to the living 
conditions of the large coolie workforce when construction began.184 The local press 
considered Malcolm Watson’s warning that engineers had yet to incorporate the “the new 
ideas on malaria” particularly poignant.185 Thomson and his successor, Dr. Hartley, faced a 
daunting challenge given the size and scattered distribution of the workforce and the rural 
conditions in which they were working.186 Initially the authorities attempted to replicate the 
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program of nullah-training that had proved so effective on Hong Kong Island, but this was soon 
abandoned as inefficient and prohibitively expensive.187 Instead the authorities resorted to 
the daily administration of quinine.188 Hartley noted that the distribution of quinine was 
hampered by native ignorance of and resistance to this ‘Western’ prophylactic: 
Quinine has been dealt out freely, though perhaps not so freely as formerly as I found 
that a considerable amount was wasted by being thrown away into the nullahs or 
bartered at the small stores for food, etc., the natives, especially when new to the 
territory, not taking kindly to the drug, and it has often to be given under compulsion. 
As soon as the practice was discovered steps were taken to stop it.189 
In addition to these prophylactic measures, a group of coolies and a European sanitary 
inspector conducted anti-larval measures in the main coolie camps.190 Hartley attributed the 
marked decline in the incidence of malaria between 1907 and 1910, when the railway line was 
completed, principally to these preventive measures (table 4.2).191 Governor Frederick Lugard 
praised this impressive decline on Hartley’s “indefatigable exertions”.192 
Table 4.2. Principal Causes of Sickness on the Kowloon-Canton Railway, 1907-10193 
 Malaria Dysentery Beriberi Injuries 
1907 1168 124 81 371 
1908 556 63 58 354 
1909 450 29 52 608 
1910 242 23 40 123 
 
 The management of malaria on the Kowloon-Canton Railway was reduced to the 
administration of quinine to the railway staff following the completion of the line. Dr. Smalley, 
who succeeded Hartley as Medical Officer to Kowloon and the New Territories, shifted to a 
more rigorous prophylactic regime to prevent the railway’s Chinese, and to a lesser extent 
Indian, staff from allegedly selling the quinine tablets on at a profit. Smalley later reported: 
I completely gave up giving pills to the Chinese staff, employing injections and Quinine 
mixture and on many occasions enforcing daily visits to the Dispensary to ensure the 
dose of the latter being taken.194 
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Smalley attributed the decline in the incidence of the disease to his “unceasing efforts” in 
teaching “the Chinese staff the value of quinine in malaria”.195 These efforts paralleled the 
prophylactic regimes administered to the police for in the New Territories. The colonial 
authorities prioritised these two elements of the state in favour of extending the anti-
mosquito campaign beyond the confines of the city of Victoria.  
The Sanitary Board briefly extended its anti-malaria campaign on Hong Kong Island 
itself as a result of an exceptional request from the military authorities. The colony’s civilian 
and medical spheres were largely separate, at least in terms of disease prevention. But in the 
summer of 1909 the newly-arrived Colonel Bedford, Principal Medical Officer of the South 
China Command, requested the Sanitary Board’s assistance to investigate an outbreak of 
malaria amongst the troops at Lei Yue Mun, on the north-eastern end of the island, which he 
attributed to the insanitary conditions in the neighbouring village of Shau Kei Wan.196 The 
Board recommended a variety of anti-mosquito measures, including nullah-training in the 
vicinity of the Chinese village of Shau Kei Wan.197 The colonial government also approved the 
free distribution of quinine from the local Chinese Dispensary – the Registrar General 
explained that this method was more effective than police coercion.198 Whilst Bedford and his 
Sanitary Board colleagues were pleased with this development, they were frustrated by the 
government’s failure to train all of the nullahs in the vicinity of the barracks.199 The Board’s 
President and head of the Sanitary Department reported: 
There was a great deal being done in the Colony in the way of nullah training, and it 
was simply a question of what district should be dealt with first. If it had not been for 
the troops, Shaukiwan [Shau Kei Wan] would not have got some much attention as it 
was receiving now. It must take its turn with other portions of the city.200 
Budget constraints heightened the sanitary department’s prioritisation of the European areas 
of urban settlement, namely the Western and Central districts of the City of Victoria, over the 
Chinese village of Shau Kei Wan and indeed the rest of the island.201 The extension of the 
colony’s civilian anti-mosquito operations to the eastern edge of Hong Kong Island was purely 
a matter of protecting the colonial presence: the medical authorities monitored the 
prevalence of malaria amongst the colony’s European troops until 1914. Once satisfied that 
the Chinese village of Shau Kei Wan no longer posed a threat to the Imperial troops stationed 
in the vicinity, the Sanitary Department’s confined its operations once again on the city of 
Victoria. 
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“Why not extend it to all China and make a job of it!” 
Historians have traditionally attributed the establishment of the colony’s Malaria 
Bureau in 1930, and the resultant extension of Hong Kong’s management of the disease 
throughout the colony, to the critical reports of a naval health officer from Singapore who 
surveyed the malaria situation in Hong Kong in the late 1920s. Initially tasked solely with 
advising the naval authorities in Hong Kong, Surgeon Commander Given subsequently 
conducted a more extensive investigation into the prevalence of the disease with the support 
of the colony’s senior medical officials.202 Given identified a lack of critical research and he 
recommended establishing a dedicated anti-malaria unit along the lines of Malaya’s Malaria 
Advisory Board. Modern historians have exaggerated the impact of Given’s reports by 
neglecting the emergence of increasingly vocal domestic critics prior to Given’s arrival. 
 One Sanitary Board member in particular became increasingly critical of the limited 
scope of the government’s anti-malaria campaign during the early 1920s. Dr. W. V. M. Koch, 
the medical officer who had briefly managed a leprosarium in Trinidad and Tobago in the 
1890s, emphasised the need for “more extensive and elaborate” anti-malaria measures 
because the authorities “had been slumbering under the happy delusion that malaria had 
been practically wiped out of the Colony”.203 Koch fundamentally disagreed with those who 
insisted that mosquito prevention was only possible in urban areas, and the resultant 
prioritisation of the city of Victoria. Official statistics certainly appeared to suggest that an 
increasing number of people were contracting the disease in Kowloon and the New Territories 
(fig. 23).  
 
Figure 23. Chinese Deaths from Malaria Registered at Kowloon and on Hong Kong Island, 1910-25.204 
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On his return from a year’s leave, Koch suggested that the colony might emulate the 
anti-malarial successes of the Federated Malay States by implementing anti-mosquito 
measures throughout the New Territories.205 The head of the Sanitary Department and 
President of the Sanitary Board (and therefore Koch’s superior) dismissed Koch’s motion as 
unnecessary because there were “so very, very few [residents in the New Territories], 
excluding natives of course”.206 The Director of the Public Works Department similarly 
challenged Koch’s strategy: 
Dr. Koch: I quite acknowledge the difficulties that exist; the point is whether we should 
not make an attempt other than in the town [of Victoria]. It seems valueless unless 
you make an attempt in the surrounding country. 
Mr. Perkins [Director of Public Works]: If you carry that out logically the question 
is how far you should go. Why stop at the New Territories? Why not extend it to all 
China and make a job of it.207 
The Hongkong Telegraph endorsed Koch’s criticisms and noted that Hong Kong’s lower 
incidence of malaria gave the authorities an advantage compared to their colleagues in the 
Malay Peninsula.208 As we shall see from the next chapter the colonial administration’s 
staunch opposition to any extension of its management of the disease to the New Territories 
was the polar opposite of the International Settlement’s approach. 
 A racialised conceptualisation of the disease underpinned both sides of the argument 
in Hong Kong. Both Koch’s opponents and his supporters (and indeed Koch himself) continued 
to pathologise the lower strata of the Chinese population as reservoirs of the disease. The 
press article that endorsed Koch’s criticisms, for instance, explained that the necessity of 
extending the colony’s anti-malaria campaign to the rural New Territories was not simply 
governed by “the mere dictates of humanity” but also by “the very important matter of 
eliminating ‘carriers,’ who could prove a menace to the sections of the population who, in the 
eyes of officialdom, merit special attention”.209 Pearse (M.O.H.) faced the awkward task of 
explaining this racially-loaded concept to Chow Shou-son, a Chinese member of the Sanitary 
Board: 
In the Far East, India, Malay, Burmah, South China, and so on, – in places where 
malaria is indigenous – the native races must always be suspected of being infected – 
in veterinary practice the term “salted” is used….If we have large numbers of artisans, 
coolies, hotel or domestic servants about us, and a few anopheles mosquitoes occur, 
we are bound to get the disease transferred from the Chinese reservoir to the 
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uninfected men, by the mosquito biting the “salted” man and then biting the 
uninfected man.210 
The fin de siècle pathologisation of the lower strata of the Chinese community was thus still 
very much in evidence, though calls for an anti-malarial racial segregation had long since been 
abandoned. The threat of infection was understood both in terms of the regular influx of 
migrants from malaria-infested regions of mainland China but also in terms of the colony’s 
own urban expansion.211 This expansion allegedly exposed urban inhabitants with low 
immunities to infected communities from rural environments where malaria-carrying 
mosquitoes abounded.  
Koch’s calls for a more extensive anti-malaria campaign fed into a broader debate 
about the geographical limits of the sanitary authorities’ jurisdiction. The unofficial members 
of the Legislative Council called for an extension of this jurisdiction beyond northern Kowloon. 
As one of them explained, the Sanitary Department was originally established to destroy 
plague-bearing rats, and consequently its work had been confined to the congested urban 
areas of Hong Kong Island and Kowloon Peninsula: 
In that campaign the Department has been entirely successful, but there are other 
campaigns which are necessary for the Department to undertake and which require a 
wider area of operations. We have it on authority of the Principal Medical Officer to 
the Garrison that malaria is increasing amongst the troops. We hear constant 
complaints, from the Residents’ Associations of the Colony, and recently very 
particularly from Peak residents, that mosquitoes are getting worse.212 
Another member pointed to the success of American anti-malaria efforts in Honolulu and the 
Philippines. Both the Colonial Secretary and the Governor, however, opposed the motion. 
They argued that the government’s existing anti-malaria campaign was perfectly satisfactory. 
Moreover the Governor dismissed the publicised successes of foreign campaigns “because, 
with some experience of malarial districts, I have noticed that these wonderful successes are 
not infrequently followed after an interval by relapses of which we see nothing in the 
newspapers”.213 
These calls for reform only resulted in limited concessions. The government agreed to 
set aside $3,000 for brushwood clearance and $20,000 to train 22 nullahs as a result of Koch’s 
original motion.214 The Botanical and Forestry Department cleared 8.25 million square feet of 
undergrowth in 1922, an increase of more than 50% on the year before, but the Public Works 
Department was only able to complete half of the programme of nullah-training.215 The 
Legislative Council also passed a bye-law regulating the use of bamboo scaffolding so as to 
prevent receptacles of standing water from forming (and therefore becoming potential 
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mosquito-breeding sites), in response to Koch’s demand that developers be held responsible 
for the health of their workforces.216 For its part the Sanitary Board appointed a small 
committee to investigate the prevalence of malaria in Kowloon.217 On the whole, though, the 
sanitary authorities did not implement any radically new measures. Instead these measures 
continued to prioritise the city of Victoria and the colonial presence in the New Territories. 
For instance, the Legislative Council approved the expenditure of $7,000 on mosquito-
proofing four police stations in the New Territories with wire gauze windows and doors rather 
than draining the surrounding land.218 Whereas the colony’s early anti-malaria campaigns had 
achieved international acclaim, its management of the disease increasingly lagged behind 
international standards. The local press for instance contrasted the colony’s reliance on small 
“gangs” of coolies to oil breeding sites in Victoria, the Peak and Kowloon with Louisiana’s 
experiments with aerial insecticide spraying.219 
Further criticism was heaped upon the colony’s management of the disease prior to 
Given’s arrival. Dr. A. G. Millot Severn, who briefly served as both Acting Medical Officer of 
Health and Medical Officer of Health in the mid-1920s, reported that little had been done in 
the way of mosquito surveys since Thomson’s and Macfarlane’s investigations.220 John 
Anderson, Professor of Medicine at Hong Kong University, similarly informed the Hong Kong 
Chinese Medical Association that, “There has never been a systematic malarial survey of this 
Colony and we have no statistics of any value for estimating the prevalence of the disease in 
our midst”.221 The local press emphasised the urgent need for a more pro-active anti-malaria 
campaign by drawing the public’s attention to Severn’s and Anderson’s statements.222 By 
ignoring the extent of this internal criticism, historians have tended to portray Given’s 
subsequent criticisms as a fresh re-evaluation of the colony’s efforts. Instead his work, as a 
foreign naval medical officer from British Malaya, should be understood as the coup de grace 
that finally overturned the government’s reluctance to heed the demands of the reformists 
within its own ranks. Following Given’s investigation, the Colonial Secretary declared: 
In view of the great progress which is being made in other parts of the world in 
combatting the ravages of malaria, it is a standing reproach to this Colony that so little 
improvement has been made here. In spite of the need for economy we can no longer 
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afford to neglect this all-important problem and the first step necessary is to obtain 
expert advice on the best way of attaining our end.223 
 
The Establishment of the Malaria Bureau 
The establishment of Hong Kong’s Malaria Bureau has generally been regarded as a 
straightforward affair. Historians typically condense this narrative to the transfer of two 
medical officers from the Federated Malay States, in December 1928 and April 1930 
respectively.224 Dr. Wellington was appointed to the newly-inaugurated position of Director 
of Medical and Sanitary Services with the dual mandate of reorganising the colony’s medical 
and sanitary services and overhauling the colony’s management of malaria, whilst Dr. Jackson 
was transferred to establish the Malaria Bureau and manage it as the colony’s first 
Government Malariologist.225 In fact this process was far from straightforward. The colony 
initially struggled to attract any applicants for the position of malariologist.226 Moreover Koch 
questioned the government’s decision to hire a malaria expert from abroad rather than relying 
on one of the colony’s own well-trained junior doctors.227 Now aged sixty-five, Koch was one 
of the few medical officers who had observed the colony’s anti-malaria campaign first-hand 
since the early 20th century.228 He therefore continued to interrogate the Sanitary Board about 
the scope of its anti-malarial activities.229 For its part the Sanitary Board implemented a variety 
of public health awareness initiatives prior to Wellington’s arrival.230 Koch nevertheless 
remained highly critical: “The work should be undertaken with greater zeal, with more 
pertinacity and not in this dilly-dallying slipshod way”.231 
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Wellington played a pivotal role in securing the services of expert malariologists from 
British Malaya. As the former Chief Health Officer in the Federated Malay States, Wellington 
had extensive experience in combating malaria-carrying mosquitoes.232 He advised the 
colonial government in Hong Kong to hire a medical officer and a sanitary inspector with “long 
experience in Mosquitology and anti-malarial works together”.233 When efforts to secure 
these individuals through the Colonial Office proved unsuccessful, Wellington successfully 
negotiated the transfer of Jackson and his assistant Mr. Deb.234 The Colonial Secretary 
informed the Legislative Council: 
It is intended that these officers shall form the nucleus of an anti-malarial branch of 
the Medical Department. They will train local recruits and they and their staff will 
make the detailed anopheline surveys which are a necessary preliminary to any 
economic and efficient anti-malarial campaign which has for its basis the destruction 
of the breeding grounds of those species of anophelines which are active agents in 
the spread of malaria.235 
The authorities proffered salaries of $8,494 (an increase of $7,614 on the original offer) and 
$3,200 for the malariologist and assistant malariologist respectively in order to secure the 
necessary individuals.236 The Hongkong Sunday Herald gratefully reported that the Colonial 
Secretary’s statement was “something above the stereotyped semi-evasive type of answer 
that has characterised so many of the Government’s utterances”, and expressed a hope that 
“at long last the Government has got – or is getting – out of the lethargic groove in which it 
has been content”.237  
 Wellington took a keen personal interest in Hong Kong’s malaria problem prior to 
Jackson’s and Deb’s arrival. He attributed the colony’s unsophisticated management of the 
disease to a lack of knowledge about the breeding habits of the colony’s mosquitoes. Drawing 
on his own knowledge of mosquito breeding in south-east Asia, he instigated preliminary 
anopheline surveys on Hong Kong Island.238 Wellington emphasised the importance of 
specialist knowledge, notably in a lecture on the ‘The Life History of Mosquitoes’ at the Helen 
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May Institute.239 The Officer Administering the Government noted that Wellington’s lecture 
“had pointed out how money could be wasted in such campaigns through incomplete 
knowledge, and a great deal of money had been so wasted already in Hong Kong”.240 
Wellington employed modern military rhetoric to explain the importance of a dedicated, 
specially-trained anti-malaria unit: 
War against mosquitoes like war against man is a scientific problem. Individual efforts 
may effect local successes but for an anti-mosquito campaign of any magnitude to be 
a success it must be planned by one who has studied the enemy’s habits and who is 
acquainted with his life history. Every effort must be made to bring untoward 
influences to bear upon the enemy’s front line, the adult mosquitoes, and upon his 
reserve the larvæ. Not only must the general know his work but each individual down 
to and including the private must be so trained that he will do his duty without a 
hitch….If this be not done the enemy will concentrate on the borders and by 
aeroplane night raids continue to do damage, the raiders returning to their reserves 
and recruiting grounds (breeding places) before morning.241 
This was not simply a nod to his Napoleonic namesake: Wellington had honed this militaristic 
approach whilst working on malaria in the F.M.S. As we shall see in the next chapter, 
Wellington’s strategic rhetoric contrasted with the tactical rhetoric of J. H. Jordan, the 
Settlement’s Commissioner of Public Health. 
 
The Malaria Bureau, 1930-1941 
 Whilst historians have noted that the Malaria Bureau’s primary objectives consisted 
of collecting data on the prevalence of malaria and mosquitoes and assisting the sanitary 
authorities’ anti-malaria operations, little attention has been paid to the Bureau’s evolution 
and achievements. Initially the Bureau consisted simply of Jackson, his assistant Deb, a clerk 
and two coolies. Four Chinese probationer Inspectors joined the Bureau later that year.242 
Given the staff’s small size and limited expertise, the Bureau initially concentrated on 
analysing larval specimens from different parts of the colony.243 It also responded to 
complaints about mosquito nuisances and conducted spleen censuses for the first time in the 
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colony’s history.244 The Malaria Bureau was responsible for extending the colony’s 
management of malaria throughout Hong Kong Island and the New Territories. Wellington, as 
Ka-che Yip has noted, reported that the rural communities in the New Territories were 
receptive to the Bureau’s activities: 
The reception given to the members of the staff demonstrates that there is no 
opposition to scientific investigations, provided the people understand the objects 
aimed at and are treated with ordinary tact and civility. Almost invariably they showed 
themselves interested in the proceedings and offered their cooperation.245 
From the outset Jackson promoted the need for specialist knowledge. His first annual 
report listed “the teaching of mosquitology” as one of the Bureau’s seven primary 
objectives.246 Jackson faced a challenging task, given that the colony's sanitary inspectors had 
only been taught to distinguish between anophelines and culicines; “progress beyond this 
elementary stage [had] not yet been attempted”.247 Jackson’s first four Chinese probationer 
inspectors were taught to identify, prepare, preserve and dissect larval specimens, to examine 
blood films and to conduct larval surveys. 248 All four were successfully promoted and a further 
three probationer inspectors were recruited and trained in the following years.249 The 
Bureau’s training program benefited from materials sent by a medical officer in Java and by 
the Director of the Philippine Health Service.250 Jackson’s emphasis on improving his staff’s 
expertise was vindicated: in addition to identifying a number of known species for the first 
time in Hong Kong, the Bureau also discovered three new species, all of which were named 
after the colony’s malariologist.251 Given that only thirteen new mosquito species have ever 
been discovered in Hong Kong, the Bureau’s discoveries were a notable achievement. 
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The colony’s Malaria Bureau increasingly exchanged specimens, images and ideas 
with malariologists and medical entomologists throughout East and South-east Asia as well as 
India and Great Britain.252 For instance the Bureau exchanged specimens with Dr. Hu in 
Nanjing, Dr. L. C. Feng of the Peiping Union Medical College, Dr. Li of the Bureau of Entomology 
in Hangzhou and Dr. Dunscombe of the International Settlement’s Public Health Department 
– all of whom will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. Jackson also shared his 
investigations with his foreign and Chinese colleagues in East Asia through The Chinese 
Medical Journal and at conferences such as the ninth congress of the Far Eastern Association 
of Tropical Medicine (Nanjing, 1934).253 
Jackson’s and Deb’s Malayan experiences profoundly impacted upon the colony’s 
management of malaria in the final decade before the outbreak of war in the Pacific. The 
Bureau’s early investigations, for instance, repudiated a widespread belief that had prevailed 
in the colony since the 19th century by demonstrating that “as in Malaya and the Philippines 
paddy fields and large wet areas on the flat are more or less harmless”.254 The two men 
introduced a concept pioneered by Watson in Malaya and Swellengrebel in the Netherlands 
East Indies in the late 1910s: species sanitation. This approach focused on breaking the cycle 
of transmission by targeting the breeding sites of the specific mosquito population that was 
responsible for infecting human populations in a particular area. The key to identifying these 
sites consisted in collecting and dissecting mosquito specimens for malaria parasites and 
plotting this data alongside data from the spleen censuses and blood surveys.255 For example 
this approach enabled the Bureau to demonstrate that the abundance of A. maculatus, a 
malaria-carrying species, in the vicinity of the Queen Mary Hospital construction site did not 
pose a threat to the coolie workforce precisely because this particular mosquito population 
was not infected with the malaria parasite (map 11). Until now, no historian has acknowledged 
the introduction of this fundamentally different approach to malaria prevention. 
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Map 11. The Site of the Queen Mary Hospital at Pokfulam, ca. 1935. 
The circle was divided into to two segments. The lower left-hand segment  
“A line has been drawn on the map from Sandy Bay to the Conduit and Forestry Paths, dividing the 
circle into a small and a large segment. In the small segment (the lower left-hand corner), 26 children 
were examined, of these 19 had enlarged spleens, 73 per cent. In the large segment, 124 children were 
examined, 3 of whom had enlarged spleens, 2.3 per cent.”256 
 
The Bureau’s campaign to control malaria during the construction of the Shing Mun 
Dam in the New Territories was another prime example of this Malayan approach. The Bureau 
was called in to assess the prospective location of the coolie camp in November 1932 following 
an outbreak of malaria amongst the coolies working on the access road.257 A preliminary 
survey identified numerous potential and existing breeding grounds for malaria-carrying 
species such as A. minimus, A. jeyporiensis and A. maculatus, whilst a spleen census and blood 
examinations revealed that malaria was prevalent in the neighbouring village of Wo Yi Hop. 
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Wellington and the Malaria Bureau devised a sophisticated anti-malaria campaign centred on 
the coolie accommodation lines by drawing on their knowledge of malaria control in south-
east Asia: 
As little was known of the power of flight of the local anophelines it was deemed wise 
to commence anti-larval measures at the centre or lines site spreading out 
concentrically until such a distance had been reached as would be sufficient to 
prevent access to the lines from the breeding places under normal flight conditions. 
Experience in Malaya had shown the margin of safety for that country to be half a mile 
and it was hoped that in Hong Kong this distance or less would prove sufficient.258 
From the outset Wellington made the Medical Department and the Bureau responsible for 
the “medical and entomological side of the problem”, and he delegated the responsibility for 
overseeing the permanent sanitary and drainage works to “an engineer who had had many 
years experience [sic] in Malaya”.259 The Bureau’s comprehensive anti-malaria operations at 
Shing Mun included the regular analysis of adult and larval mosquitoes specimens and the 
oiling of breeding pools by a small gang of coolies under the supervision of the Assistant 
Malariologist “who had had a good deal of experience of this work as Health Inspector of 
Malaya”.260 The Bureau decided against drug prophylaxis “owing to opposition on the part of 
the labourers and the difficulty of checking individuals under the contract system”.261 This 
strategy, which was the polar opposite of that employed during the construction of the 
Kowloon-Canton railway, exemplified the colony’s new environmental approach to the 
management of the disease. The authorities gradually extended the radius of these operations 
through 1935 (map 12).262 By May 1936 The Hongkong Telegraph triumphantly reported: 
‘Malaria Conquered at Dam Site’.263 
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Map 12. The Malaria Bureau’s Operations during the Construction of the 
Shing Mun Reservoir, ca. 1933.264 
Whereas the colonial authorities had previously opposed expensive anti-malaria 
campaigns, they now wholeheartedly endorsed the provision of $150,000 towards the 
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Bureau’s efforts in general, and the campaign at Shing Mun in particular.265 Malaria was seen 
as a major impediment to, rather than an unfortunate and unavoidable consequence of, the 
colony’s urban expansion. A member of the Urban Council, for instance, was concerned that 
the provision of $60,000 for anti-malaria works for 1935 was insufficient: 
Rate-payers will be interested to have the expert opinion of the Director of Medical 
and Sanitary Services whether the allocation for anti-malarial works properly so-called 
is not an amount just sufficient to tinker with the malaria problem in the 
Colony….Development of the popular Castle Peak district [in the New Territories] for 
residential purposes, which has started in real earnest, is actually retarded through 
indifference in the adoption of measures for combatting the malaria scourge in this 
beautiful district of the New Territories.266 
The following year he complained that the prevalence of mosquitoes in a residential district 
in Kowloon endangered the district’s families. The Colonial Secretary reassured him that the 
area would not be neglected.267 
 
Post-1941 
 The Malaria Bureau’s wartime activities never fully recovered from the initial 
disruption caused by the Japanese invasion of Hong Kong. After the war Dr. Selwyn-Clarke, 
who succeeded Wellington as the Director of Medical Services in 1938, reported that six weeks 
elapsed before the Japanese occupying forces could be “persuaded” to allow the Bureau to 
resume its duties.268 Moreover the Bureau’s reduced staff was “seriously handicapped owing 
to the fact that the Japanese made it very difficult for anti-malarial aid or the necessary tools 
to be secured”.269 The Bureau nevertheless did its best to focus on the “areas likely to affect 
the various internment camps and hospitals”.270 Dr. J. B. Mackie, who succeeded Jackson as 
the Government Malariologist in the late 1930s, was not immediately interned along with the 
rest of the colony’s Allied personnel in February 1942. Instead he and a handful of the Chinese 
Inspectors remained at their posts, though “they were able to achieve very little because of 
the failure of the Japanese to supply oil, etc.”.271 The fact that Mackie was not immediately 
interned highlights the fact that the Japanese authorities preserved some of the colony’s 
existing medical policies, specifically those that related to the management of diseases that 
were deemed a threat to the Japanese occupying forces. 
Mackie actually continued his work as best he could even when he was confined 
within the Stanley PoW Camp. As Selwyn-Clarke’s deputy later noted, “the old cemetery inside 
Stanley Camp was a grim reminder of the results of uncontrolled malaria” during the earliest 
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decades of settlement.272 An “anti-malarial gang” was organised and intermittently permitted 
to tackle the dangerous breeding grounds that lay just beyond the camp’s boundary.273 
Friction between the camp authorities and the “Gendarmerie post” just outside the camp and 
the camp’s progressive reduction in size – a measure of collective punishment imposed by the 
Japanese authorities – seriously hampered the gang’s activities.274 Consequently the reported 
incidence of the disease amongst the camps inmates was high, peaking at 331 cases in 1943. 
Selwyn-Clarke’s deputy concluded: 
While we must consider ourselves fortunate in being granted such facilities as were 
allowed for anti-malarial work around the camp, and in the results obtained, a large 
amount of sickness, discomfort and anxiety could have been prevented if the 
Japanese authorities had been more responsive to our insistent requests for freedom 
to carry on regular control measures over the entire area affecting the camp.275 
Mackie was amongst those who survived the ordeal of imprisonment, and he promptly 
returned to his anti-malarial duties on his release.276  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored the colonial management of malaria during the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. Whereas the colony’s management of leprosy focused principally upon 
Chinese bodies, the management of malaria focused primarily on improving the inhabited 
environment. The colony confined its efforts principally to the protection of the main urban 
settlement on Hong Kong Island, and the prophylactic preservation of the sinews of the state 
in the New Territories. Only the transfer of expert malariologists from Malaya in the 1930s 
prompted the extension of Hong Kong’s malaria prevention program throughout the colony. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, the International Settlement’s anti-malaria campaigns 
lagged behind Hong Kong’s in scope and sophistication well into the 20th century. But we shall 
also see how the Settlement overtook Hong Kong in terms of local technical innovation and 
trans-national co-operation in the decades immediately before the war. 
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 The Settlement’s efforts to tackle malaria complicate modern interpretations of 
Imperial disease prevention in East Asia. The disease’s scarcity at the turn of the century 
greatly facilitated the Settlement’s receptiveness to new aetiological theories, especially 
compared to the last chapter’s analysis of the diffusion of these ideas to Hong Kong. The 
Settlement’s management of the disease lagged far behind Hong Kong, and much of the 
British Empire, during this period. Only a desire not to be outdone by the French Concession 
finally prompted the initiation of a systematic seasonal anti-mosquito campaign in 1909. But 
whereas the colonial authorities in Hong Kong actively opposed any extension of its anti-
malaria work to the colony’s rural hinterland through the 1920s, the Settlement’s Public 
Health Department actively responded to the emergence of malaria as a public health issue 
by targeting breeding sites beyond its borders. The Settlement’s strategy was thus the polar 
opposite to Hong Kong’s enclavist management of the disease. The lands to the north-east 
and more especially to the west of the Settlement became sites of intense negotiation and 
contestation that profoundly impacted upon the Shanghai Municipal Council’s perception of 
the Chinese municipal authorities and on the Public Health Department’s willingness to 
support those medical institutions, such as the Henry Lester Institute, that straddled both 
municipalities. The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war reframed and intensified the context in 
which these negotiations took place. The Settlement’s management of malaria thus provides 
insights into the complex interaction between colonialism and medical practices in East Asia. 
 
The Malaria Mosquito Theory 
Like Hong Kong, early Shanghai was renowned for the prevalence of locally-distinctive 
febrile diseases. But whereas ‘Hong Kong fever’ referred primarily to malaria, the term 
‘Shanghai fever’ embraced enteric and typhoid fevers.1 Malaria was nevertheless a concern. 
Dr. Alexander Jamieson, the medical officer of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service who 
responded to Cantlie’s questionnaire on leprosy, reported in the 1870s that: 
The Shanghai district is … to be qualified as ‘malarious’, the convenient term ‘malaria’ 
being used to designate the mass of describable and indescribable conditions which 
prevail in the neighbourhood of marshy lands, especially when these are subjected to 
powerful heat.2 
Local commentators embraced the same miasmatic theories as their colonial brethren to the 
south.3 James Henderson of the London Missionary Society, for instance, advised Shanghai’s 
foreign residents against exposing themselves to “malarious influences at night or early in the 
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morning”.4 Edward Henderson, the International Settlement’s Health Officer from the late 
1860s until the late 1890s, reported that he and his colleagues believed that the inhalation of 
poisonous miasmas, released from the soil under the combined effects of temperature and 
moisture, was responsible for the outbreak of malarial symptoms.5 The limited prevalence of 
the disease, however, informed the local specificity of these theories. None of the theories 
espoused in Shanghai highlighted a particular local geological or topographical feature as a 
predisposing cause in the way that commentators in Hong Kong emphasised the miasmatic 
dangers of disintegrating granite. 
 The Settlement’s medical men became increasingly aware of new ideas regarding the 
cause and transmission of the disease during the late 19th century through a variety of 
overlapping regional and imperial scientific networks. As corresponding members of Hong 
Kong’s Medical Society, Shanghai’s foreign physicians would have been privy to its discussions 
about malaria.6 Locally-available journals also occasionally reviewed the society’s meetings. 
For instance The China Medical Missionary Journal, which was published in Shanghai, 
summarised the reception of Hartigan’s paper on an epidemic in Hong Kong in the late 1890s.7 
The Chinese Maritime Customs Service also provided a network for the dissemination of 
medical knowledge. Jamieson, for instance, avidly followed the research of his colleague 
Manson in Amoy: 
There can be little doubt that we are already within sight of a new and scientific 
general pathology whose foundations will have been laid in those investigations into 
the history of blood parasites and of aerial soil and germs which are ardently being 
pursued all over the world, and in China notably by Manson of Amoy.8 
 The new theories regarding the mosquito-borne transmission of the disease were 
disseminated to Shanghai’s foreign medical and lay communities through a variety of 
mediums. International periodicals and newspapers provided an important avenue for the 
circulation of scientific theories and medical research. In a letter to a local newspaper one 
resident, for instance, cited articles about Manson’s and Ross’s work that had appeared in the 
Journal of the Royal Colonial Institute, The Nineteenth century and after: a monthly review and 
The Times.9 The International Settlement’s medical men also encountered these new theories 
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at international medical conferences. The British Medical Association’s annual meetings, for 
example, would certainly have provided Henderson, the Settlement’s Health Officer, with an 
opportunity to discuss the vectoral transmission of the disease.10 
Dr. Arthur Stanley, Henderson’s successor, only appears to have given credence to the 
mosquito-borne transmission of the disease in early 1900. Whereas his report for 1898 did 
not even discuss the incidence of the disease, let alone mention such a ground-breaking idea, 
his report for 1899 (which was written early the following year) briefly suggested that 
Anopheles mosquitoes were “the probable means of conveying Malaria to man”.11 The 
following year he declared, “Considerable improvement in Public Health can be effected by 
taking advantage of the recent discoveries concerning the nature of the mosquito to the 
disease, now a ground fact of Nature”.12 Interestingly the text on malaria prevention from this 
report was appended by hand to the original three-line printed entry in the Annual Report for 
1899, i.e. the report that tentatively suggested that mosquitoes were the “probable” means 
of transmission.13 None of Stanley’s other Annual Reports were updated in this manner. What 
prompted this unique addendum? The shift in the strength of Stanley’s support for the new 
theory is suggestive: the rapid growth of international support for the new theory may 
compelled Stanley to revise the earlier report shortly after it went to press. 
 The contrast between Shanghai’s relatively swift acceptance of the mosquito-borne 
transmission of malaria and the intense debates that the new theories sparked in Hong Kong 
is striking. I conducted a detailed analysis of The North-China Daily News (N.C.D.N.), a local 
daily newspaper, and The North-China Herald (N.C.H.), a local weekly, but was unable to find 
any indication that the general public in the International Settlement vigorously opposed the 
new theories. On the contrary. For instance a correspondent using the pseudonym ‘Layman’ 
was pleased to read a leading article on ‘Mosquitoes and Malaria’ in The North-China Daily 
News and considered that “all who live in malarial climes must be most grateful to [Drs. Ross 
                                                          
10 Henderson discussed his experiences of sprue and psiolosis at the 67th annual meeting (Portsmouth, 
1899). He subsequently attended the 68th (Ipswich, 1900), 69th (Cheltenham, 1901) and 70th 
(Manchester, 1902) annual meetings. “A Discussion on Psilosis or Sprue: Its Relation (Etiological and 
Pathological) to other forms of Tropical Diarrhœa and its Treatment,” British Medical Journal, Sept. 9, 
1899, 637-642, 638. “A Discussion on the Treatment of Malaria by Quinine,” British Medical Journal, 
Sept. 1, 1900, 529-533, 533; “A Discussion on Malaria and its Prevention,” British Medical Journal, 
Sept. 14, 1901, 680-690, 689; Edward Henderson, “Heat Apoplexy,” British Medical Journal, Sept. 2, 
1902, 854. 
11 Arthur Stanley, Shanghai Municipal Council. Health Department. Annual Report 1898, (Shanghai: 
Kelly & Walsh, 1899), Shanghai Municipal Archives (hereafter SMA), U1/16/4650, 18; Arthur Stanley, 
Shanghai Municipal Council. Health Department. Annual Report 1899 (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1900), 
SMA, U1/16/4650, 23. Stanley wrote the latter report early in 1900. Born in Suffolk in 1868, Stanley 
became an MD and was awarded his diploma in public health in 1897. Macpherson, Wilderness of 
Marshes, 293n47. 
12 Arthur Stanley, Shanghai Municipal Council. Health Department. Annual Report 1900 (Shanghai: 
Kelly & Walsh, 1901), SMA, U1/16/4650, 23. 
13 The only part of the handwritten text that was not reprinted was a reference to the use of mosquito 
curtains as “an excellent protection against miasmatic exhalations” in Henry Morton Stanley’s In 
darkest Africa (1890): “a very interesting example of practice ahead of theory”. Stanley, Annual 
Report 1899, SMA, U1-16-4650, 23. 
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and Manson] for their experiments and discoveries”.14 The only debates that the local press 
reported on were precisely those that were taking place in Hong Kong.15 Both the N.C.D.N. 
and the N.C.H. even reprinted Dolly’s satirical poem, “Hearty Gun’s Warning”.16 This is not to 
say that everyone in the International Settlement readily accepted the mosquito-borne 
transmission of the disease. But the contrast with Hong Kong’s intense, prolonged and vocal 
debates is extremely striking. Arguably malaria was less prevalent in Shanghai than in Hong 
Kong during the century, and was therefore less of a concern to the medical community and 
for the population at large. As such, the new theory may have seemed less controversial than 
it did in Hong Kong where it confronted many strongly-held beliefs and personal experiences. 
 
Vector-centred measures 
During the early 20th century the Public Health Department’s management of malaria, 
like its management of leprosy, remained extremely limited, especially compared to Hong 
Kong. The department focused primarily on the collection of mosquito specimens from all 
over the Settlement. The Settlement’s Sanitary Inspectors systematically collected specimens 
on a weekly basis from all of the Settlement’s health districts from 1901 onwards.17 Stanley 
took an especially keen interest in examining them.18 So too did other foreign physicians in 
Shanghai. In an article on the Anopheles species in Shanghai and Java, Dr. Thin noted that a 
Dr. Marshall of Shanghai kindly provided him with over 150 mosquito specimens.19 Some of 
the early specimens were sent to the British Museum for positive identification.20 These 
collections revealed that malaria-carrying Anopheles species were rare in the Settlement: only 
34 of the 13,000 mosquitoes collected between 1903 and 1906 were Anopheles sinensis.21 
                                                          
14 Layman [pseud.], letter to the editor, North-China Daily News, May 26, 1900, 3; “Mosquitoes and 
Malaria,” North-China Daily News, May 10, 1900, 3. Both the article and the letter were reprinted in 
The North-China Herald. 
15 See for instance “Notes from the South,” North-China Herald, Nov. 7, 1900, 983-984; “Notes from 
the South,” North-China Herald, Dec. 19, 1900, 1297-1298; “Notes from the South,” North-China 
Herald, Apr. 17, 1901, 740-741. 
16 “Hearty Gun’s Warning,” North-China Daily News, Apr. 18, 1901, 3; “Hearty Gun’s Warning,” North-
China Herald, Apr. 24, 1901, 802. 
17 Stanley, Annual Report 1900, SMA, U1-16-4650, 25-26; Arthur Stanley, Shanghai Municipal Council. 
Health Department. Annual Report 1901 (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1902), SMA, U1-16-465031-32. 
18 See for instance Stanley, Annual Report 1899, SMA, U1-16-4650, 22-23; Stanley, Annual Report 
1900, SMA, U1-16-4650, 25-26. 
19 The timing of Dr. Thin’s article suggests that Marshall probably collected the specimens in 1899, just 
as the local interest in the new theory was emerging. George Thin, “A Note on Species of Anopheles 
Found amongst Mosquitos sent from Shanghai and Java,” British Medical Journal, Feb. 10, 1900, 307-
308. 
20 Stanley, Annual Report 1901, SMA, U1/16/4650, 32. 
21 Arthur Stanley, Shanghai Municipal Council. Health Department. Annual Report 1903 (Shanghai: 
Kelly & Walsh, 1904), SMA, U1-16-4650, 27; Arthur Stanley, Shanghai Municipal Council. Health 
Department. Annual Report 1904, (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1905), SMA, U1/16/4650, 30; Arthur 
Stanley, Shanghai Municipal Council. Health Department. Annual Report 1905 (Shanghai: Kelly & 
Walsh, 1906), SMA, U1-16-4650, 32; Arthur Stanley, Shanghai Municipal Council. Health Department. 
Annual Report 1906 (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1907), SMA, U1-16-4650, 33. 
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Instead a number of other species were identified including Stegomyia scutellaris, the carrier 
of Yellow fever (though the disease itself was not prevalent in the region).22 Every annual 
Health Report from 1900 through 1921 included a brief summary detailing the different 
species that were identified.23 Unlike Hong Kong, no ‘new’ species were ‘discovered’. 
Nevertheless these mosquito collections represented an important contribution towards the 
development of local and global (medical) entomology. 
The limited prevalence of both the disease and its vector informed the Health 
Department’s management of malaria. The department initially limited itself to abolishing 
breeding sites, either through small-scale drainage operations or by filling-in ponds and 
ditches.24 The Settlement placed a much greater emphasis on the importance of domestic 
prophylactic measures: 
It may be subject for congratulation that while in Hongkong the Anopheles Costalis 
and Minimus occur as well as the Sinensis and the dangerous Anopheles form 3% of 
the mosquitoes, in Shanghai 1% only occur. Their presence however demonstrates 
the possibility of infection within the Settlement by means of mosquitoes infected 
with Malaria, and every effort should be made by households to do away with all 
receptacles of stagnant water, where mosquitoes breed, such as ponds, water-plants, 
aquaria [sic], drains out of repair, abandoned tubs, pots, tins and what not.25 
The annual reports advised householders to eliminate receptacles that might serve as 
breeding grounds; to assiduously use mosquito nets “especially in up-country houseboat 
trips”; and to isolate those suffering with malaria under mosquito nets.26 Indeed it was not 
until 1909 that Stanley conceded that, “in the matter of mosquito extermination there seems 
to be a general desire for something more than the plodding work of the last ten years”.27 In 
the meantime the colonial authorities in Hong Kong had trained many of Victoria’s nullahs, 
devised a prophylactic regime for the police and railway staff in the New Territories, 
distributed public health propaganda, introduced tropical hygiene into the local curricula and 
established a 2,000 acre European reservation in northern Kowloon. 
The French Concession’s experimental anti-larval campaign was largely responsible 
for prompting Stanley’s comments and his overhaul of the Settlement’s anti-malaria 
initiatives. The French Municipal Council inaugurated an anti-mosquito campaign focusing on 
the cleaning and draining of creeks and ponds, and the treatment of standing water with 
                                                          
22 See for example Arthur Stanley, Shanghai Municipal Council. Health Department. Annual Report 
1907 (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1908), SMA, U1-16-4651, 18. 
23 Apart from the first two reports, these entries were brief and largely formulaic. Only the reports for 
the years from 1901 through 1906 included any indication about the number of specimens examined. 
24 Arthur Stanley, Shanghai Municipal Council. Health Department. Annual Report 1909, (Shanghai: 
Kelly & Walsh, 1910), SMA, U1-16-4651, 32. 
25 Stanley, Annual Report 1901, SMA, U1-16-4650, 32. 
26 Arthur Stanley, Shanghai Municipal Council. Health Department. Annual Report 1902 (Shanghai: 
Kelly & Walsh, 1903), SMA, U1/16/4650, 34. This advice was reprinted in every annual report through 
1921. 
27 Arthur Stanley, “Health Officer’s Report for February,” Municipal Gazette, Mar 20, 1909, 72. 
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kerosene in 1909. Word of the campaign soon spread to Hong Kong.28 Many of Shanghai’s 
residents hoped that the Settlement would emulate its French neighbour, particularly in light 
of the success of anti-malarial efforts abroad, principally in Port Ismailia, but also in Port Said, 
Panama, and Havana.29 One local newspaper commented that “experience in Port Said, 
therefore, clearly shows that even small localities in a populated area may be practically freed 
from the mosquito pest by energetic measures”.30 Another wondered whether the Public 
Health Department might not benefit from the expertise of one of the Port’s trained sanitary 
inspectors.31 Stanley recommended adopting Ross’s approach by deploying “mosquito 
brigades” in each of the Settlement’s four districts.32 Each brigade –consisting of two foreign 
policemen and five coolies – would be responsible for carrying out weekly inspections and 
treating accumulations of stagnant water with basic oiling apparatus under the supervision of 
a foreign sanitary inspector.33 The immediate implementation of Stanley’s proposal was 
considered a matter of pride as well as sound policy: 
If the experiment [i.e. Stanley’s trial ‘mosquito brigades’] be postponed for a year or 
two, it will be hard to re-awaken the present interest and enthusiasm. Moreover 
campaigns have just been inaugurated in the French Concession and in Hankow. The 
Model Settlement is not usually backward in adopting modern methods for improving 
the health and comfort of its residents. Is it possible that it is going to lag behind in 
the matter of mosquito-extermination?34 
The ‘brigades’ eventually began operating in the April of that year, although Stanley was only 
able to secure the services of two foreign policemen to begin with.35 The trial was brought to 
an end with the onset of winter. Despite the adverse effects of some unseasonably wet 
weather during the summer, the experiment was considered a success: Stanley optimistically 
                                                          
28 “A Campaign Against Mosquitoes,” North-China Herald, Feb. 20, 1909, 425-426; “Meeting: Anti-
Mosquito Work in the French Concession,” North-China Herald, May 15, 1909, 371-372. As the 
Chairman of the meeting noted, “If you have not been able to see how the work has been carried out, 
you must at any rate have been able to trace the smell, for we have heard it said on all sides that for 
the past few weeks the Concession has simply reeked with petroleum.” “Meeting: Anti-Mosquito 
Work in the French Concession,” North-China Herald, May 15, 1909, 372. For Hong Kong see “War 
Against the Mosquito,” Hongkong Telegraph, May 29, 1909, 4. This article was largely the same as the 
North-China Herald’s piece. 
29 “Mosquitoes in Shanghai,” North-China Herald, Feb. 13, 1909, 387-388; “A Campaign Against 
Mosquitoes,” North-China Herald, Feb. 20, 1909, 425-426; Edward S. Little, letter to the editor, North-
China Herald, Feb. 20, 1909, 449; “Anti-Mosquito Campaigns,” North-China Herald, Feb. 27, 1909, 
528. 
30 “Mosquitoes in Shanghai,” North-China Herald, Feb. 13, 1909, 388. 
31 Maskee-To [i.e. ‘Mosquito’] [pseud.], letter to the editor, North-China Herald, Feb. 27, 1909, 517. 
32 Stanley, “Health Officer’s Report for February,” 73. 
33 The coolies were equipped with an oil can, a pail for holding oil, a garden syringe for spraying large 
pools, a broom and a spade. Stanley, Annual Report 1909, SMA, U1/16/4651, 32; “The Mosquito 
Campaign,” North-China Herald, Nov. 13, 1909, 372. 
34 Stanley, “Health Officer’s Report for February,” 73. 
35 Minutes of the Health Committee Meeting, Apr. 20, 1909, SMA, U1/16/9, 19. 
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claimed the trial had reduced the number of mosquitoes by “25% to 75%” – an incredibly 
broad estimate.36 
Stanley nevertheless identified a number of shortcomings in the trial. For instance the 
policemen, who had been drafted in owing to the heavy plague-prevention workload of the 
department’s staff, were, for the most part, considered insufficiently thorough or enthusiastic. 
He hoped to replace them with two specially-trained assistant sanitary inspectors. Stanley was 
particularly scathing of the Chinese coolies, whom he had reluctantly allowed to work in pairs. 
He complained that “coolies working alone do not like to appear a source of annoyance to 
householders by too diligently searching their houses for larvae”.37 He recommended that a 
“good class of coolie” be secured for the following year, and that their daily operations should 
be clearly defined. He advised his staff to provide the coolies with detailed instructions about 
the locations of all stagnant bodies of water, especially “those places which are likely to be 
beyond a coolie’s intelligence to think of or beyond his courage to enter”.38 Stanley was 
similarly disparaging of the attitude of the Chinese population in general, noting that they 
looked upon the trial as “fool pidgin”.39 He hoped to erode this apathy by tasking the Sanitary 
Inspectors to deliver roadside lectures and practical demonstrations in Chinese.40 His 
department also drafted specific instructions for domestic prophylaxis in the form of a 
‘Mosquito Notice’, which was modelled on a notice used by the health department in 
Stamford, Connecticut.41 Many within the Settlement echoed the Health Officer’s opinions 
about Chinese apathy towards the campaign. But they did not share Stanley’s optimism, 
arguing that only a municipal bye-law would force the Chinese population to participate 
actively.42 Nevertheless they were eager for the campaign to be repeated the following year.43 
The trial of 1909 marked a turning point in the Settlement’s efforts to eradicate the 
disease. Stanley’s modifications established the format for the Settlement’s annual summer 
anti-malarial campaigns through to the early 1920s. Aside from reducing the extent of anti-
larval oiling measures in favour of drainage or filling-in operations, very few changes were 
made during the following decade. Indeed the entry on the Settlement’s summer campaign 
in the Annual Report for the year 1910 was reprinted every year through 1921 with only slight 
                                                          
36 Stanley, Annual Report 1909, SMA, U1/16/4651, 32; “The Mosquito Campaign,” North-China Herald, 
Nov. 13, 1909, 372 He repeated this claim in the Annual Reports for 1910, 1911 and 1912. 
37 Ibid., 32. 
38 Ibid., 32. 
39 Ibid., 32. 
40 Ibid., 32. 
41 The Stamford notice had recently been publicised in the local English-language press. Stanley 
reprinted this notice in his annual report every year through 1921. Ibid., 33; Mosquito Bitten [pseud.], 
letter to the editor, North-China Herald, Aug. 15, 1908, 414; “Mosquitoes!,” North-China Herald, Aug. 
22, 1908, 485; Arthur Stanley, Shanghai Municipal Council. Health Department. Annual Report 1921 
(Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1922), SMA, U1/16/4653, 41. 
42 “The Mosquito Campaign,” North-China Herald, Nov. 13, 1909, 372. 
43 Anti-Mosquito[pseud.], letter to the editor, North-China Herald, Mar. 25, 1910, 691; Impatient 
[pseud.], letter to the editor, North-China Herald, Apr. 1, 1910, 37; Bubbling Wellite [pseud.], letter to 
the editor, North-China Herald, Apr. 8, 1910, 85-86. 
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alterations. For instance the ‘Mosquito Extermination’ campaign was rebranded as a 
‘Mosquito Reduction’ campaign; the department also abandoned the practice of publishing 
details about the acreage of water removed or treated (table 5.1).44 These changes reflected 
the department’s realisation of the scale and complexity of the task at hand. Foreign 
malariologists nevertheless praised Stanley’s (and the Settlement’s) efforts. W. A. Lamborn of 
the Malaria Bureau in the Federated Malay States, for instance, reported that the Settlement’s 
anti-mosquito measures were “thoroughly carried out” though “the supineness of the Chinese 
authorities” of Greater Shanghai “enhanced” the difficulties of mosquito eradication.45 As we 
shall see, the Settlement’s relationship with the city’s Chinese municipality profoundly 
impacted upon the former’s trans-municipal management of malaria. The Settlement’s 
reliance on ‘mosquito brigades’ represented a significant contrast to Hong Kong’s 
management of the disease. Firstly Shanghai’s approach encompassed the entirety of the 
territory under its jurisdiction, as opposed to Hong Kong’s prioritisation of the city of Victoria 
and the prophylactic protection of the colonial state in the New Territories. This contrast 
significantly impacted upon the expansion of both governments’ anti-malaria campaigns in 
the 1930s. Whereas Hong Kong contented itself with extending its efforts within its borders, 
the International Settlement increasingly managed the disease beyond its jurisdiction. 
Secondly Stanley’s brigades laid the foundations from which the Settlement’s Malaria 
Prevention Unit evolved in the 1930s. Without this legacy, the Settlement would most 
probably have resorted to importing foreign experts as Hong Kong did. 
Table 5.7. Mosquito Extermination Work, 1909-11.46 
Year 
Acres of stagnant waters 
removed on land 
Acres of stagnant waters 
removed in and around houses  
Acres of stagnant 
waters oiled weekly  
1909 2,204 149,529 109,893 
1910 26,736 170,623 17,000 
1911 43,636 78,115 44,558 
 
Breeding Pools and Legislation 
 C. Noel Davis’s appointment as Commissioner of Public Health in 1921 ushered in a 
new era of anti-malaria activity in the Settlement. He opened his first Annual Report by 
emphasising the “enormous economic significance” of public health measures, arguing that 
“the modern Public Health Department should be the most powerful and valuable force for 
individual and social good, and its efficiency the surest index of an enlightened and progressive 
                                                          
44 Stanley, Annual Report 1912, SMA, U1/16/4651, 34. 
45 Lamborn conducted a survey into the prevalence of Stegomyia fasciata, the carrier of yellow fever, 
in three Japanese ports and two Chinese ones, including Shanghai. Although Stanely retired shortly 
before the survey took place his successor, Dr. C. Noel Davis, had not yet implemented any major 
changes to the Settlement’s anti-malaria campaign. W. A. Lamborn, “The Mosquitos of some Ports of 
China and Japan,” Bulletin of Entomological Research 12, no. 4 (1922): 403-404, 404. 
46 Data from Stanley’s annual reports for 1909 through 1911. 
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community”.47 Though not a priority, he nevertheless considered mosquito prevention “an 
important problem from the point of view of health and comfort”, one that was rendered 
“peculiarly difficult” by Shanghai’s marshy alluvial topography.48 As in previous years the 
sanitary inspectors collected mosquito specimens from all over the Settlement. But Davis 
extended the annual anti-mosquito campaigns over much larger areas of swampy land in the 
Eastern and Western Districts.49 At the outset Davis identified two major challenges to the 
successful implementation of the department’s campaign. Firstly construction sites tended to 
promote mosquito breeding by inadvertently creating stagnant pools of water. Secondly the 
campaign faced opposition from within and without the Settlement. For example some of the 
Settlement’s Chinese population in the rural Western district actively opposed this campaign, 
whilst the “hostility of the native authorities” hampered the campaign along the edges of the 
Northern and Central Districts.50 Davis also complained about the apathy of the Settlement’s 
foreign population.51 
Faced with these two challenges, Davis called for an amendment to the Settlement’s 
building permits and the distribution of public health propaganda in the form of a municipal 
notice. Davis advised the Public Works Department to insert a clause into the building permit 
that instructed developers to prevent the formation of mosquito breeding sites.52 The Deputy 
Commissioner of Public Works initially dismissed this amendment as unnecessary, claiming 
that a bye-law already empowered the Public Health Department (P.H.D.) to take action 
against mosquito nuisances.53 According to members of the department, however, the 
wording of the bye-law was too general and had rarely been used to prosecute offenders 
under Davis’s predecessor. One of the inspectors also noted that his mosquito brigade was 
powerless when it came to “wealthy ex-officials” and “influential foreigners” who refused 
access to their properties.54 Davis eventually convinced the Commissioner of Public Works of 
the necessity of including the clause.55 The Public Health Department also issued a municipal 
notification, in English, Japanese and Russian, stipulating that the presence of mosquito larvae 
in stagnant water constituted a nuisance.56 
 The notification did little to solve the Health Department’s problems. The procedure 
under the bye-law was considered too cumbersome and time-consuming, and the notification 
                                                          
47 C. Noel Davis, Shanghai Municipal Council. Public Health Department. Annual Report 1922 
(Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1923), SMA, U1/16/4653, 4. 
48 Ibid., 6. 
49 Ibid., 6, 46. 
50 Ibid., 46. 
51 Ibid., 46. Although Stanley had only hinted at this foreign apathy, it certainly existed and was 
resented by some. Mosquito-Bitten [pseud.], letter to the editor, North-China Herald, July 1, 1911, 32; 
Scratching [pseud.], letter to the editor, North-China Herald, June 25, 1921, 893-894. 
52 C. Noel Davis (C.P.H.) to Harpur (C.P.W.), 19 Jan. 1923, SMA, U1/14/2349, 2. 
53 (D.C.P.W.), to Davis, 26 Jan. 1923, SMA, U1/16/2693, 24. 
54 C. Hong (P.H.D.), 31 Jan. 1923, SMA, U1/16/2693, 5. 
55 Harpur to (Sec., S.M.C.), 17 Apr. 1923, SMA, U1/14/2349, 9. 
56 C. Noel Davis, Shanghai Municipal Council. Public Health Department. Annual Report 1923 (1924), 
SMA, U1-16-4653, 42. See also SMA, U1/16/2693, 7-11.  
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was “found to have no legal value”.57 Wealthy Chinese residents, for instance, continued to 
refuse admittance to the department’s mosquito brigades. Davis lamented: 
The breeding of mosquitoes within the Settlement must be an indictable offence 
before the mosquito is abolished. Until this is so we can only continue our present 
method of persuasion, tact and patient effort. This is slow, and expensive, an all good 
achieved may be undone by one recalcitrant householder.58 
Davis made similar complaints in his three subsequent Annual Reports.59 The department was 
especially frustrated by its inability to tackle the environmental conditions beyond the 
Settlement’s borders.60 No action could be taken, for example, in response to a complaint 
from a local resident about a mosquito-breeding creek because it lay beyond the Settlement’s 
limits, where the local villagers opposed the oiling of creeks.61 These conditions adversely 
affected the Settlement’s residents by promoting malaria and other contagious diseases.62 In 
a bid to improve the effectiveness of the Settlement’s anti-malarial campaign, responsibility 
for all creek cleansing and drainage operations was transferred to the Public Works 
Department in late 1927.63 Ultimately the problem of mosquito breeding grounds beyond the 
Settlement’s borders soon emerged as a defining and controversial issue in the Settlement’s 
environmental management of the disease. 
 Davis’s department also innovated a new anti-mosquito measure: fish that fed on 
mosquito larvae. Stanley’s ‘Mosquito Notice’ had drawn the general public’s attention to the 
anti-malarial benefits of small fish in private ornamental ponds for over a decade.64 But the 
department only began to conduct extensive experiments with different species of mosquito-
eating fish under Davis.65 Experiments with a batch of Gambusia affinis (‘Western 
Mosquitofish’) from the Bureau of Science in Manila, for instance, proved so successful that 
the P.H.D. ordered more.66 The department hoped that by advertising the free distribution of 
these fish to owners of private ponds, Gambusia affinis and the ‘Henli’ minnow would make 
an important contribution towards the department’s annual anti-malarial campaign: 
                                                          
57 (Actg. C.P.H.) to E. T. Maitland (Prosecuting Solicitor), 26 May 1924, SMA, U1/16/2693, 21; C. Noel 
Davis, Shanghai Municipal Council. Public Health Department. Annual Report 1924 (Shanghai: Kelly & 
Walsh, 1925), SMA, U1/16/4653, 44. 
58 Davis, Annual Report 1924, SMA, U1-16-4653, 45. 
59 C. Noel Davis, Shanghai Municipal Council. Public Health Department. Annual Report 1925 
(Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1926), SMA, U1/16/4653, 45; C. Noel Davis, Shanghai Municipal Council. 
Public Health Department. Annual Report 1926 (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1927), SMA, U1-16-4654, 68; 
C. Noel Davis, Shanghai Municipal Council. Public Health Department. Annual Report 1927 (Shanghai: 
Kelly & Walsh, 1928), SMA, U1-16-4654, 63. 
60 Meleney (P.H.D.), 26 May 1924, SMA, U1/16/2693, 20; Davis, Annual Report 1924, SMA, 
U1/16/4653, 44. 
61 (D.C.P.W.) to P. W. Samman, 20 Apr. 1926, SMA, U1/14/2349, 97. 
62 G. B. Marsh (P.H.D.) to H. Bland (P.H.D.), 1 Aug. 1926, SMA, U1/14/2349, 100. 
63 Bland to Davis, 11 Nov. 1927, SMA, U1/14/2349, 155. 
64 Stanley, Annual Report 1909, SMA, U1/16/4651, 33. This notice was reprinted verbatim in every 
Annual Report through 1921. 
65 Davis, Annual Report 1923, SMA, U1/16/4653, 42. 
66 Davis, Annual Report 1924, SMA, U1-16-4653, 44; Davis, Annual Report 1925, SMA, U1-16-4653, 45. 
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It is certain that such stocking of ponds will lead to increase in the comfort of 
householders and their neighbours by reducing somewhat the number of mosquitoes, 
though, as already noted, full public co-operation is needed to produce any marked 
reduction.67 
The department improved its breeding program, experimented with other species and 
increased its fish stocks with advice from the US Bureau of Fisheries and the Rockefeller 
Foundation.68 In 1929, for instance, the department distributed 4,000 Gambusia, 14,000 local 
minnow and 300 Henli minnow.69 
 
Malaria and the Military 
 A surprise outbreak of malaria in 1927 amongst the troops stationed beyond the 
Settlement’s borders profoundly impacted upon the geographical scope of the Settlement’s 
management of the disease. An epidemic broke out amongst the Shanghai Defence Force, 
which was encamped near the Shanghai Golf Club in Hungjao some five miles to the west of 
the Settlement. The incidence of malaria rose at an alarming rate amongst both the British 
and Indian troops within months of the arrival of a contingent of Punjabi troops from Hong 
Kong and a Jhansi Brigade from India.70 According to Lt. Col. MacArthur (R.A.M.C.), the troops 
stationed in Hungjao were forced to evacuate their camp because the medical authorities 
feared a “disaster”.71 The outbreak revealed a startling local ignorance about the prevalence 
of the disease. Strikingly neither the military nor the civilian authorities were aware that 
malaria-carrying mosquitoes abounded along the western outskirts of the Settlement. Indeed 
in his report MacArthur stated that several medical and lay practitioners had assured him that 
malaria did not even exist in Shanghai. Moreover he was incredulous that the site at Hungjao 
had been selected for a military encampment in the first place given the prevalence of malaria-
carrying Anopheles hyrcanus.72 Davis was perplexed by MacArthur’s claims, particularly as his 
predecessor Stanley had highlighted the prevalence of the disease ever since the turn of the 
century.73 Moreover Lamborn, the medical entomologist from the Federated Malay States 
                                                          
67 C. Noel Davis, Shanghai Municipal Council. Public Health Department. Annual Report 1928, 
(Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1929), SMA, U1-16-4654, 67. Soochow Creek was nicknamed ‘Henli’ 
because it served as the Settlement’s primary stretch of ‘rowable’ river. The buildings of the Shanghai 
Rowing Club, located on the Creek near the Garden Road Bridge (now known as the Waibaidu Birdge) 
and the creek’s confluence with the Huangpu River, were restored in 2010. 
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70 Davis, Annual Report 1927, SMA, U1/16/4654, 23. 
71 W. P. MacArthur, “The Adult Mosquitoes of Shanghai”, ca. 1927, SMA, U1/16/2736, 3. 
72 Ibid., 2-3; W. P. MacArthur, “The adult mosquitoes of Shanghai,” Journal of the Royal Army Medical 
Corps 52, no. 4 (1929): 241-247. 
73 Davis to MacArthur, 3 June, 1929, SMA, U1/16/2739, 13. 
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who visited Shanghai in the early 1920s, had specifically identified the Settlement’s outskirts 
as a major breeding site for this species.74 MacArthur replied: 
When at the beginning of the malaria outbreak, I told two practitioners of standing, 
known to you, that we had then thirty or forty men down with malaria they were 
dumbfounded, and argued that the troops had brought the malaria into 
Shanghai….My recollection is that the outbreak caused general surprise, and I cannot 
remember that anyone said, “Well, what else did you expect?”75 
The tone of Davis’s entry on ‘Mosquito Reduction’ in the Annual Report for 1929, his last as 
Commissioner of Public Health, clearly hinted at his frustration at the apparent lack of popular 
awareness about the department’s efforts. Not only did he draw attention to MacArthur’s 
report in the Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps as well as Stanley’s old Annual Reports, 
but he emphatically stated that “as long ago as the 1840’s and the 1850’s, Dr. Lockhart and 
Dr. James Henderson wrote about malaria in Shanghai”.76 The lack of popular awareness 
about the prevalence of malaria in and around Shanghai is surprising, and suggests how 
ineffective the department’s public health propaganda was. 
 The outbreak in the Hungjao area also raised a new and disturbing spectre: the 
possibility that Chinese communities residing immediately beyond the Settlement’s borders 
served as malarial ‘hosts’. The military outbreak was swiftly followed by reports of civilian 
cases of malaria nearby. The Public Health Department launched a “hurried survey” of seven 
Chinese villages in the area, identifying 200 “probable cases”.77 The general public initially 
blamed the outbreak on the newly-arrived contingent of Punjabi troops from the garrison in 
Hong Kong.78 Davis, however, concluded that whilst the initial outbreak amongst the non-
British troops was triggered by the arrival of the fresh troops, he traced the subsequent 
outbreak amongst the British troops and local residents to the Chinese population living in the 
rural areas immediately to the west of the Settlement.79 The army’s rigorous use of mosquito 
nets and the regular oiling of nearby breeding grounds appeared to reduce the prevalence of 
the disease in the year after the outbreak, but the number of civilian and military cases began 
to rise again in 1929 (fig. 24).80 Dr. Jordan, who was appointed acting then full Commissioner 
of Public Health after Davis’s departure at the end of 1929, was alarmed that “the very large 
increase in the number of Malaria cases opens up a vista which is by no means pleasant”.81 
Unlike the authorities in Hong Kong, the medial authorities had never previously thought of 
Greater Shanghai’s Chinese inhabitants as a ‘host’ population and therefore a potential source 
of infection to the Settlement’s foreign community. Reducing the number of notified civilian 
                                                          
74 W. A. Lamborn, “The Mosquitos of some Ports of China and Japan,” Bulletin of Entomological 
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80 Ibid., 63. 
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and medical cases was therefore an urgent matter. But the medical authorities also recognised 
that the implementation of anti-malaria measures along and beyond the Settlement’s borders 
was impossible without the support of the French and Chinese municipal authorities.82  
Figure 24. Military and Civilian Cases of Malaria, 1927-32. 
 
 
 The outbreak coincided with the Nationalists rise to power – a political development 
which had resulted in a significant deterioration in the Public Health Department’s 
relationship with the recently-established Department of Health of Greater Shanghai. Shortly 
before his departure Davis lamented the Nationalists’ duplicity in a confidential report: 
In summing up it is clear that while Dr. Hou Ki Hu [the new Chinese Commissioner of 
Health] and the officials of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai were extended all 
possible facilities and co-operation by the Public Health Department they not only 
signally failed to return the courtesies extended to them but through the medium of 
the Press indulged in political chicanery and carried on a scurrilous campaign of 
misrepresentation against the S.M.C. in general and the P.H.D. in particular. In 
conclusion, it must be said, that until the Chinese are willing and able to think 
honestly, to observe and record facts as they are and not as they wish them to be… it 
is hopeless for Foreigners to attempt to meet them on a common ground of mutual 
trust, understanding and co-operation.83 
This animosity negatively impacted upon the Settlement’s anti-malaria activities, notably in 
the vicinity of the British troops stationed beyond the Settlement’s jurisdiction. For example 
Jordan informed the senior British military medical officer that “on one occasion a number of 
our oiling coolies were arrested by the Chinese authorities for interference”.84 By 1932 Jordan 
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warned the military authorities that if they continued with their small-scale anti-larval 
measures, they would find themselves “faced by a riotous population”.85 
 
Innovation, Experimentation and the ‘Flying Column’ 
Jordan’s commissionership oversaw the most significant transformations in the Public 
Health Department’s management of malaria, including the establishment of the Malaria 
Prevention Unit. Whereas Wellington, Hong Kong’s first Director of Medical and Sanitary 
Services, was transferred from the Federated Malay States, Jordan had risen through the ranks 
of the Public Health Department and was therefore well-versed with his predecessor’s anti-
malaria campaigns.86 At the beginning of his tenure he presciently predicted that malaria 
would “be one of the diseases to be reckoned with in the future”.87 As such he was especially 
eager for his department to solicit advice from abroad. Under Jordan the Public Health 
Department maintained a separate folder entitled “Methods of Control in Other 
Municipalities: Mosquitoes”, which contained information on malaria prevention in the 
Philippines, South Africa, Portugal, Great Britain and Hong Kong.88 Jordan’s principal frame of 
reference was south-east Asia. He was certainly aware, for example, of Malcolm Watson’s 
anti-malaria campaigns in the Federated Malay States.89 But it was to the Philippines – the 
source of the department’s earliest stocks of mosquito-eating fish – that Jordan turned to for 
advice. He enquired as to the possibility of despatching one of the Settlement’s Senior Health 
Inspectors to Manila to observe the Philippines’s anti-malaria efforts first-hand.90 Dr. Farjardo, 
Director of the Philippines Health Service, supplied Jordan with a summary of his department’s 
anti-malaria work from a local scientific journal.91 Moreover he informed Jordan that “my 
government will only be too glad to welcome your Health Inspector”, not least because Dr. 
Wu Lien The, the new Commissioner of Health for Greater Shanghai, had recently visited the 
malaria field laboratory north of Manila only the year before.92 
Jordan’s subordinates were equally as passionate about malaria prevention, initiating 
a number of independent local experiments. For instance, his staff briefly trialled quick lime 
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as a means of killing mosquito larvae. Having observed on a number of occasions that 
mosquitoes failed to breed in water containing quick lime, Inspector Noon conducted a series 
of successful tests in his office and then at various sites throughout the Settlement. He 
recommended that the department initiate its own experiments.93 Sadly for Noon, these 
additional experiments proved unsuccessful. The Chief Analyst concluded that although the 
lime had “a definite, though slow, larvicidal action”, he argued that its effectiveness was 
restricted to small collections of water.94 Further experiments in the Northern district 
confirmed the Chief Analyst’s conclusions.95 Instead the department briefly shifted its 
attention to reports from India about a French mercury vapour lamp that allegedly killed 
mosquitoes.96 Unable to secure additional information by himself, Jordan enlisted the help of 
the local French Consular authorities to contact Prof. Seguy, an entomologist at the Natural 
History Museum in Paris.97 Seguy alleged that the ray could attract mosquitoes, but was “not 
prepared to say what effect it would have on oriental mosquitoes whose habits are not 
comparable to occidental ones”.98 Fortunately for Jordan The Shanghai Times reported that 
the ray’s inventor was due to visit Shanghai in the near future to demonstrate the ray’s 
effectiveness to the all three municipal authorities.99 Ultimately the department never 
adopted this idea, but the degree of innovation demonstrated by the International Settlement 
during this period stood in marked contrast to Hong Kong’s management of the disease. 
 Both Jordan and his subordinates became increasingly dissatisfied with the 
Settlement’s existing approach to malaria prevention as a result of the alarming increase in 
reported cases. Whilst the incidence amongst the foreign population had witnessed a 
dramatic decline since the early 1930s, the number of Chinese resident and non-resident cases 
was on the increase (fig. 25). In a Staff Memorandum to his Chief Health Inspectors Jordan 
concluded: 
I really feel that the time is past for this department alone of all the health 
departments, to continue its oiling and disinfection with methods which are no better, 
after all, than an improved garden syringe, distributing large globules of disinfectant 
and penetrating nowhere except by accidental seepage.100 
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Jordan increasingly identified Shanghai’s urban expansion into the countryside as one of the 
driving forces behind this alarming increase.101 He argued that the “magnificent progress in 
road making” simultaneously encouraged Shanghai’s residents to travel to the surrounding 
countryside where they were liable to be infected with malaria, and promoted the migration 
of malaria-infected individuals from rural areas to Shanghai.102 He even suggested that 
“automatic traffic to some extent functions as a carrier of Anophelines from suburban districts 
to the Central areas”.103 These comments echoed those of Hong Kong’s medical officials.104 
Figure 25. Notified Cases of Malaria Amongst the Foreign and Chinese Communities, 1927-36. 
 
 
 The Public Health Department overhauled its approach to malaria prevention by 
initiating strategic, structural, technical and operational changes. Firstly Jordan called for 
district spot maps to be drawn up in order to pinpoint the source of an outbreak (see fig. 
27).105 The department had used spot maps to chart the distribution of plague rats, plague 
victims and anti-plague measures during the early 20th century.106 The cholera outbreak of 
1932 was similarly mapped out.107 At a glance these maps provided a visual representation of 
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the most insalubrious neighbourhoods. By chronologically colour-coding notified cases of 
malaria, Jordan believed that the task of identifying the “anopheline foci” would be relatively 
straightforward.108 Secondly his staff in the Eastern and Western districts called for the 
number of mosquito brigades to be doubled and for the number of staff to be increased from 
24 to 59 (table 5.2). 
Table 5.8. Proposed changes to the anti-malarial staff in the Eastern and Western Districts.109 
District 
Existing Staff (1934) Proposed Staff (1935) 
Sub-District Staff Sub-District Staff 
Eastern 1 & 2 E 
1 Overseer, 1 
Foreman & 9 
Coolies 
1 E 
1 Overseer, 1 Foreman 
& 9 Coolies 
2 E 
1 Overseer, 1 Foreman 
& 9 Coolies 
3 E 1 Foreman 5 Coolies 
4&5 E 1 Foreman & 5 Coolies 
Western 
1, 2 & 3 W 
1 Overseer & 
5 Coolies 
1, 2 & 3 W 
1 Overseer and 3 
squads of 4 coolies 
4 W 7 Coolies 4 W 3 squads of 4 coolies 
  
The Public Health Department also overhauled the technical apparatus used by these 
mosquito brigades. All four District Inspectors agreed that the department’s reliance on two-
wheeled tanks to transport anti-mosquito oil to the breeding sites was outdated. These tanks 
were unsuitable for the terrain and they were allegedly a “direct incentive to waste as the 
coolies feel that as soon as the oil was finished then they could loaf a little bit more”.110 But 
selecting which new spraying apparatus to purchase was easier said than done. The 
department assiduously researched the models that were available on the international 
market.111 Jordan’s staff reported that the “Martsmith Headland Knapsack Sprayer”, a type of 
backpack sprayer, would be ideal for Shanghai.112 Jordan was hesitant, however, to import the 
modern sprayers favoured by some of his subordinates before testing cheaper locally-
obtainable varieties.113 Inspector Wolnizer dismissed the haversacks being used by the 
Chinese authorities; his superior disparagingly reported that “This is a locally made machine, 
they have faithfully copied TRADEMARK and all”.114 Eventually the department purchased 
                                                          
108 Jordan, “Staff Memo No.29: Malaria”, 15 Aug. 1934, SMA, U1/16/2624, 32. 
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twelve haversack sprayers and imported four patent spray tanks.115 The spray tanks were 
mounted on carriages “designed particularly for use in camps, hospitals, schools, factories and 
large foreign houses” because they were found to be “too heavy and awkward for the Chinese 
coolies”.116 Wolnizer also developed his own prototype of a horizontal pressure sprayer tank 
mounted on wheels.117 He managed to build the tank in just over three weeks despite a brief 
setback when his “experimental tank exploded, which proved the big joke of the week”.118 
Jordan was so impressed that he tried to persuade a Birmingham-based company that built 
sprayers to purchase Wolnizer’s design, though Wolnizer was later forced to defend himself 
against accusations of plagiarism. Jordan’s active interest in the development of the 
department’s spraying equipment was striking. He regularly visited the sub-districts where his 
staff was experimenting with the new equipment and he held strong views about the type of 
equipment that was needed.119 
 The most innovative operational change, at least as far as Jordan was concerned, was 
the formation of a mobile anti-mosquito squad: ‘The Flying Column’. Given Shanghai’s flat, 
urban landscape, Jordan was adamant that mobility was the key to modernising the 
department’s approach to malaria prevention. In a lecture to his staff, Jordan dismissed his 
predecessor Stanley’s claims about the effectiveness of the department’s early anti-malaria 
measures as “absurd” and claimed that the department “had been muddling through ever 
since”.120 He tasked District Inspector Bloom to trial “a flying mechanised column” using one 
of the department’s vans.121 By deploying this “flying column” against the larger pools of water 
in the Eastern and Western districts, Jordan hoped that the regular mosquito squads, who 
travelled on foot, would be able to operate more efficiently within their respective health 
districts.122 Moreover the trials provided an ideal opportunity to experiment with Ginsburg’s 
larvicide on a large scale.123 Despite minor setbacks – one of the pumps “blew out from the 
bottom” and an overseer injured himself by falling into a ditch – the initial trial in the Eastern 
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District proved highly promising.124 So too did subsequent trials in both the Western and 
Eastern Districts.125 Jordan was so pleased with the result of Bloom’s trials that he organised 
a demonstration – using water instead of larvicide – on the lawns of the Isolation Hospital for 
the benefit of the press (fig. 26).126 
 
Figure 26. The Public Inauguration of the Flying Column, ca. Aug. 1936. 
Four Mosquito Coolies with Sprayers and one Coolie standing next to the pump (front-left).127 
Popular criticisms about the Public Health Department’s anti-malaria measures may 
have contributed to the timing of this trial. The idea of forming a mobile squad was not in fact 
a novel one. Bloom had first proposed the idea of a “flying squad” as early as August 1934 as 
part of the re-organisation of the department’s anti-mosquito staff.128 But his suggestion was 
only taken up two years later, shortly after the editor of The North-China Daily News 
forwarded a very critical letter from a local resident to Jordan. The letter’s author, who used 
the pseudonym ‘More Than Once Bitten’, complained that “the extent of the mosquito 
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menace in a city as large and wealthy as Shanghai is surprising and disgraceful”, and he 
suggested that most residents thought Jordan’s department did “very little to suppress” this 
menace.129 Jordan drafted a disparaging letter to the paper’s editor in a moment of “haste 
and in heat both external & internal” that opened with: “I really think this sort of ‘twaddle’ is 
quite impossible to answer”.130 Rather than sending this letter, though, Jordan drafted a more 
sober reply in which he explained that the death rate from malaria was much lower in 
Shanghai than in Hong Kong (0.12 per 1,000 compared to 0.39), in spite of the fact that the 
Settlement’s reported population was larger by some 165,000 inhabitants (or 16.6%).131 
 Jordan deliberately infused his discussions about the ‘Flying Column’ with a militaristic 
rhetoric. Whereas his colonial counterpart Dr. Wellington (fittingly) envisioned malaria 
prevention the way a general strategized for war, Jordan outlined his approach in terms of 
tactical deployments. Thus in his report outlining the Flying Column’s workings, he compared 
the haversack sprayers to “rifles”; the mosquito brigades to infantry units; the ten-gallon drum 
and the knapsack sprayers to “a squad of Maxim guns”; and the compressed-air sprayers to 
“big guns for heavy work”.132 This rhetoric was far more explicit than the pseudo-military 
references that he had briefly used the year before.133 They were also far more explicit than 
Wellington’s comments. Jordan explicitly used “quasi-military language throughout as it 
would seem it is the only language which expresses the idea satisfactorily”.134 Indeed he 
claimed that the inspiration behind the very name ‘Flying Column’ came from the fact that 
most of his staff had military experience. In a lecture on malaria prevention to his staff, he 
suggested that the Column’s purpose was comparable to that of the Police’s “Red Maria”, 
rounding up “undesirables”: 
The local Policeman on his beat reports to the local Inspector (also on his beat) that 
there has been an armed robbery, a riot, or some other infringement of the law, which 
requires the presence of more policemen than are available on the spot. The Red 
Maria immediately supplies these; the area is combed and it is to be hoped that the 
malefactors are picked up. Applying this simile to mosquito work, the local Inspector 
looks at his map, ticks off anophelene breeding areas which are too large to be dealt 
with by his own staff, and calls in the Flying Column. The Flying Column deals with the 
area in half an hour, as against the three or four days previously occupied, and then 
passes on to other work. But the Inspector has not finished nor has his staff any more 
than our policeman in the previous simile. He must scout round and see if any 
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criminals or Anophelene larvae have escaped the attention of the Flying Column. He 
must deal with them and at the same time watch the area combed by the Flying 
Column for the reappearance of such larvae.135 
For Jordan, the Flying Column’s mechanised mobility represented the modern antithesis to 
the department’s current reliance on “bows and arrows”.136 According to this militaristic 
approach to malaria prevention, accurate maps and precisely-rehearsed strategies 
underpinned the successful deployment of the Column. Jordan gave specific instructions as to 
how the breeding sites of both Anopheles and Culex mosquitoes were to be mapped and he 
drew a schematic of the Column’s larvicidal “drill”.137 
 For all Jordan’s rhetoric about a modern militaristic campaign against malaria, the 
Flying Column was still in its infancy. It was most certainly not a highly mobile squad equipped 
with ‘big guns’, ‘Maxims’ and ‘rifles’. Rather it consisted of a van with some spraying 
equipment. Indeed the department only discussed the possibility of mounting the Column’s 
staff on bicycles at the conclusion of the anti-mosquito campaign for that year.138 Jordan must 
have realised how tenuous his militaristic similes were when he compared “oil cans” to “close 
quarter weapons”: 
Inspectors with their squads thus … represent Infantry, and like infantry will be armed 
with weapons of precision….Like infantry however, at times they will need close 
quarter weapons, which in the case of anti-mosquito warfare seem to be to be 
represented largely by suitable oil cans for pouring film into gutters etc., not get-at-
able by the sprayers.139 
Strikingly this rhetoric was abandoned almost as quickly as it had appeared. Neither Jordan 
nor any of his staff ever resorted to this rhetoric again after 1936. Precisely why is unclear, but 
the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War may have trivialised Jordan’s military metaphors: 
knapsack and compressed-air sprayers could hardly be compared to machine guns and 
artillery at a time when the atrocities of modern warfare encircled the Settlement. Within the 
context of the Settlement’s management of malaria, however, the formation of the Flying 
Column nevertheless marked an important turning point. Firstly the retention of the Column’s 
foreign and Chinese coolie staff on a permanent basis – as opposed to temporarily hiring staff 
afresh every spring – enabled the authorities to promote specialist knowledge, thereby 
increasing the effectiveness of its anti-malaria campaigns.140 Secondly the Flying Column 
marked the genesis of a dedicated departmental sub-unit to Hong Kong’s Malaria Bureau: the 
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Memo: B12 Anti-Mosquito & Disinfection Unit”, 26 Oct. 1936, SMA, U1/16/2701, 34. 
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Malaria Prevention Unit (M.P.U.). Unlike Hong Kong’s Malaria Bureau, however, the M.P.U. 
was responsible for co-ordinating a much more systematic coverage of the territory under its 
jurisdiction. 
 
The Malaria Prevention Unit 
 The Malaria Prevention Unit gradually evolved out of the Settlement’s existing anti-
malaria materiel. District Inspector W. J. Silvey, who was placed in charge of the column in the 
autumn of 1936, was responsible for amalgamating the Flying Column with the Settlement’s 
district mosquito squads and for managing this M.P.U. through to early 1943.141 Silvey’s 
appointment to the Flying Column was largely a matter of coincidence, rather than the 
product of any specialist knowledge on his part. Despite the paucity of source material, it is 
clear that his involvement in the department’s anti-malaria operations during the early 1930s 
was not exceptional.142 On the contrary, Health Inspector Sunblad was chosen instead of Silvey 
to conduct the delegates to the ninth congress of the Far Eastern Association of Tropical 
Medicine (Nanjing, 1934) – possibly including Hong Kong’s Government Malariologist R. B. 
Jackson – on a tour of the Settlement’s anti-malarial activities; Inspector Mentor was selected 
to conduct the leprosy tour.143 But by the time of the Flying Column’s press launch in August 
1936, Silvey was a District Inspector in the Western District.144 The fact that the addenda to 
the staff memorandum stipulated that the Flying Column would “in future act under the 
instructions of the District Inspector (at present Mr. Silvey)” clearly indicated that Silvey 
earned the appointment by dint of his position rather than his person.145 He was simply in the 
right place at the right time. 
From the outset Silvey recognised the need for close co-operation between the 
permanent staff of the Flying Column and the temporary staff of the district mosquito squads. 
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He suggested that he be “authorised to advise and assist” the sanitary inspectors in charge of 
the latter squads in order to bring the Settlement’s management of the disease “a little more 
up-to-date”.146 Inevitably his suggestion led to a “bone of contention” with the Chief Health 
Inspectors, who were reluctant to relinquish control over their respective district mosquito 
brigades, especially to a man who was junior to them in status.147 Instead they expected Silvey 
to report the Flying Column’s weekly programme of activities to them in advance. Moreover 
J. A. Stoddart, Chief Health Inspector for the Central District, argued that “one man can not 
effectively and efficiently supervise this work throughout the whole Settlement”.148 Silvey, 
however, explained that he merely wanted to advise the district mosquito squads working on 
the outer fringes of the Western and Eastern districts, i.e. the “principal mosquito breeding 
areas” and therefore the focus of the Flying Column’s activities.149 He also he dismissed 
Stoddart’s claim by stating that “the Settlement is a mere back-yard in comparison to one man 
[sic] supervised areas in other parts of the world”.150 Ultimately the authorities sided with 
Silvey: he was placed in charge of the Flying Column as well as the mosquito squads in the 
Eastern and Western Districts.151 The Chief Health Inspectors of the Northern and Central 
Districts retained control of their respective squads until early 1939, when these were also 
handed over to Silvey.152 
 Silvey was instrumental in co-ordinating and developing the Malaria Prevention Unit’s 
various elements. The ‘Flying Column’ was divided into squads: the former consisting of a 
foreign inspector, one foreman and sixteen permanent coolies, the latter of an inspector or 
overseer and three permanent coolies. The first squad used a van to transport the heavier 
spraying equipment between the Western and Eastern districts, where they focused on 
tackling the larger mosquito breeding sites, whilst the latter was tasked with investigating 
reported cases of malaria and destroying all adult as well as larval mosquitoes in the vicinity.153 
Accurate maps of notified cases of malaria as well as mosquito breeding spot maps were 
deemed essential for this work (fig. 27).154 Meanwhile the temporary coolies of the district 
mosquito squads searched for mosquito larvae, conducted house-to-house inspections, 
treated small breeding sites, and distributed posters and handbills.155 Responsibility for the 
Public Health Department’s mosquito fish stocks was divided between the Malaria Prevention 
Unit and the Chief Health Inspector in the Western District: the Flying Column was tasked with 
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distributing the stocks maintained by the latter.156 These fish were principally destined for 
ponds in the Settlement’s public parks, ornamental ponds in private properties, rice fields in 
the Eastern district and a number of creeks throughout the Settlement.157 The number of fish 
distributed rose from 6,200 in 1936 to a staggering 70,000 in 1939.158 
 
Figure 27. A corner of the M.P.U. experimental laboratory, ca. 1939. 
Note ‘Mosquito Breeding Spot Maps’ on the wall to the right.159 
 
Silvey, like Jackson in Hong Kong, emphasised the importance of developing the 
expertise of both his permanent and temporary staff. He ensured that all the inspectorial staff 
possessed a copy of “Staff Memoranda: B26 – Mosquito Reduction: Campaign 1937”, which 
detailed the M.P.U.’s activities. Further literature could be loaned on request. He also gave 
clear instructions as to his inspector’s responsibilities towards their respective native staffs: 
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Native Staff should be taught to identify mosquito larvae and to distinguish 
anopheline from culicine. They should also be taught the reason for spraying larvicide, 
not to waste larvicide and to treat all equipment with care, to recognise potential 
anopheline breeding places…to report existence [sic] of stagnant water and other 
sources of mosquito breeding, to be polite to the public, not to enter private grounds 
or houses unless accompanied by the Cadet or Overseer, to keep their uniforms clean 
and to be conversant with the information contained on mosquito handbills.160 
Silvey also held weekly meetings at which the M.P.U. Inspectorial Staff could “discuss 
difficulties, methods, improvement of routine measures, equipment efficiency and malaria 
control generally” to ensure the effectiveness of the anti-mosquito campaign.161 The 
increasing number of ponds under surveillance, for instance, necessitated a specialist sub-
unit. Initially one of the Unit’s mosquito coolies was trained to monitor and stock all the 
private ponds in the Western District; by 1940 the Unit had its own dedicated “Ornamental 
Pond Squad”, which was later mounted on bicycles 162 
Some residents resented the Malaria Prevention Unit’s intrusiveness. For example a 
Mr. Turner of Haiphong Road – a road in the Western district only a handful of streets away 
from the Brenan Road Emergency Leprosarium – complained that these regular visits were a 
waste of time, and he informed the P.H.D.: “I shall be glad if they keep out altogether”.163 
M.P.U. Junior Inspector Woo conceded that the weekly inspection of private ornamental 
ponds was admittedly “futile” in Turner’s case, but lamented that this was “an example of the 
ingratitude and lack of appreciation of Malaria Prevention Work shown by the public”.164 
Jordan empathised with Woo, and requested the Commissioner of Public Works – an “old 
friend” of Turner’s – to “persuade him to be a little more reasonable”: 
I consider Mr. Turner is showing an ungrateful state of mind and I am inclined to take 
some steps to make him realise that he is not entitled to get [mosquito] fish for 
nothing and then make himself objectionable, but I thought you might persuade him 
to be a little more reasonable. You might let me know what you think, as I am strongly 
inclined to see what can be done in regard to Mr. Turner’s stagnant water.165 
Obviously fish were not the principal means of combatting malaria-carrying mosquitoes in the 
Settlement, and Jordan admitted that they were “a somewhat capricious method of mosquito 
control”.166 But the distribution of mosquito-fish was nevertheless considered integral to the 
M.P.U.’s management of the disease, reflecting the urban nature of the Settlement’s 
environment. 
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To the Border and Beyond 
 The Public Health Department’s efforts to tackle mosquito breeding sites on the 
fringes of the International Settlement and beyond represented the most striking difference 
between the Settlement’s and Hong Kong’s management of malaria. Whereas the colonial 
authorities were reluctant to intervene in the rural New Territories, let alone beyond the 
colony’s borders, Jordan tried repeatedly to enlist Chinese municipal support in the years 
immediately preceding the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. His association with the 
Shanghai Yacht Club, located to the south-west of the Settlement precipitated his first 
overture. As the club lay beyond the jurisdiction of Greater Shanghai, Jordan attempted to 
enlist the support of a local Chinese benevolent association but the initiative ultimately fell 
through. Undeterred Jordan seized upon the establishment of the Flying Column and the 
Malaria Prevention Unit in 1936 and 1937 respectively as ideal opportunities to initiate a joint 
anti-malaria campaign in Chinese territory. His Chinese counterpart’s dismissal of both 
proposals not only hindered the Settlement’s efforts to reduce the prevalence of the disease 
within its own borders, but damaged its relationship with a trans-municipal medical research 
institution: the Henry Lester Institute. 
 Jordan increasingly believed that the key to reducing the prevalence of malaria in the 
International Settlement lay in eradicating malaria-carrying mosquitoes on both sides of the 
border. His efforts to reduce the threat from tertian malignant malaria from the environs of 
the Shanghai Yacht Club in the mid-1930s represented an early attempt to tackle the disease 
beyond the Settlement’s borders. A survey of the new mosquito-screened club revealed that 
malignant malaria, the most dangerous form of the disease, abounded in the neighbouring 
Chinese villages.167 Jordan was concerned that the Settlement’s pleasure-seeking house boat-
frequenting residents would not only be inconvenienced by the disease, but would serve as a 
reservoir on their return to the Settlement.168 He believed that the prevalence of malaria near 
the yacht club presented “an opportunity of doing some interesting research work, both in 
regard to vectors and possibly in regard to mass treatment”.169 As a member of the Yacht Club 
himself, Jordan also had a vested interest in reducing the prevalence of the disease.170 But the 
Club and its environs lay several miles beyond the Settlement and therefore the department’s 
jurisdiction.171 The club was also beyond the jurisdiction of Dr. Li Ting An, Commissioner of 
Public Health for Greater Shanghai. Jordan therefore initiated negotiations between the 
Shanghai Yacht Club and Dr. Huang, who presided over a “Benevolent Society” that operated 
in the neighbourhood.172 He successfully convinced the club to agree to supply quinine to the 
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club’s members and to the villages in the area.173 This represented the Settlement’s first and 
only attempt to manage the disease through the wide-scale distribution of quinine. Jordan 
also persuaded the medical staff of Huang’s association to agree to visit the club on a regular 
basis. Unfortunately these negotiations fell through because Huang considered the club’s 
relative geographical isolation too inconvenient to be included on the society’s weekly 
rounds.174 The Yacht Club therefore had to content itself with displaying “Precautions against 
Malaria”, a notice produced especially for the Club by the Public Health Department.175 
The inauguration of the Flying Column the following year presented the Public Health 
Department with a fresh opportunity to initiate a joint anti-malaria campaign with the Chinese 
authorities, this time on a much broader scale. The Nationalist Government had only recently 
begun to conduct local investigations into the prevalence of the disease as part of its efforts 
to build a modern health system.176 For instance Dr. L. C. Feng’s investigation into the 
mosquito-borne transmission of Wucheria bancrofti (roundworm) at Woosung, a small town 
fourteen miles downriver from the International Settlement, represented the Nationalist 
Ministry of Health’s first mosquito survey in the Shanghai area.177 This nascent local interest 
coincided with a gradual rapprochement between the Settlement’s Public Health Department 
and the Nationalist government. Jordan, for instance provided the Nationalist Health 
Administration in Nanjing – the same administration with whom Hong Kong’s Malaria Bureau 
exchanged specimens – with information about the habitat preferences of his department’s 
mosquito-eating fish.178 Word soon spread from Nanjing to the Bureau of Entomology in 
Hangzhou, and later to the Zhejiang Provincial Fisheries Experiment Station.179 As well as 
supplying information and specimens, the Public Health Department also arranged for a 
number of Chinese officials to observe the Settlement’s anti-malarial activities first-hand.180 
Following the Flying Column’s successful trials in the summer of 1936, Jordan felt that the time 
was finally “ripe” for an official overture towards the Chinese municipal health authorities.181 
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He was optimistic that Li Ting An, his Chinese counter-part, would readily appreciate the 
mutual benefits of such a campaign: 
It occurs to me that it might be practicable for us to cooperate fruitfully in [the 
deployment of the Flying Column], particularly if it were possible for a Liaison Officer 
to be detailed to work at certain periods with the Squad when the areas to be 
attended to are areas over which control is divided, or else is under the control of the 
Shanghai City Government. The Settlement would benefit by a diminution of Malaria, 
and the City Government would benefit by not having to spend sums of money on oil, 
apparatus etc. to attend to areas not largely populated, and would thus be enabled to 
concentrate on areas inhabited by ratepayers.182 
Jordan identified two areas of concern (see map 13). The first lay along the 
Settlement’s north-eastern extremity, in the vicinity of the Japanese-owned Kung Dah Cotton 
Mill.183 The majority of the site lay beyond the Settlement’s border even though the mill 
technically lay within the Shanghai Municipal Council’s jurisdiction.184 The second area of 
concern was the land to the west of the Settlement as far as the railway line. The area officially 
lay beyond the Settlement’s borders, but in reality was regarded as the fourth Western sub-
district (4W). The Public Health Department’s district mosquito squads had been operating in 
this extra-Settlement district since the early 1930s and many of the ornamental ponds under 
the department’s (and later the M.P.U.’s) surveillance lay in this district. Jordan’s request for 
co-operation principally concerned the outer extremities of this sub-district, notably along the 
Shanghai-Hangzhou railway line and in the vicinity of Tunsin and Yu Yuen Roads. Dr. Li’s 
assertion that the Chinese Municipality already had the matter in hand came as a 
disappointing response.185 
 The establishment of the Malaria Prevention Unit the following year reopened the 
possibility of conducting an extensive joint anti-mosquito campaign beyond the Settlement’s 
borders. Silvey proposed deploying the M.P.U.’s mobile units much further to the west of the 
Settlement, from the 4 Western sub-district as far as Monument Road, as well as to the north 
of the Kung Dah Cotton Mill (see map 13).186 Silvey’s proposal came on the very eve of war. 
He secured permission from a Colonel Tang for the M.P.U. to operate in the 4 Western sub-
district, i.e. within the railway line, to prevent his squads’ spraying equipment and bicycles 
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from being confiscated.187 Meanwhile Jordan tried once again to secure Chinese support for a 
joint venture, to the northeast of the Settlement in the vicinity of the Kung Dah Cotton Mill 
and to the west beyond the railway line as far as Monument Road. Jordan emphasised the 
“steady growth of malaria throughout Shanghai” and highlighted the technical superiority of 
the Malaria Prevention Unit’s apparatus.188 Rather than agreeing to Jordan’s request for co-
operation, Li opposed the deployment of the M.P.U. in Chinese territory and made it 
adamantly clear that the Settlement’s borders clearly demarcated its sphere of 
responsibility.189 Jordan’s subordinates actually translated Li’s reply twice: the second was 
couched in a more diplomatic tone that the first, presumably to avoid provoking Jordan’s 
notorious and self-professed “Celtic temperament”.190 Unsurprisingly Jordan considered Li’s 
responses a “setback”, informing the Shanghai Municipal Council that Li’s “so-called squads 
will be unable to deal with the matter at all, and it is, therefore, quite obvious that the whole 
matter is merely a political move”.191 Reports from his staff allegedly ‘confirming’ the 
ineffectiveness of the Chinese anti-mosquito squads aggravated Jordan further.192 To make 
matters even worse, residents in the western extra-Settlement area that was to be included 
in the joint-operation complained to the Department about the prevalence of mosquitoes.193 
Jordan dramatically informed the S.M.C. Secretary: 
Unless I receive some assurance [from Dr. Li Ting An] that this work is actually to be 
done, I really must inform the Council officially that I cannot be held in any way 
responsible, should Malaria get out of hand…. 
It will, I think, be fairly evident that the logical thing to do is to kill the mosquitoes 
or their larvae, rather than find out for the “nth” time where they are, and since even 
our resources fall lamentably short of this desideratum, I feel that to allow the laissez-
faire attitude of the Chinese authorities to continue might possibly result in a 
catastrophe, though of course that would depend on the luck of the town.194 
Jordan hoped to pressure Li into conceding that the Chinese authorities were woefully under-
prepared to deal with the situation without the Settlement’s help by detailing how complex, 
extensive and expensive the Settlement’s anti-malarial operations were.195 But the S.M.C. 
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10,000 mosquito fish per year; spraying 800 gallons of concentrated solution at $1,000 per month 
over 25,000 sq. yds of creeks, 2,500 sq. yds. of swamps, and 35,700 sq. yds. of ponds. And that was 
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Secretary considered Jordan’s draft letter inappropriate, and he was forced to send a simple 
formal acknowledgement instead.196 
Relations between the two public health authorities deteriorated to such an extent 
that the Settlement’s anti-malarial units began operating covertly. Jordan was alarmed by 
reports that an M.P.U. squad operating in the 4 Western sub-district, i.e. the extra-Settlement 
area that lay within the railway line, was wearing distinctive departmental uniforms: “would 
[it] not be preferable for outlying areas to be handled ‘in mufti’???” (figs. 28 and 29).197 Silvey’s 
response was striking, and bears reprinting in full: 
Whilst agreeing that it would seem the best policy for our Mosquito Coolies to avoid 
wearing distinctive uniforms while employed in 4 Western, it is felt that this practice 
might eventually weaken our position, in that the public in missing our familiar 
uniformed Staff may obtain the impression that the work was being conducted by the 
Greater Shanghai City Government and the latter authority obtain credit where none 
was really due. 
With all due respect to the Greater Shanghai Public Health Dept. officials it is 
considered that we would be playing into their hands if we adopted the policy of 
hiding our lightunder [sic] a bushel. In this respect, and in an effort to cope with the 
Malaria problem, we might put our own feelings in the matter aside and suggest to 
the Greater Shanghai Health authorities that we conduct the work with our Staff 
wearing the uniforms, if any, of the Greater Shanghai Public Health Department. 
In the meantime the wearing of uniforms has been stopped and I further propose 
to take the present foreign Overseer off the 4 Western job and replace him with a 
[Chinese] Cadet. The fact that the 4 Western Mosquito Staff was entirely Chinese 
might eliminate possibility of trouble and be of interest to the Commissioner of Public 
Health of Greater Shanghai.198 
Silvey was clearly dedicated to eradicating malaria by any means possible. As well as working 
covertly in the 4 Western sub-district, Silvey informed his superiors that the activities of the 
Chinese Municipality’s anti-mosquito staff would be “closely, and discreetly, followed”.199 
                                                          
simply for the annual summer campaign. Jordan to Li Ting An, draft, 15 Apr. 1937, SMA, U1/16/2697, 
50-51. 
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Apr. 1937, SMA, U1/16/2697, 52. 
197 Emphasis in the original. Turnbull to Veit and Silvey, 3 May 1937, SMA, U1/16/2695, 100. 
198 Silvey to Jordan, 3 May 1937, SMA, U1/16/2695, 101. 
199 Silvey to Jordan, 8 June, 1937, SMA, U1/16/2697, 53. This small squad was observed “dipping for 
mosquito larvae” for the very first time; Cadet Waung reported that the squad did not have any 
spraying equipment. The Chinese-language Shun Pao newspaper reported that the Shanghai City 
Government’s “Mosquito and Fly gang” consisted of twelve sanitary coolies and a sanitary engineers. 
C. M. Zao, “Trans. of “Article on Mosquito & Fly Prevention Work by the S’hai City Government in the 
‘Shun Pao’”, ca. 9 June 1937, SMA, U1/16/2697, 54. 




Figure 28 & 29. The distinctive Public Health Department uniforms, ca. 1936-39.200 
 
 Li Ting An’s refusal to support a joint anti-malaria campaign not only impacted on 
Jordan’s perception of the Chinese medical authorities (and their anti-malaria efforts) for the 
worse, it soured Jordan’s close relationship with the Henry Lester Institute. The Institute, 
which was located in the Settlement’s Western district on Avenue Road, was formally 
inaugurated in 1932.201 From the outset the Institute’s Division of Pathological Sciences 
focused its entomological research on the vectoral role of mosquitoes in the transmission of 
filariasis and malaria.202 Dr. Robert C. Robertson, the man who would later criticise the Chinese 
                                                          
200 Jordan, Annual Report 1936, SMA, U1/16/4656, 12; Faulder, “Malaria Prevention,” 310a. 
201 Henry Lester Institute of Medical Research, Untitled annual report, (Shanghai, 1934), 10-13. 
202 For instance Stephen M.K. Hu built on Feng’s research into the mosquito-borne transmission of 
roundworm at Woosung. See bibliography. After completing a Doctor of Science at John Hopkins 
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Mission to Lepers for its handling of the evacuation of the National Leprosarium in the autumn 
of 1937, headed this division. Robertson and his entomological staff developed a close 
working relationship with Jordan and his Public Health Department by the early 1930s. On the 
one hand, the Settlement’s Public Health Department drew on the division’s specialist 
knowledge by sending in mosquito specimens for positive identification.203 Robertson 
subsequently provided Jordan with a selection of all the mosquitoes that were common to the 
Shanghai area, which Jordan mounted in a glass-fronted case in the Public Health 
Department’s library for the benefit of his staff.204 On the other hand, Jordan agreed to 
investigate the mosquito nuisance at the home of Robertson’s friends on Lucerne Road, a 
small lane one kilometre south of the Brenan Road Emergency Leprosarium, in return for 
copies of the Institute’s scientific papers on mosquitoes.205 
Jordan was therefore fully supportive of Robertson’s proposal to relocate the 
Institute’s Field Entomological Station from Kao-chiao in Pudong (i.e. to the west of the 
Settlement across the Huangpu River) to the Millington Boy Scouts Camp, which lay to the 
west of the railway line on Hungjao Road.206 For one thing the camp’s proximity to the 
Settlement ensured that the research would be beneficial to Jordan’s department. The 
selection of the Millington Camp was doubly convenient: Silvey was Assistant Commissioner 
for the Boy Scouts Association.207 At Silvey’s request, Robertson provided a “simple non-
technical article” about the proposed experiments for The Totem: Official Organ of Shanghai 
Scouting in which he compared the Institute to “the Scouts of Medical Science”.208 Thus the 
Settlement’s M.P.U. worked in close co-operation with the Institute’s field station through 
May 1937, providing details about notified cases of malaria amongst the local municipal tax-
paying residents, and Jordan himself was fully supportive of Robertson’s work.209  
                                                          
University, Hu briefly worked with the Chinese Republic’s National Health Administration in Nanjing as 
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This support quickly evaporated following Li Ting An’s refusal to support the 
deployment of the Settlement’s newly-inaugurated Malaria Prevention Unit in the Hungjao 
area beyond the railway line as part of a joint anti-malaria campaign. Robertson called a 
meeting with Jordan in the hope of persuading the Public Health Department to pay for a 
doctor to treat the malaria cases that Robertson’s staff uncovered in the Hungjao area.210 
Jordan refused, informing Robertson that the Public Health Department had been “‘warned 
off’ the areas” in question by the Chinese health authorities and that he “failed to understand 
how he could be of any assistance” to Robertson.211 Robertson dismissed Jordan’s suggestion 
that the Institute turn to the Chinese authorities for support by stating that that they had 
already done so but that the man sent by Li Ting An had provided had been “found tactless at 
work, and more of a nuisance than a help amongst the villagers”.212 A heated exchange rapidly 
ensued between the two men: 
The Commissioner reiterated that this did not concern the P[ublic] H[ealth] 
D[epartment] and asked whether he (Dr. Robertson) expected us, after having been 
snubbed by Dr. Li to pursue the latter, begging for co-operation, or what?... 
Dr. Robertson suggested that in any event, the Public would no doubt blame the 
Department for not taking more vigorous steps, whereupon the Commissioner replied 
that in such a case he would not have the slightest hesitation in releasing for 
publication all of the documentary evidence, which would the truth quite clear to the 
Public [sic].213 
Despite Jordan’s protestations, the Public Health Department was caught between a rock and 
a hard place. On the one hand the Chinese authorities refused to allow them to operate to the 
west of the railway lines. On the other, as Silvey pointed out, the department was in “an 
unenviable position” because it was unable to satisfy the expectations of Hungjao’s municipal 
tax-paying residents.214 Duck, who assumed Jordan’s duties following the latter’s departure 
on leave later that month, was reluctant to exacerbate the situation further. He asked 
Hungjao’s residents not to disclose the department’s statements regarding “the restriction of 
our activities outside the Settlement” because “it may be misconstrued and possibly impair 
existing friendly relations with the City Government Administration which we are anxious to 
maintain”.215 Silvey actually began to assist Dr. S. K. M. Hu of the Institute with one of his 
experiments at the Millington Camp.216 But the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war and the 
Battle of Shanghai permanently disrupted the Institute’s work and rendered the question of 
the Public Health Department’s support moot. 
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Map 23. A Trans-Municipal Approach to Malaria Prevention, 1936-42.217 
The International Settlement is outlined in blue and the 4 Western sub-district in red. The Kung Dah 
Cotton Mill is shaded in yellow (the star denotes the mill building) whilst the Hungjao area from the 4 
Western sub-district west as far as Monument Road is shaded green (this area comprised Jordan’s 
proposed joint-campaign for 1937). Silvey was only able to deploy his M.P.U. squads in a portion of this 
area in 1940, namely as far as Warren Road (shaded purple). The Millington Boy Scouts Camp, which 
served as the Henry Lester Institute’s Field Entomological Research Station is starred orange, and the 
Hungjao Golf Club is starred pink. 
 
The Sino-Japanese War and the Western Extra-Settlement Areas 
 The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the encirclement of Shanghai by Japanese 
troops impacted upon the Malaria Prevention Unit’s operations along the Settlement’s 
eastern and western extremities. The economic ramifications resulted in an immediate 
reduction of the M.P.U.’s staff: Silvey was only able to deploy three district mosquito squads, 
primarily in the Western district, in 1938.218 The M.P.U.’s mobile squad, which now consisted 
of an Austin 7 accompanied by five coolies on bicycles, was initially confined to the Western 
District though Silvey hoped to secure the necessary passes from the Japanese authorities to 
operate in the vicinity of the Kung Dah Cotton Mill in the 6 Eastern sub-district (fig. 30 and 
map 13).219 The following year the M.P.U. actually secured permission from the Japanese 
authorities to operate to the west of the railway line, i.e. well into occupied-territory.220 Silvey 
took the initiative to apply for passes to enter the area, arguing that “apart from the 
                                                          
217 Source of map: http://nla.gov.au/nla.map-brsc47. 
218 One overseer and nine coolies were deployed with 4 haversack sprayers in the 4 Western sub-
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219 Silvey to Jordan, 30 May 1938, SMA, U1/16/2699, 53. 
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to Jordan, 24 May 1939, SMA, U1/16/2624, 70. 
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desirability, or otherwise, of working in the area for political reasons”, the passes would 
enable his staff to tackle breeding sites in the vicinity of military outposts and to conduct 
further experiments.221 He dispatched his subordinate Woo to survey the land running 
immediately parallel to the railway line and the areas either side of Hungjao Road in the 
vicinity of municipal tax-paying residents.222 But the M.P.U. crucially failed to secure this 
permission in writing, as recommended by the S.M.C.’s Treasurer.223 The fresh contingent of 
Japanese troops who replaced those stationed in the area refused Silvey’s staff permission to 
operate west of the railway line. The matter “was not pressed” because of “the prevailing anti-
British and anti-S.M.C. agitation” and because rumours circulated that the Japanese lieutenant 
who had verbally assured Silvey that the M.P.U. would not be obstructed had been shot.224 
Moreover the Japanese authorities had recently apprehended some of the Public Health 
Department’s vehicles.225 The Unit’s troubles did not end with its retreat within the confines 
of the railway line. By now French troops patrolled the southern portion of the 4 Western sub-
district adjacent to the French Concession. These troops refused to allow the M.P.U. to 
respond to complaints from local residents without written permission from the French 
Municipal Council.226 The Public Works Department were similarly barred from taking any 
action to abate the mosquito nuisance.227 Jordan suggested that the French authorities would 
be more amenable once they discovered that the Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council 
resided within the area in question.228 
 
 
Figure 30. The Flying Column: the Austin 7, Trailer Pump and Five Mounted Mosquito Coolies.229 
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 The prospect of deploying the Malaria Prevention Unit’s squads to the west of the 
railway line in 1940 initially appeared bleak. In response to a renewed appeal for assistance 
from the Hungjao Area Association, a local residents’ association, Silvey was forced to concede 
that he lacked the resources to adequately control the situation within the Settlement, let 
alone beyond its borders.230 As well as expressing concern about the prospect of fresh 
confiscations, Jordan highlighted the enormity of the challenge of dealing with the “thousands 
of acres of water” to the west of the railway line: 
To properly undertake the work in this area is a stupendous task as may be judged 
from the difficulties which the American nation had when tackling the Panama Canal, 
which went through a similar watery country.231 
Matters had changed by the summer. An improvement in the drainage operations in the 
Eastern district enabled the M.P.U.’s two mobile units – a squad with a van and a squad with 
a hand-powered trailer pump – to be redeployed in the Hungjao area. Jordan recommended 
detailing one of the Department’s Japanese Inspectors to oversee the unit’s work as he was 
still “a little nervous of the re-action [sic] of the Japanese military”.232 The Shanghai Municipal 
Council successfully petitioned the Japanese authorities, and “after considerable negotiation” 
both mobile units were permitted to operate to the west of the railway line as far as Warren 
Road (see map 13).233 Silvey tempted fate with his reports that neither the Japanese military 
nor the local Chinese authorities interfered with the M.P.U.’s mobile units: one of the hand-
powered trailer pumps was detained by the Japanese authorities in the 4 Western sub-district 
less than a fortnight after he announced that this squad was due to be withdrawn from the 
Hungjao area.234 Fortunately the Deputy Commissioner of Public Health for Greater Shanghai 
negotiated the pump’s release, for which Jordan was especially thankful.235 Despite this 
inauspicious end to the anti-malaria campaign for 1940, the Malaria Prevention Unit 
nevertheless continued to deploy its mobile squads in Western extra-Settlement area and 
beyond the railway line at Hungjao the following year.236 
The Western extra-Settlement area became increasingly volatile under the Chinese 
puppet administration. Confrontations between the puppet police and the Shanghai 
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Municipal Police in the “Badlands” became increasingly common.237 Anti-Settlement 
sentiment continued to threaten the Malaria Prevention Unit’s activities even after the 
Settlement negotiated the establishment of the Western Area Special Police Force (W.A.S.P.) 
early in 1941. For instance an incident involving the Unit’s innocuous ornamental pond squad 
quickly turned hostile. On June 18th, 1941, Tsang King-kwei, one of the squad’s three coolies, 
requested permission to inspect a pond at the Loh Kuo Hotel on avenue Haig.238 According to 
Silvey “the Coolie, wearing P.H.D. uniform, politely tendered his Identity card for inspection”, 
whereupon the gate-keeper proceeded to beat him “stating that he intended to beat and kill 
all S.M.C. employees”.239 Fortunately for Tsang his companion was able to alert their superiors 
at the Malaria Prevention Unit. Tsang and the gate-keeper were first taken to the nearby 
police station – located on the same road as the hotel – but they were all sent on to the 
W.A.S.P. headquarters because of the gate-keepers’ intimidating threats.240 W.A.S.P. 
Inspector Wilkinson reported that “both parties accused each other of being aggressive and 
causing the quarrel”.241 Silvey instructed his ornamental pond squad “not to enter premises 
occupied by W.A. Special Police or political factions” pending the settlement of the assault; 
the watchman was merely reprimanded by the police.242 
Ironically the outbreak of war resulted in a rapprochement between the Settlement’s 
medical authorities and the Henry Lester Institute. The Institute’s main building was closed 
for over a year and many of the foreign staff retired, left China or else did not return from 
leave; Robertson was invited to join the League of Nations’ Epidemic Commission to China.243 
Consequently the Institute’s diminished research on malaria relied increasingly on the Public 
Health Department’s support.244 Unable to conduct field research, the Institute switched its 
focus to examining mosquito breeding habits under urban conditions.245 Silvey and Hu, for 
instance, began to collaborate on a joint paper in early 1941.246 Meanwhile Silvey’s Malaria 
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Prevention Unit continued to stock the ponds at the Millington scout camp, which lay well 
beyond the Settlement’s jurisdiction, with mosquito-eating fish.247 Jordan passed on Silvey’s 
warnings about the necessity of additional anti-mosquito measures to the Commissioner of 
the Shanghai Boy Scouts Association: 
I understand that we have already heavily stocked the mosquito ponds in the 
neighbourhood with anopheline larvae – eating fish but this is only a palliative. 
Moreover, though I have never been a scout, I believe that one of the features of 
scouting is to have Fireside Talks, etc., and to go in for exercises long after dusk. This 
would give the Malaria Mosquito the best possible opportunity to infect and, coupled 
with the obvious disinclination of small boys to take any trouble about their mosquito 
nets, makes it practically impossible for me to advise any suitable measures other than 
the one you do not wish to take, namely the abandoning of the Camp for the summer 
months.248 
Jordan explained that he was hoping to secure a new mosquito repellent from the United 
States, and that he would be more than happy to let the scouts have some. The fact that the 
International Settlement’s Commissioner of Public Health and the Commissioner of the Boy 
Scouts Association (Shanghai Branch) were discussing the possibility of importing repellent for 
the benefit of local campers might seem trivial if it were not for the fact that these discussions 
took placed a little over a month before the Japanese invasion of the Settlement itself. 
 
The Eastern District: The Kung Dah Cotton Mill and the Public Works Department 
 The Settlement’s war-time anti-malaria measures in the Eastern district strained the 
Public Health Department’s relationship with the Public Works Department so severely that 
the Malaria Prevention Unit was forced to justify its very existence. By now the Public Works 
Department had been responsible for filling in or draining mosquito breeding sites for more 
than a decade. As was customary, Silvey compiled lists of the mosquito-breeding sites in the 
Eastern district that needed to be filled in by the Public Works Department.249 The land around 
the Kung Dah Cotton Mill, which now lay in occupied territory, remained a focal point of 
concern. The Settlement’s medical authorities identified the mill’s employees as “a reservoir 
[of malaria] for areas within the Settlement”.250 The fact that the mill was surrounded by 
cultivated rice paddies complicated the task of tackling the incidence of the disease: these 
important mosquito breeding grounds could not simply be filled in. Jordan was nevertheless 
far from impressed with the P.W.D.’s efforts. In a confidential letter to G. G. Phillips, S.M.C. 
Secretary & Commissioner General, Jordan complained that the M.P.U. was forced to expend 
valuable time and expensive resources spraying mosquito breeding sites in the Eastern District 
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because the Public Works Department had “so far done absolutely nothing”.251 Moreover he 
was outraged by a report by one of the P.W.D.’s engineers, which “contained remarks 
reflecting very gravely on my competence, and phrased in somewhat unrestrained 
language”.252 Jordan sent Phillips a personal letter shortly after the two men had inspected 
some of the sites together, which though allegedly “pitched in as conciliatory tone as seems 
possible”, remained highly reproachful of the P.W.D.’s efforts.253 Jordan was also offended by 
the suggestion that Silvey had “readily deceived” him about the true extent of the P.W.D.’s 
efforts.254 Jordan composed an urgent personal letter to Phillips following a report from Silvey 
to the effect that the P.W.D. had failed to take any action: 
You will see that in spite of my having written to you on the subject and in spite of the 
that fact it is costing the Council $1,200 a month to do a job which we abolished last 
year by using eight temporary coolies for a few days, nothing as yet has been done in 
regard to the rice-fields in the Eastern District. Really, it is too much! A most insulting 
letter was written about me and read by a Committee in which letter it was stated 
that a group of unsupervised coolies could do our Malarial work and yet I have to wait 
until well on into the malaria season for ‘tuppenyha’penny’ rice-field jobs to be 
finished and at the same time I am requested not to critise [sic].255 
Initially Phillips sided with A. F. Gimson, the Commissioner of Public Works, but he soon 
realised the futility of antagonising either Jordan or Gimson further.256 Instead he proposed a 
trial compromise which uniquely placed the onus for departmental co-operation on their 
respective subordinates, namely Silvey and Harbottle.257 Both Jordan and Gimson accepted 
the Secretary’s proposal, the latter albeit somewhat grudgingly.258 
 Whilst this compromise proved highly successful, the breakdown in relations between 
the two departments placed the M.P.U.’s very existence in jeopardy. With both departments’ 
anti-malaria expenditures under review, the Public Works Department’s filling-in operations 
appeared to offer the cheapest management of the disease. Jordan claimed that the 
Settlement’s authorities had come to the conclusion that the M.P.U. “could be abolished or 
nearly so”.259 At Jordan’s request, Silvey marshalled statistical data demonstrating that the 
M.P.U. was spraying nearly ten times more land than the P.W.D. was filling in.260 Jordan 
instructed Silvey to describe the conditions in the Hungjao area and in the north-eastern 
                                                          
251 Jordan to (Sec. & Com. Gen., S.M.C.), Confidential, 24 May 1940, SMA, U1/16/2694, 94-95. 
Jordan’s highly critical comments earnt Phillips’s censure. Phillips to Jordan, 27 May 1940, SMA, 
U1/4/779, 41. 
252 Jordan to Phillips, 28 May 1940, SMA U1/4/779, 40. 
253 Jordan to Phillips, (personal), 2 June 1940, SMA, U1/4/779, 23-25, 23. 
254 Ibid., 24. 
255 Jordan to Phillips, (urgent personal), 21 June 1940, SMA, U1/16/2694 
256 Phillips to Jordan, 28 June 1940, SMA, U1/16/2694, 103-104. 
257 Phillips to Jordan, Confidential, 2 July 1940, SMA, U1/16/2694, 107-108; Phillips to A. F. Gimson 
(C.P.W.), 2 July 1940, SMA, U1/4/779, 29-30. 
258 Jordan to Phillips, 3 July 1940, SMA, U1/16/2694, 109; Gimson to Phillips, Confidential, 3 July 1940, 
SMA, U1/4/779, 21-22. 
259 Jordan to W. J. Silvey, 18 July 1940, SMA, U1/16/2700, 99-100, 99. 
260 Ibid., 99-100; Silvey to Jordan, 30 July 1940, SMA, U1/16/2694, 111-112. 
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corner of the Settlement as “breeding reservoirs”.261 Consequently Silvey’s report, which 
Jordan forwarded to the Health Sub-Committee, stated: 
In the event of an almost complete abolishment of anopheline breeding places within 
the Settlement other than ornamental ponds … it is considered that we would still be 
faced with a malarial mosquito menace arising from the prolific breeding areas which 
almost completely surround the Settlement.262 
At Jordan’s request Silvey also began compiling monthly reports detailing the M.P.U.’s 
activities in a bid to improve transparency, and to emphasise the extent of the M.P.U.s 
operations.263 Ultimately the Malaria Prevention Unit’s activities were deemed sufficiently 
necessary to warrant the Unit’s continued existence. This incident highlights the internal 
challenges that the Settlement’s dedicated malaria prevention unit faced at a time when the 
Japanese occupation of Shanghai and the hostility of the Chinese community greatly restricted 
the M.P.U.’s trans-municipal sphere of operations. 
 
Epilogue 
The significant volume of material in the Shanghai Municipal Archives attesting to the 
M.P.U.’s activities in the first half of the 1940s suggests that the Unit was able to resume some 
of its work, both within and without the Settlement, after an initial period of severe 
disruption.264 Within days of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, Inspector Woo and 
Inspector Noda were transferred from the M.P.U. to other duties – the former temporarily, 
the latter permanently.265 Woo’s reinstatement came at Silvey’s expense: he was placed on 
“special duty” for almost four months.266 Some of the Unit’s permanent coolies were also 
transferred to other duties.267 The Unit’s headquarters, which were located in the 3 Western 
sub-district, were briefly blockaded, stranding the small group of mosquito coolies who had 
                                                          
261 Jordan to Silvey, 18 July 1940, SMA, U1/16/2700, 100. 
262 Silvey to Jordan, 30 July 1940, SMA, U1/16/2694, 112. 
263 The Shanghai Municipal Archives preserved all of Silvey’s reports from July 1940 through 
November 1941, along with his subordinate K.J. Woo’s monthly reports from December 1941 through 
December 1942. See SMA, U1/16/4607. 
264 For instance the Shanghai Municipal Archives contain the M.P.U.’s monthly reports through 
December 1942 and the department’s Annual Report for 1942. I uncovered an additional 22 
documents in English from 1942 relating specifically to malaria and mosquito prevention, 9 from 
1943, 6 from 1944 and a single document from June 1945. 
265 Woo was temporarily transferred to Food Control. K. J. Woo (M.P.U.) to J. A. Stoddart (P.H.D.), 20 
Dec. 1941, SMA, U1/16/4607, 57. 
266 Silvey was transferred on the day that Woo resumed his post. The precise nature of Silvey’s ‘special 
duty’ is unclear. B.H.O. Woo to Stoddart, 20 Dec. 1941, SMA, U1/16/4607, 57; Silvey to Jordan, 13 
Apr. 1942, SMA, U1/16/2699, 74. 
267 Woo to Jordan, 30 Jan. 1942, SMA, U1/16/4607, 60. 
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managed to enter the building.268 Woo, who was temporarily in charge of the Unit, had applied 
for identity papers in preparation for just such an eventuality but to no avail.269 
 The Unit’s seasonal campaigns proceeded nonetheless. For instance winter drainage 
and filling-in operations and the Unit’s investigations into foreign and Chinese cases of malaria 
proceeded, albeit on a reduced scale.270 Moreover the Unit launched a regular summer 
spraying campaign following Silvey’s reinstatement, though the scarcity of petrol precluded 
the deployment of the Unit’s mobile squads.271 Temporary coolies were employed and three 
knapsack spraying squads were deployed in the western and eastern sub-districts, including 
in the vicinity of the Kung Dah Cotton Mill.272 Indeed the squad that was responsible for 
supervising the sub-district in which the mill lay was twice as big as the other two squads, and 
was equipped with the Unit’s two hand-powered pumps.273 Silvey also persuaded his superiors 
to secure the Western Area Authorities’ permission for the deployment of the M.P.U.’s 
ornamental pond squad and a knapsack spraying squad in the western extra-settlement area 
by arguing that a “dislocation of this work would seriously impede malaria mosquito control 
locally”.274 Consequently the M.P.U.’s ornamental pond squad supervised up to 128 ponds 
that year and distributed almost 17,000 fish during the course of the summer.275 By contrast 
Jordan suspended all of the M.P.U.’s operations, including the inspection of ponds, in the 
Hungjao area – the area beyond the 4 Western sub-district and the railway line – doubtless to 
the dismay of local rate-paying residents.276 
As winter drew near, the squads were withdrawn and the M.P.U. shifted its efforts to 
drainage operations and adult mosquito extermination. By January 1943 Silvey reported that 
                                                          
268 Woo reported that the Robison Road area was blockaded from 8th to 19th March, but his earlier 
correspondence indicates the blockade began a few days earlier. Woo to Stoddart, 7 and 9 Mar. 1942, 
SMA, U1/16/3108, 2-3; Woo to Stoddart, 1 Apr. 1942, SMA, U1/16/4607, 64. 
269 Woo to Stoddart, 2 Mar. 1942, SMA, U1/16/4607, 62; Woo to Stoddart, 7 Mar. 1942, SMA, 
U1/16/3108, 2. During the blockade the M.P.U.’s office was relocated to the 1W sub-district. In total 
seven coolies and one foreman managed to enter the blockade, but they were prevented from 
leaving it. Woo to Stoddart, 9 Mar. 1942, SMA, U1/16/3108, 3; (Staff Office) to K. Noguichi (S.M.C.), 
14 Mar. 1942, SMA, U1/16/3108, 4. 
270 See for instance Woo to Stoddart, 2 Mar. and 1 Apr. 1942, SMA, U1/16/4607, 61-64. 
271 The staff car and Austin van were withdrawn from service in December 1941. Woo to Stoddart, 30 
Dec. 1941, SMA, U1/16/4607, 58. 
272 Silvey to Jordan, 13 Apr. 1942, SMA, U1/16/2699, 74; E. F. Duck (D.C.P.H.) to (Treasurer, S.M.C.), 17 
Apr. 1942, SMA, U1/16/3108, 60; Silvey to Jordan, 2 June 1942, SMA, U1/16/4607, 68-70. 
273 The 6E squad consisted of 1 overseer, 2 acting foremen, 10 permanent coolies and 8 temporary 
coolies, compared to 1 foreman, 1 acting foreman and 10 coolies in the 1-5E squad and 1 overseer, 1 
foreman and 8 coolies in the 1-3W&C squad. Silvey to Jordan, 2 June 1942, SMA, U1/16/4607, 68-70. 
274 Silvey to Jordan, 13 Apr. 1942, SMA, U1/4/593, 4; Jordan to (Sec., S.M.C.), 15 Apr. 1942, SMA, 
U1/4/593, 3; 
Silvey to Woo, 22 May 1942, SMA, U1/16/2700, 135. By September the 4W squad consisted of an 
acting foreman and 8 coolies equipped with 5 knapsack sprayers, 1 hand-powered wheelbarrow 
pump and a motor-powered pump. Silvey to Jordan, 1 Oct. 1942, SMA, U1/16/4607, 83. 
275 The squad consisted of 1 acting foreman and 3 “trained coolies”. Silvey to Jordan, 2 June 1942, 
SMA, U1/16/4607, 68. Data on fish distribution from Silvey’s monthly reports. 
276 Silvey to Jordan, 12 May 1942, SMA, U1/16/2700, 131; Jordan to R. Heyng, 12 May 1942, SMA, 
U1/16/2700, 132. 
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“the full staff of the Unit” was engaged in filling in the breeding sites in the Eastern District 
with waste ashes taken from the Shanghai Power Company.277 This was Silvey’s last extant 
report. He was interned along with many other ‘Allied’ personnel, in the early spring of 
1943.278 His subordinate K. J. Woo succeeded him.279 Many of the M.P.U.’s non-Allied (and 
Axis) personnel continued to work on malaria prevention through the Second World War. For 
instance Woo put B. A. Vouich, who was first hired as a Sanitary Overseer in 1926 and was 
assigned to the M.P.U. in 1937, in charge of the 1-3 Western squad during the summer anti-
mosquito campaign of 1943, and in charge of the filling-in operations in the Western District 
during the winter of 1943-44. The following summer Woo dispatched Vouich to deal with a 
request for assistance from the Deutscher Hockey Club, whose emblem now consisted of a 
swastika-clutching German eagle.280 Woo’s promotion coincided with the amalgamation of 
the Settlement’s malaria and fly prevention work under the “Fly & Malaria Prevention Unit”.281 
Woo was responsible for organising the summer anti-mosquito campaigns – including the 
spraying squads and the ornamental pond squad – as well as the winter drainage operations 
until at least the summer of 1944.282 It is striking that the highly-specialised Unit that had been 
created during the mid-1930s was thus still operational almost a decade later, albeit with 
limited resources and only within the Settlement’s limits. 
 
Conclusion 
Until now the only published account of the International Settlement’s management 
of malaria during the 20th century was a contemporary summary in The China Journal by a 
non-specialist.283 H. Crozier Faulder published a range of articles in this journal during the 
1930s, but in 1939 he contacted W. J. Silvey, the District Inspector of the Malaria Prevention 
Unit, about the possibility of writing an article on malaria prevention in Shanghai. Jordan 
granted his approval for the project, but stipulated that Silvey was only to provide the barest 
                                                          
277 Silvey to E. F. Duck (D.C.P.H.), 4 Jan. 1943, SMA, U1/16/4607, 91. The M.P.U. presently had 20 
permanent coolies, and the Commissioner of Public Health requested authority to engage 20 
temporary coolies for the coming season. (C.P.H.) to (Treasurer, S.M.C.), 7 Jan. 1943, SMA, 
U1/14/2349, 78. 
278 Silvey was interned in Lunghwa Camp. See the list of allied civilian internees in the Lunghwa camp 
(‘Lunghwa Camp part 3’) compiled by the Chinese researchers at the Shanghai Academy of Social 
Sciences, which is available through the University of Bristol’s Chinese Maritime Customs Project. 
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/history/customs/ancestors/shanghai.html. 
279 Woo’s promotion occurred sometime between mid-January and early April. Woo to Silvey, 4 Jan. 
1943, SMA, U1/16/4607, 92-93; Woo to (P.H.D.), 3 Apr. 1943, SMA, U1/16/3108, 87-88. 
280 Woo to (P.H.D.), 3 Apr. 1943, SMA, U1/16/3108, 87; Woo to G. Mingozzi (P.H.D.), 21 Oct. 1943, 
SMA, U1/16/3108, 99; Woo to Cheng, 10 June 1944, SMA, U1/16/2694, 137. 
281 U1-16-2700 Silvey to (C.P.H.), 31 Aug. 1942, SMA, U1/16/2700, 86; U1-16-2700 P. S. Page (P.H.D.) 
to Duck, 31 Aug. 1942, SMA, U1/16/2700, 87; “Addendum to Staff Memo: B5/43 – Fly & Mosquito 
Prevention Work”, 18 Feb. 1943, SMA, U1/16/2700, 88. 
282 See for example Woo to (P.H.D.), 3 Apr. 1943, SMA, U1/16/3108, 87-88; Woo to C. Bogomoloff 
(P.H.D.), 11 May 1943, SMA, U1/16/3108, 23; U1-16-3108 Woo to Mingozzi, 21 Oct. 1943, SMA, 
U1/16/3108, 99; Woo to (P.H.D.), 25 July 1944, SMA, U1/16/2693, 304-305. The latter is Woo’s last 
extant report in English. 
283 Faulder, “Malaria Prevention,” 305-312. 
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details of the M.P.U.’s activities “in order to prevent people with more leisure than we have 
to get all the credit for investigation work done by us”.284 Both Jordan and Silvey were 
delighted, however, with Faulder’s piece, and requested several copies for distribution to 
sanitary staff in the Settlement and the French Concession.285 At Silvey’s request copies were 
also sent to Mackie and to Deb, the Government Malariologist and Assistant Malariologist in 
Hong Kong.286 For Silvey this represented an opportunity to thank the latter for giving him a 
guided tour of the Malaria Bureau’s activities during a recent holiday in Hong Kong.287 Given 
that Silvey had informed Jordan that “the duties of the [Malaria Bureau’s Chinese] Inspector 
[sic] were difficult to define and did not appear to be of a strenuous nature”, Crozier’s article 
must also have represented a cunning opportunity for Silvey to showcase the Settlement’s 
(and his own) anti-malarial work – work which Silvey considered superior to Hong Kong’s 
management of the disease.288 But as this chapter has shown, the International Settlement’s 
management of the disease emerged at a much later stage compared to Hong Kong’s 
extensive fin de siècle innovations, largely as a result of the comparative rarity of malaria in 
Shanghai until the inter-war period. Moreover the Settlement approached malaria prevention 
in a fundamentally different way. Whereas Hong Kong pursued an enclavist strategy, limiting 
its management of the malarious colonial environment to the city of Victoria, the Settlement 
actively sought to manage the Chinese environment both with and without its borders. 
  
                                                          
284 Jordan to Silvey, 4 Feb. 1939, SMA, U1/16/2693, 225. 
285 Jordan to G. G. Phillips (Sec., S.M.C.), 19 May 1939, SMA, U1/16/2693, 230; Silvey to Jordan, 23 
May 1939, SMA, U1/16/2693, 234; Silvey to C.A.E. Carr (Sec., P.H.D.), 25 May 1939, SMA, U1/16/2693, 
245. 
286 Silvey to Jordan, 23 May 1939, SMA, U1/16/2693, 234; Jordan to Deb (Assist. Govt. Malariologist, 
Hong Kong), 10 June 1939, SMA, U1/16/2693, 249; Jordan to J. B. Mackie (Govt. Malariologist, Hong 
Kong), 10 June 1939, SMA, U1/16/2693, 250. 
287 Silvey to Jordan, 10 Jan. 1939, SMA, U1/16/2754, 2. Mackie and Deb had also provided Silvey with 
a copy of the Bureau’s annual report for 1937. Silvey to W. D. Wells, 19 Jan. 1939, SMA, U1/16/2754, 
3. 
288 Silvey to Jordan, 10 Jan. 1939, SMA, U1/16/2754, 2. 
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 This dissertation explored the management of colonial bodies and colonial 
environments through the prisms of leprosy and malaria. Chapters two and three explored 
the evolution of Hong Kong’s and the International Settlement’s reliance on deportation at 
the exclusion of domestic segregation as the principal means of managing Chinese leprosy 
sufferers. The colony pursued this practice more vigorously and from a much earlier stage. 
Whereas the disease emerged as a pressing social and policing issue in Hong Kong in the 
1870s, the International Settlement only began to interrogate the disease as a public health 
issue from the late 1920s. The Settlement nevertheless embraced the same justifications that 
underpinned Hong Kong’s management of the disease. On the one hand, Chinese migrants 
were held responsible for importing the disease. Deportation was therefore considered both 
an obvious and a morally-justifiable expedient. On the other, Western medical practices were 
deemed inherently superior – a superiority that was allegedly recognised throughout 
mainland China. Accordingly both Hong Kong and Shanghai feared that the establishment of 
Western medical facilities would trigger an influx of destitute mainlanders. Cantlie’s trope of 
the “El Dorado to the leprous Chinaman from the mainland” thus applied as much to the 
International Settlement as it did to Hong Kong. 
These two chapters explored the challenges that confronted Hong Kong’s and the 
Settlement’s extreme coercive measures. Hong Kong’s fin de siècle geo-political expansion, 
for instance, unwittingly incorporated a traditional Chinese leprosy village into the colonial 
sphere at a crucial juncture in international medical and metropolitan discourses on domestic 
segregation. Chinese agency profoundly impacted upon both territories’ management of the 
disease from the late 1920s onwards. In particular the Chinese Mission to Lepers and its 
auxiliaries challenged the colonial contention that all Chinese leprosy sufferers were illegal 
destitute immigrants from the mainland. Both Hong Kong and the International Settlement 
were forced to recognise the emergence of local identities within the broader Chinese 
community by assuming the maintenance of a distinctive sub-set of deported Chinese leprosy 
sufferers: British Chinese subjects in Hong Kong and bona-fide residents of the International 
Settlement. This agency had greater ramifications in Hong Kong. The colony’s Chinese elite 
contested the indiscriminate management of the disease, calling for the segregation of British 
Chinese patients within the colony. Hong Kong’s experiences therefore highlight the need for 
a more critical scholarly usage of the term ‘repatriation’.1 Repatriation constituted a process 
of returning an individual to his or her place of origin whereas deportation was simply a form 
of expulsion that did not necessarily imply a relationship between the deportee’s destination, 
nor indeed his or her point of departure. This distinction was of little concern in the Empire’s 
white dominions because Chinese communities, and by extension Chinese leprosy sufferers, 
were considered members of an immigrant ethnic minority. But this distinction assumed much 
                                                          
1 Many historians have used ‘deportation’ and ‘repatriation’ interchangeably. Edmond, for instance, 
did not discriminate between the ‘deportation’ of Chinese leprosy sufferers from Australia to China, 
i.e. across national borders, and the ‘deportation’ of Hawaiian leprosy sufferers from one Hawaiian 
island to another. Rod Edmond, Leprosy and Empire: A Medical and Cultural History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 107, 166, 232.See also Angela Ki Che Leung, Leprosy in China: A 
History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 12. 
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greater significance in Hong Kong precisely because of the emergence of a colonial Chinese 
majority. The colonial Chinese elite protested against the deportation of British Chinese 
leprosy sufferers because this practice appeared akin to exile. By contrast they 
wholeheartedly endorsed the government’s repatriation of non-British Chinese leprosy 
sufferers. Ultimately the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war overturned both Hong Kong’s and 
the International Settlement’s reliance on deportation and staunch opposition to domestic 
segregation, prompting the confinement of diseased Chinese bodies within their respective 
spheres. 
 The second pair of core chapters explored the evolution of Hong Kong’s and the 
International Settlement’s management of malaria within the context of major global shifts in 
the disease’s aetiology and prevention. Ironically the comparative prevalence of the disease 
in East Asia mirrored that of leprosy: malaria emerged as a major public health issue in the 
International Settlement at a much later stage compared to Hong Kong. This comparative 
prevalence profoundly impacted upon the extent of the local research into the transmission 
of the disease, the reception of new theories regarding its vectoral propagation, and the 
importance attached to the local validation of these new theories. Thus the new theories were 
disputed far more vigorously in Hong Kong, where they challenged decades of received 
experience. Moreover a much greater emphasis was placed upon the local validation of these 
new theories than in the International Settlement. The local validation process fed into the 
colony’s existing reactive management of the disease: Kennedy Town became a focal point 
precisely because the new ideas were diffused within the context of the Sanitary Board’s 
inability to protect the European staff at the Animal Depôts. Local medical men with amateur 
interests in entomology, men such as Thomson, Young, Ladds and Ford, played a crucial role 
in this process, dictating the timing, loci and nature of the colony’s early anti-mosquito 
experiments. This competitive process profoundly impacted upon all of their careers: some 
briefly experienced local and metropolitan recognition, for others this period laid the 
foundations of unique career opportunities as world-renowned local specialists. Educational 
opportunities, timing, initiative and luck all came to bear on their fates. 
 These two chapters also explored the emergence and development of Hong Kong’s 
and the International Settlement’s efforts to manage the disease through environmental 
interventions. Initially the Settlement lagged behind both Hong Kong and even the 
neighbouring French Concession. By the time of the Settlement’s first larvicidal trial in 1909 
the colony had developed a broad range of anti-mosquito measures on Hong Kong Island, 
developed an oral prophylactic regime for the members of the colonial state posted in the 
New Territories, and instituted a public health education scheme that targeted both adults 
and students. Moreover the medical authorities in Hong Kong appropriated the latest 
Imperial-sanctioned malarial discourses on racial segregation to push through a controversial 
proposal for a European reservation in Kowloon. The significance of this discourse should not, 
however, be exaggerated: it came to the fore within the context of the colony’s urban 
expansion, and was abandoned almost as quickly as it was taken up. Instead the colonial 
authorities restricted the geographical scope of its anti-malaria program, confining its anti-
mosquito measures to the city of Victoria on Hong Kong Island and resorting to prophylactic 
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measures in the New Territories. By contrast the pathologisation of Shanghai’s Chinese 
communities prompted the extension of the Settlement’s management of the disease to the 
environment beyond its borders. Thus whereas the colonial authorities resisted internal calls 
for reform until the late 1920s, the Settlement’s Public Health Department responded to the 
emergence of malaria as a major urban health issue by pioneering a mechanised and highly 
mobilised specialist staff and by attempting to initiate joint operations with the Chinese 
municipal authorities. The Settlement’s Malaria Prevention Unit was thus marked as much by 
local innovation as Hong Kong’s Malaria Bureau was defined by its Malayan inheritance. The 
Settlement’s trans-municipal operations prior to, and during the Sino-Japanese war, provide 
original and fascinating insights into the contestations of power that paralleled the 
International Settlement’s complex negotiations with the Chinese Mission to Lepers. 
 
Post-war 
 The Second World War irrevocably altered the foreign Imperial landscape in China. 
War-time alliances with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists prompted the signing away of all of 
Britain’s treaty-ports including the International Settlement in 1943; the French Concession 
was similarly abolished.2 Of Britain’s pre-war possessions and concessions, only colonial Hong 
Kong was reclaimed after the war.3 The post-war colonial authorities considered malaria 
prevention a priority. As chapter 4 noted, J. B. Mackie resumed his work as the Government 
Malariologist within months of the Japanese surrender. A Malaria Sub-Committee was 
appointed to facilitate co-operation between the civilian, naval and military experts.4 The 
colonial administration briefly experimented with the aerial spraying of DDT – a technological 
approach that achieved global prominence during this period – but this method was deemed 
inefficient and unsafe. Instead the authorities relied on pre-war anti-larvicidal measures, 
which focused principally on the colony’s main urban centres on Hong Kong Island and the 
Kowloon Peninsula, just as they had done for much of the early 20th century.5 Gradually the 
authorities extended these measures to the New Territories, prompting a marked decline in 
the indigenous incidence of the disease. Indeed the final quarter of the century witnessed a 
major epidemiological shift: the disease that had once been so inextricably associated with 
the colony was increasingly regarded as an imported disease. The disease was thus no longer 
a major environmental concern, but, like leprosy before it, a social one. 
                                                          
2 Robert Bickers, “Settlers and Diplomats: The End of British Hegemony in the International 
Settlement, 1937-1945,” in In the Shadows of the Rising Sun: Shanghai under Japanese Occupation, 
eds. Christian Henriot and Wen-Hsin Yeh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 229, 251. 
3 For a concise summary of the colony’s ‘recovery’, see John M. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong 
Kong (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlfield, 2007), 126-129. 
4 Some of the committee meeting minutes are preserved in the Hong Kong Public Records Office, 
HKRS146/1/1. 
5 Ka-che Yip, “Colonialism, Disease and Public Health: Malaria in the History of Hong Kong,” in Disease, 
Colonialism, and the State, Malaria in Modern East Asian History, ed. Ka-che Yip (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 2009), 22-29. 
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As chapter two explained, the colonial authorities initially resumed the indiscriminate 
practice of deporting Chinese leprosy sufferers to the mainland, with the exception of 
prisoners suffering from the disease who were placed in solitary confinement, just as they had 
been in the Victoria Gaol’s “Leper Cell” in the late 19th century. But the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China and the formation of a Hong Kong Auxiliary to the (British) Mission 
to Lepers – an auxiliary completely unrelated to the pre-war Chinese Mission to Lepers 
Hongkong Auxiliary – prompted the erection of a temporary leprosarium at Sandy Bay and a 
permanent isolation facility at Hay Ling Chau. These developments bore testament to a new 
era in the colonial management of the disease. Whereas the Kennedy Town Leprosarium 
served primarily as an isolation facility, Hay Ling Chau represented a modern missionary-run 
medical institution.6 The institution proved so ‘successful’ that it was closed in the mid-1970s 
and the government shifted to a reliance on out-patient facilities. The Leprosy Mission 
devoted the majority of the summer issue of its magazine New Day to “Project Completed: 
The Hay Ling Chau Story”.7 Ironically the leprosarium’s closure fell just shy of the centenary of 
the ordinance that had first sanctioned the colony’s deportation of Chinese leprosy sufferers 
to the mainland. Many of the issues that chapters two and three analysed with regard to Hong 
Kong’s and Shanghai’s pre-war leprosaria, such as expressions of patient agency and unrest, 
the production of health subjectivities, the evolution of evangelistic opportunities, and the 
complex interplay between popular stigma and institutional confinement have yet to be 
explored within the context of Hong Kong’s post-war leprosaria. Moreover my analysis of the 
impact that the presence of an ‘Open House’ leprosarium on Hong Kong Island had upon the 
colonial stigmatisation of the disease suggests that further research into post-war stigma is 
necessary. A preliminary survey of the public outcry at the government’s closure of Hay Ling 
Chau and its shift towards out-patient facilities suggests that this institution actually 
entrenched the popular aversion to the disease.8 The fact that the island was given over to 
 
                                                          
6 The Mission to Lepers Hong Kong Auxiliary’s annual reports as well as the publications of Olaf K. 
Skinsnes, the leprosarium’s pathologist, and A. Grace Warren, a medical superintendent in the 1960s, 
provide insights into the leprosarium’s focus on medical, religious and occupational therapy.  
7 “Project Completed: The Hay Ling Chau Story,” New Day: Magazine of the Leprosy Mission, no. 312 
(1975): 3-6. Some 40 remaining inmates were transferred to the new Lai Chi Kok Hospital. K. H. Lau, 
“Leprosy in Hong Kong: From Hay Ling Chau to Cheun Sha Wan,” Hong Kong Journal of Dermatology 
and Venereology 10, no. 3 (2002): 107; N. R. Honey, “Leprosy in Hong Kong, Past, Present and Future,” 
“The Bulletin” Journal of Society of Community Medicine Hong Kong 9, no. 1 (1978): 24-26; N. R. 
Honey and M. Y. Ho, “Leprosy in Hong Kong,” Public Health & Epidemiology Bulletin 5, no. 1 (1996): 2; 
L. Y. Chong and N. R. Honey, “Leprosy control programme in Hong Kong,” Journal of The Hong Kong 
Medical Association 45, no. 1 (1993): 70-71; C. K. Ho and K.K. Lo, “Epidemiology of leprosy and 
response to treatment in Hong Kong,” Hong Kong Medical Journal 12, no. 3 (2006): 174-175. 
8 The colonial authorities anticipated significant popular opposition to the closure of the Hay Ling 
Chau Leprosarium as early as the late 1960s. See for instance the confidential reports in HKPRO, 
HKRS489/7/18, as well as HKPRO, HKRS880/2/79; HKRO, HKRS79/988/1 and HKPRO, 
HKRS163/10/117. 
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drug addiction treatment facilities rather than to recreational facilities suggests that the ‘The 
Isle of Happy Healing’ has never freed itself from the stigma. 
 
Colonial Medicine 
 This dissertation explored the locality, production and dissemination of medical 
knowledge and practices from the perspective of these two British territories in China. Hong 
Kong and the International Settlement shared similar conceptualisations of both diseases, but 
these ideas were inherently rooted in local actors, local institutions, and local circumstances. 
Both territories provided local and visiting physicians with unique opportunities. Durand-
Fardel, for instance, established his expertise on leprosy amongst French circles as a result of 
his visits to Shanghai in the 1870s. Hong Kong provided Cantlie with a unique opportunity to 
research leprosy. On the one hand, he was granted prolonged access to patients under 
observation and treatment in the colony’s hospitals. On the other, the colony’s proximity to 
Canton and Macao facilitated comparisons between Chinese and European segregation 
methods. Moreover as a British Chinese colony and a major point of departure for Chinese 
indentured labour, Hong Kong placed Cantlie at the very heart of Imperial fears of a leprosy 
pandemic in the Pacific. The local environments also proved especially fruitful fields for 
entomological research, in terms of the ‘discovery’ of new species of mosquitoes previously 
unknown within Western medical discourses; the identification of known species within new 
nationally-defined habitats; and the accumulation of knowledge about breeding patterns – all 
of which were central to the formulation of effective malaria prevention strategies. 
 Both Hong Kong and the International Settlement represented important loci within 
broader networks of communication. Scientific forums such as Hong Kong’s trans-national 
medical society and the Shanghai-based China Medical Missionary Journal provided linkages 
for debate and for the dissemination of local and ‘foreign’ ideas and practices. Western 
medical practitioners engaged with scientific and lay audiences both with and without China 
through a variety of mediums, including newspapers, peer-reviewed journals, and regional 
and international conferences. This dissertation has highlighted the contemporary importance 
placed upon the validation of new ideas that were regarded as controversial. Hong Kong’s and 
the International Settlement’s experiences also highlight fluctuations in local innovation and 
scientific initiative. The interwar period witnessed the waning of Hong Kong’s scientific 
agency, at least in terms of its research on malaria and leprosy, and the rise of the 
International Settlement’s proactive stance. This shift was most clearly exemplified by the 
contrast between the formation of both territories’ dedicated anti-malaria units: the 
Settlement’s Malaria Prevention Unit was an organic, home-grown affair whereas the colony’s 
Malaria Bureau was a foreign import. 
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Race, Sex, Medicine and Colonial Space  
 This dissertation explored the interplay between race, medicine and colonial space by 
focusing on two forms of segregation: institutional and residential. The former served to 
confine the threat of leprous bodies, the latter established a cordon sanitaire between the 
European residents and the threat of inhabited malarial environments. Both forms served 
primarily to protect the colonial European population but also increasingly the Chinese elite. 
Hong Kong’s and the International Settlement’s abhorrence of leprosy was underpinned by a 
racialised conceptualisation of the disease, one that presumed that the disease was inherently 
associated with destitute Chinese mainlanders. Deportation thus served a dual purpose: 
‘returning’ these diseased immigrants beyond the colony’s borders precluded the necessity of 
confining leprosy sufferers within the colonial sphere. Hong Kong’s and the International 
Settlement’s relationships with mainland leprosaria broadens our understanding of the 
management of leprosy in China. The accommodation of deported leprosy sufferers, and the 
extent and nature of official versus popular financial support suggest ways of complicating 
Leung’s identification of three distinct types of China leprosaria. Moreover chapter 4 
uncovered a completely new field within the historiography on China by demonstrating how 
the discovery of a Russian leprosy patient in the International Settlement of Shanghai in the 
late 1930s precipitated a unique, racialised response. Non-Chinese leprosy suffers struck at 
the very heart of colonial fears about contagion. Numerous studies have explored how 
leprosaria often internally segregated patients along racial lines but until now the racialised 
management of leprosy within Chinese leprosaria has been completely ignored.9 
 This dissertation also fundamentally revised the existing historiography on the 
racialised management of malaria. At the turn of the century, metropolitan-endorsed 
research in Africa identified the lower Chinese classes as the principal source of malarial 
infection amongst Europeans living in the tropics. As such it provided an urgent justification 
for the establishment of European reservations, including an existing proposal for a 
reservation in Kowloon. But this justification needs to be understood both within the context 
of the colony’s broader history of racial segregation and the evolution of Hong Kong’s fin-de-
siècle malarial discourse. Firstly this new theory was vigorously contested in Hong Kong, 
principally because it appeared to fly in the face of received wisdom, most notably with regard 
to the prevalence of malaria at the police stations in the New Territories. Secondly this 
discourse was appropriated to convince the local colonial administration to sanction an 
existing, controversial, twice-rejected and economically-motivated proposal for a European 
reservation in Kowloon. Thirdly this discourse was never used to justify racial segregation in 
Hong Kong, in any form, ever again. Indeed the reservation of the Peak District, which was 
                                                          
9 Harriet Deacon, “Leprosy and racism at Robben Island,” in Studies in the History of Cape Town, vol. 7 
ed. Elizabeth van Heyningen (Rondebosch: UCT Press, 1994), 72-74; Harriet Deacon, “Racial 
Segregation and Medical Discourse in Nineteenth-Century Cape Town,” Journal of Southern African 
Studies 22, no. 2 (1996): 302-304; Edmond, Leprosy and Empire, 157, 163-165; Janice Dickin McGinnis, 
“ ‘Unclean, Unclean’: Canadian Reactions to Lepers and Leprosy,” in Health, Disease and Medicine: 
Essays in Canadian History, ed. Charles G. Roland (Hannah Institute for the History of Medicine, 1984), 
267. 
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proposed and promulgated only two years after the Kowloon reservation, made no reference 
whatsoever to malaria prevention precisely because the malarial discourse did not 
pathologise the Chinese elite. The presumption that the lower Chinese classes were 
nevertheless the principal hosts of the malaria parasite – or “salted” – continued well into the 
20th century. The Medical Officer of Health, for instance, faced the awkward task of explaining 
this discourse to a Chinese member of the Sanitary Board in the 1920s. Coincidentally this 
period witnessed the emergence of this discourse in Shanghai. The Settlement’s public health 
authorities increasingly identified the rural Chinese communities along and beyond the 
Settlement’s borders as the principal source of infection as a result of the unexpected 
outbreak of malaria amongst the British and Indian troops stationed beyond the International 
Settlement in Chinese territory in 1927.  
 The segregation of leprosy sufferers provided a variety of opportunities for internal 
forms of sexual, as well as racial and social segregation. The segregation of male from female 
leprosy patients reflected contemporary debates about the sexual transmission of the disease 
and the disease’s alleged heredity. Popular assumptions about the inherent promiscuity of 
leprosy sufferers compounded these debates further. Leung has explored how the popularity 
of such beliefs in China prompted the emergence as early as the thirteenth century of guolai, 
a custom whereby women suspected of suffering from leprosy sought to cure themselves by 
passing off or ‘selling’ the disease to men through sexual intercourse. Western medical 
practitioners became increasingly aware of this popular Chinese belief from the mid-
nineteenth century.10 As this dissertation has demonstrated the absence of sexual segregation 
within traditional Chinese leprosaria convinced Western practitioners such as Cantlie that the 
disease was sexually-transmissible. This dissertation has extended the historiographical 
discussions about the sexual segregation of leprosy sufferers in places such as India, South 
Africa and Brazil by broadening our awareness of the various forms of institutional sexual 
segregation in China.11 The patients in the leprosy village at Au Tau, for instance, were not 
segregated at all. In some missionary leprosaria such as the Rhenish asylum at Tung Kun or 
Lake’s asylum on Tai-Kam, segregation was only de rigeur at night, each sex being 
accommodated within separate wards (or clusters of wards). This form of segregation 
emerged in Hong Kong in the late 1930s as a result of the hardening of official attitudes 
towards domestic segregation; whereas Au Tau was left to its own devices, the Kennedy Town 
Leprosarium was a Chinese- and later government-run institution. The asylums at Sheklung 
and in Macao represented the most extreme form of sexual segregation: male and female 
                                                          
10 Leung, Leprosy in China, 114-124, 149. 
11 For examples of the sexual segregation in other contexts see Simone Horwitz, “Leprosy in South 
Africa: A Case Study of Westfort Leper Institution, 1898-1948,” African Studies 65, no. 2 (2006): 286-
287; Sanjiv Kakar, “Medical Developments and Patient Unrest in the Leprosy Asylum, 1860-1940,” in 
Health, Medicine and Empire: Perspectives on Colonial India, eds. Biswamoy Pati and Mark Harrison 
(Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2001), 198-202; Yara Nogueira Monteiro, “Prophylaxis and exclusion: 
compulsory isolation of Hansen’s disease patients in São Paulo,” História, Ciências, Saúde –
Manguinhos 10, no. S1 (2003): 98, 110; Jo Robertson, “The Leprosy Asylum in India: 1886-1947,” 
Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 64, no. 4 (2009): 503-504. 
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leprosy sufferers were confined to separate islands. The Nationalists attempted to heighten 
this segregation at Sheklung by posting two squads of armed troops on the islands.12 By 
contrast the Chinese Mission to Lepers not only opposed such forms of internal 
differentiation, but actually promoted a sense of community by modelling the National 
Leprosarium of Shanghai on a “cottage plan”.13  
 
Health Subjectivities 
This dissertation principally interrogated disease prevention in East Asia from the 
perspective of those who managed rather than those who were managed. This approach 
nevertheless provided insights into popular experiences and indigenous resistance. These 
insights were often fleeting snapshots; the authorities in Hong Kong and the International 
Settlement shed little thought for the emotional and physical costs of their polices, particularly 
with regard to the deportation of leprosy sufferers. This dissertation’s close analysis of the 
records documented how traumatic the admissions procedure could be. Separations from 
loved ones profoundly impacted upon the emotional and physical well-being of both parties. 
For instance the admission of Tsa Tsang Z, a heavily-pregnant refugee patient from the 
International Settlement, to the temporary leprosarium in the Salvation Army Camp came at 
an exceptionally high price. The trauma of her separation from her husband and four year-old 
daughter and the absence of adequate medical facilities within the leprosarium doubtless 
contributed to the death of the child that she bore within days of her confinement. 
Many refused to submit to the colonial prophylactic or treatment regimes. For 
instance colonial officials resorted to ever more coercive regimes to ensure that the Chinese 
railway staff in Hong Kong received the necessary dosage of quinine. Some of Hong Kong’s 
and Shanghai’s leprosy sufferers vigorously rejected their incarceration. The increasingly 
rigorous confinement policies that accompanied the segregation of patients within Hong Kong 
and Shanghai during the late 1930s provoked patient unrest in both the Emergency 
Leprosarium and the Kennedy Town Leprosarium. The “unruly and turbulent body” of patients 
in the Kennedy Town leprosarium resented the government take-over of the institution, and 
the resultant erection of a barbed wire fence, the “continuous police patrol” and the 
government’s refusal to grant voluntary discharges.14 Over a third of the patients escaped that 
year: in absolute terms, this was three times as many escapes as in the year preceding the 
government take-over. Comically audacious break-outs revealed how easily patients could 
                                                          
12 Leung, Leprosy in China, 169-170. 
13 T. C. Wu, “How to Build A Modern Leprosarium,” Leper Quarterly 15, no. 3 (1941): 90. Wu’s “guide” 
was largely modelled on the National Leprosarium that his Mission had established just a few miles 
north of the International Settlement in 1935. He drafted this piece, however, at a time when this 
leprosarium was housed in the Emergency Leprosarium on Brenan Road in the extra-Settlement area 
– the third temporary premises since the outbreak of the war. 
14 Hong Kong Government, Administrative Reports: Annual Medical Report for the Year 1938, 1939, 
Hong Kong Government Records Online (hereafter HKGRO), 12. 
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undermine coercive colonial medical policies. Unsanctioned breaches of exile-enclosure, 
whether real or rumoured, struck at the very heart of popular fears about the contagiousness 
of the disease. Significantly this dissertation’s focus on the ‘colonial’ management of the 
disease revealed examples of patient unrest in non-state-run mainland leprosaria such as the 
National Leprosarium of Shanghai which were expunged from the official institutional 
narratives. 
For many patients, though, colonial confinement defined formative periods of their 
lives. Wang Kying-ziang served the longest sentence of all of the Chinese leprosy sufferers 
maintained by the International Settlement. Diagnosed with the disease in early adolescence, 
he was institutionalised at the age of 18 in the National Leprosarium before it had even 
officially opened its doors. On the outbreak of war just over a year and a half later, he was 
transferred to a mainland leprosarium, where he remained for seventeen months before 
being readmitted to the National Leprosarium, which was now situated on Brenan Road within 
the western extra-Settlement. Ironically this institution was located only a stone’s throw away 
from the St. Faiths Settlement, where Wang had spent more than a decade of his life before 
being admitted to the original National Leprosarium. By the time of the Japanese occupation 
of the Settlement on December 8th, 1941, the Settlement had maintained Wang’s 
confinement in the National Leprosarium and its wartime incarnations for a total of 1,746 days 
at a total cost of £1,548.61.15 This was in addition to the interim period he spent at the 
leprosarium in Hangzhou. The Settlement maintained Wang’s confinement for another 1,239 
days. By the time he was “repatriated” April 1945, he had been institutionalised for a third of 
his life.16 Despite the rarity of ‘cured’ cases, the Shanghai Municipal Archives nevertheless 
preserves a handful of exceptionally rare documents that attest to a patient’s efforts to secure 
the Japanese Commissioner of Public Health’s support for his post-discharge rehabilitation in 
the summer of 1943! 
This dissertation has also shed light on the extent of patient agency, specifically the 
agency of leprosy sufferers during the 1930s. Whereas malaria cases were temporarily 
hospitalised, leprosy sufferers were permanently institutionalised. Contrasts between the 
administrative structures of Hong Kong’s and the International Settlement’s leprosaria 
fundamentally impacted upon the extent and nature of this agency. On the one hand, the 
Kennedy Town Leprosarium was simply an isolation facility: the patients were only provided 
with basic provisions and supplied with a modicum of medical supervision. Little changed 
following the government take-over and the leprosarium’s official promulgation as a leprosy 
                                                          
15 Wang was confined in the National Leprosarium from Nov. 1st, 1935 to July 31st, 1937 and then 
readmitted on Nov. 28th 1938. 1936 and 1940 were leap years. The total maintenance therefore 
equals 61 days in 1935 at $20/month + 366 days in 1936 at $20/month + 212 days in 1937 at 
$20/month + 3 days in November 1937 at $20 for that month ($0.67/day) + 31 days in December 
1937 at $20/month + 365 days in 1939 at $20/month + 366 days in 1940 at $30/month + 334 days for 
January through November 1941 at $45/month + 8 days in December 1941 at $45 for that month 
($1.45/day). 
16 1944 was another leap year. Unfortunately the records do not explain where he was repatriated to, 
or why. T. C. Wu (C.M.L.) to (C.P.H.), 20 May 1945, Shanghai Municipal Archives, U1/16/760, 121.  
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settlement in late 1938. Despite a gradual improvement in living conditions, little was done in 
the way of promoting occupational therapy. As the Director of Medical and Sanitary Services 
conceded, the patients lived “necessarily restricted and monotonous lives”.17 By contrast the 
Chinese Mission to Lepers designed the National Leprosarium in such a way as to promote the 
importance of patients’ “social, intellectual and religious welfare”.18 Despite severe financial 
constraints and a wartime shortage of resources, the Mission facilitated patient agency in the 
Brenan Road Emergency Leprosarium as best it could, enabling the production of a newspaper 
and the exhibition of a patient’s artwork. 
The greater evidence of patient agency in the National Leprosarium, particularly in 
the emergency premises on Brenan Road, compared to Hong Kong’s Kennedy Town 
Leprosarium may also have reflected a stronger sense of cohesiveness among the former 
patients.  The patients must have developed strong bonds with one another as a result 
through the shared experience of multiple evacuations and being forced to make do in 
cramped, squalid and poorly-insulated temporary premises with little or no outside support 
or supplies. A select few of the patients in the temporary premises at the Salvation Army 
Camp, including the very first ‘refugee patient’ Chen Siao Wong, who was a boy of only 13 or 
14, would have remembered the stressful evacuation from the Chung San Hospital. At least 
twenty of the ‘bona-fide residents’ and ‘refugee’ patients who had been admitted to the 
Salvation Army Camp in 1938 experienced the relocation to the Brenan Road Leprosarium, 
where many of them remained for a number of years (six of them until 1945). This was on top 
of those who were admitted as non-residents and those who were admitted from outside the 
International Settlement. Furthermore two resident patients who had been evacuated out of 
the National Leprosarium at Tazang to other mainland leprosaria before the outbreak of the 
war were (re)admitted to the Brenan Road Emergency Leprosarium. As such, Wang and Nyi 
Kying Ziang would have been able to share their experiences of the pre-war conditions in other 
leprosaria – including the comparative freedoms and luxuries of the original National 
Leprosarium – with the Emergency Leprosarium’s growing patient population. By contrast the 
transient nature of the Kennedy Town Leprosarium’s community hindered opportunities for 
patient agency. Of the 835 patients admitted to the Kennedy Town Leprosarium between 
1935 and 1939, 376 (or 45%) were deported to the mainland. Others escaped, were 
discharged, or died. In any given year at least 60% of the hospital’s total annual population 
were dismissed for one reason or another; this figure exceeded 85% in 1936. Admission to 




                                                          
17 Hong Kong Government, Administrative Reports: Annual Medical Report for the Year 1939, 1940, 
HKGRO, 21, 54. 
18 Daniel G. Lai, “What the National Leprosarium of China May Serve,” Leper Quarterly 8, nos. 1&2 
(1934): 4. 
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Disease, Medicine and Evangelisation 
Hong Kong’s and the International Settlement’s management of leprosy sufferers 
during the 1930s and early 1940s broadens our understanding of the evangelistic 
opportunities that leprosaria provided. Kipp argued that the extent of these opportunities 
varied according to the degree to which a leprosarium was a “total institution”.19 Thus in 
Sumatra: 
Leprosy patients were attracted to the missionaries’ religion because therapy entailed 
separation from kin and community and then incorporation into a new kind of 
community, an asylum, where the authority structure, the dispensation of resources, 
and the constructed spaces of everyday life made the idea of a supreme deity an 
experienced reality.20 
All of these internal factors were present in Hong Kong’s Kennedy Town Leprosarium but the 
absence of any missionaries precluded the possibility of taking advantage of the patients’ 
receptiveness. Granted this may seem an obvious point, but it highlights the importance of 
identifying the nature of a leprosarium’s administrative structure, and the levels of access that 
non-missionary or state-run institutions accorded to missionaries. Thus the evangelisation of 
leprosy sufferers in Hong Kong’s leprosaria only emerged in the post-war period precisely 
because the Stanley Bay and Hay Ling Chau leprosaria were jointly administered by the newly-
formed Mission to Lepers Hong Kong Auxiliary. By contrast the Kennedy Town Leprosarium 
was initially managed by the Tung Wah authorities – a Chinese (non-Christian) charitable 
organisation – before becoming a secular state-run isolation facility. 
 Shanghai’s experiences complicate Kipp’s argument by highlighting the importance of 
external factors upon patient receptivity. The Chinese Mission to Lepers did not report any 
conversions in the National Leprosarium prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, 
though services were regularly held in the institution’s chapel. Instead the institution focused 
on providing medical treatment, educational and occupational therapy.21 War-time 
deprivations triggered the Emergency Leprosarium’s patients’ receptiveness to 
evangelisation, notably from the foreign missionaries attached to the Chinese Mission to 
Lepers. Unlike the Mission’s Chinese members, the movements of figures such as the 
American missionary Dr. Lee S. Huizenga were less restricted. Within the space of just three 
years the Emergency Leprosarium’s Christian community grew from a small group of 
dedicated members and new converts in late 1938 to encompass over three-quarters of the 
institution’s 100-some patients. 
 
                                                          
19 Rita Smith Kipp, “The Evangelical Uses of Leprosy,” Social Science & Medicine 39, no. 2 (1994): 166. 
20 Kipp, “The Evangelical Uses of Leprosy,” 165. 
21 See for instance Daniel G. Lai, “The First Annual Report of the National Leprosarium of Shanghai for 
the Year 1936,” Leper Quarterly 11, no. 2 (1937): 81-94, 91-92. 
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‘Semi-Colonial’ Medicine? 
 This dissertation opened by asking whether the nature of medical practices in the 
foreign treaty-ports in China was markedly distinctive from the nature of colonial medicine. 
This dissertation’s comparative analysis of the management of local bodies and environments 
in a British colony and a British treaty-port has shed light on how colonialism in China impacted 
upon the role, evolution and limitations of foreign medical strategies. In many ways Hong 
Kong’s and the International Settlement’s management of leprosy and malaria paralleled one 
another. Or, perhaps more accurately, the Settlement’s management of these two diseases 
paralleled that of Hong Kong, given that both diseases emerged as public health issues at a 
much later stage. Some of the divergences, however, reflected Hong Kong’s status as a colony 
and the International Settlement’s position as a treaty-port within a broader tri-municipal city. 
This distinction manifested itself through issues of citizenship, extra-territoriality, jurisdiction 
and occupation. 
 Chinese agency challenged both Hong Kong’s and the International Settlement’s 
reliance on deportation as a means of permanently expelling Chinese leprosy sufferers beyond 
their respective spheres, forcing both authorities to assume the maintenance of local 
deportees in mainland leprosaria. Hong Kong provided annual grants in aid to the Sheklung 
asylum in support of deported British Chinese subjects, whereas the International Settlement 
maintained bona-fide and emergency residents in the National Leprosarium of Shanghai. The 
former deportees were thus defined in terms of their citizenship, the latter by their residency. 
This distinction crucially impacted upon the demands of local Chinese agency. On the one 
hand the Chinese Mission to Lepers not only endorsed but facilitated the segregation of these 
resident patients beyond the Settlement’s borders. By contrast the C.M.L.’s Hongkong 
Auxiliary, and the colonial Chinese community more generally, staunchly opposed the 
government’s indiscriminate deportation policy. To be clear, they did not resolutely oppose 
institutional segregation. On the contrary, they advocated the need for segregation along 
national lines. During the 1930s Chinese members of the Sanitary Board and the Legislative 
Council, as well as local community organisations such as the Kowloon Residents’ Association, 
repeatedly challenged the government’s refusal to establish a domestic leprosarium. Their 
demands reflected the confluence of humanitarian concern and colonial Chinese identities. 
 The contrast between Hong Kong’s and the Settlement’s sovereignty also impacted 
upon the geographical scope of their respective disease prevention strategies. Both Hong 
Kong and the International Settlement implemented a variety of anti-mosquito measures 
during the 20th century. But the colony restricted its direct interventions to the city of Victoria 
on Hong Kong Island and confined its management of the disease in the New Territories to 
the protection of the police force and later the railway authorities. For much of the early 20th 
century the colonial administration vigorously resisted calls from figures such as Dr. Koch of 
the Sanitary Board to extend the drainage, filling-in and nullah-training operations to the 
colony’s rural hinterland. By contrast the International Settlement’s anti-mosquito campaigns 
not only encompassed the Settlement but, from the mid-1930s, large areas of land beyond as 
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well. Contrasts in scale and topography certainly facilitated the Settlement’s trans-municipal 
operations: the Settlement was smaller than Hong Kong Island itself, whilst the land around 
the Settlement consisted of (flat) alluvial plain rather than steep densely vegetated hills and 
mountains. Even so, the colony’s sovereignty clearly demarcated both the limits of the 
colony’s medical as well as its political jurisdiction. By contrast the International Settlement 
was situated at the heart of a much larger tri-municipal city – concerns about its residents’ 
health and well-being therefore extended well beyond the confines of its own borders. The 
Settlement’s medical authorities maintained close ties with their French counterparts, both 
of whom engaged in a complicated, volatile and unpredictable relationship with the Chinese 
municipal authorities. Commissioner of Public Health Davis, for instance, complained about a 
deterioration in relations following the Nationalists rise to power. His successor Jordan 
repeatedly tried to take advantage of an apparent rapprochement in the mid-1930s and the 
Settlement’s rapidly developing anti-malaria materiel to secure the Chinese municipality’s 
support for joint extra-Settlement prevention. Strikingly these overtures continued even after 
the Settlement was encircled by the invading Japanese forces. Jordan only suspended the 
deployment of the Malaria Prevention Unit’s squads beyond the railway line, i.e. beyond the 
limits of the extra-Settlement area, in 1942. 
 The outbreak of the war revealed limits to the Settlement’s medical jurisdiction 
compared to Hong Kong’s. The Chinese Mission to Lepers was forced to evacuate the National 
Leprosarium to three consecutive sites within the space of a year as a result of the Japanese 
invasion. Eventually the inmates were permitted to settle at the Emergency Leprosarium on 
Brenan Road, which lay in the western extra-Settlement area. Within weeks the colonial 
authorities in Hong Kong proclaimed its own domestic leprosarium on Hong Kong Island. Both 
authorities emphasised the paramount importance of rigid confinement. Indeed the need to 
assuage popular fears about the unregulated movements of leprosy sufferers within the 
colony underpinned the government’s take-over of the Tung Wah-administered institution at 
Kennedy Town. But whereas the colony’s legislation empowered the authorities to detain the 
patients within the confines of an officially-recognised leprosarium such as the state-run 
institution at Kennedy Town, the Settlement lacked the authority to do so. The joint escape of 
Loh Liang and Li Ping within hours of being admitted against their will to the National 
Leprosarium by the Settlement’s Public Health Department, was a case in point. Alternative 
policing priorities and the Chinese Mission to Lepers’ deteriorating relationship with the 
Settlement’s Public Health Department – due in part to a clash of personalities that was only 
inflamed by further escapes – compounded the fact that the Settlement lacked the 
wherewithal to vigorously enforce confinement. 
 The Japanese occupation of Hong Kong and the International Settlement in December 
1941 revealed a fourth and final distinction that belied the impact of sovereignty upon official 
medical practices. Whereas the collapse of British sovereignty in Hong Kong severely 
disrupted colonial medical practices, the occupying forces preserved the bureaucracy that 
underpinned the Settlement’s medical policies. Although Silvey was eventually interned along 
with all of the other Allied personnel in Shanghai, the Chinese and non-Allied members of the 
Malaria Prevention Unit continued along the same lines that Silvey had developed prior to the 
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outbreak of war, albeit on a reduced scale as a result of war-time shortages. Similarly the 
identification and maintenance of ‘bona-fide’ resident leprosy sufferers continued beyond the 
abolition of the International Settlement, i.e. the very territory upon which the distinction 
between ‘bona-fide’ residents and non-residents was made. By contrast the Kennedy Town 
Leprosarium was allowed to disintegrate shortly after the British surrender of Hong Kong. Not 
all of Hong Kong’s colonial medical practices were abandoned however. Mackie was not 
interned until 1943, well over a year after most of the other Allied personnel. But this 
continuity reflected Japanese concerns about the threat of diseases such as malaria to its 
troops. These examples suggest that the geography of colonialism in China did indeed have a 
significant impact upon the geography of medicine. By exploring Hong Kong’s and the 
International Settlement’s disease prevention strategies through the prisms of malaria and 
leprosy – two diseases whose relation to one another Cantlie considered ‘a burning question’ 
– this dissertation has laid the foundations for further research into the nature of ‘semi-
colonial medicine’. 
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‘Hearty Gun’s Warning’ 
 
‘In spite of Dr.Hartigan’s vigorous protests the Sanitary Board shows a singular reluctance to 
deal with the mosquito-infested pools, which, we are told provide breeding places for the 
malaria-bearing pests. – Daily Papers 
 
Ye who would doubt that mosquitoes, malaria microbes imbibe. 
List to the story of Hearty Gun, medicine man of the tribe. 
 
Deep was the Hearty Gun’s learning, great his renown as a chief, 
Long had he ruled in the wigwam, bringing to sickness relief; 
Potent the charms he could muster, yet did the warriors die. 
Then met the wigwam in Council, demanding of Hearty Gun ‘Why?’ 
 
Up spake a chief, ‘O my brothers, malaria lurks in our camps. 
Know ye the nimble mosquito doth spread it about from the swamps; 
We find that he carries contagion, and who-so he bites droppeth dead, 
He breedeth in pools and morasses and visits our camp. I have said.’ 
 
Then made the Hearty Gun answer, ‘Wisely my brother doth speak; 
Let us destroy the mosquito, ere further havoc he wreak; 
Let us fill up all the puddles, where lurks our insidious foe.’ 
Swiftly the warriors checked him, ‘That means expenditure. No!’ 
 
Wrathful was Hearty Gun’s visage, burning the language he spoke. 
‘Are all our zealous researches, merely to end then in smoke? 
Just of the sake of a dollar, must we see warriors die?’ 
‘Brother the cost is excessive!’ the Council as one made reply. 
 
So did malaria ravage, warrior, papoose and squaw, 
Spite of the Hearty Gun protests, spite of their science and law; 
And, when they, weakened with ague, by worthier tribes were o’er-run. 
Cursed their previous blindness. Heed ye the story of Gun! 
 DOLLY1 
                                                          
1 Italics in the original. Dolly [pseud.], “Hearty Gun’s Warning,” China Mail, Mar. 22, 1901, 2. This 
poem along with Dolly’s other contributions were later published. Dolly [pseud.], Tales of Hongkong in 
Verse and Story (Hong Kong: Kelly & Walsh, 1902). 
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Table A2.9. Leprosy Cases in Hong Kong,1880-1922 
(A)dmissions and (D)eaths 
Year 


















A D A D A D A D A D A D A D A D 
1880 1              1              
1881                             
1882                             
1883 1              1              
1884 1              1              
1885 1              1              
1886 1              1              
1887 1 1            1 1             
1888                             
1889                             
1890                             
1891                             
1892                             
1893                             
1894                             
1895                             
1896 3              3              
1897 2              2  1       1  
1898 4              4           
1899    3           3           
1900 1      4 1     5 1 2       2  
1901 1      1       2  1       1  
1902 1             1  1       1  
1903 2             2  2       2  
1904                7       7  
1905                7 2     7 2 
1906 2             2  2       2  
1907 3      1       4  14 2     14 2 
1908 2      1       3  14 3     14 3 
1909 1 1           1 1 5       5  
1910 1      1     2  14       14  
1911                       
1912 1           1  6       6  
1913 2 1 3        5 1 4       4  
1914    5        5           
1915              1       1  
1916 3   1 1      4 1 6       6  
1917 6 1         6 1 4 1     4 1 
1918 6           6  1       1  
1919 6           9  10 3     10 3 
1920 8           8  10 1     10 1 
1921 6           6  10 2     10 2 
1922 3   1        4  13   3   16  
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Table A2.10. Leprosy Cases in the International Settlement’s Isolation Hospitals, 1903-31 
  Foreign Cases Chinese Cases Total 
Admitted Died Admitted Died Admitted Died 
1903 n/a n/a n/a n/a 4 - 
1904 n/a n/a n/a n/a 2 1 
1905 - - - - - - 
1906 1 1 - - 1 1 
1907 - - - - - - 
1908 - - 1 - 1 - 
1909 - - - - - - 
1910 - - - - - - 
1911 - - - - - - 
1912 - - - - - - 
1913 - - 1 - 1 - 
1914 - - - - - - 
1915 - - 2 - 2 - 
1916 - - 3 - 3 - 
1917 - - - - - - 
1918 - - - - - - 
1919 - - - - - - 
1920 - - - - - - 
1921 - - - - - - 
1922 - - - - - - 
1923 - - - - - - 
1924 - - - - - - 
1925 - - - - - - 
1926 - - - - - - 
1927 - - - - - - 
1928 - - - - - - 
1929 - - - - - - 
1930 - - 1 - 1 - 
1931 - - 2 - 2 - 
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Table A2.11. The International Settlement’s Maintenance of Resident and Refugee Leprosy Sufferers, 
1938-40 
Period 
Resident Patients Refugee Patients 
Number 
Paid in Maintenance 
($) 
Number 
Paid in Maintenance 
($) 
1938 
Jan 3 33.2 n/a n/a 
Feb 7 72.34 n/a n/a 
Mar 16 254.84 15 254.84 
Apr n/a n/a n/a n/a 
May 6 87.06 18 318.08 
Jun 7 133.2 20 391.02 
Jul 13 197.62 25 469.96 
Aug 14 265.96 25 491.22 
Sep 13 244.62 25 492.54 
Oct 13 243.96 25 465.94 
Nov 15 255.84 27 520.06 
Dec 13 240 27 541.98 
1939 
Jan 15 255.18 31 570.16 
Feb 15 383.96 30 589.24 
Mar 18 335.64 29 580 
Apr 17 340 30 501.12 
May 17 310.56 30 567.72 
Jun 15 300 29 561.78 
Jul 15 300 31 608.38 
Aug 15 300 31 602.64 
Sep 16 320 30 600 
Oct 16 320 31 619.14 
Nov 16 320 31 620 
Dec 16 320 31 620 
1940 
Jan 16 480 32 960 
Feb 16 480 32 960 
Mar 16 480 33 962 
Apr 23 597 34 1,008.00 
May 24 720 34 1,018.00 
Jun 26 693 34 970 
Jul 22 660 32 937 
Aug 23 690 30 900 
Sep 28 711 31 923 
Oct 24 720 33 1,030.00 
Nov 24 720 32 960 
Dec 25 732 34 982 
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From rest of 
the Colony 
Total 




1897 - - 160 630 25 
1898 - - 121 630 19 
1899 - - 239 770 31 
1900 167 223 390 929 42 
1901 243 164 407 920 44 
1902 121 55 176 919 19 
1903 83 84 167 921 18 
1904 40 67 107 993 11 
1905 42 85 127 1018 12 
1906 37 37 74 1047 7 
1907 40 65 105 1049 10 
1908 32 76 108 1018 10 
1909 37 50 87 1050 8 
1910 66 69 135 1039 13 
1911 30 83 113 1031 11 
1912 37 51 88 1120 8 
1913 68 95 163 1170 14 
1914 101 81 182 1206 15 
1915 116 92 208 1289 16 
1916 63 99 162 1057 13 
1917 51 84 135 1192 11 
1918 40 49 89 1228 7 
1919 13 74 87 1228 7 
1920 27 60 87 1281 6.7 
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Table A2.13. Annual Malaria Returns for the European Troops in Hong Kong, 1898-19142 
Year Admissions Deaths Invalided 
Avg. Annual 
Strength 
% of Strength 
(per 1,000) 
1898 595 10 18 1,569 379.3 
1899 829 5 25 1,643 504.6 
1900 629 4 16 1,484 423.8 
1901 1,010 4 15 1,673 603.7 
1902 1,523 6 24 1,381 1102.8 
1903 937 2 6 1,220 768.0 
1904 390 1 9 1,426 273.5 
1905 348 0 1 1,370 254.0 
1906 480 4 15 1,525 314.7 
1907 287 0 12 1,461 196.0 
1908 515 0 17 2,012 256.0 
1909 269 2 10 1,943 138.9 
1910 334 1 9 1,887 177.0 
1911 232 0 4 1849 125.5 
1912 151 1 0 1797 84.0 
1913 80 0 1 1883 42.5 
1914 87 0 0 1654 52.6 
 
Table A2.14. Notified Civilian and Military Cases of Malaria in the International Settlement of 
Shanghai, 1927-32. 
  
1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 
Civilian Military Civilian Military Civilian Military Civilian Military Civilian Military Civilian Military 
Jan - - - - - 1 - 1 1 - - - 
Feb - - 1 - - 1 2 - 3 - - - 
Mar - 2 - - - - 1 1 3 - - - 
Apr - 29 2 - 2 - - 1 2 1 2 2 
May - 12 1 2 3 - 2 - 3 - 0 1 
Jun - 17 3 1 1 - 5 1 3 - 1 0 
Jul - 45 4 6 5 18 19 4 12 7 4 6 
Aug - 71 2 16 9 7 11 36 14 35 3 9 
Sep 3 59 3 20 15 20 19 32 10 26 5 14 
Oct 11 35 3 28 6 16 22 91 12 14 4 9 
Nov 2 3 1 5 2 1 9 10 7 6 2 2 
Dec 2 1 - 2 3 1 2 1 - 4 3 0 
TOTAL 18 274 20 80 46 65 92 178 70 93 24 43 
 
  
                                                          
22 Atkinson and Clark, General Report, Feb. 1, 1908, HKGRO, 407; Hong Kong Government, Medical 
and Sanitary Reports for the Year 1914, Mar. 9, 1915, HKGRO, 22. 
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